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Romans decisively defeated the Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna. This is derived from a close reading of
ancient sources (primarily Livy, Polybius, and Plutarch) taken together with personal autopsy of the routes
the Romans took in the modern countries of Greece, Albania, and FYROM. Chapter 1 covers the Roman
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Cynoscephalae in 197 BC and Thermopylae in 191 BC. Chapter 5 covers Rome's invasion of Macedon in
169-168 BC, culminating in the Battle of Pydna. The results of this dissertation point to a new way to interpret
this period, organized around two different but related concepts: theater of war and Roman policy. During this
period the Romans operated in three distinct theaters of war: the Myzeqeja plain and its surroundings,
Thessaly, and Macedon. In turn, the transitions from one theater of war to the next coincided with the
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gradually extend the buffer zone to the east, continuing the regional policy Rome had established and
maintained since 229 BC; second to reduce the influence of each of the Hellenistic kingdoms while
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Greece, the third policy looked to actively change it.
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ABSTRACT 	  
SHIFTING LANDSCAPES, POLICIES, AND MORALS: 
A TOPOGRAPHICALLY DRIVEN ANALYSIS 
OF THE ROMAN WARS IN GREECE FROM 200 BC TO 168 BC 
 
Jacob Nathan Morton 
 
Supervisor: Jeremy McInerney 
 
 
 This dissertation offers a new analysis of the activities of the Roman army in the 
Balkan peninsula between 200 BC, when the Romans declared war on Macedon and took 
a land army to Illyria, and 168 BC, when the Romans decisively defeated the 
Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna. This is derived from a close reading of ancient 
sources (primarily Livy, Polybius, and Plutarch) taken together with personal autopsy of 
the routes the Romans took in the modern countries of Greece, Albania, and FYROM. 
Chapter 1 covers the Roman campaign in the Myzeqeja plain during 200 BC. Chapter 2 
focuses on the Roman campaign in the border areas between Illyria and Macedon during 
199 BC. Chapter 3 covers the Battle of the River Aous, the first battle fought between the 
Romans and Macedonians, at the border of Epirus and Illyria in 198 BC. Chapter 4 
covers Roman activities in Thessaly between 198-170 BC, including new reconstructions 
of the battles of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC and Thermopylae in 191 BC. Chapter 5 covers 
Rome's invasion of Macedon in 169-168 BC, culminating in the Battle of Pydna. The 
results of this dissertation point to a new way to interpret this period, organized around 
two different but related concepts: theater of war and Roman policy. During this period 
the Romans operated in three distinct theaters of war: the Myzeqeja plain and its 
surroundings, Thessaly, and Macedon. In turn, the transitions from one theater of war to 
vii 	  
the next coincided with the development of three distinct phases of Roman policy 
towards Greece: first to protect the Adriatic ports and gradually extend the buffer zone to 
the east, continuing the regional policy Rome had established and maintained since 229 
BC; second to reduce the influence of each of the Hellenistic kingdoms while 
maintaining a balance of power in Greece; third to invade Macedon for the first time and 
permanently alter how it was administered. While the first two policies both acted to 
maintain some type of status quo in Greece, the third policy looked to actively change it.  
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INTRODUCTION 	  
 This dissertation focuses on the activities of the Roman army in the Balkan 
peninsula during the period between 200 BC, when the Romans declared war on 
Macedon and took a land army to Illyria, and 168 BC, when the Romans decisively 
defeated the Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna and gained control of Greece. Those 
Roman military movements then become the basis for a new understanding of both short- 
and long-term goals and policies for the states involved in these conflicts, as well for as 
the individual actors. The analysis thus ranges from individual decisions made during 
campaigns, to how and why specific battles unfolded, to seasonal goals, and ultimately 
the development of long-term goals and policies. The results of this study lead us to a 
new understanding of Roman policy in Greece and how it developed. 
 Roman expansion during the second century BC has been the subject of much 
scholarly interest and study, starting with the contemporary historian Polybius himself. 
Traditionally, scholars divide this period into three wars Rome fought in Greece, each 
war distinguished by whom they were fighting against: the Second Macedonian War, the 
Syrian-Aetolian War, and the Third Macedonian War. However, in this dissertation I 
offer a new approach to elucidating the history of this period based on topographic 
analyses. Where the Romans were fighting was more important to the Romans than 
whom it was they were fighting against. A focus on where the events took place cuts 
across the previous divisions and gives new perspective into the development of Roman 
behaviors and policies during this period. Determining exactly where and how the people 
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involved moved through the landscape of Greece and its surroundings provides a solid 
foundation on which to build: where, when, and how the Romans moved through Greece 
points us to why they did so. 
 The chronological parameters of this study were chosen with topographic and 
policy-based criteria in mind. The campaign of 200 BC serves as the starting point 
because it is the first instance of Rome bringing an army across the Adriatic to wage war 
against Macedon. Rome had in fact been militarily involved in the Adriatic coast of 
Illyria since 229 BC, but had not acted to extend their sphere of control outside the 
Illyrian coast. Similarly, though Rome had been at war with Macedon between 214 and 
205 BC, they had not waged a full-scale land campaign. In 200 BC, however, war against 
Macedon and the dispatch of a land army to the Balkan peninsula finally converged. The 
campaign of 168 BC serves as the endpoint of this study because after their victory at the 
Battle of Pydna, Rome took the unprecedented step of instituting administrative control 
over the peoples she defeated (Macedon and Illyria), and Rome's relationship to Greece 
fundamentally changed. 
Organization 	  
 While the overall narrative arc of the dissertation follows the chronological series 
of events, the individual chapters each focus on a specific region. In each chapter I 
explore the routes the Roman army took through the landscape; the locations and 
reconstructions of battles and skirmishes; the locations of field camps, settlements, and 
natural toponyms; the calendar of events during each campaign; and the logistics of 
maintaining an army in the field. The scale of these logistical concerns indicates their 
3 	  
	  
importance, as the Roman armies in the field in Greece at this time required almost 18 
tons of grain daily. The Roman army dealt with its food requirements through lines of 
supply, pack trains taken on the march, and local foraging. Understanding how one could 
supply oneself in the field involves understanding the economic seasonality of regional 
harvests, transhumant shepherds, and methods of storage.  
 The conclusions drawn from these findings are then used to understand decisions, 
plans, and goals made during each campaign, and the relationships of different 
campaigns.  
 This dissertation is organized into five chapters, each focused on a specific region.  
This organization facilitates our understanding of how Roman involvement in Greece 
evolved better than traditional schemes of periodization, which subdivide this period into 
the Second and Third Macedonian Wars, punctuated by the Syrian-Aetolian War. 
 Chapter 1 focuses on the Myzeqeja plain in western Illyria. In 200 BC, Rome sent 
an army under the consul Gaius Sulpicius Galba to secure this plain in order to further 
guarantee the Illyrian ports under Rome's protection. These ports had great economic and 
strategic value for Rome, given their role in controlling trade in the Adriatic and the 
movement of ships from the Balkan peninsula to Italy. As a result of this campaign, 
Rome was able to maintain control of the Myzeqeja plain and the Illyrian ports and did 
not need to fight to protect them again throughout the period under study. 
 Chapter 2 focuses on the area extending east-west between Illyria and Macedon. 
In 199 BC, the Romans campaigned through this area under Sulpicius. The Romans did 
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not return to this region subsequently, however, as in the following year the Macedonian 
king Philip V pulled the Romans attentions elsewhere.  
 Chapter 3 focuses on the first half of the 198 BC campaign season, from when 
Philip encamped to the southeast of the Roman winter quarters at Apollonia through the 
Roman victory under the consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus at the Battle of the River 
Aous. This chapter demonstrates that Philip took the initiative to pull the theater of war 
from the western boundaries of Macedon to the southern boundary of Illyria. The Battle 
of the River Aous forms the centerpiece of this chapter for two reasons.  First, it was the 
crucial turning point in the topography of the conflict.  Had Philip not taken steps to shift 
the Romans' focus to this new region, the Romans might well have continued their 
eastward advance from the coast towards Macedon. Instead, the Romans' responded to 
Philip, moving south to attack his camp. Second, the Aous has been largely neglected in 
scholarship on this period, and was thus ripe for a new and detailed study.   
 Chapters 1-3 can be seen as a cohesive unit in that they collectively cover the 
theater of war of the Myzeqeja plain and its surroundings.  However, at the end of chapter 
three it is unclear what and where Rome's next steps would be, and thus this marks a shift 
in the study as a whole. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the Roman campaigns in the new theater of war of Thessaly, 
covering Rome's military presence in Thessaly between 198 BC - 194 BC, 191 BC - 190 
BC, and 172 BC - 168 BC. In 198 BC Flamininus first led the Roman army across the 
Pindus to Thessaly and the senate voted to support his actions in winter 198/197 BC. 
After this crossing, the Roman theater of war did not revert to Illyria, but rather stayed in 
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Thessaly for the next three decades. Throughout this chapter, the Aetolians and 
Athamanians play key roles as sometime allies and sometime enemies of the Romans. It 
will be seen that over the course of this 30-year period, Thessaly evolved from an area of 
key importance to many states to merely the gateway to Macedon. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the Roman campaigns in Macedon, the third and final 
theater of war. In 169 BC, Rome took the unprecedented step of invading Macedon 
directly. Rome invaded again in 168 BC under the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus and 
defeated the Macedonian king Perseus, son of Philip V. 
 The results of this dissertation point to a new way to interpret this period, 
organized around two different but related concepts: theater of war and Roman policy. 
During this period the Romans operated in three distinct theaters of war: the Myzeqeja 
plain and its surroundings, Thessaly, and Macedon. In turn, the transitions from one 
theater of war to the next coincided with the development of three distinct phases of 
Roman policy towards Greece: first to protect the Adriatic ports and gradually extend the 
buffer zone to the east, continuing the regional policy Rome had established and 
maintained since 229 BC; second to reduce the influence of each of the Hellenistic 
kingdoms while maintaining a balance of power in Greece; third to invade Macedon for 
the first time and permanently alter how it was administered. While the first two policies 
both acted to maintain some type of status quo in Greece, the third policy looked to 
actively change it. 
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 Identifying these three distinct policies in this short time period differs from 
previous scholarship in that Rome's 200 BC campaign is often looked as the beginning of 
a slippery slope of Roman imperialism that led to Rome's takeover of the Mediterranean. 
 I approached this period originally intending to sidestep the "Roman Imperialism 
question" as the scholars who study it are locked in their positions and the debate is 
frozen.1 I just wanted to know actually how the Romans campaigned in Greece. 
However, my approach led to new conclusions that hopefully open a new window into 
the Roman Imperialism debate and reopen the dialogue concerning it.  
Methodology 	  
 Our evidence for the routes taken by Roman armies is literary - primarily taken 
from Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch - and is not nearly as clear or defined as one might 
like. These sources report where the Roman armies went by naming locations along their 
routes. However, they do not tell us exactly how to get between these locations, and all 
too often we are not sure where these places were actually located in the landscape.  
 To determine an ancient military route, I started from fixed points where 
archaeology has confirmed the placement of a location mentioned in the texts. To get 
between these fixed points, I began by gleaning clues from the literary narratives, such as 
discussions of terrain, as well as logical inferences, such as the fact that an army camp 
requires a source of fresh water. I then studied maps of the area in question to better 
understand the topography. I also looked at more contemporary evidence, such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For recent reviews of the state of the debate on the development of Roman imperialism, see e.g. Rich 
2004, Hoyos 2013, Edwell 2013. 
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documented Ottoman routes through mountain passes, the accounts of early modern 
travellers, and military accounts, including the works of English WWII veterans who 
operated in Greece and Albania and official Greek military accounts of the Balkan Wars 
and WWII. Then I traveled the route or routes in question, recording with a GPS unit, 
camera, and extensive notes. This personal autopsy refuted or confirmed my 
hypothesized route by revealing details I could not otherwise learn, such as lines of sight, 
details of terrain, difficulty of travel, relative time of travel, appearance of landmarks, and 
the effects of different weather conditions on specific landscapes, as well as offering the 
opportunity to talk to local people who are familiar with the region.  
 Topographic study rooted in autopsy of these regions of ancient Greece already 
has a strong scholarly history.  W.M. Leake and N.G.L. Hammond are noteworthy 
predecessors for the regions covered in Chapters 1-3; Leake, Stählin, Bequignon, 
Hammond, and Pritchett for Chapter 4; and Leake, Hammond, and Pritchett for Chapter 
5. 
 The bulk of my fieldwork was done by bicycle. Between September 23rd, 2013 
and May 2nd, 2015, I conducted eight bike-touring research trips in the territories now 
divided between modern Greece, Albania, and FYROM. 
 Bike trip 1 lasted from September 23rd to October 5th, 2013. This trip's primary 
overarching goal was to investigate whether L. Aemilius Paullus travelled from Corcyra 
to Delphi by ship or by land in 168 BC, and to retrace Paullus' route in 168 BC from 
Delphi to the Battle of Pydna via Larisa and Tempe. Trip 1 started in Igoumenitsa, Epirus 
and went south through Aetolia to the Corinthian Gulf, continuing east along the Gulf. I 
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then turned north at Itea to Delphi and continued north through Phokis and Thessaly, and 
then through Tempe into Pieria, stopping where the Battle of Pydna was fought in 168 
BC. While travelling along this route I also spent time on other avenues of research: e.g. 
visited Delphi to see Paullus' relief and inscription from 167 BC; explored Phokis for 
Flamininus' route in 198 BC; went through the Malian plain to Larissa tracing the Roman 
route from 191 BC in reverse, and part of Flamininus' route in 198 BC; researched the 
area of Thessaly where Cynoscephalae was fought in 197 BC; researched the area of 
Thessaly between Larisa and Tempe pertinent to Antiochus' campaign in 191 BC, and the 
Roman campaigns of 171 BC to 168 BC; explored Tempe relevant to the 169 BC Roman 
campaign; explored Pieria relevant to the 169 BC Roman campaigns; visited Dion for the 
169 BC Roman campaign; passed through Pieria tracing the Roman campaigns of 169 
BC and 168 BC; explored the potential courses of the Elpeus river in relation to the 168 
BC Roman campaign; and explored where the Battle of Pydna was fought in 168 BC. 
 Bike trip 2 lasted from October 11, 2013 to October 18, 2013. This trip's 
overarching research goal was to trace the route the Roman legions walked when they left 
Greece in 194 BC. I started in Demetrias and went west across Thessaly to Gomphi 
before continuing north and taking the Zygos pass across the Pindus to Ioannina. This trip 
again allowed me to pursue additional research goals: visiting Demetrias, one of Philip's 
"three fetters of Greece" and a key location in the campaigns of 197 BC, 191 BC, 190 
BC, and 169 BC; investigating the Pagasitic gulf, important to the Macedonian and then 
the Thessalian economies; the route between Demetrias and Farsala pertained also to 
Flamininus' movements in 197 BC; I was able to explore the area related to 
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Cynoscephalae in 197 BC in greater detail, along with the area of western Thessaly 
relevant to campaigns of 191 BC; I visited Gomphi for its role in the campaigns of 199 
BC, 198 BC, 191 BC, and 171 BC; I biked the route between Gomphi and Kalambaka to 
trace Flamininus' route in 198 BC in reverse; I investigated the Thessalian side of the 
Zygos pass for its role in the campaigns of 198 BC and 191 BC; I looked at the 
northernmost pass over the Pindus between Thessaly and Epirus for its role in the 
campaigns in 198 BC and 191 BC; and visited Ioannina to explore its role as the possible 
location of ancient Passaron and to see its exceptional archaeological museum. 
 Bike trip 3 lasted from February 17th, 2014 to February 22nd, 2014. This trip's 
overarching research goals were to investigate the route Flamininus took in 198 BC to 
subdue Phokis and the route Flamininus took in 197 BC between Phokis and Pherae. I 
began this trip in Livadia and went south to Anticyra on the Corinthian Gulf before then 
going north and tracing Flamininus' route through Phokis in 198 BC; I then continued 
north to the Malian gulf and researched where the conference of Nikaia took place in the 
winter of 198/197 BC, and then continued west to where the Battle of Thermopylae 
occurred in 191 BC. The remainder of the trip was to trace Flamininus' route at the 
beginning of 197 BC, going from Elatia north to the coast, west past Thermopylae, and 
then north through the Malian plain and to Xyniae before I attempted to head northeast 
cross country to Phthiotic Thebes. However, this final part of the route turned out to be 
only a maze of small agricultural roads, not passable by bicycle, and instead I went over 
Mt. Othrys via Anavra to Phthiotic Thebes and then on to Demetrias.  
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 Bike trip 4 lasted from February 26th, 2014 to March 3rd, 2014. This trip's 
overarching research question was to explore Flamininus' route across the Pindus 
between Thessaly and Ambracia in 198 BC and Flamininus' subsequent move on Atrax. 
Bike trip four started in Menidi in Aetolia, from where I travelled north to Arta before 
turning east into the Pindus and taking the southernmost route between Epirus and 
Thessaly. I then continued across Thessaly via Gomphi and Trikala to Larisa. This trip 
researched Flamininus' 198 route through the Pindus and then across Thessaly from 
Gomphi to Atrax; the remains of Ambracia and how they relate to the Ambracian Gulf; 
Tricca, where Philip first stopped after crossing the Pindus in 198 BC; Larisa, important 
to the campaigns of 197 BC, 191 BC, and 172 - 168 BC; and generally gave me more 
familiarity with Thessaly. This trip also highlighted just how cold it gets in the Pindus in 
the early spring. 
 Bike trip 5 lasted from April 4th, 2014 to April 15th, 2014. This trip went through 
the Peloponnese and focused on Flamininus' 196 campaign on Argos and Sparta and 
Paullus' 167 BC tourism trip around the Peloponnese. Ultimately, neither of these were 
included in my final study. 
 Bike trip 6 lasted from April 22nd to May 4th, 2014. This trip's overarching goal 
was to explore the location for the Battle of the River Aous in 198 BC and the supply 
routes associated with it, as well as Sulpicius route in 199 BC. This trip began in 
Ioannina; I went north into Albania, and continued up the Drin valley to Fier via 
Tepelenë. From here I turned north east and continued to Elbasan and on to Lake Ohrid 
and into FYROM, returning to Greece via the Monastir Gap, going through the Vevi pass 
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and then entering Macedon via Edessa and finishing in Thessaloniki. This trip researched 
Philip's route from Passaron to the Stena in 198 BC; the location of the Battle of the 
River Aous in 198 BC during a three day stay at Tepelenë; the Roman supply route 
between Fier and Tepelenë in 198 BC; the remains of Apollonia; and then Sulpicius' 
route of 199 BC between Apollonia through the Genusus valley to Lake Ohrid; then the 
areas north of the lake pertinent to control of movement through the area and the Parthini 
and Atintanes; the site of Lynchnidus important to the Roman position in 169 BC; the site 
of Heraclea the area of southern FYROM that Sulpicius was on in 199 BC; the site of the 
skirmish at Vevei pass from 199 BC; the route between the Vevi pass and Edessa that 
Sulpicius did not take in 199 BC; allowed me to gain familiarity with central Macedon, 
and to visit Pella and Thessaloniki. 
 Bike trip 7 took place between October 15th and October 27th, 2014. The primary 
research goal of this trip was to explore the potential route through the Devoll valley 
relevant to the 200 BC and 199 BC campaigns, and other areas pertinent to Sulpicius' 199 
BC campaign. This trip started at Tirana where I met Professor Iris Pojani about getting 
her support to direct an archaeological project to locate the Battle of the River Aous. 
From Tirana I went southeast to Elbasan before attempting to (unsuccessfully) take the 
Devoll valley between Elbasan and the Korce valley potentially used in the 200 BC and 
199 BC campaigns. Returning to Elbasan, I instead retraced the route from Elbasan to 
Ohrid from Bike trip 6, before going south around the lake to the Korce valley, tracing 
Sulpicius 199 BC route and the skirmishes in the Korce plain. From the Korce plain I 
further traced Sulpicius' 199 BC route east out of the plain and northeast over the pass to 
12 	  
	  
Florina before continuing northeast into FYROM past the site of Stuberra to Prilep. 
Continuing to tract Sulpicius' 199 BC route, I went south to again see the Vevi pass 
before continuing Sulpicius' route south to Kozani and then west and north to Kastoria. 
This trip was particularly enlightening for the first hand experience of regional rain in 
mid to late October. 
 Bike trip 8 lasted from April 23rd to May 2nd, 2015. The primary goal of this trip 
was to explore possible routes across the Pindus including between Kozani and Konitsa 
and the Grevena pass to determine routes and locations relevant to the 198 BC campaign. 
This trip researched a possible route for Philip to have taken in 198 BC between Kozani 
and Konitsa across the Pindus mountains. Then I went up the Aous valley from Konitsa 
to Permet and then south to Ioannina, to research Philip's supply lines in 198 BC as well 
as his route of retreat after the Battle of the River Aous, including visiting the most likely 
remains of Passaron near Ioannina. From Ioannina I went east into the Pindus to Metsovo 
where Philip stopped to determine what do to next in 198 BC. I then continued north via 
the Grevena pass, which was the route Philip had taken earlier in 198 BC in reverse. I 
then continued on to Veria to see how difficult this entrance into Macedon was compared 
to the one via Edessa.  
 Based on findings from Bike trip 6, I began a project to more intensively 
investigate the Aous river valley and the possible location of the battle in 198 BC. 
Between April 24th - 27th, 2014, I initially explored this valley on foot with Professor 
Nick Rauh and Taylor Rauh to see if the landscape aligned with Livy's description and 
Hammond's conclusions. I returned to show my findings to the local representative of the 
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Albanian Ministry of National Culture, Gjirokaster, on October 9, 2014 and again on 
April 7th 2015. I then served as project director for the Vjöse River Valley 
Archaeological Project (VRVAP) between July 22nd and August 16th, 2015, with the 
express goal of determining the location of Philip's camp and the location of the Battle of 
the River Aous.  
 Finally, I led three hiking-based research trips.  The first two involved hiking 
around Thermopylae to explore how the different historical accounts accorded with the 
landscape.  The third trip aimed to investigate the movements related to the 169 BC and 
168 BC campaigns in Perrhaebia and Pieria and to find and investigate the Macedonian 
forts at Karya and around Tempe.  
Sources 	  
 The texts used for Greek and Latin sources were as follows: for Livy Books 31-
45, I used Briscoe's Teubner editions; for the remainder of the texts, I used the Loeb 
Library editions. My translations generally follow the Loeb translations as well as the 
Livy translations by Yardley (31-40) and Chaplin (41-45). 5), with some adaptations, 
except where otherwise notes. 
 Our ancient sources are narrative accounts each with their own agendas, 
overarching themes, and authorial biases. My close readings of these sources take these 
into account and pay particular attention to the relationships between the different 
authors' works. The topographic analyses work as a check on our written accounts to 
determine whether they depict reality or merely narrative devices. As a result, this 
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dissertation offers new insights into the ancient texts, including highlighting narrative 
goals that may not have been apparent previously.  
 For the topographical studies that underpin this dissertation, I used a variety of 
maps.  For Greece, I used declassified maps issued by the Hellenic Military Geographical 
Service (HMGS), and road/hiking maps by brands Road and Anavasi. For Albania, I used 
maps by the brand Vector and Reise. For FYROM, I used maps by the company Trimaks.  
I also used Google Earth and Google Maps extensively.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE MYZEQEJA PLAIN 
 
Introduction 	  
 In 200 BC Rome declared war on Macedon and sent an army across the Adriatic 
to the Illyrian city of Apollonia. Livy reports that this new war against Macedon, the 
Second Macedonian War, was actually a direct extension of the First Macedonian War 
(L.31.1.8). The Romans were able to restart their war against Macedon now that the 
Second Punic War had ended (L.31.1.9). The 200 BC Roman campaign was not only an 
extension of the First Macedonian War politically, but topographically as well, as it 
concerned the same Illyrian ports of Apollonia, Corcyra, and Oricum. However, Roman 
concern with these Illyrian ports had not begun with the First Macedonian War, but in 
fact had been a Roman military concern since the First Illyrian War in 229 BC. In 200 
BC, the Roman army returned to Illyrian territory that Rome had been fighting to control 
and protect periodically for the past 30 years. However, the Romans now led a land army 
further inland than they ever had before. 
 [Figure 1.1] In 229 BC Rome first established in the region a group of cities and 
peoples under their direct protection: Corcyra, Apollonia, Dyrrachium, the Ardiaei, the 
Parthini, the Atintanes, and Issa (Plb.2.11.5-12). In 219 BC, Rome took control of 
Dimallum (Plb.3.18.3-7). In 215 BC, Rome was still in control of Corcyra, Apollonia, 
Dyrrachium, Dimallum, the Parthini, and Atintania, as Philip demanded that the Romans 
relinquish these in his treaty with Hannibal (Plb.7.9.13). By 208 BC, Atintania and the 
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Ardiaeans had fallen back under Macedonian control (L.27.30.13).2 By 205 BC, Philip 
controlled the Parthini, "other neighboring tribes", and Dimallum (L.29.12.3).3 In 205 
BC, the Peace of Phoenice assigned the Romans control over the Parthini and Dimallum, 
and assigned the Macedonians control over Atintania4 (L.29.12.13.).  
 This chapter investigates the topography of the Roman land campaign of 200 BC 
to better understand the campaign, the motivations behind it, and the behaviors of the 
different peoples involved. The 200 BC campaign was the first major Roman land 
campaign in this region and set the stage for the ongoing Roman military presence in the 
east. 
The 200 BC Campaign 	  
 The 200 BC campaign took place in the Mezeqeja plain.5 [Figure 1.2] The 
Myzeqeja is a fertile, roughly triangular shaped plain in modern Albania. It is bound to 
the west by the Adriatic coast; to the north by the Shkumbi river; to the south by the Aous 
river in the west, and then the mountains that extend east-west between the Semeni and 
Vjose rivers; and extends east to Berat. Mountains surround the plain in all directions 
except the west.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Perhaps during Philip's military activities in the region in 211 BC (L.26.24.1 - 26.26.4). 
3 Philip is able to march from Macedon to Apollonia quickly and without incident and the Romans stay 
holed up in Apollonia (L.29.12.5). 
4 The Epirotes sign as allies of Philip (L.29.12.14). 
5 I follow the spelling used by Albanian Wikipedia. There are variations: e.g. Brandt's 2012: Muzeqeja; 
Brandt's 2008, Muzeqe; Winnifrith 2002: Muzeqë; Blue Guide 1996: Myzege; Hammond, 1968 & 1972: 
Myzeqija; Hammond 1989: Myzeqe. 
6 Hammond 1968, p 1, map p 3; Hammond 1972, map 3, p6; Hammond 1989, maps pp 13 & 18, pp 14, 22, 
25; Wilkes 1992, p15; Winnifrith 2002, map 1, pp 34, 59. 
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 The campaign began in late autumn when the Roman consul Publius Sulpicius 
Galba sailed with his consular army from Brundisium to his allotted province of 
Macedon (L. 31.14.1-2; 31.22.4; Zon. 9.15; App.Mac.4). After depositing his land troops 
near Apollonia, Sulpicius promptly split the fleet, sending part to Athens and wintering 
the rest at Corcyra (L.31.22.4-5).  
 The military crossing from Brundisium to the Illyrian coastal cities was not novel. 
Roman military fleets had been making this journey during the First Illyrian war (229 
BC), the Second Illyrian war (219 BC), and the First Macedonian war (214 BC - 205 
BC).7 Additionally, Roman traders had been sailing in the Adriatic prior to 229 BC, as 
Illyrian depredations on Roman merchant ships had originally spurred the Roman 
military interest in the area (Plb.2.8.1-3).8 The port cities on the Illyrian coast had been 
under Roman protection since 229 BC and were thus safe harbors (Plb.2.11.5-10).9 
 Livy provides the fullest narrative of this campaign:  
(1) Consul Sulpicius eo tempore inter Apolloniam ac Dyrrachium ad 
Apsum flumen habebat castra, quo arcessitum L. Apustium legatum cum 
parte copiarum ad depopulandos hostium fines mittit. (2) Apustius 
extrema Macedoniae populatus, Cor<r>hago et Gerrunio et Orgesso 
castellis primo impetu captis ad Antipatream, in faucibus angustis sitam 
urbem, uenit. (3) ac primo euocatos principes ad conloquium, ut fidei 
Romanorum se committerent, perlicere est conatus; deinde, ubi 
magnitudine ac moenibus situque urbis freti dicta aspernabantur, (4) vi 
atque armis adortus expugnauit puberibusque interfectis, praeda omni 
militibus concessa, diruit muros atque urbem incendit. (5) hic metus 
Codrionem, satis ualidum et munitum oppidum, sine certamine ut 
dederetur Romanis effecit. (6) praesidio ibi relicto Cnidus – nomen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Illyrian port (Apollonia, Corcyra, Oricum, Epidamnus) usage references and crossings between Italy and 
the Illyrian coast: First Illyrian War (Pol.2.11.8; Second Illyrian War (Pol.3.18.); First Macedonian War: 
(L.24.40.2,5; 24.40.8; L.26.26.2). 
8 For the crossing between Italy and Apollonia, see e.g. Pliny NH 3.100. 
9 Orlic et al 1992, discuss how the natural currents of the Adriatic run between Brundisium and Apollonia 
facilitating the crossings across the Adriatic. 
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propter alteram in Asia urbem quam oppidum notius – ui capitur. 
reuertentem legatum ad consulem cum satis magna praeda Athenagoras 
quidam, regius praefectus, in transitu fluminis a nouissimo agmine adortus 
postremos turbauit. (7) Ad quorum clamorem et trepidationem cum 
reuectus equo propere legatus signa conuertisset et coniectis in medium 
sarcinis aciem direxisset, non tulere impetum Romanorum militum regii: 
multi ex iis occisi, plures capti. (8) legatus, incolumi exercitu reducto ad 
consulem, remittitur inde extemplo ad classem. 
 
 (1) The consul Sulpicius was at that time encamped between 
Apollonia and Dyracchium along the river Apsus, to where he summoned 
the legate L. Apustius and sent him with part of the forces to pillage the 
territory of the enemy. 
 (2) Apustius pillaged the edges of Macedonia, seized the forts 
(castella) of Corrhagus and Gerrunius and Orgessus at first attack, and 
came to Antipatreia, a city located in a narrow pass. 
 (3) At first he tried to entice the leading men, called out to a 
conference, to formally surrender to the Romans; Then, when they, 
confident in the size of the force and of the walls and site of the city, 
scorned his words, (4) he attacked and captured it by force of arms, and 
with all the men of military age having been killed, and all the booty given 
to the soldiers, he destroyed the walls and burned the city. 
 (5) This fear caused Codrio, a sufficiently strong and fortified town 
(oppidum), to surrender without contest to the Romans. Having left a 
garrison there, he captured by force Cnidus - a name known on account of 
the other city (urbs) in Asia than for this town (oppidum). 
 (6) As the legate was returning to the consul with a sufficiently 
great amount of booty, Athenagoras, a prefect of the king, attacked the 
rearmost troops while crossing a river and threw the rearguard into 
confusion. (7) When the legate had promptly rode back to their clamor and 
alarm, he turned around the standards and drew up the battle line, with the 
baggage having been gathered in the center, and the royal troops did not 
endure the attack of the Roman soldiers: Many of these men were killed, 
more were captured.  
 (8) The legate, with the army having been returned unharmed to 
the consul, was sent from there immediately to the fleet. 
 (L. 31.27.1-8) 
 
 Appian's and Zonaras' more brief accounts accord with Livy's description of the 
campaign, but supply no topographical detail. Appian reports only that "a Roman army 
hastened to Greece, Publius commanding the land forces and Lucius the fleet" 
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(App.Mac.4). Zonaras reports that "Apustius invaded Macedonia and was plundering the 
country as well as subduing garrisons and cities" as well as that Sulpicius was ill upon 
crossing the Adriatic, causing Apustius to lead the campaign, and Apustius ended the 
campaign "when it was already winter." (Zon.9.15).10 Scholars understand that all three 
authors had access to Polybius as a source, or to authors who had previously had access 
to Polybius, although the portion of Polybius that covers this campaign is lost.11 
 Sulpicius' 200 BC land campaign thus had six successive components: 1) 
Sulpicius established the Roman camp on the Apsus; 2) From this camp, Apustius 
ravaged territory under Macedonian control, 3) took by force three forts (castella), 4) 
sacked the city (urbs) Antipatreia, 5) gained control of two towns (oppida), and 6) was 
harassed by Macedonian troops while returning to Sulpicius' camp.  
 Livy reports that Sulpicius arrived in his province "near the end of autumn" - cum 
autumno ferme exacto (L.31.22.4). Livy is understood here to have been using Polybius 
as his source. However, Polybius' year had only two seasons, summer and winter, while 
Livy's year had four. The increase in the number of seasons resulted in Livy translating 
Polybius' phrase "near the beginning of winter" into "near the end of autumn".12 
However, there is scholarly disagreement as to when exactly Polybius' beginning of 
winter occurred, ranging from the fall equinox (roughly September 22nd) to the morning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Badian 1970, p 35 follows Zonaras that Sulpicius was sick during the 200 BC campaign. 
11 Livy's use of Polybius here: Tränkle 1977; most recently Briscoe 2009, p 462.  
12 That Livy is using Polybius as his source for this passage, see Briscoe 1973 p115; Tränkle 1977, p27; 
Briscoe 1977; Briscoe 2009 p462. For discussion of Livy's handling of Polybius' seasons in this passage, 
and more generally, see Briscoe 1973, pp 115-6; Briscoe 1977.  
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setting of the Pleiades (roughly November 7th).13 Sulpicius thus marched east from 
Apollonia some time between late September and early November, and ended the 
campaign once winter had begun. It remains to determine just how much time that was in 
order to determine how much time Apustius had to operate.  
 Sulpicius had been in command of forces during the First Macedonian War for six 
continuous years (211 BC - 206 BC). He would have been familiar with the weather 
patterns in this area from personal experience, and thus would have known the best time 
to put troops into winter quarters at Apollonia (L.31.22.4).  
 The seasonal weather patterns in northwestern Greece and southern Albania are 
predictable, consisting of a dry summer followed by autumn rains that start in October 
and reach their maximum intensity in November, during which month they often turn to 
snow.14 The amount of rainfall increases and the temperature decreases further from the 
coast and at higher elevations. 
 The autumn rains begin in early October, but the weather dramatically worsens in 
late October and early November.15 For example, Lear's 1848 journal records rain, and 
often torrential rain, on ten of thirteen days between October 5th and 17th on a trip across 
the Myzeqeja plain from the coast to Berat and back.16 The increasing cold and 
unrelenting rain at the end of October compelled Lear to leave Albania entirely on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For advocacy of the fall equinox, see Holleaux 1932, Etudes iv pp 338ff; Walbank 1940, pp 138, 317, 
341; Briscoe 1973. For advocacy of the morning setting of the Pleiades, see Pédich 1964. For advocacy of 
the mid-point of the two, see Briscoe 1977. 
14 Gloyer 2012, pp 3, 25; Keefe et al. 1971, pp vii, 35-37. 
15 For daily rains in this area to be understood to begin at the start of October, see Hobhouse 1817, p19; 
Walbank 1940, p317. The American School for Classical Studies at Athens completes the School research 
trip to Epirus by the end of September because of how regularly it rains in early October (Margaret M. 
Miles pers. comm.).   
16 Lear 2008, pp 69-99. 
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November 6th.17 Between October 15th and October 27th, 2014 while traveling through 
Albania, FYROM, and northern Greece, I experienced cold, torrential rain on nine of the 
eleven days. The Albanians I spoke to all said that this was normal weather for late 
October, and would only increase in intensity in the days to come. 
 The effect of this weather pattern on military activity was evident in the campaign 
in northern Epirus during the First Balkan War in 1912. Between October 6th and 11th, 
"torrential rain" and "continuing inclement weather" adversely affected the Greek troops' 
morale and led to great confusion with the Greek pack transportation units.18 The weather 
dramatically changed on October 25th, though, when "a sudden cold set in, and thick fog 
and continuous torrential rain made the operations of the Army of Epirus difficult," and 
by early November, "battlefield conditions had changed significantly due to adverse 
weather" causing the Greeks to suspend all offensive operations by November 13th.19  
 Similarly, during World War II, it had already been raining for days when the 
Italian army crossed the Albanian border into Greece on October 28th, 1940 during a 
torrential thunderstorm.20 The storms did not break until November 2nd, and were so 
severe that they prevented supply ships from sailing across the Adriatic from Italy and 
knocked out radio antennas.21 By November 8th, temperatures had fallen and rain had 
turned to snow, and on November 10th the Italian mountain division was defeated - with 
the Italians blaming the defeat on lack of provisions due to the weather disrupting their 
lines of supply and the Greeks attributing the Italians’ defeat to "the excessive demands 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Lear 2008, p163. 
18 Hellenic Army General Staff (HAGS) 1998, pp 151-6, map 15.  
19 HAGS 1998, pp 165-170, 206. 
20 Carr 2013, pp 40-45. 
21 Carr 2013, pp 42-46, 50-51. 
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of mountain combat in foul weather which eroded [Italian] divisional morale 
wholesale."22  
 [Figure 1.3] The rains caused streams and rivers to swell and generated 'brown 
quagmires' of mud and mire that greatly slowed the movements of men and pack 
animals.23 This resulted in the problems seen in both 1912 and 1940 with maintaining 
supply lines, troop movements, and soldiers' morale. John Carr, a military historian of 
Greece, additionally points out that mud and rain are "immeasurably harder on an 
advancing army than on one in a defensive position,"24 and so in 200 BC would have 
affected the Romans more than the fortified hill settlements they were attacking.  
 As Sulpicius was familiar with the regional weather patterns as well as with 
commanding an army in the field, it seems unlikely that he would risk getting caught in 
this predictable weather. We read of no pressing goals that needed to be accomplished by 
the end of the season, and Sulpicius expected to lead the troops during the following 
campaign season so he was not compelled to act rashly because this was his only chance 
for military glory.25 Sulpicius would have wanted to winter his troops by the end of 
October at the latest, knowing that the weather reliably changed for the worse at that 
time. Therefore, to give Apustius as much time as possible to complete his campaign, we 
should understand that Sulpicius arrived in his province in late September, which gave 
Apustius a maximum of four weeks to campaign.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Carr 2013, pp 53-54. Similarly, World War II British commando David Smiley reports on the brutal cold 
in Albania in early November (Smiley 1984, p95). 
23 Carr 2013, pp 40, 43, 47. See also Smiley 1984, p31 "In both Greece and Albania it was frequent for 
small streams, or even dried up river beds, to become deep and broad rivers in a very short time after heavy 
rainfall in the mountains." 
24 Carr 2013, p40. 
25 See discussion of this point in chapter 2. 
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 Antipatreia is the only site in Livy's report of the 200 BC campaign with a 
description of its topographic setting, and was the largest settlement in the narrative, 
being the only urbs in contrast with the three castella and two oppida. Since the other 
toponyms in Livy's narrative are located in relation to Antipatreia, it follows that 
Antipatreia's location must be determined first.  
 Since the early 19th century, travellers and scholars have proposed that 
Antipatreia lay beneath the modern city of Berat at the southeastern corner of the 
Myzeqeja Plain for three reasons:26 the first reason was that Berat fits Livy's description 
as "a city located in a narrow pass," as Berat sits inside the western entrance to the Osum 
valley extending to the southeast;27 the second reason was that Berat was in Dassaretian 
territory (Plb.5.108.2), which extended from Berat eastward through the Korce plain;28 
and the third reason was that the walls of the Byzantine citadel at Berat contained large 
ancient, potentially Hellenistic, blocks in its 13th century walls, and Livy specifies that 
Antipatreia had significant walls. 
 Albanian archaeologist Gani Strazimiri's 1964 systematic study of the walls of the 
Byzantine citadel at Berat further demonstrated that there were 4th and 3rd century BC 
Illyrian phases to the walls and that these phases showed evidence of burning at the end 
of the third century.29 Albanian archaeologist Hëna Spahiu followed up Strazmiri's work 
with excavations of the castle at Berat in the years 1973, 1974 and 1978. Spahiu's study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Hughes 1820 p 257-260; Leake 1835 I, pp 361-2; Leake 1835 III, pp 325-7; Patsch 1904, p131; 
Kromayer 1907, p10 n4; Kiepert 1914; Fine 1936, p26; Walbank 1940, pp 11-12; Walbank 1957, p632. 
27 Hughes 1820, plate between pp 254 and 255 and Patsch 1904, Fig.102 show the strong position of Berat's 
castle looming over the valley. 
28 For the area associated with the Dassaretii, see TIR; Hammond 1972. 
29 Strazimiri 1964, esp. pp183-184, with photographs of the Hellenistic phases and a site plan. However, 
Strazimiri supplies no images of the "traces conservées de l'incendie". Hammond 1966, p42 n11 advocated 
for Strazmiri's conclusions and alerted English speakers to Strazmiri's research. 
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of the foundation levels of the walls together with the corresponding ceramic sequences 
led him to conclude that Antipatreia had been located at Berat and had been destroyed 
around the year 200 BC.30 Spahiu's work also pointed to the importance of this location 
through time, as the ceramic sequences suggest inhabitation of the site in the early Iron 
Age, and continuous settlement starting from the 7th century BC.31   
 Albanian archaeologist Neritan Ceka, however, has proposed that Antipatreia 
was, instead, at the western edge of the Korçe plain, located by either of the modern 
villages Symiza or Hija e Korbit at the eastern end of the Devoll valley.32 No 
archaeological evidence supports Ceka's claim, and neither Symiza nor Hija e Corbit lie 
in a valley, although both are near the Devoll valley.33 Ceka attributes the ancient blocks 
found at Berat to the ancient Illyrian city of Partha.34  Placing Antipatreia at the western 
edge of the Korce plain would shift Apustius' campaign significantly further east and 
through the rugged Devoll valley.35  
  Due to the limited time available for the campaign and greater effect of seasonal 
weather on higher elevations and rugged terrain, Antipatreia was most likely located at 
Berat. I will analyze the campaign with that understanding, but return again to the claim 
of Symiza.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Spahiu 1983, esp. pp 133-5, with photos of the ancient courses of the walls and site plan. 
31 Gilkes 2013 pp 67-87, briefly summarizes the archaeological evidence at Berat up through Spiahu's 
scholarship, however, Gilkes has no citations or proper bibliography. 
32 Ceka 2005 p90; Ceka 2011, map 1; Ceka 2013, pp 110-111, 185. Ceka's argument gains authority from 
his extensive autopsy of the region, e.g. Hodges 2014 p45, "[Neritan Ceka] knows this Balkan country 
more intimately than any living soul." 
33 Ceka 2013 has no footnotes and the bibliography cites nothing specifically on Antipatreia, Symiza, or 
Hija e Korbit. While Ceka calls this book "scientifically correct; without analysis or debate" (Ceka 2013, 
p9), one hopes he will fulfill his promise "to rework the book and put in references for every idea and 
place" (Hodges 2014, p45).  
34 Ceka 2013 p110, passim. 
35 Ceka 2013, p209.  
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 [Figure 1.4] Livy reports that Sulpicius led the army out from Apollonia and 
established camp along the Apsus river between Apollonia and Dyracchium. Apollonia 
was roughly 7.5 km due west from the city of Fier, just south of the village of Pojan.36 
Dyrrachium, formerly the Greek city of Epidamnus (Strabo 7.5.8) lies beneath the 
modern city of Durres.37 The Apsus river, currently the Seman river, begins at the 
confluence of the Osum and Devoll rivers just north of the village of Kuçovë and flows 
southwest for roughly 27 km before turning northwest and emptying into the Adriatic 
approximately 13 km northwest of Apollonia.38 
 We should expect that Sulpicius would encamp at the eastern edge of Roman 
controlled territory, with a secure supply line and access to a water source, as well as at a 
location elevated off the plain both to make it easier to defend and because the Myzeqeja 
plain had the potential to get swampy during the fall rains.39 The area in the foothills of 
Mt. Shpiragut roughly 29 km east-southeast from Apollonia, at 235 m elevation just 
south of the modern village Kutalli would have been an ideal place for Sulpicius' camp, 
and was less than 4 km from the Apsus river. 
 This encampment was roughly 5.5 km north of the Roman controlled settlement 
of Dimallum at the eastern edge of Roman influence in the Myzeqeja plain. Dimallum sat 
at an elevation of 404 m at the western edge of the foothills of Mt. Shpiragut.40 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Gilkes 2013, pp 39-55; Ceka 2013 passim; Hammond 1972 passim; Vrekaj 2012; Dimo 2012; Dimo et 
al. 2007.  
37 Gilkes 2013, pp 157-168; Ceka 2013 passim; Hammond 1972 passim.  
38 Hammond 1966, p42; Ceka 2013; Barringtons Map 49 citing Hammond 1974 p 191; Dr. Beqiraj pers. 
comm.; Briscoe ad loc, adds, "B has Hapsum, which is also the form in the Peutinger table". Alternative 
spellings for the river are Semen and Semeni (object case).  
39 On the Myzeqeja plain getting swampy in the rains, see Hammond 1966 p42n10. Marmullaku 1975 pp 
102-103. 
40 Dimallum: Hammond 1968, pp 12-15. 
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Romans had been vying with Philip for control of Dimallum since 219 BC due to 
Dimallum's strategic role in controlling the central Myzeqeja plain: the Romans took 
control of Dimallum in 219 BC (Plb.3.18.3); Philip desired to gain control of Dimallum 
from the Romans in 217 BC (Plb.7.9.14); Philip gained control of Dimallum by 205 BC 
(L.29.12.3); the Romans regained Dimallum at the Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC 
(L.29.12.13). The camp's proximity to the permanent settlement of Dimallum, as well as 
the cluster of houses there today, indicate that there was access to fresh water at the 
encampment. 
 Sulpicius had a flat and secure supply line through Roman controlled territory 
between Apollonia and the encampment. Although he could have brought 30 days of 
food with him into the field, which would have covered the length of the campaign, 
Sulpicius would still have he wanted a secure supply line in case of unforeseen 
circumstances. Furthermore, Sulpicius might not have wanted to bring such a large pack 
train into the field and have depended on periodic resupply. Sulpicius left for campaign 
with two legions (L.31.8.5) consisting of freshly levied troops and volunteers from 
Scipio's veterans of the Second Punic War (L.31.8.6, 31.9.5, 31.14.2). Middle Republican 
Roman legions consisted of 4200-5000 infantry plus 300 cavalry with a roughly equal 
number of allies (Plb.6.21.8-9, 6.26.7).41 According to Roth's calculations, two legions 
plus allies would have required 2,640 modii of grain per day weighing 17.9 tons.42 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For discussion of legion sizes in Polybius in Livy, see Dobson 2008, pp 47-58. 
42 Roth 1999 pp16-24, esp. chart p22. Roth convincingly argues that the Roman army was divided into 
units of men into which the modius divided evenly, thus units that involved basic, fraction-less math to 
supply. 
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Sulpicius might have preferred a system of resupply than having to move so many carts 
of grain at once at the beginning of the campaign.  
 Hammond proposed that the most logical place for the Roman camp was just 
south of the village Kuç (now Ura e Kucit) in the foothills of Mt. Shpiragut.43 Indeed, this 
would be an ideal location from which to control the narrow east-west passage to the 
north of the Mt. Shpiragut foothills. So much so, however, that the Macedonians had time 
to recognize its strategic location during their 100 years of activity in the area, and would 
have taken the effort to control the best locations before the Roman arrival. As such, the 
Macedonians had already placed their castellum Corrhagus just south of Ura e Kucit and 
therefore this area was not available for a Roman campsite.44 
 However, the question remains why Sulpicius' encampment does not appear to 
accord well with Livy's description. Livy uses the cities Apollonia and Dyrrachium as 
reference points with which to situate where the camp was located for the reader. The 
camp, though, would be much closer to Apollonia, and 'between Apollonia and 
Antipatreia, along the river Apsus' would have been a more precise description. However, 
the pairing of Apollonia and Dyrrachium has strong associations for Rome's military 
presence in the region for the reader of Livy - and of his source Polybius. 
 In 229 BC, Apollonia and Dyrrachium came under the direct protection of Rome, 
as part of a group of cities under Rome's protection in the region (Pol. 2.11.8-12). From 
229 BC to 200 BC Rome militarily protected them in the face of attack four times. From 
the Illyrians in 229 BC (Pol. 2.11.8-10) and from Philip three times: in 216 BC (Pol. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Hammond 1966 p 42; Walbank 1940 p 138n4. 
44 Corrhago is discussed further below. 
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5.110), 214 BC (L. 24.40), and 205 BC (L. 29.12.5-7). Later in 205 BC, the Romans 
reaffirmed their continuing protection of Apollonia and Epidamnus in the Peace of 
Phoenice with Philip V (L. 29.12.13). Throughout, Apollonia and Dyrrachium were safe 
and friendly harbors for the Romans. Thus, by using these toponyms, the Roman camp 
and campaign are from the beginning established as in direct relationship to cities in 
Illyria that Rome has already actively protected. 
 Because of this legacy, using these two cities to site the first Roman fort in the 
Second Macedonian War could serve to make the Second Macedonian War seem like a 
natural extension of Roman military activity in the area. Up to this point, this activity had 
been to keep Greek cities free from Macedonian control, and free to govern themselves as 
they saw fit. Thus, Livy’s narrative begins with topographic references that evoke a 
narrative of Roman protection of Greek cities from Macedonian aggression from the 
initial landing in Greece for the Second Macedonian War, with the liberation of all 
Greece by Rome being the direct end result of the end of the Second Macedonian War.  
 After encamping by the Apsus, Sulpicius divided the army between Apustius and 
himself, but we have no evidence for how Sulpicius made the division. Since both 
Apustius and Sulpicius required a significant amount of men - Apustius for his campaign 
to be successful and Sulpicius to safely encamp on the borders of hostile territory - it 
seems reasonable to assume that that Sulpicius divided his force in half, keeping one 
legion in camp with him and sending one out with Apustius. 
 Livy does not provide any topographical information concerning the castella of 
Corrhagus, Gerrunius, and Orgessus, and there are no definitive archaeological or 
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epigraphic finds to help locate them.45 Livy does report, though, that these are castella, as 
opposed to the urbs Antipatriea, or the two oppida Codrio and Cnidus. What is in Livy's 
mind's-eye when he uses the term castellum? Furthermore, when Livy writes castellum in 
a passage for which he is using Polybius as a source, what was in Polybius' mind's eye?  
 To address this problem, I found all the passages in which Livy uses a form of the 
word castellum and then cross referenced these with all of the passages where Livy 
appears to have directly translated Polybius to see if there are any matches to determine 
what word Polybius used that Livy later translated as castellum.46 
 Livy uses some form of the word castellum 113 times in his extant corpus, with 
the majority (79) in books 31-45, which are the books that cover the time period relevant 
to this dissertation. Of these usages, two are in passages considered to be direct 
translations from Polybius. Both passages of Polybius are reports of formal treaties and as 
such can be expected to use precise language. 
 The first example is found in the last clause of the terms Rome established after 
the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC: 
Livy 33.34.11: Amynandrum tenere iusserunt castella quae per belli 
tempus Philippo capta ademisset 
 
They directed Amynander to hold the castella which he had taken from 
Philip during the period of the war. 
 
Polybius 18.47.13: Ἀµυνάνδρῳ δὲ συνεχώρησαν, ὅσα παρεσπάσατο κατὰ 
πόλεµον ἐρύµατα τοῦ Φιλίππου, 
κρατεῖν τούτων 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 cf. Briscoe 1972, ad loc. "The precise location of these forts is not known." 
46 Packard 1968 assembled all of Livy's uses of castellum; Tränkle 1977 pp29-32 assembled all the 
passages Livy appears to have directly translated Polybius.  
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They allowed Amynander to hold all the erymata he had taken from 
Philip in war. 
 
The second example is found in the last section of the Peace of Apamea in 188 BC: 
Livy 38.39.14: Regi Eumeni Chersonesum in Europa et Lysimachiam, 
castella vicos agrum quibus finibus tenuerat Antiochus, adiecerunt 
 
To King Eumenes they bestowed, in Europe, the Chersonesus and 
Lysimachia, the castella, villages, and lands within the boundaries of 
Antiochus. 
 
Polybius 21.46.9: περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως Εὐµένους . . . τότε τῆς µὲν 
Εὐρώπης αὐτῷ προσέθηκαν Χερρόνησον καὶ Λυσιµάχειαν καὶ τὰ 
προσοροῦντα τούτοις ἐρύµατα καὶ χώραν, ἧς Ἀντίοχος ἐπῆρχεν 
 
For King Eumenes ... they bestowed now in Europe the Chersonese, 
Lysimachia, and the adjacent erymata and territory which Antiochus held. 
 
 Eryma is the corresponding word to castellum in both passages. In both treaties, 
the preceding sections had to do with the legal status of peoples and settlements of 
different sizes, e.g. poleis. Thus, in both treaties a clear distinction is made between an 
eryma and other forms of settlement. 
 The LSJ defines eryma as "fence, guard" that can refer to the wall of a settlement, 
a stone breastwork for a military encampment, or a river or trench used as a military 
defense. All of the definitions have a military connotation. Sylvian Fachard, scholar of 
Classical and Hellenistic fortresses in Greece, adds that an eryma can be used as 
metonymy for a fort or guardpost. He has found through his study of the term that it most 
often refers to forts involved in border conflicts and that it would be "small and 
inexpensive to build, most probably in dry rubble."47 Fachard asserts that in Thucydides, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Sylvian Fachard, pers. comm. August 9, 2016. 
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"eryma occurs eight times and in five of the cases it is coarse construction, quickly 
assembled - rubble walls."48  
 Since Polybius is using what is apparently a precise term, eryma, and Livy is in 
both these cases translating him and using the word castellum, we need to examine 
whether Livy is being equally precise and consistent in his distinction between settlement 
types. Three passages in Livy where castellum is contrasted with other settlements 
demonstrate that Livy's usage is consistent. The first two passages are again found in the 
formalized, precise context of treaties.  
 The first passage is the Senate's decision concerning the conditions of the peace 
with Antiochus III after the Battle of Magnesia. Conditions relating to 'agrum ... castella 
vicosque ... oppida' are discussed in one place (L.37.56.3), and conditions relating to 
'oppida vici castella agri' (L.37.56.6) in another. The treaty presents castella as distinct 
from other types of settlements.  
 The second passage also comes from the account of the Peace of Apamea.49 The 
conditions of the peace specify that Antiochus III must withdraw from certain "urbibus 
agris vicis castellis" (L.38.38.4), removing nothing from these certain "oppidis agris 
castellisque" (L.38.38.6) Again we see castella as distinct from other terms for 
settlements.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Sylvian Fachard, pers. comm. August 10, 2016. For more on erymata, see Fachard 2012, pp251, 252, 
284. 
49 The peace of Apamea is also the context of the second example of correspondence between Polybius and 
Livy discussed above. The corresponding passage of Polybius (Plb.21.42.6) to this passage of Livy has a 
lacuna that begins during the phrase, perhaps even at the word, that corresponds to castellis in Livy. 
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 In the third passage (L.39.28.4), Philip complains that the Romans only allowed 
him to recover quaedam castella magis quam urbes. Here, castella are presented as 
distinctly different, and less desirable to possess, than urbes. 
 In the preceding three passages along with the two mentioned earlier which are 
direct translations from Polybius, the term castellum is presented as distinct from other 
types of settlements and having a military character.  
  The best comparanda for what I believe these castella to have been are located 
above the Vale of Tempe. Livy, in discussing the 169 BC campaign, reports that the 
Romans gained possession of the castella ... quae super Tempe essent et circa Philan 
(L.44.7.12). The archaeological remains of two Macedonian forts near Tempe, one by 
Karya and one by Rapsani, fit Fachard's description of what an eryma should look like.50 
Both were situated along the border of Macedonian territory and utilized dry-rubble 
construction, exploiting the locally available stone. Despite the construction materials, it 
is clear that they were built with care, and were not merely temporary structures. Both 
were situated on a height that afforded the occupants maximum visibility of neighboring 
territories, while making them difficult to assault. The size of the remains suggested 
small forts, with the walls of the one above Karya roughly 270 m by 100 m and the walls 
of the one above Rapsani roughly 125 m by 125 m, appropriately sized for a garrison of a 
few hundred men. These forts were contemporary with the ones near Antipatreia, and, 
since they were also built by the Macedonians, similarity in their construction should be 
expected. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Rizakis 1986; Pritchett 1991. 
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  To be effective, these walled forts should have occupied the best strategic 
positions from which to control access to Antipatreia. Macedonia had been regularly in 
control of this region for over one hundred years by this point; we should expect that they 
had a strategic understanding of the landscape, and were defending it accordingly. 
  Placing these three forts relatively near to one another and to the west of 
Antipatreia would accord well with Livy's narrative. Livy would then be understood to be 
describing Apustius' movements as a logical progression from west to east, moving from 
Sulpicius' camp towards Berat, with the three castella somewhere between them.  
 This hypothesis makes good strategic sense as well, as the castella would then be 
a system of defense guarding the approaches to Antipatreia. McCredie, in his book on the 
forts on the Athenian-Boiotian border, states that the point of 'garrison-forts' was "not so 
much in the hope that then could themselves prevent the entry of an invading army or 
fleet, but more because they could force such an army to weaken itself. An invader could 
not afford to leave these strongholds unreduced; for, if they were left, their garrisons 
could at any moment emerge to disrupt the enemy's communications and, if faced with a 
with a superior force, retreat again into the strongholds."51 
 McCredie's analysis of the function of a border fort accords with the Thesaurus 
Linguae Latinae's (TLL) definition of a castellum. In the entry for castellum under 
heading I "in re militari et aliis rebus publicis"  and subsection A "proprie: castri parvi 
genus ad castra vel res alias tutanda extructum" we find what appears to be a fitting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 McCredie 1966, p88. For further (often tendentious) discussion of the Attic border forts: Ober 1985, 
Munn 1986, Harding 1988, Ober 1989, Harding 1990, Camp 1991, Munn 1993, Ober 1994. More recently, 
see Fachard 2013 and Daly 2015. Fachard's work with the Mazi Plain Archaeological Project continues to 
advance the scholarship on Classical and Hellenistic forts in Greece and on the relationship of these forts to 
regional borders. For forts in Asia Minor, see Ma 2000. 
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definition: 'a kind of small military fort built for protecting camps or other things'. The 
TLL glosses castellum as equivalent to the Greek term phrourion, a fort or hill fort - a 
word that can be a synonym for eryma.52  
  Understanding that the function of these three castella was to protect Antipatreia 
from assaults both from the north and west, locating them at three points that control 
access to Antipatreia makes the most logical sense. As discussed above, the first of the 
three forts was above Ura e Kucit, not far from Sulpicius' camp. Following the west-east 
progress of the campaign, as reported by Livy, this would be the first castellum 
mentioned, Corrhagus. The fort would sit at the modern boundary of the division between 
the two administrative zones of Fier and Berat, controlling the pass and thus the route 
towards Antipatreia from the western part of the Myzeqeja plain and the coast. Sulpicius' 
camp was well positioned in relation to Corrhagus, and this placement would have 
allowed the Romans to be close enough to Corrhagus to attack it suddenly, but not so 
close that it would have been an impediment to establishing their camp. 
 Before assaulting Corrhagus, though, Apustius ravaged the territory of the 
Macedonians. This territory was most likely the areas on the north bank of the Apsus to 
the north and west of Corrhagus. 
 The second fort, Gerronius, was in the foothills above the modern village of 
Perondi. This fort would function both to help Corrhagus control access to Antipatreia 
from the west, and to control the pass that controls access from the north via the valley 
running north-south between the Osum and Devoll valleys. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Fachard pers comm. August 9, 2016. 
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 The third fort, Orgessus, was in the foothills by the modern village of Mbreshtan. 
Located to the west-northwest of Berat, between Mt. Shpiragut and the foothills to the 
east, Orgessus would occupy a position that would be difficult to assault.53 Orgessus 
would effectively be the last line of defense should an army force its way past the other 
two castella.  Apustius would have been forced to deal with these three castella before 
assaulting Antipateia, as Livy describes.54  
 After seizing the three forts, Apustius proceeded to Antipatreia. After failed 
attempts at negotiating their surrender, Apustius sacked the city with a brutal display of 
force, including killing all the men and burning the city. The Roman pack train now 
carried an extensive amount of booty as well. 
 From Antipatreia, Apustius moved on the oppida of Codrio and Cnidus. There are 
neither positive archaeological remains identifying these sites nor additional literary or 
epigraphic references to them besides Livy's mention of them here.  
 Livy reports that Codrio was a walled oppidum that was in a strategic enough 
position to warrant a Roman garrison after its capture. [Figure 1.5] After securing 
Antipatreia and the three forts protecting the approach to it across the Myzeqeja plain 
from the northwest, the next important strategic area was the valley running north-south 
between the eastern Myzeqeja plain and the western entrance to the Devoll valley. A 
Macedonian invasion from the west, whether it came through the Devoll or Shkumbi 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Hammond 1966, p42 proposed that all three forts were located on Mt. Shpiragut west and south of where 
I placed Orgessus. However, a castellum by the summit, which Hammond implies to be a prime location, 
would be too far south to offer optimal protection for Antipatreia. Additionally, the total absence of any 
human habitation there today indicates that there is no fresh water on the mountain and unsuitable for a 
permanent fort. Finally, placing all three forts on the same north-south ridge that extends south of Berat 
does not seem very strategic for preventing attacks from the west and north. 
54 Ceka does have an alternate theory for the placement of these castella, however it is tied to his mistaken 
placement of Antipatreia and questionable etymology: Ceka 2013, pp 111, 132, 209, 210. 
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valleys, could enter the Myzeqeja plain only by continuing through the Shkumbi valley or 
had to pass through this north-south corridor. [Figure 1.4] From the location of the 
modern village of Dragot in the foothills north of the plain, Codrio was well placed to 
control the southern access to this north-south valley, and sitting at 150 m above the plain 
was difficult to assault as well. This location was roughly 19 km north-northwest of 
Antipatreia, which both allowed for quick communications between the two and made it 
a logical next place for Apustius to attack. The strategic value of the location for 
controlling access through both the passes to the west and to the north made Codrio 
worthy of a Roman garrison. 
 Livy reports that Cnidus was an oppidum which thought that it could withstand 
the Roman assault. As Apustius likely continued his campaign to secure the rest of the 
valley, Cnidus would logically lie further north up the valley towards the western 
entrance to the Devoll valley. The modern village of Grekan, roughly 10km northeast of 
Dragot, would have been a fitting location for Cnidus. Grekan is at a high point of the 
foothills before they start descending to the north, making it a strategic, defensible 
location, one from which the inhabitants could reasonably think they could resist a 
Roman assault. As the Romans had just successfully overcome Antipatreia's resistance, 
there were likely extenuating circumstances that led to Cnidus believing that they could 
prevail in the face of Roman attack where the larger Antipatreia had not. That the weather 
was either already becoming more severe, or that they knew it would shortly, could 
reasonably have led them to think that the Romans would not attempt a siege. 
Furthermore, as they were located near the entrance to the Macedonian controlled Devoll 
37 	  
	  
valley, the Cnidians might have expected the Macedonians to come save them. This 
belief seems quite reasonable in light of the fact that a Macedonian attachment did arrive 
on the scene just after Cnidus was taken, in time only to harass the Romans on their way 
back to Sulpicius' camp. Thus, Cnidus' naturally defended location and proximity to 
Macedonian protection presumably led them to think they could withstand the Romans. 
 Hammond proposed that the archaeological remains of a fortified site at Kalaja e 
Irmajt are "probably to be identified with Codrion" based on the idea that these are the 
only walled remains found in the district and Codrio is the only settlement in the district 
to which Livy specifically assigns walls.55 However, Polybius' report of Scerdilaidas' raid 
in Dassaretia (Plb.5.108.2) in 217 BC and Philip's immediate reprisal raid (Plb.5.108.8) 
contains the names of two more poleis that were surely walled (Chrysondon and Gertus) 
in this district as well as two more settlements of unspecified size (Creonium and 
Gerus).56 As a result, we need not feel compelled to identify these archaeological remains 
as Codrio. Additionally, Kalaja e Irmajt sits high (nearly 1000m above the valley floor) in 
the mountains west of the Devoll valley, 20km west of Dragot. Storming this location 
would have been an intensive undertaking, especially at the end of the campaign season 
as the weather changed.57 Since Hammond believed this fortress "guards the entry into 
the district of Gramsh,"58 it seems illogical that it would be a part of a limited campaign 
focused around Antipatreia. There was neither time in the season, nor sufficient strategic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Hammond 1966 p43n14, repeated at Hammond 1972 p100; for a more thorough description of the 
archaeological remains, see Hammond 1967 p586.  
56 Walbank 1957, p632 and Hammond 1968 p16 n55 argue that Polybius' Gerus was the same settlement as 
Livy's Gerunium. I remain unconvinced. 
57 Nothing in Livy's narrative suggests such effort here. 
58 Hammond 1972 p100. 
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motivation, for the Romans to have assaulted an oppidum at Kalaja e Irmajt. The 
location, instead, seems more fit for controlling movement through the Devoll valley than 
the valley between Antipatreia and Elbasan, making it a suitable location for a 
Macedonian fort controlling the Devoll valley.59 This fort would be a likely candidate for 
where the Cnidians thought they would get Macedonian assistance against the Roman 
assault.  
 My placements for both the castella and oppida, however, beg the question, "why 
have no archaeological remains of them been found?" First of all, we should expect that 
the walls of these settlements were not as impressive or well-built as the walls of an urbs 
such as Antipatreia. It is likely that even the Hellenistic walls at Berat were only 
preserved because they were incorporated directly into a later phase of construction. 
Additionally, my experience in Albania taught me that Albanians are very resourceful 
about reusing stone in their own buildings and this culture of reuse could explain why no 
remains of these forts have been found. In Kelcyre, the stone remains of Old Kelcyre had 
been almost entirely removed and incorporated into the buildings of Kelcyre and other 
local villages in just the short period since Kelcyre was moved to its current location in 
the 1950s. If in 60 years the stone remains of houses were reused to such a degree, one 
can imagine what may have happened to the stone walls of these castella and oppida over 
2200 years. 
 That does not preclude some degree of preservation of these structures. I am not 
aware of any systematic search for remains such as these in the area around Berat. Since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 I have not visited the site, but I looked at images freely available on the internet and the site looks more 
like a phrourion such as Eleutherai in Attica than a town. Additionally, Kalaja means fort, indicating that 
the Albanian archaeologists who named it thought it to be a fort and not a town as well.  
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the Albanian archaeological tradition has recently favored Ceka's interpretation that 
Apustius' campaign was located in the Korçe valley, archaeologists have not focused 
their attentions on this particular region with a view towards finding Hellenistic 
remains.60  
 After sacking Cnidus, Apustius turned around and began to head back to 
Sulpicius' camp. This supplies an opportunity to determine a calendar of events for the 
200 BC campaign from when Sulpicius set out from Apollonia to when Sulpicius wanted 
Apustius to return to the Roman camp so they could winter the troops. 
Action Approximate days the 
action took 
Total days 
Sulpicius in Apollonia 0 0 
To Apsus camp 1 1 
Summons Apustius 1 2 
Apustius arrives 1 3 
Apustius ravages territory 3 6 
To Corrhagus + sack 2 8 
To Gerrunius + sack 2 10 
To Orgessus + sack 2 12 
To Antipatreia 1 13 
Failed negotiations 1 14 
Antipatreia sack 3 17 
To Codrio + garrison 2 19 
To Cnidus + sack 2 21 
Table 2: Calendar of events for 200 BC campaign  
 Assuming that Apustius moved efficiently from sack to sack and had no troubles 
or delays in his assaults, the Roman campaign had already taken three weeks before 
Apustius headed towards Sulpicius' camp, which would have taken at least two days due 
to Apustius' booty-laden pack train. Time would have been tight even if we suppose that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Unfortunately I have not yet had the opportunity for autopsy of the region around Berat to search for 
these remains, however I hope to conduct this work myself in the future. 
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Antipatreia were at Berat. However, if were to follow Ceka and place Antipatreia at 
Symiza, we would need to add to that itinerary two 110 km trips through the Devoll 
valley. These trips would have been slowed due to the fact that the Devoll valley was 
exceptionally rugged and steep terrain that went through hostile territory, and that the 
difficulty of travel would have been enhanced by the increased rainfall, lower 
temperatures, and earlier snows in the Devoll valley compared to the eastern Myzeqeja 
plain.61 This was a difficult military route in good weather, and in late October weather 
for an army with a pack train laden with booty could have been catastrophic. Given the 
most plausible time constraints, Ceka's placement seems most improbable. Additionally, 
it seems difficult to believe that an experienced consul would have sent his army under a 
legate through a hostile, rugged, unfamiliar valley under the threat of severe weather to 
wage the 200 BC campaign.  
 Finally, it is important to point out that there may be a modern political reason 
influencing Ceka's placement of Antipatreia in the Korçe valley. Placing Antipatreia in 
the Korçe valley realigns the ancient spheres of control within the territory that became 
Albania. If Antipatreia was at Symiza and Berat was instead the site of the ancient 
Illyrian city Partha, then the area that was historically under non-Illyrian administrative 
control and cultural influence is moved significantly further east.62 Ancient control of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The Devoll valley starts in the west at about 100m elevation and climbs through rolling mountainous 
terrain to an end elevation of 800 m where it opens into the Korçe plain. To create a flat area to lay the 
modern road involved great public works projects. As of October 2014, landslides just south of the town of 
Gramsh had washed the road away. The workmen there told me that the damaged road had been closed for 
years and they did not expect it to open for many more.  
62 Siting Partha at Berat: Ceka 2013, 110. Siting Partha in the Shkembi valley: Hammond 1972 p96n4, TIR. 
Justification of modern Albania's borders through appeal to ancient Illyrian ethnic and cultural presence: 
Ceka 2013, pp 9-10, 11, 26-27, 30, 41. Korçe valley as the western extent of Macedonian occupation: Ceka 
2013, p209. 
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land is an important factor in the arguments used for the creation and evolution of the 
borders of the Balkan states.63 Arguing for continuous Illyrian inhabitation and control of 
the eastern Myzeqeja plain, coupled with the idea that modern Albanians are direct 
descendants of the Illyrians, bolsters the Albanian claim on land that was later inhabited 
by other ethnic groups. 
 On the way back to Sulpicius' camp from Cnidus, Apustius was attacked by a 
Macedonian force while crossing a river. Apustius had been fording the river Apsus due 
east of Corrhagus, as this was the best place to ford the river before proceeding to 
Sulpicius' camp. Crossing here would have left the entrance of the valley towards 
Elbasan obscured, allowing the Macedonians to approach unseen and take the Romans by 
surprise from the rear. This Macedonian force came out from the Gramsh valley, from the 
garrison stationed at Kalaja e Irmajt or another near it. The Macedonians briefly threw 
the Roman rearguard into confusion, but the Romans drew up into military formation and 
repelled the Macedonians. Apustius then continued on to rejoin Sulpicius' camp and 
Sulpicius led the army back to winter quarters at Apollonia.  
 Scholars since Leake have associated Apustius' campaign with Polybius' 
discussion of the 217 BC campaign season (Plb. 1.108. 1-8).64 In this passage, 
Scerdilaidas, the king of Illyrian Arideia, seized multiple towns of the Dassaretii, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 On the creation and development of Albania's borders, see e.g. Marmullaku 1975 pp30-35; Abrahams 
2013; Mazower 2000. Tensions over Albania's borders still run hot: e.g. the October 14th, 2014 brawl 
between the Serbian and Albanian soccer teams over a map of "Greater Albania", and the immediate 
political fallout. I was in Tirana at the time and all were convinced that the Third Balkan War would 
actually begin at any moment. 
64 e.g. Leake 1835 NG III pp326-328; Bekker 1844; Walbank 1957, p 632; Hammond 1968, pp 15-16, 
16n55; Bricoe 1972 ad loc. 
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including Antipatreia, from Macedonian control, before Philip promptly took them back, 
along with additional settlements in the vicinity.  
 Polybius reports Philip hearing about Scerdilaidas' raid: 
τῆς δὲ Δασσαρήτιδος προσηγµένον πόλεις, τὰς µὲν φόβῳ, τὰς δ' 
ἐπαγγελίαις, Ἀντιπάτρειαν, Χρυσονδύωνα, Γερτοῦντα, πολλὴν δὲ καὶ τῆς 
συνορούσης τούτοις Μακεδονίας ἐπιδεδραµηκότα.  
 
[Scerdilaidas] had got into his hands by menaces or by promises several 
cities of the Dassaretae, namely Antipatreia, Chrysondyon, and Gertus, 
and had made extensive inroads on (overran) the neighboring parts of 
Macedonia. 
(Plb. 5.108.2; trans. Loeb, adapted) 
 
Polybius then reports Philip's reprisal raid: 
πλὴν ὅ γε Φίλιππος στρατεύσας ἀνεκτήσατο µὲν τὰς προειρηµένας πόλεις, 
κατελάβετο δὲ τῆς µὲν Δασσαρήτιδος Κρεώνιον καὶ Γεροῦντα ... 
 
Philip, then, advancing with his army recovered the cities I mentioned, 
took Creonium and Gerus in the Dassaretis ... [Philip heads east taking 
more places] 
(Plb. 5.108.8; trans. Loeb) 
   
  We see here a precedent for the Roman military movements in 200 BC centered 
on Antipatreia. The maximum extent of Macedonian control to the west in both 217 BC 
and in 200 BC was western Dasseretis, and Antipatreia was the key city in this area. This 
account reveals that this area around Antipatreia was so important to Philip that he felt 
compelled to immediately retake it personally, even though it was at the far edge of his 
territory. 
 The eastern Myzeqeja plain was understandably important to Philip as it 
functioned as a distinct entity from the western Myzeqeja plain with its own key 
economic and strategic strengths. From the fifteenth century through to today, the 
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Myzeqeja plain has not been viewed as a homogenous entity but rather two 
administrative and economic units.65 This comparative evidence helps us understand the 
likely patterns of economic use and administration of the ancient landscape.  
 [Figure 1.6] The Albanian government currently divides the Myzeqeja into two 
administrative zones, with the western Myzeqeja up to the western edge of the foothills 
of Mt. Shpiragut within the administrative zone of Fier, and the continuation of the plain 
to the east within the administrative zone of Berat. The Ottomans likewise divided the 
plain administratively. In 1466, they made the Myzeqeja plain into the administrative 
Sandjak of Avlona with Berat as its capital. This effectively divided the plain into two 
administrative zones with the western administrative center at the Sandjak's eponymous 
city of Avlona and the eastern administrative center at the Sandjak's capital city of Berat. 
Avlona, ancient Oricum and modern Vlorë, is 25km south of Apollonia, which in turn 
sits 7km west of Fier. There has been continuity in the placement of the two 
administrative centers between the 15th century and today, with the major coastal city in 
the west (Apollonia, then Avlona, then Fier), and Berat in the east holding the 
administrative seats. Berat was always the most important administrative seat in the 
eastern Myzeqeja plain, and often for the central plain as well.66 
 Berat was a wise choice for administrative control of the plain because of how the 
pastoral economy of the plain worked. Throughout time, this plain has been pasturage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 contra Hammond 1968, p1 who argued that the Myzeqeja was a singular entity controlled by the port 
cities of Apollonia and Dyrrachium. 
66 Leake FO Nov 1805 reports that there were only three vizirs in charge of all Albania and Berat was one 
of them (the other two were Scutari and Ioannina). The importance of Berat to the administration of the 
plain is further indicated by the fact even though the Sandjak was originally called the Sandjak of Avlona, 
the capital city was Berat, and then over time the Sandjak came to be called the Sandjak of Berat. Sandjak 
of Avlona: e.g. Karaczay 1842, p69 - seat of the pasha at Berat. Sandjak of Berat: Patsch 1904. 
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used by transhumant shepherds. The shepherds live in the mountains to the east and south 
in summer and move with their flocks into the Myzeqeja plain for the winter.67 Located at 
the boundary of the mountains and the plains, Berat is well positioned for administrative 
control of these people and their flocks at each season of transhumance. This plain is 
pastureland controlled from the edge of the mountains, not from the ports. Apollonia and 
Dyrrachium were foreign controlled (Greek, then Roman) cities focused on the larger 
world of international trade centered on the Adriatic, not the control over transhumant 
shepherds.  
 Caesar, in his Bellum Civile, gives us valuable evidence for the economic use of 
the plain in antiquity. When Caesar was encamped at Dyrrachium, he was unable to get 
provisions brought by ship because Pompey was camping nearby and controlling the 
ports (Caes. BC 3.42.1-3). Caesar was unable to requisition grain from nearby, as the 
surrounding regions "generally need imported grain" (Caes. BC 3.42.5). This is supported 
by the fact that Pompey was importing grain for his own troops. That the land was used 
primarily for pasturage and less for growing cereals is shown in that Caesar was not able 
to get enough grain for his men, but makes up for this caloric deficiency though meat and 
milk (Caes. BC 3.47.4 - 3.48.268). Milk and meat are the products of a pastoral economy, 
and having enough of them to feed an army indicates their abundance. Later in the 
season, the hope of the grain crops beginning to ripen raised the spirits of Caesar's men 
(Caes. BC 3.49.1), indicating that there was some agricultural activity in the region, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See e.g Campbell 1964. 
68 Meat for the men: Pecus vero, cuius rei summa erat ex Epiro copia, magno in honore habebant. Milk for 
the men: chara, quod admixtum lacte multam inopiam levebat. 
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not enough to support an army for an extended period of time. Pompey's troops later in 
the season have trouble even foraging fodder in this area (Caes. BC 3.58; 3.76.3). 
 Varro also supplies us with key economic information about the region. Each of 
the three books of Rerum Rusticarum consists of a dialogue devoted to a different 
component of farming: Book I to agriculture, Book II to pasturage of flocks, and Book III 
to pasturage of small animals. Tellingly, for our purposes, Varro places the dialogue of 
Book II in Epirus (Varro RR 2.int.6). It is reasonable to infer that Varro placed the 
dialogue here because it was expected to resonate with the reader as an ideal setting for a 
discussion of pasturage due to the prevailing landuse in northern Epirus at the time being 
pastoral.69 Reinforcing the idea of there being large-scale pasturage in northern Epirus, 
within the dialogue Varro's characters speak casually of very large herds of hundreds of 
sheep (Varro RR 2.2.20, 2.10.11). Varro's characters also speak of Illyrians being 
transhumant shepherds so skilled and so plentiful that even their women are exemplary at 
the job (Varro RR 2.10.6-9). 
 During the majority of its recorded history, most of the Myzeqeja plain was 
swampland not fit for large-scale agriculture.70 This only changed when the large public 
works projects and agricultural collectives established in the 1960s under the communist 
regime drained the swamps and turned the area into productive agricultural land for 
growing cereals.71 However, without the goad of communist collectives, land all over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Presumably the conversation takes place just north of Butrint, as Atticus, who is included as a participant 
in the dialogue, had an estate there. 
70 Keefe et al.; Marmallaku, esp. pp102-103 for a harrowing account of the ubiquity of malaria here in the 
early 20th century.  
71 Marmallaku; Keefe et al. 
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Albania is today again reverting from agricultural use to pasturage.72 Both Hughes, in the 
early 19th century, and Hammond, in the 1930s, observed the eastern part of the 
Myzeqeja plain near Berat being full of flocks and herds and the western part being 
swampland, and Leake reported that The Bishop of Koritsa told him that "an army 
landing at Avlona, and advancing as far as Berat, would be unable to proceed from a 
want of provisions, Albania producing nothing but men, and this fine looking plain 
returning very little to the cultivator."73 The land use of the Myzeqeja plain in antiquity 
would have been similar to the pastoral land use seen from Caesar to the pre-communist 
modern era. 
 Berat held a position of administrative importance in the region due to its key 
economic and strategic location for the movement of transhumant shepherds in and out of 
the plain. Destroying Antipatreia removed the Macedonian infrastructure for controlling 
the economic and strategically valuable eastern Myzeqeja plain. [Figure 1.7] Rome 
pushed their control eastward and now controlled the western Myzeqeja plain from 
Apollonia, the central Myzeqeja plain from Dimallum, and the eatern Myzeqeja plain 
from the garrison at Codrio. Sulpicius used the 200 BC campaign to push Roman control 
eastward to the next natural barrier. This served to extend the buffer zone around 
Apollonia and to control a key economic area. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 When I biked across the plain from Fier to Lushnjë and then up to Rrogozhinë on April 29, 2014, I was 
astonished at how this landscape was used today predominately for pasturage rather than agriculture. 
Looking at a map, one would assume the limited plains in Albania would be used for agriculture, as are 
Thessaly and Boiotia in Greece. The predominance of pastoralism is reflected in the modern diet, which is 
viewed as deeply traditional. Bread is not a standard part of the meal, as it is in Greece, but meat, cheese, 
and milk always are. A typical breakfast includes both cheese and milk for drinking. 
73 Leake 1835 I, p341; Hughes 1820 II, p262f; Hammond 1968, p1; Hammond 1972, p6. 
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 Politically, this show of force served to pull allies away from the Macedonians, as 
during the winter of 200/199 BC, the Illyrian king Pleuratus (the extent of whose lands is 
unclear but appears traditionally based around the Ardiaeans74), Athamanians, and 
Dardanians offered allegiance to the Romans against the Macedonians75 (L.31.28.1-2). 
Rome would have already learned during their previous actions in the region that the 
political factions in the area would align themselves with whoever appeared to be 
strongest at the moment: In 229 BC, the Romans defeated the Aridaeans in a single 
campaign, after which many local tribes offered their allegiance and asked to be under 
Rome's protection (Plb.2.11.5-17); in 219 BC the Roman campaign in the region 
consisted solely of sacking the best defended settlement in the region, Dimallum, after 
which Demetrious of Pharos surrendered and all the neighboring tribes asked to be 
Roman allies (Plb.3.18.3-6); In 211 BC, the Romans pointed to their recent success in 
battle to convince the Aetolians to ally with them (L.26.24.1-3); and, in 205 BC, Roman 
military presence at Dyrrachium inspired the neighboring tribes with hope to revolt from 
distant Macedonian control and for Roman alliance (L.29.12.3). The Romans knew that a 
show of force, such as burning Antipatreia, would likely pull local tribes out of 
Macedonian control and into their own sphere of alliances. As Antipatreia was far from 
the main Macedonian forces, which limited their potential to come to her aid, especially 
so close to the end of the campaign season, it was an effective and low risk way for Rome 
to demonstrate her military power. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 L.27.30.14: The Aetolians demand Philip return the Aridaeans to Pleuratus and his father; On 
Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus being part of the Ardiaean dynasty, Wilkes 1992, pp167-171; Hammond 1966, 
p243 
75 Aetolians are as yet undecided. 
48 	  
	  
 Hammond argued that this campaign was only intended to create a bridgehead in 
order to attack further east the next season.76 However, the eastern Myzeqeja plain is not 
the only route one might have used to campaign eastward the following year, and thus 
focusing the campaign here would have done little to facilitate an eastward push in 199 
BC. To campaign further east, the Romans would take the Shkumbi valley, which they 
already controlled due to their alliance with the Parthini. Instead, we should view the 200 
BC campaign as primarily aimed to enlarge the buffer zone around Apollonia. Although 
the eastern Myzeqeja plain is small, since there is a major mountain range at the eastern 
end of the plain, pushing Macedonian control out of this area pushes the Macedonians all 
the way to the other side of the mountains to the Korçe valley. The Romans could have 
maintained this extended buffer zone in Illyria and waged the war against Macedon with 
the navy in the east. Such a naval focus would have been consistent with Roman activity 
in the First Macedonian War.77 While preparation for the 199 BC campaign was a factor, 
the 200 BC campaign also served distinct functions of its own and extended Roman 
control into a new vital area. 
 From the end of the 200 BC campaign through the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC, the 
Romans never fought over the Myzeqeja plain again and were repeatedly able to ferry 
troops between Italy and Apollonia, Oricum, and Dyrrachium as well as move troops 
through the Myzeqeja plain without incident. The Romans used these ports to pull all of 
the Roman troops from Greece in 194 BC (L.34.50.10, 34.52.1-2) and 188 BC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Hammond 1966, p43.  
77 For Roman naval campaigns in the First Macedonian War, see Thiel 1946, pp 55-199. 
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(L.38.41.15), as well as to deliver troops to Greece from Italy in 192 BC (L.35.20.11, 
L.35.24.7), 191 BC (L.37.6.1-2), and 189 BC (L.38.3.9-10).  
 In 172 BC, after fifteen years without a military presence in the east, Rome's first 
step in preparing for the Third Macedonian War was to establish garrisons in Apollonia 
and other coastal cities, and this was accomplished without a fight (L.42.18.2-3). Then in 
171 BC, the Romans transferred troops to Apollonia, from where the consul "sent 
tribunes with two thousand soldiers to hold castella of the Dassareti and of the Illyrians" 
(L.42.36.8-9). These actions seem strikingly reminiscent of the 200 BC campaign, and 
were similarly successful in securing the area as Rome had no problem using the coastal 
ports or moving through the plain in 171 BC (L.42.48.7 (Dyrrachium), 42.49.10 
(Apollonia)), in 170 BC (L.43.9.6 (Illyrian Coast west of Dassaretia)), and Paullus' 
arrival on the Illyrian coast in 168 BC.78 
 In 200 BC, Rome sacked Antipatreia to extend the buffer zone around the Illyrian 
ports under Roman protection as well as to gain regional allies. The Illyrian ports had 
come under Roman protection in 229 BC and Rome had previously extended the buffer 
zone in a similar manner by sacking Dimallum in 219 BC. Thus, in location and conduct 
the first step of the Second Macedonian War was a direct extension of the first two 
Illyrian Wars. The 200 BC campaign was successful in that Rome never needed to fight 
to secure this strategically vital area.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 The Third Illyrian War (L.44.30-31) (App. Ill. 9) = (L.42.36) takes place too far north to be covered in 
this chapter. The sacking of Epirus takes place after the time parameters of this dissertation. 
50 	  
	  
 
CHAPTER 2: BETWEEN ILLYRIA AND MACEDONIA 
 
Introduction 
 After the 200 BC campaign season, the Romans gained key allies including the 
Dardani and elected a new consul to replace Sulpicius in the consular province of 
Macedonia. However, Sulpicius still led out the army in the 199 BC campaign.  
 This chapter focuses on the 199 BC campaign and an investigation into the 
topography of the area between Illyria and Macedonia in which it took place, continuing 
through the subsequent events in this area through 168 BC. The Roman campaign of 199 
covered the most territory and spent the most time in the field of any Roman campaign in 
the east to date. This campaign also featured the first clashes between a Roman army and 
a Macedonian army led by Philip V. 
 The landscape in which the 199 BC campaign took place is crucial for the control 
of east-west travel between Illyria and Macedonia and acts as a buffer zone protecting 
against attacks from each direction. 
 Once we understand the topography of the campaign we are able to understand 
better both Sulpicius' goals for the campaign as well as certain of Sulpicius' and Philip's 
actions which otherwise would seem confusing or even foolish. 
Sources of evidence for the 199 BC Campaign 
 Livy (L.31.33.4 - 31.40.6), Cassius Dio (Cass. Dio 18.1-4), and Dio's epitomizor 
Zonaras (Zon. 9.15) discuss the 199 BC land campaign. Livy's account is our most 
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detailed and full, but differs significantly from that of Dio and Zonaras. The most crucial 
difference is that the accounts of Dio and Zonaras recount a much shorter Roman 
campaign; the Romans return to winter quarters at Apollonia at a point in the narrative 
when Livy reports that they continued east with the campaign. Livy is understood to be 
using Polybius as a source for his narrative of the 199 BC land campaign, although the 
corresponding passage of Polybius is lost.79 Dio often differs from Polybius in his 
account of events, but also claims acquaintance with Livy (Dio 67.12.4).80 The 
differences between Livy's and Dio's accounts indicate that Dio was employing additional 
source materials. 
 Both Livy's account and the Dio/Zonaras account of the 199 BC campaign begin 
with the Romans already engaged in military action, having omitted the details 
concerning Roman troop movements from winter quarters to this moment. In Livy's more 
detailed account, military action begins with Roman assaults on settlements in the eastern 
Genusus valley; in the more abrupt Dio/Zonaras account, military action begins with 
skirmishes with Philip's forces in the Korçe valley.   
 In an effort to identify the potential routes and understand the topography of this 
campaign, I conducted three separate research trips through the region which today spans 
portions of Greece, Albania, and FYROM. 
 Understanding the topography is crucial for understanding the trajectory of the 
199 BC campaign. Once the topography is defined, it becomes clear that the restrictions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Briscoe 2009, p462. Tränkle 
80 On differences between Dio's and Polybius' accounts of the same historical events, see Beck 2013. For 
the difficulties in Quellenforschung for Dio, see Millar 1964, pp34-38; Beck 2013, esp. p141n69 "Dio's 
sources are a notorious problem."  
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on movement imposed by the landscape at several points in the campaign forced the 
Roman consul to make crucial decisions. These decisions reveal larger goals and 
priorities, and suggest how they aimed to achieve them. 
Circumstances at the beginning of 199 BC campaign 
 Sulpicius would have expected his imperium to be prorogued for 199 BC based 
both on his own experiences during the First Macedonian War, as well as the recent 
appointments of magistrates in Spain and Africa.  
 In the First Macedonian War, the praetor M. Valerius Laevinus was granted 
imperium in 215 BC, which was then extended annually through 211 BC, in which year 
Sulpicius was elected consul and sent to replace Laevinus in Macedonia (L.26.26.4).81 
Sulpicius command was subsequently extended yearly through 206 BC.82 Extended 
campaigns were thus standard in the Macedonian theater. 
 This practice was not limited to Macedonia nor did it stop in 205 BC with 
Sulpicius' recall. Six magistrates with foreign appointments had their imperium 
prorogued in 205 BC; nine in 204 BC; eight in 203 BC; and eight in 202 BC. In 201 BC 
five magistrates were prorogued, and Laevinus was again granted imperium with relation 
to activities in Macedonia, suggesting that perhaps the magistrates in command of the 
First Macedonian War would again be in charge of the Second. In 200 BC, Sulpicius 
goes to his consular province of Macedonia.  Four other magistrates are prorogued during 
that year, and L. Cornelius Lentulus returned to Rome after a six-year command in Spain; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See Broughton 1951 for full citation of primary sources for magistrates. 
82 Sulpicius was replaced by P. Sempronius Tuditanus in 205 BC (L.29.12), the year in which the Peace of 
Phoenice ended the war. 
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his successor was subsequently prorogued for a second year. Furthermore, in 203 BC the 
Senate took the extreme step of extending Scipio Africanus' imperium indefinitely until 
the end of the Second Punic War (L.30.1.10).  Importantly, Sulpicius himself was 
appointed dictator to prevent anyone from interfering with Scipio's special appointment 
(L.30.24.1-3).83 Recent precedent thus indicated that foreign commands were going to get 
extended terms, and Sulpicius could reasonably have expected such treatment.84 
 It is clear that Sulpicius desired such an outcome.  During the winter of 200/199 
BC, Sulpicius sent letters to the Senate "in which, among other things, it was said that a 
laurel had grown out of the stern of a warship"85 (L.32.1.12). The laurel was both a 
symbol of victory and the 'ornament of generals enjoying a triumph' (Lewis-Short); in 
fact, Sulpicius's contemporary Plautus even used the term 'laurel' as metonymy for a 
triumph (Plaut. Cist. 201). Sulpicius thus was signaling to the Senate that a prodigy had 
appeared that foretold a military victory for Sulpicius in Macedonia, and that a triumph 
would be forthcoming.  
 In the same year, there was a parallel case to Sulpicius' reporting an omen to the 
senate to get his imperium prorogued. In 200 BC, when Quintus Minucius Rufus was the 
praetor in charge of the province of Bruttium, the Temple of Proserpina at Locri was 
robbed and the Senate ordered Minucius to make right this sacrilege (L31.12.1-4). 
Importantly, Livy tells us that "the concern to atone for the violation of this temple was 
increased by the prodigies which were reported in numerous parts of the country at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The consul Servilius Caepio had announced his intention to interfere with Scipio's extended command.  
84 Africanus' influence at Rome was strong in 199 BC, as he was elected consul and chosen Princeps 
Senatus in that year, and Sulpicius might have thought that Africanus would support Sulpicius' extended 
command as Sulpicius had supported his. 
85 "in quibus inter cetera scriptum erat lauream in puppi navis longae enatam" 
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same time", prodigies which included "dread forms of animals reported in several places" 
(L.31.12.5-6). Minucius successfully investigated the sacrilege and replaced the money 
(L.31.13.1), and so his work there seemed to be complete. However, he then sent a report 
to the senate that in his province a colt and three chicks were each born with one too 
many legs (L.32.1.7-11), apparently indicating continued divine displeasure. As a result, 
the senate extends Minucius' command to continue dealing with conspiracies in Bruttium 
(L.32.1.7-8). Magistrates were claiming indications of divine pleasure or displeasure in 
order to influence the Senate's decisions about prorogation. 
 According to Livy's account, there is further precedent for Sulpicius making use 
of religion to gain military command. Sulpicius was a strong advocate for declaring war 
on Macedonia and used evidence of divine approval to get the war vote passed. At the 
time Sulpicius is elected consul in 200 BC, the Roman senate and people were debating 
whether to declare war on Macedonia, but the people had not yet voted. On the day he 
was inaugurated as consul, Sulpicius offered a motion that the consuls perform sacrifice 
and conduct a short prayer he composed that "whatever the senate and people shall 
resolve for the common good and with reference to beginning a new war" turns out well 
(L.31.5.3-4). Sulpicius then reported back to the senate that the gods approved this prayer 
and sacrifice and that the haruspices said that the "entrails were propitious and portended 
an extension of territory, victory, and a triumph" (L.31.5.7). Nonetheless, the people 
voted against the war (L.31.6.3).  
 In response, Sulpicius explained his earlier actions and the meaning of the divine 
response, saying that "the immortal gods themselves favor [voting for war], for when I 
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offered sacrifice and prayer that this war should turn out successfully for me, for the 
senate and for you, for the allies and the Latin confederacy, and for our fleets and armies, 
they all gave favorable and propitious signs" (L.31.7.14-15). As a result, the people then 
voted for war (L.31.7.15). Because Sulpicius had previously been assigned Macedon, this 
vote was in effect a vote for Sulpicius to have military command in Macedon.86  
 However in 199 BC, contrary to expectation, Sulpicius's imperium was not 
extended and he was replaced for the upcoming campaign. On the Ides of March 199 BC, 
the province of Macedonia was assigned to the incoming consul P. Villius Tappulus. 
Sulpicius knew this well before the campaign season began. In 199 BC, the Ides of 
March fell on either January 4th (Gregorian) or January 26th (Gregorian).87 Either 
possible date leaves more than enough time for Sulpicius to have learned that he was 
replaced before Villius would have come to replace him.  
 It appears then that Sulpicius decided to go on campaign anyway even though he 
knew he was not intended to. To do this, Sulpicius left his his winter quarters with his 
army before Vilius showed up to relieve him, and therefore set out earlier than the normal 
start of campaign season. 
 The other reason that Sulpicius wanted to leave earlier than usual was that he 
needed to start harassing the Dassaretii as soon as possible if he wanted to engage with 
Philip during the 199 campaign season. Philip might have otherwise chosen to direct his 
energies towards a different theater, as the Macedonians were engaged in conflicts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 After obtaining the war vote, Sulpicius successfully challenged the normal actions of the fetials 
(L.31.8.3) and the pontifex maximus (L.31.9.7-8) to get what he wanted, furthering the idea that he is 
unafraid to manipulate religion for his own ends. 
87 Marchetti 1973; Derow 1976. Briscoe 1981, pp 17-26 summarizes and critiques their debates and 
supplies a helpful chart. 
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elsewhere during this period. Sulpicius wanted to engage with Philip in order to win a 
major battle and get a triumph. The need for this was even greater since he was defying 
the senate and knew this could be his last chance to hold imperium. 
Topographical Analysis of the 199 BC Campaign 
 For the purposes of this analysis, I have divided the Roman campaign of 199 BC 
into three sections, on the basis of geography. Furthermore, there are Roman military 
victories over Macedonian forces at the end of each of these three sections. The Romans 
had to make a decision about what to do next after each of these victories; these were not 
inevitable choices. Important information can thus be extrapolated from the choices made 
at these key moments.  
 Section one focuses on the events in the Korçe valley through to their victory over 
the Macedonians near Otolobus (L.31.33.4 - 31.39.3). Section two focuses on the plain 
extending from the Kleidi pass (Greece) north to the modern city of Prilep (FYROM) 
culminating in the Roman victory over the Macedonians at the Kleidi pass (L.31.39.4 - 
31.39.15; Dio 18.1-4; Zon.9.15). Section three focuses on the area from the Kleidi pass 
south to the modern city of Kozani, continuing west and northwest to the Tsangon pass 
where the Romans take the Macedonian controlled city of Pelium (L.31.40.1-6). 
Topographic Analysis of Section I 
 Livy reports that the Romans left their winter quarters at Apollonia (L.31.18.9, 
31.40.6) and headed east:  
per Dassaretiorum fines exercitum ducebat, frumentum quod ex hibernis 
extulerat integrum uehens, quod in usum militi satis esset praebentibus 
agris. oppida uicique partim uoluntate, partim metu se tradebant; quaedam 
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ui expugnata, quaedam deserta in montes propinquos refugientibus 
barbaris inueniebantur. ad Lyncum statiua posuit prope flumen Beuum; 
inde frumentatum circa horrea Dassaretiorum mittebat. 
 
Sulpicius was leading the army through the territory of the Dassaretii, 
carrying with him untouched the grain he had brought from winter 
quarters, since the country supplied adequately the needs of the soldiers. 
The oppida and vici surrendered, some voluntarily, others through fear; 
some were carried by assault, some were found abandoned as the 
barbarians fled to the neighboring mountains. He established a base near 
Lyncus on the river Bevus; from there he sent troops to forage among the 
granaries of the Dassaretii. 
(Livy 31.33.4-6) 
 
 It will be useful to first determine the location of Roman camp, and then to 
establish how he traveled between Apollonia and this location.88 
 In this passage, Livy supplies us with five topographic clues for locating the 
Roman camp: 
1) It is near 'Lyncus' 
2) Territory of the Dassaretii had to be passed through to get there 
3) It is close enough to (or in) an area controlled by the Dassaretii that would allow for 
granary raiding. 
4) This area controlled by the Dassaretii generates (or trades for) enough grain to have all 
these granaries for the Romans to raid. 
5) It is on a river named Bevus.  
 Scholars agree that Livy's use of the toponym Lyncus here does not refer to the 
city Lynchnidos (located at modern Ohrid) but rather "the name of the canton occupied 
by the Lyncestae,"89 a people who occupied the mountainous area east of and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See chapter one for discussion of location of Apollonia just west of the modern city of Fier, Albania. 
89 Hammond 1966a, p43n19  
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surrounding Lake Prespa.90 [Figure 2.1] It follows that Sulpicius established his camp at 
the western edge of this territory, as Livy makes no mention of Sulpicius having passed 
through it. 
 Topographic clues 2, 3, and 4 above all refer to an area of land under control of 
the Dassaretii. The Dassaretii appear to have controlled an area centered around the 
Korçe valley and the mountainous zone between the Korçe valley and Berat (Antipatreia) 
including the Devoll valley, but the extent "varied with political conditions".91 At times it 
extended as far as the western shore of Lake Ohrid,92 the southern shore of Lake Ohrid,93 
beyond the Tsangon pass at the eastern edge of the Korçe valley,94 and the easternmost 
part of the Genusus valley by Lake Ohrid.95 In 199 BC it would appear that all of this 
territory was under Dassaretian control due to their relationship with Macedonia; 
Macedonia's military interventions in this area since 217 BC kept the Dassaretian borders 
at their greatest extent.96 Territory controlled by the Dassaretii thus lies between the 
Roman winter quarters at Apollonia and the western edge of Lyncus.97 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 e.g. Leake 1835, 3.310-311; Kromayer 1907, map 199 BC; Hammond 1967, p614-616; Hammond 1972, 
pp58ff; TIR; Hammond & Walbank 1988, p 153; BA; Ceka 2013, p381. Notice that Kromayer, Hammond, 
and Ceka all agree on this placement - a rare occurrence of scholarly consensus.  
91 Hammond 1972, p95. 
92 Hammond: 1968, Fig 1;1966a, Fig 3; 1966b, Fig 1;1989, Fig 1; Hammond & Walbank 1988, Fig 8. 
93 Ceka 2013, p421; Badian 1952, p74; Hammond 1967, Map 15. 
94 Wilkes 1992, map 4; Ceka 2013, p421; Hammond 1972, p96; Badian 1952, p74; BA. 
95 Hammond: 1968, Fig 1; 1966a, Fig 3; 1966b, Fig 1; 1989, Fig 1; 1988, Fig 8. 
96 Macedonian military takeover of the Dassaretii in 217 BC (Plb. 5.108.8). Macedonian actions that led to 
potential expansion of Dassaretian territory: Macedonian military control of Ardiaeans and Atintanes on 
north shore of Lake Ohrid and extending west by 208 BC (L.27.30.13). Macedonian intervention in 
Dassaretii and takeover of Lynchnidos on eastern shore of Lake Ohrid in 208 BC (L.27.32.9). Macedonian 
military control of Parthini by 205 BC (L.29.12.3). Macedonian insistence on control of Atintanes in 205 
BC (L.29.12.13). Repeated attacks by Philip on Apollonia and Dyrrachium that involved moving land 
forces via Lake Ohrid indicating Macedonian/Dassaretian control of areas south and west of Lake Ohrid in 
216 BC (Pol. 5.110), 214 BC (L. 24.40), and 205 BC (L. 29.12.5-7). 
97 Walbank 1940, p142 and Kromayer 1907 both believe Sulpicius went north of Lake Ohrid, but 
Hammond has since convincingly demonstrated that the Atintani, not the Dassaretii, controlled the area 
north of the lake (most thoroughly, Hammond 1989), which helps explain the Macedonian interest in the 
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 Livy states that the Romans raided the granaries of the Dassaretii. The Romans 
need to raid granaries because the grain in the fields is not yet ripe at this point in the 
campaign; in fact Livy reports when it does become ripe later in the season (L.31.36.6). 
[Figure 2.2] The only major agricultural zone in Dassaretian territory is the Korçe valley. 
This is the only area that could produce enough surplus grain that the Romans could still 
successfully raid storehouses containing the previous year's harvest just before the new 
harvest is to begin. The Korçe valley borders the western boundary of Lyncus. Thus a 
location in the Korçe valley accords with the first four of Livy's topographic clues.  
 What remains is identifying the River Bevus. This is difficult as the only other 
mention of a river Βεύος is in Stephanus of Byzantium who states only that a 
Macedonian polis named Βεύη was near it.  Though poorly attested, it is possible to 
identify the river Bevus on the basis of other evidence; we should look for a river that 
accords with Livy's other topographic clues, supplies a strategic location for the camp, 
and aligns with the rest of Livy's narrative. The Çërravë river fits these requirements: it is 
located at the edge of the Korçe plain near the mountains of Lyncus, and offers a strategic 
location for a camp.98 The Çërravë river flows into Lake Ohrid from the south, 
originating in the ridge of hills that divide the Pogradec plain on the southern shore and 
the Korçe plain.99  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Atintani at the Peace of Phoenice (L.29.12.13). There is an agricultural area at the north of the lake, but its 
proximity to Macedonian controlled Lynchnidus (L.27.32.9) would lead one to expect Lynchnidus to play a 
role in the narrative if the Romans went by it, especially as Lynchidus does play a role in the Roman 
preparations for the Third Macedonian War.  
98 In disagreement: Ceka 2013, p210 places the river Bevos [sic] "in the upper flow of the river Devoll" 
without supporting argument. 
99 Hammond (1968, p16n55; 1967 p616 n1; 1966a, p43; 1972, p94) previously argued for this river being 
the Bevus, but his reasoning was based on unconvincing linguistics (namely that Polybius' Boioi 
(Plb.5.108.8) should be related to, and live by, this Bevus) paired with an unconvincing placement for the 
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 Establishing a camp on the ridge by the site of the modern village of Cërrave 
along the Çërravë river would be a strategic choice for multiple reasons: it sits roughly 
100m above the Pogradec plain to the north, but 100m below the top of the ridge; this 
area is thus effectively hidden from the Korçe plain while still being within easy raiding 
distance. From the top of this ridge, Roman scouts would have a commanding view of the 
entire Korçe plain, including the Tsangon pass and the pass south of Korçe. Positioning 
their camp by Cërrave would also give the Romans the advantage of high ground in the 
event of an attack from the Korçe valley to the south, as an attacking army would have to 
climb 150 m of elevation.  
 Scholars have proposed three possible routes that could take the Roman army 
through the territory of the Dassaretii between Apollonia and the Korçe valley. 
 [Figure 2.3] The first is a relatively direct route as the crow flies between Berat 
and Korçe, described in detail by Leake on the basis of personal autopsy.100 In his Travels 
in Northern Greece, Leake describes his own journey via this route; scholars have since 
interpreted this to mean that it was a viable route for the Roman army.101 However, in 
Leake's foreign office correspondence, there is a letter dated November 7th, 1805 
addressed to Lord Mulgrave, concerning his mission to identify potential military routes 
through the landscape. Leake writes that this route cannot be called "a practicable 
passage".102 Leake could travel it with a horse but declares it not passable for an army. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Boioi, themselves, (namely that Polybius is listing toponyms following Philip's route east, but 
acknowledging that at least one location does not follow this logic). There is no evidence to locate where 
on the lake the Boioi were. 
100 Leake 1835, I p337-354 covering September 10-13, 1805.  
101 Hammond 1972, pp97-99 argues for this route, citing Leake, and is followed by TIR and BA. 
102 Leake FO 78/57, pp128-131. 
61 	  
	  
Even today there is no road along this route and very few villages; this rough landscape 
does not lend itself to travel by ancient or modern means.  
 This leaves two viable routes that must be considered. The first goes southeast 
through the Devoll valley via Gramsh and enters the central Korçe plain by Maliq.103 The 
other passes through the Genusus valley to the western bank of lake Ohrid, before 
heading south along the lake to the northern edge of the Korçe plain.  
 The route through the Genusus valley is most likely to have been the one 
Sulpicius chose, due to the comparative difficulty of the terrain of the Devoll valley. This 
difficult terrain would have been amplified by seasonal weather, logistical concerns, and 
the fact that it was hostile territory.  
 The route through the Devoll valley travels through significantly more rugged 
terrain than the route through the Genusus valley. The hills rise steeply from both sides of 
the river resulting in more limited areas at the same level for troops to march together, 
and route itself is comprised of a series of steep hills. It took a modern public works 
project to level enough space to first build a major road through this valley. However, 
this road was washed out so severely that as of October 2014 it had not been operational 
in years and the road workers I spoke to did not expect it to be operational for many more 
years due to both the work involved and the propensity of this valley for further 
washouts. The hills to the west of the road are so steep that there is no route around the 
washout.104 In contrast, the via Egnatia was built in the Genusus valley in the 130s BC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Supports this route: Hammond 1972; Ceka 2013, p210.  
104 The Albanian road workers explained this to me with my map. The only roads in those hills are "too 
difficult even for a pick up truck". 
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and was maintained throughout the Byzantine, Ottoman, and modern periods in part due 
to this valley's gradual grade and wide areas for troops to march together.  
 The difficulty of the terrain would have been amplified by the season in which the 
Roman army was traveling, due to the fact that inclement weather, snow, flooded 
streams, and mud would make movement through rough terrain even more difficult.  
 Livy gives us two major temporal markers over the course of the narrative related 
to the grain harvest in this region, and the relationship of the harvest season to the events 
of the campaign.  Based on our understanding of the traditional time for the harvest 
season in this area, it is possible to work backwards and determine the point at which 
Sulpicius set out from Apollonia.  
 Later in the campaign, when the Romans arrive at Stuberra, they foraged the grain 
that was in the fields of Pelagonia (L.31.39.4). The period of time in which cereals are 
reaped in the field is limited because cereals need to be within a certain window of 
ripeness to be reaped and ripe cereals are especially susceptible to loss due to adverse 
weather, e.g. wind, hail, and rain.105 The entire cereal harvest of oats, barley, and wheat 
lasts only four to six weeks, with the wheat harvest focused in the last two weeks.106 
Wheat can be harvested "green" at the beginning of this period, and although riskier for 
storage purposes, can be immediately eaten.107 Comparative studies with lowland and 
mountain crops in northern Greece as well as mountain villages in Euboia indicate that 
the wheat harvest in Pelagonia and the Korçe valley traditionally fell in end of June and 
beginning of July, but wheat could be "green harvested" before it was fully ripe from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Halstead 2014, pp 67-121, esp. pp71-77, 102-104, 113. 
106 Halstead 2014, pp 72, 103-4; du Boulay 1994, pp275-6. 
107 Halstead 2014, pp73-75, 104. 
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beginning of June.108 From this information, it can be deduced that the Romans must 
have begun foraging in Pelagonia in early July to have been able to gather significant 
quantities of grain in the fields, as it would have been in the local farmers' best interest to 
have gotten their crops out of the fields as soon as possible to avoid loss. The sooner the 
Romans arrive, the less the locals have already harvested. Additionally, it can be deduced 
that the Romans could not have begun foraging in the fields in the Korçe valley before 
the beginning of June, as the wheat would not yet have been edible. 
 The following is a conservative estimate of days of the 199 BC campaign, using 
the harvest dates discussed above as fixed points to determine when Sulpicius left his 
winter quarters. All of the time periods are estimated cautiously, even using the bare 
minimum number of days when such information is available, and each time estimate 
could reasonably be extended. Although I have not discussed Philip's movements yet, I 
include them in the timeline and will discuss them in detail below. 
Starting date: Mid April (Approximately 48 days before beginning harvest in Korçe 
valley) 
Roman march from Apollonia to camp at Çërravë, including raiding of settlements and 
pillaging foodstores: (~184km) 14 days 
Time from Roman arrival at Çërravë before Philip leaves Bitola area: 7 days  
Philip marches from Bitola area to east of Tsangon pass: (~85 km Bitola to Bilisht via 
Florina pass) 3 days 
Cavalry searching/skirmish/corpse recall: 4 days 
Philip recalls Perseus; Perseus marches to Philip: (~100 km Bitola to Gradsko) 8 days 
Philip marches to Athacus: (~40km Bilisht to Blace) 1 day 
Time before Romans to Ottolubum: 10 days 
Romans to Ottolobus: 1 day 
Beginning of harvesting date for Korçe valley: June 1 (approximate) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Halstead 2014, p72; DuBoulay 1994, p276. In 195 BC, Roman foragers harvested ripe grain and 
trampled the unripe grain (L.34.26.8); the presence of both in the field indicates that they were foraging at 
the earliest part of the harvest. I have not been able to find comparative data on pre-modern harvest times in 
Albania. When anthropological interest in Greece in the 20th century was strong, the communist regime in 
Albania kept their borders closed and information secret. 
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Romans forage/get careless: 7 days 
Skirmish: 1 day 
End Section I 
Romans stay in Korçe valley after Philip leaves: 7 days 
Roman march to Stuberra: (~150km Çërravë to Chepigovo) 5 days 
Period of harvest in Pelagonia: Late June/early July 
Romans start harvesting in Pelagonia roughly 20 days after beginning harvesting in 
the Korçe valley. 
 
 According to this estimate, for the Romans to have been able to forage in the 
fields in the Korçe valley and Pelagonia as Livy says they did, the Romans had to have 
left winter quarters at mid-April at the latest. Since all of these time estimates are low 
estimates, Sulpicius could have reasonably set out as early the beginning of April or even 
late March. April is a cold and wet period for travel through the mountainous terrain 
between Apollonia and the Korçe valley.109 The harsh spring weather of April would 
have increased the relative difficulty of travel through the Devoll valley compared to the 
Genusus valley. 
 In further support of this timetable, we know that Sulpicius would have been 
motivated to begin his campaign as early in the season as possible, since he needed to set 
out before the new consul arrived, and because of his desire to engage with Philip, as 
discussed above. 
 Logistical concerns would also impact Sulpicius' choice of route. Livy notes that 
the Romans set out from winter quarters carrying grain with them (L.31.33.4). Later in 
the account of this campaign, Livy mentions that they were traveling with a grave agmen 
that did not allow them to pursue Philip when he escaped via a mountainous route 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 I was in Tepelene in early April 2015 and it was freezing cold. The mountains seen to the north and east 
from Permet at the end of April 2015 were all covered in snow. The Metsovo pass was closed due to heavy 
snowfall through April in 2015. 
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(L.31.29.2). Based on his use of the same term in his description of the Roman troop 
movements in Asia in 189 BC, a grave agmen is a wagon train.110 Livy tells us that their 
movement is slowed to a mere five miles per day because they were "dragging a train 
heavy now with booty" (praeda iam grave agmen trahens) (L.38.15.14). The grave 
agmen clearly refers to carts rather than heavy infantry.111 In both these situations, the 
grave agmen restricts Roman troop movements.112 
 While a Roman military expedition always had a large number of mules and the 
soldiers carried great weights on their persons, not all campaigns had trains, and for the 
ones that did, the size of the train could vary considerably.113 Having carts as part of the 
baggage train would be consistent, however, with later examples of Roman military 
action in Greece. For example, in 171 BC the Roman army in northeast Thessaly was 
foraging with at least 1000 wagons (L.42.65.3). Livy's mention of the grave agmen thus 
shows that the 199 BC campaign had a wagon train and that the train was of sufficient 
size that rough terrain would slow and/or impede its travel. 
 Furthermore, the Romans were bringing elephants on this campaign and this was, 
in fact, the first campaign in which they had done so (L.31.36.4). In 169 BC, a full 30 
years later, the Romans still have serious problems maneuvering elephants through 
rugged terrain (L.44.5.2-12). Since this is the first time the Romans included elephants in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Roth 2012, p 297 takes it as self-evident that grave agmine (L.31.29.2) means a wagon train.  
111 Then on the Roman return to Greece in 188 BC, Livy tells us that their baggage train (impedimenta) 
contained, or possibly consisted of, loaded carts (plaustra) (L.38.40.6). Presumably this is the same train 
this same army had in the earlier part of their campaign. 
112 For further discussion concerning military movement without a train being faster and easier than with 
the train, see Roth 2012, pp 79-90. 
113 Roth 2012, passim esp. pp68-116. 
66 	  
	  
their campaign, they were likely considerably less skilled at maneuvering them than they 
were in 169 BC, and as a result should be expected to choose a more conservative route. 
 The final issue is whether the Romans had to pass through hostile territory, since 
there is a greater potential for getting ambushed and generally harried as opposed to 
traveling in allied territory. One should assume that Sulpicius took this into consideration. 
The route through the Devoll valley via Gramsh was controlled by the Dassaretii. The 
route through the Genusus valley was controlled in part by the Parthini and in part by the 
Dassaretii. 
 [Figure 2.1] The Parthini occupied the area north of the Genusus valley extending 
east from Dyrrachium, controlling movement through the lower Genusus valley that runs 
northeast between the modern city of Elbesan and the modern village of Librazhd.114 At 
Librazhd, the valley turns to the southeast and gradually climbs to the modern village of 
Qukes before turning east through the Prrenjas plain and quickly climbing up the ridge 
and then quickly down to Lake Ohrid. Control of the valley between Librazhd and the 
lake appears to have shifted through time between the Parthini and the Dassaretii.115  
 The Parthini were Roman allies in 199 BC. They had surrendered to the Romans 
without a fight in 229 BC and were taken under Roman protection (Plb.2.11.11). Rome 
was still in control of them in 215 BC (Plb.7.9.13), but by 205 BC the Parthini had come 
under Macedonian control (L.29.12.3). Apparently, though, the Parthini found the 
Romans more agreeable masters, as the Roman arrival at Dyrrachium in 205 BC aroused 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 See Hammond 1968, p8 for bibliography of ancient sources on the Parthini. As Mt Shpatit and Mt 
Polisit rise up from the area directly south of the valley in this area, this part of the Genusus valley is 
logically easier to control from the north. 
115 The Parthini controlled the entire Genusus valley by the Third Macedonian War due to Roman 
patronage (Pliny NH 3.145; L.43.9.7).  
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the Parthini "to the hope of revolution". The Parthini were then restored to Roman control 
at the Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC (L.29.12.13).  
 On the other hand, the Macedonians controlled the Dassaretii in 199 BC, and 
during the 200 BC campaign there appears to have been at least one active Macedonian 
garrison in the Devoll valley.116 
 [Figure 2.3] All of this evidence points to the idea that Sulpicius would have 
chosen the Genusus valley. Sulpicius was an experienced general with many years in the 
field and many previous years of command in this theater of war. He should be expected 
to have taken all of these considerations into account when he chose his route inland and 
chosen the least difficult route. 
Location of Philip and the Macedonian army 
 Having established the Roman route and the location of their camp at Çërravë, it 
will be useful to determine the Macedonian army's location at this point in the campaign.  
 The Macedonian army is not all in one place as Philip has split his forces. Philip 
began the season by sending his son Perseus with troops to guard the pass ad Pelagoniam 
to prevent Dardanian invasion (L.31.33.3). [Figure 2.4] To invade Macedonia or 
Pelagonia the Dardanians would travel south along the Axius river to the confluence of 
the Erigon and Axius rivers, where the ancient city of Stobi was located (L.39.53.16). At 
this juncture, the Dardanians could continue southeast and south along the Axius valley 
into Macedonia or head southwest along the Erigon valley to Pelagonia.  The confluence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Discussed in chapter one. 
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of the Erigon and Axius rivers is thus a key point to control to prevent Dardanian 
invasions into Macedonian controlled territory.117 
 Controlling this pass had been a focus of Philip's.118 In 217 BC, "Philip occupied 
Bylazora, the largest town in Paeonia and very favorably situated as regards the pass 
from Dardania to Macedonia. So that by this conquest he very nearly freed himself from 
the fear of the Dardani, it being no longer easy for them to invade Macedonia, now that 
Philip commanded the passes by holding this city" (Plb.5.97.1-2). Bylazora was located 
in the Axius valley roughly 22km northwest of Stobi at the modern village of Veles in 
FYROM. Bylazora thus also controlled access to the Axius and Erigon valleys.119  
 Then in 211 BC, "Philip captured a city of the Dardanians, Sintia, as likely to 
afford a passage for the Dardanians into Macedonia (L.26.25.3). While the location of 
Sintia is not secure, it is reasonable to assume that it was within the territory controlled 
by the Sinti, which extended from the Roupel pass into Macedonia between Mt Kerkini 
and Mt Sintiki north along the Strymon river valley almost 40km to the Kresnenska 
pass.120 A city in the Strymon valley due east of Veles would control access through the 
valley. Presumably this more eastern route into Macedonia became an issue once the 
Axius and Erigon valleys were shut off in 217 BC. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 The Macedonian controlled territory further west than Pelagonia is protected by the Macedonian 
controlled/allied buffer zone of the Atintani in 199 BC. However, from a period beginning sometime 
between 215 BC and 208 BC (211 BC is the most likely date) to the Peace of Phoenice in late 205 BC, this 
buffer zone included the Parthini and the Ardiaeans as well as the Atintani. 
118 And understandably so, as the Dardanians had been a thorn in the Macedonian side for some time, 
including conflicts in 229 BC both before and after Demetrius' death (before: L.31.28.1-1; After: Justin 
28.3.14), as well as Philip's first campaign as king, in 220 BC (Justin 29.1.10). See Greenwalt 2010, pp301-
302. 
119 Bylazora: Papazoglou 1988, pp. 308-310, map 12; Hammond 1972, pp79-81, map 17. 
120 Papazoglou 1988, p366-368, map 16; Hammond 1972, p198, map 17. 
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 Controlling these passes needed to be a repeated undertaking by the Macedonians 
because the Dardanians were persistent in their efforts to raid them. In 208 BC The 
Dardanians invade Macedonia and hold Orestis and advance west into the Argestaean 
plain121 (L.27.28.1). This Dardanian campaign would have taken the Erigon valley pass 
into Pelagonia and then continued south through the Monastir gap. In 207 BC Philip 
waged war with these Dardanians, presumably to regain control of this pass. (L.28.8.14). 
 After Philip pulled Perseus from the pass in 199 BC, the Dardanii invaded 
Macedonia through the Axius valley.122 Then, in 183 BC Philip, as part of the process of 
shoring up his eastern and northern borders (L.39.53.12-14), founded a new city (Perseis) 
on the Erigon near Stobi (L.39.53.14-16) to control more directly Dardanian access 
through the Erigon valley. 
 Between the 200 BC and 199 BC campaign seasons, the Dardanians allied 
themselves to the Romans in order to join them in attacking the Macedonians (L.31.28.1-
2). This recent alliance provides extra reason for Philip to have suspected that there 
would be a Dardanian attack this campaign season.  
 That Philip split his forces at the beginning of the 199 BC campaign shows that he 
was not sure what the Romans would do in this campaign season. Sending Perseus to 
guard the pass shows that Philip suspects one of two actions: The Romans could stay put 
on the western coast and send the newly allied Dardanians and Illyrians to attack the 
Macedonians for them, or they could attack on two fronts with the Dardanians/Illyrians 
from the north and the Romans from the west. Since Philip does not send all his troops to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 For the Argestaean plain as a part of Orestis, see Leake 1835, IV p122; Hammond 1972, p 100. 
122 This is discussed later in this chapter. 
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guard against the Dardanians, or leave the vicinity to resume his recent military activities 
in Asia, Thrace, or Attica, we must assume that Philip suspects a Roman land assault 
from the west. However, there are two different routes by which Philip could expect the 
Romans to make this attack. 
 [Figure 2.3] The first route goes north of Lake Ohrid past Pylon, Lynchnidos, and 
Herakleia. The Via Egnatia later followed this route (Strabo 7.7.4).123 This was the most 
common route taken, and the easiest route for an army to travel, which argues for this 
being the expected route for the Romans. The second route is the route Sulpicius actually 
chose, namely to go south around Lake Ohrid to the Korçe valley.  
 [Figure 2.4] If one were mounting an invasion of Macedonia from the west by 
either of these routes, one would emerge in the southern Pelagonia valley, an area called 
the Monastir Gap by scholars of World War II. The northern route would enter the valley 
at Heracleia Lyncestis, located at the modern city of Bitola (formerly Monastir), while 
the southern route would enter the valley less than 30km south of Heracleia by the 
modern city of Florina. If Philip tried try to block or ambush the Roman army on the 
march on either the northern or southern route, and guessed wrong, the Roman army 
would end up behind him with a clear path into the heart of Macedonia via Edessa. 
Knowing this, the best strategy would be to wait in the area between Florina and 
Heracleia.124 Heracleia was a major Macedonian city in a grain-growing region and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 For the route of the via Egnatia, see Hammond 1974; Romiopoulou 1974; Collart 1976; Fasolo 2003; 
Lolos 2008; Via Egnatia Foundation 2010. 
124 Philip had left winter quarters before the Romans sent out their scouts to look for his camp (L.31.33.7), 
indicating that he was not waiting at Pella, but had already moved west.  
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would have had the provisions to supply the Macedonian army. Philip thus camped here 
and waited to hear if and how the Romans were invading. 
 While the Romans were pillaging the horrea of the settlements in the Korçe 
valley, Livy tells us that "Philip saw that everything round about was in confusion and 
that the people were greatly terrified" (L.31.33.6). However, Philip did not know where 
the Roman army was encamped and sent out a squadron (ala) of cavalry as a scouting 
party into the Korçe valley (L.31.33.6-8). 
 From his camp by Heracleia, Philip's options for entering the Korçe valley were 
few. He could travel the very round-about route north of the lakes and then circle around 
Lake Ohrid and enter the Korçe valley from the north, or he could travel north of Lake 
Prespa and cut south between the lakes through rugged territory and enter the Korçe 
valley from the north. The most direct option was to enter the Korçe valley from the east 
via the Tsangon Pass. While this third option is more direct, if the Romans held the 
Tsangon pass, Philip could end up in a disadvantageous situation. Philip needed to 
proceed with caution until he understood how the Romans occupied the Korçe valley. 
 If Philip sent out his cavalry from where he was encamped by Heracleia, it would 
have involved the cavalry traveling roughly 85km each way, a multiple day journey. This 
seems unlikely. Rather, once Philip knew that the Romans were in the Korçe valley, he 
moved his camp through the Florina pass and established a new camp in the Bilisht plain 
southeast of the Tsangon pass. From here he sent out his cavalry scouting party to 
investigate the situation, including the Tsangon pass.  
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 At the same time, the Romans knew that the Macedonian army had left winter 
quarters and were in the land of the Dassaretii, but did not know exactly where they were 
(L.31.33.7). The Romans sent out cavalry to scout for Philip's camp, simultaneously with 
Philip's scouting party (L.31.33.7).  
 The Macedonian and Roman cavalry scouting parties met and had an inconclusive 
skirmish in the Korçe plain (L.31.33.8-10), and neither army learned the location of the 
other's camp from their scouts (L.31.33.10).125 However, deserters furnished information 
to each army on each other's campsite (L.31.33.11). 
 Philip now acted decisively, having learned where the Romans were encamped 
and that they were not holding the Tsangon pass. He recalled Perseus and the soldiers 
with him (L.31.33.6), indicating that the imminent Roman threat was his primary 
concern. Once Philip had gathered both forces together, he had 20,000 infantry and 2000 
cavalry (L.31.34.7) - equivalent numbers of men to the Romans. Since Philip learned of 
the Roman location from deserters, it is reasonable to assume that he also learned how 
many men Sulpicius had and the state of their provisions.126 
 Philip used deserters as guides (L.31.33.7), who would have had foreknowledge 
of the landscape, and been able to have led Philip to a strategic location in relation to the 
Roman camp at Çërravë. [Figure 2.5] Philip advanced and "fortifies with a wall and 
ditch a hill near Athaeus, a little more than a mile from the Roman camp" (L.31.33.7). 
The location of Athaeus is unknown, as is its proper spelling, as different manuscripts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 As the ridge south of the Roman camp by Çërravë blocked the view of the Roman camp from the plain, 
this skirmish could have taken place anywhere in the Korçe valley. 
126 Sulpicius, on the other hand, would have learned from deserters that Philip had significantly fewer men 
than Philip later showed up with. 
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and editors supply Athaeo, Ataeo, Athaco, Achaco, and Achaeo and we have no other 
attestation to help us determine the correct name.127  
 Despite this, it is possible to determine the location of the Macedonian camp. 
Following Livy, we know that the camp was on a hill, and a little more than a mile from 
the Roman camp located by Çërravë. There is a ridge of hills that runs from south of 
Çërravë towards the northeast, with a small gap southeast of Çërravë. This ridge runs 
roughly one mile from Çërravë. The modern village of Blace is less than 1.5 km 
southeast from here, and is a reasonable location for where ancient Athaeus was. The area 
on the hill east-northeast of Çërravë is large enough to have held a Macedonian camp. 
Therefore this is the most logical place for Philip's camp to have been. 
 Additionally, from this hill one has a clear view of Çërravë and the surrounding 
plain. Livy relates an anecdote about Philip looking down on the Roman camp from his 
own camp. Livy states that Philip "seeing the Roman camp stretched out below him, it is 
said that he admired its whole arrangement and each section allotted its own place, with 
the rows of tents and also the well-spaced streets between, and that he remarked that no 
one could believe that that camp belonged to barbarians" (L.31.34.8).  
 [Figure 2.2] To get to this new camp site on the ridge above Blace, Philip went 
west through the Tsangon pass and proceeded north along the eastern edge of the Korçe 
valley to the northeast corner of the plain by the modern village of Padgorie before 
heading cross-country north to Blacë. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Briscoe 1972, p140 "The place is unknown and the correct spelling therefore unascertainable." Briscoe 
1991, ad loc. nomen incertum. 
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 At this time, when the Romans are camped by Çërravë and the Macedonians are 
camped on the ridge to the east above Blace, Dio's and Zonaras' more limited narratives 
come into play alongside Livy's. 
 [Figure 2.5] Livy reports that both armies stayed in their camp for two days, then 
had an inconclusive skirmish with only 1000 men fighting per side (L.31.34.9 - 31.34.7). 
Although the Romans led out all their forces to the battlefield, the Macedonians were 
only willing to engage in a limited skirmish. Logically, this skirmish occurred in the plain 
between the two camps. 
 Livy continues that after another day in their respective camps there is another 
skirmish (L.31.36.1-3). For this skirmish, Philip "concealed his caetratos whom they call 
peltasts in ambush in a suitable place between the two camps" (L.31.36.1). Then, Philip 
ordered his cavalry to engage the Romans and that if things went badly, "they should by 
retiring gradually draw the enemy towards the place of ambush" (L.31.36.2). The ridge 
on which the Macedonians were encamped has a small gap just southwest of their camp. 
Behind the hill to the southwest of the gap would be an ideal place for the Macedonians 
to hide and from which to ambush the Romans if they approached the Macedonian camp. 
However, the Romans did not fall for the ruse. Livy notes that Romans were victors in 
both skirmishes, however neither skirmish was significant to have had losses worthy of 
note. 
 Dio and Zonaras both support Livy's account, albeit with less detail. Dio's account 
begins after a lacuna: "and they delayed for several days, not meeting in battle array, but 
engaging in skirmishes and encounters with light armed troops and the cavalry" (Dio 
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18.1). Dio's account notes that a period of time passed, although he is less precise than 
Livy. Zonaras gives a similar account to Dio that "when the two leaders drew near 
together they pitched camp opposite each other and engaged in skirmishes with the 
cavalry and light-armed troops," (Zon.9.15). Zonaras omits the waiting period, but 
supplies the detail that the camps were closely placed - a detail seen in Livy but absent 
from Dio as preserved. 
 Livy reports that the next day, Sulpicius sent out his entire army including his 
elephants "to the hills and even against the wall itself" of the Macedonian camp, but the 
Macedonians would not leave their camp (L.31.36.4-5). The Romans decide to move 
their camp because the Macedonians would not engage in battle, and the proximity of 
their camp made foraging unsafe (L.31.36.5-6). That the Romans need to forage gives us 
important temporal information.  
 Heretofore, Livy has said that the Romans were foraging from the horrea of the 
Dassaretii, but now they will forage grain from the fields. As discussed above, this 
indicates that it is now the season in which one can harvest grain, which begins in this 
area in early June. It also indicates that the Romans have already consumed their 
provisions, both the grain they brought from winter quarters and that which they pillaged 
from the Dassaretian settlements. Dio, in fact, gives a slightly different account of this 
episode in which he stresses the Roman lack of provisions. Dio states that the Romans 
repeatedly advanced to the Macedonian palisade to try to draw out the Macedonians to 
fight, as opposed to the single occasion Livy reports, and that they did this because they 
had few provisions (Dio 18.1).  
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 We now have a strategic reason for why Philip would not engage with the Roman 
army. It is otherwise confusing why Philip would gather all his troops together, leaving 
open the northern border to Dardanian invasion, as well as ignoring the recently troubled 
areas of Thessaly, Ionia, Thrace, and Euboia, to march to a mile from the Roman army, 
and then refuse to engage with them. However, Dio says that "Philip's supply of 
provisions was better than the Romans because his own country was close by; so he 
waited, expecting to wear them out without a conflict" (Dio 18.2). Philip clearly knew 
that the Romans were out of provisions, perhaps through information supplied by the 
deserters he had been employing. By not engaging militarily, Philip employed an active 
strategy of starving out the Romans in order to make them leave or compel them to make 
a mistake, such as commit to battle in disadvantageous territory. Philip's delay is 
presented as strategic in Dio, but as potentially cowardly in Livy.  
 Dio, Zonaras, and Livy are in agreement that the Romans moved their camp to a 
location that allowed them to forage more safely (Dio 18.2; Zon.9.15; L.31.36.6), but 
only Livy supplies topographic details. Livy says that "Sulpicius moved his camp about 
eight miles from there to Ottolobum - so they call the place" (L.31.36.6). 
 To locate this new Roman camp we need a place that fulfills the following 
requirements: it is about eight miles from the previous Roman camp by Çërravë; it is in 
or near an area with enough arable land to generate enough grain for this move to have 
been strategically sound; and it has to be near swampland, as a swamp plays a role later 
in Livy's narrative (L.31.37.8). 
77 	  
	  
 [Figure 2.6]  Just south of the ridge on which the Romans and Macedonians are 
encamped lies the Korçe valley. This is a large highland plain of arable land extending 
roughly 30km north-south and roughly 11km east-west at its widest point. This was the 
only area that had the potential to have generated sufficient grain to feed the Roman 
army. Additionally, in the center of this plain towards the west, lies the area of Maliq, 
formerly known as the Swamp of Maliq (Keneta e Maliqit) before it was drained as part 
of a public works project under the Communists in the 1960s. Before this draining, the 
swamp of Maliq covered an extensive area in the west of the plain between the modern 
villages of Sovjan and Maliq - sometimes even turning into Lake Maliq during especially 
wet periods - and extending to the northeast across the plain.128 
 Livy places this new Roman camp by a settlement whose name has five 
manuscript and editorial variants for its spelling: Otolobum, Attalobum, Octolophum, 
Ortholophum, and Ottolobum129. Briscoe uses Otolobum, citing Pritchett's analysis of the 
word Otolobus as used in Livy.130 Pritchett here argues that "the word must be equivalent 
to the Greek otos lobos and mean the "lobe of the ear."131 Pritchett then argues that 
certain mountains "can be identified without question as having a profile suggesting the 
name."132 While it is implausible to think that we can identify exactly which mountain or 
hill looks most like an ear lobe, Pritchett's argument that the ancient Greeks assigned the 
name 'ear lobe' to mountains or hills is valid. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 For the size of the swamp, see Fouache et al. 2010, p526. 
129 The Loeb opts for Ottolobum. 
130 Pritchett 1969, p171. The context for Pritchett's discussion is the Otolobus in Livy's narrative of Q. 
Marcius Philippus' route of 169 BC. 
131 Pritchett 1969, p171. 
132 Pritchett 1969, p171. 
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 Briscoe gives support to the variant spelling Octolophum in his apparatus criticus. 
This name would mean eight hills, or perhaps "Eighth Hill".133 What matters here is that 
the concept of a hill or hills is inherent in this name as well. Similarly, all the other 
readings have in the second half of their name a root of 'lobom' or 'lophum', indicating a 
name designating a hill or mountain.134 The name Otolobum should then indicate a 
settlement in hill country. Along the western edge of the Korçe plain rise up the foothills 
of the mountains extending to the west. 
 The Roman camp by Otolobum thus sat eight miles south of the Roman camp by 
Çërravë, west of the Swamp of Maliq, at the western edge of the Korçe plain. In the hills 
to the west and above the modern village of Symiza is a strategic location for the Roman 
camp that corresponds to the elements of the description in Livy. There are the 
archaeological remains of a castle or fortress here, indicating that this area was 
considered a strategic location at some point in the past.135 Placing the camp in the hills 
here would have provided defense against attack and allowed access to the expansive 
Korçe plain to the east and south. 
 Livy supplies details on the Roman foraging operation and Philip's response:  
Cum in propinquo agro frumentarentur Romani, primo rex intra vallum 
suos tenuit, ut cresceret simul neglentia cum audacia hosti. 
 
While the Romans were gathering grain in the neighboring fields, the king 
at first kept his men within the camp, that carelessness might increase in 
the enemy along with rashness. (L.31.36.7) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 This use of the name 'Eight Hill' brings to mind the common use in Montana of the name Nine Mile for 
a specific area outside of town, the memory of from just what it is nine miles distant being long gone. 
134 Especially Ortholophum - 'Straight Hill'. 
135 Ceka 2013, pp111, 210. 
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 Foraging on this scale was a major undertaking.136 Feeding two Roman legions 
plus an equivalent number of allies would require roughly 17,900 kg of grain a day.137  
 Two examples in Livy give us a sense of what such a foraging operation looked 
like. In 201 BC, while campaigning in the territory of the Boi in northern Italy, the 
Roman army "chose a campsite near the fortified town of Mutilim that was suitable for 
reaping crops as the grain was now ripe" (L.31.2.7). The Gauls made a surprise attack 
and "killed about seven thousand men scattered through the grain fields," killing both 
unarmed men focused on reaping and their armed guards (L.31.2.8-9).138 The Roman 
army sending out these foragers was no larger than Sulpicius' army in 199 BC (L.31.2.6), 
and although composed of allies was under direct command of a Roman military praefect 
(L.31.2.6,9) and should be expected to have behaved no differently than a Roman 
legion.139 Livy gives no indication that this was an unusually large foraging operation, 
only commenting that the praefect did not assign enough armed men to protect the 
unarmed foragers.  
 An example from 171 BC in northeast Thessaly also highlights the scale of these 
Roman foraging operations. As in 199 BC, the Romans were encamped in the same 
general area as the Macedonian army, but far enough away to feel that foraging was safe; 
nevertheless they were attacked by the Macedonians while reaping grain in the fields 
(L.42.45.1-4.) The Macedonians captured 1000 wagons, many of which were already full 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Foraging in the fields was a key tactic of all ancient armies (Engels, 1978) including the Roman army 
(Roth 1999, esp. pp117-155). See Trajan's column scene 109 for the classic image of Romans reaping in 
the fields on campaign. 
137 For the number of Sulpicius's troops, see chapter 1 discussion as well as Briscoe 1973, p166. For 
quantities of food required, see chapter 1 discussion and Roth 1999, esp. pp. 18-24. 
138 Livy comments that the Romans did not have as many armed guards as they should have. 
139 Livy blames their slaughter on the commander's decision to not have enough armed guards and to put 
the men in a position where they could get ambushed, not on any rash action of the allied troops. 
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of grain. Livy gives no indication that this number of wagons was out of the ordinary, but 
does say that the men reaping had no armed guard. 
 Using these roughly contemporaneous accounts of similar foraging activities, it 
can be inferred that Sulpicius' foraging operation in 199 BC involved similar numbers of 
men and wagons.  
 When Philip waited in his camp in the hope that "carelessness might increase in 
the enemy along with boldness", he was in fact waiting for the Romans to do two things: 
to reduce the number of armed guards for the foragers, as occurred in the 201 BC and 171 
BC examples, and for the Romans to travel further from their camp while foraging. 
 Livy tells us that "when Philip saw them scattered he set out with all his cavalry 
and the Cretan mercenaries"140 and established his position between the Roman camp and 
the scattered foragers, (L.31.36.8-10). Philip then divided his forces, sending one part to 
chase down foragers and the other to catch foragers trying to return to their camp, and 
"there was slaughter and flight everywhere" (L.31.36.9-11). Dio's and Zonaras' briefer, 
and nearly identical, accounts corroborate Livy's narrative: Philip unexpectedly attacked 
the Romans while foraging and killed a few men (Dio 18.2; Zon.9.15). 
 The Romans and Macedonians were positioned in the following manner: the 
Roman camp was in the hills directly above Symiza at the western edge of the plain; the 
Roman foragers were scattered to the east all the way to the edge of the plain and to the 
south past Korçe; the Macedonians were positioned through the center of the plain to the 
south and east of the Swamp of Maliq between the Roman camp and foragers, roughly 
8km from the Roman camp. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Philip has 2000 cavalry (L.31.34.7) and at least 300 Cretan auxiliaries (L.31.35.1). 
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 After an indeterminate period of time, some foragers made it through the 
Macedonian blockade back to the Roman camp. In response, Sulpicius sent out the 
cavalry to aid the foragers and personally led out the legions (L.31.36.11 - 31.37.1).141 
According to Livy, the Macedonians were winning the cavalry skirmish but over-
zealously pursued the retreating Romans and "following too incautiously, they met the 
Roman cohorts advancing under command of the tribunes" (L.31.37.3-6) with the result 
that "the tide of the battle was turned and the pursuers became the pursued" (L.31.37.7). 
At 8km away, the Macedonian blockade would be far enough from the Roman camp that 
the Roman cavalry could engage the Macedonians significantly before the infantry 
arrived. 
 Dio and Zonaras again provide briefer, and nearly identical, accounts that support 
Livy's narrative: "on perceiving Philip's attack on the foragers, Galba made a sortie from 
the camp, attacked him unexpectedly, and slew many more in his turn" (Dio 18.3; 
Zon.9.15).  
 In describing the Macedonian flight, Livy introduces a swamp into the narrative:  
The Macedonians died not by the sword alone, but thrown into the 
swamps they were swallowed up by the deep mud, horses and all. Even 
the king was in danger .... The king, riding around the marshes over roads 
and impassable places in panicked flight, came at length to his camp, 
when nearly all had given up hope of his safe escape. 
 
nec ferro tantum periere, sed in paludes quidam coniecti profundo limo 
cum ipsis equis hausti sunt. Rex quoque in periculo fuit .... rex 
circumuectus paludes per uias inuiaque trepida fuga in castra tandem, iam 
desperantibus plerisque incolumem euasurum, peruenit. 
L. 31.37.8-9,11; 9-10 on Philip getting on a new horse omitted) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Livy specifies that Sulpicius acted in response to the foragers report, however Supicius likely had 
lookouts posted who alerted him to what was happening as well. 
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 This is the swamp of Maliq discussed above.142 The Macedonians advanced into 
the swamp to their north and northeast during their disordered flight. 
 During the night, Philip secretly fled the area (L.31.38.9-10; Dio 18.3; Zon.9.15), 
and the Romans now controlled the Korçe plain. 
Topographic Analysis of Section II 
 Before discussing Sulpicius' next move, it is necessary to first determine where 
Philip went when he left the Korçe plain, and why he did so. 
 Livy supplies two reasons why Philip left the area after the defeat at Otobulum. 
The first is the more obvious reason, namely that Philip thought it unsafe to remain in the 
same camp after two skirmish defeats (L.31.38.9).143 The second reason, however, was 
that Philip heard that "Pleuratus and the Dardani had already left home with great forces 
and had invaded Macedonia; and if he were surrounded by these encircling forces, it 
might well be believed that the Romans could end the war by sitting still" (L.31.38.7-8). 
 As discussed above, when Philip pulled Perseus from the pass by Stobi, he 
opened up two potential routes for the Dardani to invade: via the Erigon valley into 
Pelagonia or via the Axius valley into central Macedonia. If Philip feared being encircled, 
then he feared the Dardani coming via the Erigon valley, as they had in 208 BC,144 as 
then they could continue south past Herakleia and then cut west through the Florina pass 
and the Tsangon pass and enter the Korçe valley from the east.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Fouache et al 2010 discuss the presence of the swamp from 2000 BC through to the communist period 
in Albania.  
143 Dio/Zonaras say only that Philip was "defeated and wounded" (Dio 18.3; Zon.9.15) when he withdrew. 
144 In the Dardanian raid in 208 BC, the Dardanians took this same route south via the Erigon valley and 
past Herakleia through the Monastir Gap. This recent experience would have taught Philip to expect them 
to take this route again. 
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 Livy says that "Philip made for the mountains, choosing a road which he knew the 
Roman, with his wagon train, would not take" "Montes, quam viam non ingressurum 
gravi agmine Romanum sciebat, petit" (L.31.39.2). [Figure 2.7] Philip set out north from 
his camp between Lakes Ohrid and Prespa. This is a rugged cross-country route through 
what is currently a national wildlife park.  
 While Livy supplies Philip's reasoning as to why the Romans would not follow 
him on this terrain, Dio on the other hand supplies Sulpicius' reasoning for not following 
Philip, namely that "being short of provisions, ignorant of the country, and in particular 
not knowing his adversary's strength, he feared that if he advanced incautiously anywhere 
he might come to grief" (Dio 18.4). 
 This route would have allowed Philip to emerge from between the lakes by the 
Macedonian controlled city of Lynchnidus, which could furnish provisions and supplies 
to Philip's men. It would avoid the Dardanian advance via Florina, and if the advance 
were instead to the north of the lakes on the route that became the Via Egnatia, 
Lynchnidus could offer refuge for the Macedonian army. 
 We learn later in Livy's narrative that Philip 'established a base near Bruanium' 
(L.31.39.5). [Figure 2.8] Concerning Bruanium, Strabo reports that "all the cities of the 
Deuriopes on the Erigon river were populous, among which were Bryanium, 
Alalcomenae, and Stubara" (Strabo 7.7.9). The remains of ancient Stuberra are located 
between the villages of Trojkrsti and Chepigovo roughly 17 km southwest of the modern 
city of Prilep in FYROM.145 When Strabo first introduces the Erigon river to the reader, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 I visited the unimpressive remains of Stuberra on October 22, 2014. I discussed the state of the 
excavations there in November, 2014 with Aleksandra Papzovska Sanev, a Macedonian archaeologist then 
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he mentions the peoples that live along the river in order of the flow of the river (Strabo 
7.7.8); he appears to be listing these three cities along the Erigon river in the same order. 
Thus Alacomenae was west of Stuberra, and Bruanium was west of Alacomenae.  
 Papazoglou correctly places Alacomenae by the modern village of Buchin at the 
western edge of the plain on the Erigon river.146 The best location for Bruanium is at the 
modern village of Demir Hisar roughly 12 km southwest of Buchin on the Erigon. Any 
visitor to the area will immediately deduce that this is a naturally protected location due 
to it being nestled in the foothills of the mountains to the west and protected by hills and 
ridges in all directions except along the Erigon valley.  
 Later in Livy's narrative, we read that Philip marched from Bruanium cross-
country (transversis limitibus) and "inspired sudden terror" in the Romans encamped on 
the Erigon somewhere just south of Stuberra (L.31.39.5). For Philip to have surprised the 
Romans like this, he needed to give the appearance that he came out of nowhere. A camp 
at Demir Hisar would have allowed for this as the hills between Demir Hisar and the 
plain rise up to 800m above the elevation of Stuberra, totally blocking the view from the 
plain. Further north along the Erigon, the valley climbs to higher elevations through more 
rugged country, making it less likely to be the site of a polis, as Strabo specifies 
Bruanium was. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in residence at the ASCSA, to get additional information and evidence that these remains were, in fact, of 
Stuberra. 
146 Papazoglou 1988, pp302-3, maps 11 & 20. 
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 [Figure 2.7] Sulpicius was now in control of the Korçe plain, Philip had 
disappeared into the mountains147, and the Dardani were somewhere in the territory of 
Macedonia. Sulpicius spent a "few more days foraging" before leaving the Korçe valley 
(L.31.38.10). 
Stuberram deinde petit atque ex Pelagonia frumentum quod in agris erat 
convexit. Inde ad Pluinnam est progressus, nondum comperto quam 
regionem hostes petissent. 
Thence Sulpicius marched to Stuberra and brought there from Pelagonia 
the grain which was in the fields. He then marched to Pluinna, still 
ignorant as to where the enemy had gone. 
 (L.31.39.4) 
 [Figure 2.9] Sulpicius traveled from Otolobus to Stuberra via the Tsangon and 
Florina passes and then continued north through the Monastir plain to Stuberra. Sulpicius 
then foraged the grain in the fields in the large agricultural valley of Pelagonia, in which 
Stuberra lay. Sulpicius moved from pillaging one major grain-growing region controlled 
by Macedon to another.148 Sulpicius appears to have been attacking Macedonian allies 
that were economically valuable to force Philip to defend them. Since the grain was still 
in the fields, the harvest had not been completed by the locals, which supplies us with a 
fixed date, as discussed above. 
 Sulpicius then advanced to Pluinna, a toponym for which we have no other textual 
attestation and no archaeological evidence. Using the rest of this narrative, we can 
roughly place Pluinna in the Erigon valley between Stuberra and Heracleia.  
At this point, Philip surprises the Romans from his camp near Bruanium: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 We should understand that Sulpicius knew that Philip escaped via route 1, between the lakes. Sulpicius 
would have realized this when he saw no evidence of the Macedonian army having passed through when he 
passed through the Tsangon pass. 
148 Philip II incorporated this region into Macedonia presumably for its agricultural potential. Alexander's 
speech at Opis (Arrian 7.9.2) indicates that Philip II turned this area from pastoralism to agriculture.  
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When Philip had established a camp near Bruanium, marching from there 
across country he inspired sudden terror in the enemy. On that account the 
Romans moved from Pluinna and encamped on the Osphagus river. The 
king also pitched camp not far away, throwing up a rampart along the 
bank of the river - the natives call it the Erigonus. 
 
Philippus cum primo ad Bruanium statiua habuisset, profectus inde 
transuersis limitibus terrorem praebuit subitum hosti. mouere itaque ex 
Pluinna Romani et ad Osphagum flumen posuerunt castra. rex haud procul 
inde et ipse uallo super ripam amnis ducto – Erigonum incolae uocant – 
consedit. 
(L. 31.39.5-6) 
 
 Philip's sudden appearance from the mountains west of the plain, taken together 
with the distinct possibility that the Romans were again caught unawares while foraging, 
makes the Roman terror at his arrival understandable. In response, Sulpicius moved from 
Pluinna and encamped by the Osphagus river. The location of this river is unknown, but 
it was presumably a tributary of the Erigon river to the south towards the direction of 
escape from this valley for the Roman forces. Philip encamped nearby on the Erigon, 
presumably near the earlier Roman camp.149  
 Livy reports that Philip, instead of forcing a battle here, moves south to block the 
Romans' route: "Then, feeling certain that the Romans would move towards Eordaea, he 
hurried forward to gain the pass, that the Romans might not force the road, which was 
closed by the narrow entrance" (L.31.39.7). 
 Philip knew where the Romans would go next due to his familiarity with how 
armies could move through this landscape.150 Philip knew to block the Klidi pass.151 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 See Thompson, 1968 for whether Philip used the river as a bulwark or if Philip actually built a bulwark 
on the riverbank. Either way, Philip was on the opposite bank of the Erigon from the Roman camp on the 
Osphagus and the camps were close together. 
150 I realized this when biking through the area - it was so clear that this was the choke point. Additionally, 
the name of the town is 'Key', a name designated for Greek villages that are at the ends of passes. 
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1912 and 1941, generals' knowledge of local topography similarly allowed them to 
predict that their enemies would have to go through the Klidi pass. As a result, each time 
they led their army there first and attempted to block the pass, as Philip did in in 199 BC.  
 In Autumn1912, the Ottoman forces held the Klidi pass to prevent the Greek army 
from advancing north to Monastir (Bitola). The Greeks sent three divisions from the 
south and drove the Ottomans from the pass, and then held the pass with the significant 
force of five divisions to prevent Ottoman troops from advancing south from Monastir. 
The Greek army then moved its General Headquarters to the Klidi pass, indicating its 
strategic importance.152  
 In Spring 1941, The Greek army held the Klidi pass to prevent the German 
advance through the Monastir Gap. When the German invasion began further east, the 
Greek army reinforced its position at the Klidi pass with additional Greek, Australian, 
and British units. Once the Germans had taken Bitola, the Greek army further 
strengthened their position at the pass, calling in as many units as possible. Nonetheless, 
the Germans successfully assaulted the Klidi pass in only two days.153 
 In both these cases, all the armies involved knew that the Klidi pass was key for 
north-south movement in this area and as a result either blocked the pass in advance or 
gathered enough troops in order to make an attempt to break through the pass. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Walbank 1940 first proposed this location for this battle of 199 BC. Impressively, he proposed this 
before the events of 1941 set into stark relief that this is the key spot to hold to prevent an enemy advance 
south of the Florina plain. 
152 HAGS 1998, pp 88-93, map 9. 
153 Papagos 1949, pp363-372. There is more information on this small World War II battle, including 
publications and interviews from generals and enlisted men from all armies involved, than on any event in 
the ancient world.  
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attackers took no alternate route; the defenders concentrated their forces in this one 
location.  
 Livy reports that once Philip was at the pass, he quickly fortified it, taking 
advantage of the natural terrain and the materials at hand.  
There he threw up hasty fortifications, using sometimes a rampart, 
sometimes a ditch, sometimes piles of stones to serve as a wall, sometimes 
cut-down trees, as the nature of the terrain and the material at hand 
permitted, and, as he thought, rendered a road which was already naturally 
difficult impassable by the obstacles with which he blocked every passage.  
 
ibi alia uallo, alia fossa, alia lapidum congerie ut pro muro essent, alia 
arboribus obiectis, ut aut locus postulabat aut materia suppeditabat, 
<pr>opere permuniit atque, ut ipse rebatur, uiam suapte natura difficilem 
obiectis per omnes transitus operibus inexpugnabilem fecit. 
(L.31.39.8-9) 
   
 Using the twentieth century battles as comparanda, as well as personal auopsy of 
the area, the area Philip fortified between Vevi and Klidi can be reasonably identified.  
 Philip's defensive works were in vain, as Livy reports that the Romans promptly 
took the pass with a two-pronged attack. 
Then, scorning these [thrown stones] also, part of the Romans, forming a 
testudo advanced in the face of the enemy, while others, gaining the saddle 
by a short detour, dislodged the terrified Macedonians from their strong 
points and outposts, and even killed some of them, since flight was slow in 
the difficult country. So the pass was won with less trouble that had been 
anticipated 
 
deinde iis quoque spretis partim testudine facta per aduersos uadunt 
hostes, partim breui circuitu cum in iugum collis euasissent, trepidos ex 
praesidiis stationibusque Macedonas deturbant et, ut in locis impeditis 
difficili fuga, plerosque etiam obtruncant. Ita angustiae minore certamine 
quam quod animis proposuerant superatae 
(L.31.39.14 - 31.40.1) 
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 This encirclement tactic is the same tactic that Philip had feared that the arrival of 
the Dardani would have allowed the Romans to do earlier in the campaign in the Korçe 
valley.154  
 Similar to what we have seen from Philip previously this season, Philip loses 
control of the battlefield and retreats but suffers very few casualties. He seems to each 
time have an escape route prepared and have a focus on 'living to fight another day' than 
gambling all on a major pitched battle. Philip presumably retreated from the area to hold 
the Edessa pass to prevent the Romans from invading central Macedonia.  
Topographic Analysis of Section III 
 At this point, Sulpicius has chased Philip back to Macedon and Sulpicius is in 
control of the Klidi pass, and the location of the invading Dardani is still unknown. Livy 
continues following Sulpicius' movements:   
 "The consul marched to Eordaea, and after laying waste the country in all 
directions, proceeded towards Elimia. Then he made an attack on Orestis and assaulted 
the town of Celetrum, which lay on a peninsula; a lake surrounds it walls; a narrow 
tongue of land offers the only approach from the mainland" (L.31.40.1-2). 
 [Figure 2.10] Eordaea was the area south of the Kleidi pass extending south 
almost to the modern town of Kozani.155 This region is predominantly arable land 
currently used for agriculture.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 How the Romans take the pass is the same strategic move that they will employ the next season at the 
Aous, i.e. a bullrush through the center of the enemy's defense combined with an encircling maneuver. 
155 Hammond 1972, pp106-110, map 11. 
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 Once through the Kleidi pass, Sulpicius could have advanced on Macedonia and 
invaded via Edessa, but instead he continued south to Eordaea. He does not move quickly 
through the area, but stays to "lay waste the country in all directions." Sulpicius seems to 
be repeating the behavior he exhibited in both the Korçe plain and Pelagonia of ravaging 
the area until Philip arrived to stop him. However, in this case Philip did not appear and 
Sulpicius moved on after an unspecified period of time, but presumably long enough to 
realize that this time Philip was not going to come out to stop him. 
 Elimia consisted of the area to the south of Eordaea that extended west through 
the Siatista pass to Orestis.156 Orestis extended northwest from the Siatista pass to the 
area surrounding Celetrum, located at the modern town of Kastoria.157 This Roman route 
follows the contours of the landscape and is the route that the modern roadway takes and 
the route the Dardani took in 208 BC. 
 Livy reports that the Celetrians trust in their natural and man-made defenses, as 
the city sat on an impressive rock outcrop on a peninsula, until they see the Romans' 
advance - at which point they promptly surrender (L.31.40.2-3). Whereas the testudo 
helped the Romans take the Kleidi pass, the Celetrians surrender just seeing it advance 
towards them. 
 "From Celetrum he proceeded to the land of the Dassaretii and took the city of 
Pelium by storm" (L.31.40.4). Alexander the Great took a similar route in 335 BC, 
moving from Paeonia via the Erigon river to the Devoll river and the site of Pellium 
(Arr.1.5.1-5). This route would involve going through Pelagonia, Eordaea, Elimia, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Hammond 1972, pp116-123, map 11. 
157 Hammond 1972, pp110-116, map 11. 
91 	  
	  
Orestis as Sulpicius did. Understanding Arrian's Pellium to be the same place as Livy's 
Pelium, scholars agree that this city sat in the immediate vicinity of the Tsangon pass and 
directly controlled it.158  
 Alexander waged his campaign in at the Tsangon pass to control his western 
border before heading off on his extended eastern campaign. This makes sense as this 
pass controls one of the only two major east-west routes between Illyria and Macedonia, 
the other being the northern route that became the via Egnatia. Philip II's founding of 
Herakleia controlled Illyrian access west by the northern route; Alexander taking Pelium 
and the Tsangon pass controlled the southern route. The next possible route west from 
Illyria was the Metsovo pass far to the south in Epirus. Thus, by taking Pelium, 
Alexander could reasonably believe that he had protected Macedonia from Illyrian 
invasion and head off on his eastern campaign. 
 Similarly, Sulpicius took Pelium to secure the Tsangon pass and the southern 
route east-west between Macedonian and Illyria and his control of the Genusus valley (by 
the allied Parthini and the earlier part of his 199 BC campaign) controlled the northern 
route, again leaving the Metsovo pass as the next available option for the Macedonians to 
go west.159  
 Livy says that Sulpicius installed a strong garrison (praesidio valido) at Pelium 
"because the city was well suited as a base to launch attacks into Macedonia" 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 There is debate concerning exactly where in the immediate vicinity of the pass Pelium was located. 
Winnifrith 2002, pp143-149, 187, map 7 is the most recent discussion, with analysis and bibliography of 
previous scholarship. Ceka is the outlier in this debate (Ceka 1972, 2005, 2011, 2013), placing Pelium at 
Selçë, which lies roughly 9 km west of Lake Ohrid and 8 km south of the Genusus valley. No remains 
positively associate Selçë with Pelium; the location does not accord with the narratives of Arrian or Livy.  
159 The hostile Dardani and Ardiaeans prevented the Macedonians from attempting a more northern 
passage. 
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(L.31.40.5).160 However, the garrison at Pelium was not solely offensive, but should be 
understood to have been defensive like the garrison Alexander installed. The purpose of 
this Roman garrison was two-fold, like Polybius' stated aims for Philip's Asian campaign 
in 200 BC: to prevent a stepping-stone for a Roman attack and make a stepping-stone for 
his own future attack (Plb.16.29.1-2). The Romans did not use this base to launch future 
attacks, however this base did affect future Macedonian movements, as explored in the 
succeeding chapters. As such, although Livy says that this garrison was founded for 
offensive purposes, its solely defensive use suggests that it was intended, perhaps 
primarily, for defensive purposes as well. 
 [Figure 2.11] From Pelium, Sulpicius then returned to winter quarters at 
Apollonia, ending his 199 BC campaign (L.31.40.6). As Sulpicius spent significant time 
during this campaign harassing Dassarettian communities, including pillaging their stored 
grain and foraging their harvest, it seems likely that Sulpicius would avoid going back 
through the hostile Devoll valley and instead take the same route back that he took to the 
Korçe valley at the beginning of the campaign through the Genusus valley. 
Topographic Analysis Conclusions 
 Analyzing Sulpicius' actions, especially his actions made at crucial moments 
when he had choices, helps us to draw some conclusions about the goals of the 199 BC 
campaign. These moments are when Sulpicius arrives in the Korçe valley, after the 
skirmish at Otolobus, and after the battle at Kleidi pass.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 This would then be a similar situation to in 169 BC when Antiochus IV installed a strong garrison 
(validum praesidium) at Pelusium "so that he could reinvade Egypt whenever he wished" (L.45.11.5), 
which Antiochus then did the next year (L.45.12.1). 
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 At the end of this campaign, Sulpicius garrisoned Pelium and now effectively 
controlled both direct routes west (Tsangon Pass and Genusus valley) from Macedon to 
Apollonia and Dyracchium. This was a logical goal for the 199 BC campaign in that the 
Roman protected ports were then safer, which precludes Macedonian use of them to 
invade Italy.161 Alexander's securing of the Tsangon pass in 335 BC supplied historical 
precedent for such a move. Additionally, this goal would have made for apparent 
continuation of the 200 BC campaign that pushed the westernmost boundary of 
Macedonian military influence further east. 
 However, if this was Sulpicius' goal for the campaign, it begs the question why 
Sulpicius did not make an attempt to control the Tsangon pass earlier in the campaign 
when he had the opportunity. After he established camp by Çërravë, Sulpicius spent a 
period of time pillaging the storehouses of the Dassaretian settlements before Philip 
arrived. Sulpicius here had time to attempt to secure the Tsangon pass but chose not to. 
 Instead Sulpicius' actions appear to have been designed to disturb Macedonia's 
allies, and perhaps also disrupt Macedonian economic interests as the Korçe valley was a 
grain surplus generating region, in order to draw out Philip. Sulpicius could look to 217 
BC when Demetrias' military actions in Dassaretia brought swift direct reprisal from 
Philip (Plb.5.108), or more recently to Philip's repeated military interventions in the area, 
including personally led raids on the Illyrian ports in 216 BC (Pol. 5.110), 214 BC (L. 
24.40), and 205 BC (L. 29.12.5-7) which involved troop movements through Dassaretii 
controlled territory. Sulpicius appears to have wanted to goad Philip into battle and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Roman fears that Macedonian will launch a naval invasion of Italy: L.31.3.6, 31.7.2-14. 
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compel him to come to the Roman established position rather than bring the fight to 
Pella.  
 After Philip fled the Korçe valley, Sulpicius had a critical choice of actions to 
take which can help us understand his campaign goals. For example, Sulpicius could 
have returned to Apollonia, or secured the Tsangon pass, or pressed on into Macedonia, 
or stayed in the Korçe valley and established a strong beach head for the next year's 
campaign. Interestingly, Dio/Zonaras and Livy each report Sulpicius making a different 
choice. In Dio/Zonaras, Sulpicius's campaign ended here and he returned to Apollonia, 
indicating that Sulpicius' goal for the campaign was to continue the 200 BC campaign to 
push Macedonian military influence east as well as to control the two direct east-west 
routes between Macedon and Illyria. However, Livy's account has Sulpicius choosing to 
press on further east into Macedonian territory. This suggests that Sulpicius' goal was 
either to force Philip into a decisive battle or to invade Macedonia. 
 However, Sulpicius does not invade Macedonia two different times in this 
campaign when he had the opportunity. After the battle of Otolobus, when Sulpicius went 
east via the Florina pass, he could have continued east via the Klidi pass and entered 
central Macedonia at Edessa. Sulpicius knew that Philip had fled the Korçe valley to the 
north. Once he entered the Monastir plain and realized that Philip had not already passed 
through (as Philip was at Bruanium), Sulpicius would have known that he could have 
gotten to Edessa before Philip. Since the Dardani were supposed to be attacking Macedon 
via the Axius valley, as I will discuss below, this would have made for a potentially 
devastating two-pronged attack on a central Macedonia unprotected by its royal army. 
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But, instead, Sulpicius went into Pelagonia and, as in the Korçe plain, ravaged land until 
Philip arrived to stop him.  
 Similarly, after breaking through the Klidi pass, Sulpicius could have continued 
east to central Macedonia via Edessa but chose instead to go south to Eordaea and ravage 
land. At this point, the Dardani were actually raiding in Macedonia and would have made 
for a two-fronted attack on the Macedonian central plain.  
 Sulpicius ravaged the Korçe plain until Philip came to stop him, then ravaged 
Pelagonia until Philip came to stop him, and then ravaged Eordaea, recent evidence 
suggesting that he was trying to draw Philip out to try to stop him. This then would have 
made for Sulpicius employing the same strategy three times in one campaign season. As 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Sulpicius' pre-campaign behavior indicated 
that he wanted to fight a decisive battle with Philip; his actions in the campaign indicate 
this as well.  
 Understanding this to be Sulpicius' goal could help shed light on other issues. In 
200 BC, Philip was at Abydus conducting a seige (L.31.14.4), which would have 
prevented Sulpicius from bringing him to battle. This lack of opportunity for achieving 
his goal could help explain why Sulpicius left so late on campaign that season after 
previously campaigning so hard for the war. 
 Perhaps there were in fact two not mutually exclusive goals for the beginning of 
the Second Macedonian War: Sulpicius' goal and a greater Roman goal. In this 
conjecture, the greater Roman goal was to establish control of the two direct east-west 
routes between Illyria and Macedon while Sulpicius' goal was to win a victory over 
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Philip; the Roman goal was defensive while Sulpicius' goal was offensive. Dio's account 
of the campaign would then be employing a Roman source that only recounted the 
greater Roman goal, omitting the exploits of a Roman general gone rogue.  
 Another key to understanding the 199 BC is the actions and movements of the 
Dardanians. Philip left the Korçe valley in part because he heard that the "Dardani had 
already left home with great forces and had invaded Macedonia" (L.31.38.7). There is no 
mention of the Dardani between this report of their Macedonian invasion until they are 
already withdrawing from Macedonia after the battle at the Kliidi pass (L.31.40.7-8). 
[Figure 2.7] This indicates that the Dardani did not take the Erigon valley into Macedon 
but rather the Axius valley, because one of the two armies would have run into them in 
the Erigon valley. This means that the Dardani were never coming to attack the 
Macedonians in the Korçe valley from behind, as Philip feared. This also helps to explain 
what otherwise would have been confusing behavior by Sulpicius in the Korçe plain. 
 If the Dardani were coming to the Korçe valley via the Erigon valley and the 
Tsangon pass as Philip feared, then it would have been in Sulpicius' best interests to 
avoid a pitched battle with the Macedonians until their arrival. Instead, we read that 
Sulpicius repeatedly tried to get the Macedonians to engage in a full infantry battle, and 
Philip refused to engage. If, however, Sulpicius' plan with the Dardani for the invasion of 
Macedon (L.31.28.1-2) had always involved the Dardani invading through the Axius 
valley, then Sulpicius' attempt to force battle makes more sense. This sheds light on 
Sulpicius' movements into Pelagonia as well. If Sulpicius had expected the Dardani to 
have invaded through the Erigon valley, then he might have been going to Stuberra to try 
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to unite the allied forces. However, if he knew that the Dardani were taking the Axius 
valley, Sulpicius went to Stuberra only to ravage the area, presumably to draw out Philip.  
 Philip's consistent past behavior could have allowed Sulpicius to understand how 
to act to generate a predictable response from Philip. Philip had previously acted quickly 
and decisively in response to threats and acts of aggression, e.g. his lightning strike on 
Thermon in 218 BC in response to Aetolian agression (Plb.5.6-16); his swift reprisal raid 
in Dassaretia in 217 BC in response to Illyrian aggression (Plb. 5.108.3-8); his lightning 
strike on Apollonia in 211 BC in response to Aetolian and Roman aggression (L.26.25.2); 
his immediate response to a Roman raid in 208 BC by Sicyon (L.27.31.1); his series of 
lightning strikes on multiple fronts in 207 BC (L.28.5-8); and his forced marches to, and 
attack on, Apollonia upon Roman arrival in 205 BC (L.29.12.5-7). These events would 
have taught Sulpicius that Philip was quick to react to an act of aggression, and Sulpicius 
had personal experience as well, as he was in charge of the 208 BC raid by Sicyon that 
drew Philip's immediate response. As a result, Sulpicius would have understood that 
taking Antipatreia in 200 BC and ravaging Dassaretian lands in 199 BC would have been 
an effective way to draw out Philip. As all of these actions by Philip were quick raids 
after which he left the area, Sulpicius should also have realized that Philip often avoided 
a single deciding battle, but instead took measure to limit casualties and risk. 
 Philip, in 199 BC, then did act consistently with his past conduct, justifying 
Sulpicius' behavior. Philip was consistently quick to act in response to aggression as well 
as quick to change strategy upon a setback: Philip moved into the Korçe valley to deal 
with the Roman disturbance, then left in the night after two minor setbacks; Philip 
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advanced from the mountains in Pelagonia to frighten the Romans, but then left the 
valley when they did not fluster enough; Philip built impromptu defense works to stop the 
Roman advance, yet promptly fled the scene when these defenses were breached. 
 Philip's actions after the battle at Klidi pass help make sense of certain 
unsuccessful Macedonian tactics against the Romans in the 200 BC and 199 BC 
campaigns. When Philip retreated from the Klidi pass, the Dardani were already 
withdrawing from Macedon and Philip sent Athenagoras to harass the Dardani returning 
home (L.31.40.8; 31.43.1-3). This action was very similar to when Athenagoras harassed 
the Romans returning to their winter quarters at the end of the 200 BC campaign 
(L.31.27.6-8), the difference being that against the Romans this raid was ineffectual, 
while against the Dardani it caused great confusion and delay.  
 Philip also made a surprise attack led by his cavalry on the Aetolian camp, and 
this was enough to make the Aetolians panic and flee the theater of war (L.31.41.10 - 
31.42.9). This is similar to Philip's raid on the Romans by Pluinna, the difference again 
being that against the Romans this tactic was ineffectual.  
 Philip employed two tactics unsuccessfully against the Romans which later are 
demonstrated to work against Dardani and Aetolian troops. The later success of these 
tactics this helps explain why Philip employs them against the Romans.  
The area between Illyria and Macedon from 198 BC to 168 BC 
 From after the 199 BC campaign season through 168 BC, control of this corridor 
between Macedon and Illyria stays relatively consistent: the Romans controlled the area 
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west of Lake Ohrid and the Macedonians control east of Lake Ohrid, and the Romans 
maintained control of the Parthini and the Genusus valley throughout (L.43.21.1). 
 In 191 BC, the Roman consul Marcius Baebius met Philip in the country of the 
Dassaretii to plan how to stop Antiochus' invasion (L.36.10.10), and Philip escorted two 
separate Roman contingents through Macedon in order to invade Thessaly (L.36.10.11, 
36.13.1). Roman control of Pelium should indicate that the country of the Dassaretii was 
under Roman control, but the furthest east point of Roman control. 
 Philip continued his concern with protecting himself from Dardani invasion 
through the Erigon and Axius valleys by founding a new city (Perseis) in 183 BC on the 
Erigon near Stobi (L.39.53.14-16), and resettling Paeonia in 182 BC in the hope of added 
safety from a potential Roman invasion (L.40.3.3-4).162 
 The Macedonians did not campaign west of the lake. Perseus traveled through 
Eordaea and Elimia in 171 BC as part of his invasion route into Thessaly (L.42.53.5), but 
nothing indicates these areas were in revolt, but rather that they have constantly been 
under Macedonian control. In 170 BC, Perseus still controlled Stuberra and Pelagonia, as 
he used this area to mount a campaign among the Penestae to the north (L.43.18-20). 
 The Romans did not campaign in this area again until preparing for the Third 
Macedonian War. In 172 BC, Romans took forts of the Dassaretii presumably in advance 
of a land campaign into Macedonia (L.42.36.9). In 171 BC, the Romans made one 
inconsequential raid into Illyria (L.43.1.1-3) followed by the consul illegally taking his 
army ineffectually through Illyria towards Macedonia (L.43.1.4-5, 43.5.1). In 170 BC, 
the Romans mounted an offensive, marching their army from the coast and taking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Philip repelled a Dardanian invasion at Stobi in 197 BC (L.33.19.1-5). 
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Lynchnidus, which they still held in 169 BC (L.43.21.1). In 168 BC, though, Roman 
envoys reported to the senate that the army at Lynchnidus was not safe there (L.44.20.5), 
indicating that the areas east of lake Ohrid were still under Macedonian control. The 
senate promptly recalled the army from Lynchnidus to campaign on the Adriatic coast 
instead (L.44.21.4-11). The boundaries established in the 199 BC campaign held until the 
Battle of Pydna in 168 BC. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER AOUS 
   
Introduction 
 Rome had spent the 200 BC and 199 BC campaign seasons expanding the buffer 
zone that protected the Illyrian ports, while waging concurrent naval campaigns focused 
around Attica and Demetrias.163 In these two years, Rome extended this buffer zone east, 
first from the area around Dimallum in the central Myzeqeja plain to include the entire 
Myzeqeja plain through control of the area around Antipatreia, and then further east to 
include the entire Korçe plain through their control of Pelium.164 Rome gained control of 
other regional routes, including the Genusus valley - a major east-west corridor, through 
alliances with the Parthini, Athamanians, Dardanians, and Illyrians. One could reasonably 
expect that the consul for the 198 BC campaign would have continued this policy of 
gradual eastward expansion and aim to campaign in, and then secure with garrisons, 
either the northeastern shore of Lake Ohrid, Pelagonia, the Orestis-Elimia corridor, or a 
combination of the above. Continuing the gradual eastern advance, paired with an active 
naval campaign, would have been consistent with 200 and 199 BC Roman actions. 
However, Philip disrupted this progression of events by seizing the initiative at the 
beginning of the 198 BC campaign and forcing the Romans to react to him. Philip pulled 
the Romans' attention south by going around the east-west routes that Rome controlled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 While beyond the scope of this dissertation, the naval campaigns of 200 BC and 199 BC had been 
waged by a combined Rhodian, Pergamene, and Roman navy that focused on disrupting the Macedonian 
economy by targeting the Saronic Gulf, Demetrias' shipping lanes, and Macedon's raw materials exports 
and ship building capabilities on the Chalkidike. See Thiel 1946, pp 202-238. 
164 See chapters 1 and 2. 
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between Macedon and Illyria and encamping at the Aous before the Romans had left their 
winter quarters at Apollonia.   
 This chapter covers the first half of the 198 BC campaign, from the beginning of 
the campaign season through Philip's flight after the Battle of the River Aous. The Battle 
of the River Aous was the first major battle between the Romans and the Macedonians, 
and also the last time Rome fought in southern Illyria during the time period covered by 
this dissertation, as after this battle Roman shifted focus in Greece to Thessaly and 
Macedon. The Battle of the River Aous thus acted as a turning point as to where Rome 
waged war in Greece, with the focus between 229 BC and the Battle of the River Aous 
being southern Illyria and the Adriatic ports, and the focus between the Battle of the 
River Aous and the Battle of Pydna being Thessaly and Macedon. 
 The Battle of the River Aous deserves renewed attention due to the fact that it has 
been understudied compared to Rome's other campaigns in the east. The history of 
scholarship on the topography of the Battle of the River Aous began with Colonel 
Leake's 1835 work referencing his autopsy in 1804 and 1805.165 In 1907, Johannes 
Kromayer mapped and analyzed the battle working from maps alone.166 In 1966, N.G.L. 
Hammond published his own new interpretation, relying heavily on his personal 
autopsy.167 However, this autopsy consisted of a single three and a half hour visit to the 
valley that took place in 1931, 35 years earlier.168 Since Hammond, no scholar walked 
through this valley for the purpose of locating and analyzing this battle for more than 80 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Leake 1835 I & III. Since this event that happened near Tepelenë and Ali Pasha's residence, perhaps the 
Battle of the River Aous gets extra attention from Leake because he spent so much time in that area. 
166 Kromayer 1907, 1922. 
167 Hammond 1966. 
168 Briscoe 1973 endorses Hammond's view. 
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years. This was due in large part to the political situation in Albania.169 In the early 20th 
century, Albania experienced Ottoman rule, the Balkan Wars, independence, tumultuous 
internal politics, and Italian occupation.170 After World War II, Albania sealed her 
borders until 1991, and there was subsequently a revolution in 1997.171 [Figure 3.1] The 
lack of opportunity for foreign scholars to study in Albania led to a lack of interest in 
ancient events that took place in modern Albania by foreign scholars. 
 Albanian scholars have tended to focus on what they consider to be the ancient 
antecedents of the independent nation state in the geographical area of modern Albania, 
namely, the Illyrians and their Bronze Age precursors.172 One can see this focus in the 
large-scale mosaic on the National Museum of Albania, which faces the main square of 
Tirana [Figure 3.2]. Starting from the back left we see a Bronze Age warrior and then a 
4th-2nd century BC Illyrian warrior, clearly identified by his shield. From here, we 
immediately leap to the 14th century AD with a warrior identified by Skanderbeg's coat 
of arms on his shield, and then jump ahead through time to the Balkan Wars and the 
Communist period. Notably, only periods of independence for the geographical region of 
Albania are represented. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 There is a direct relationship between ancient places that have been given thorough topographic analysis 
in the Balkans and their ease of access from Athens. 
170 See e.g. Winnifrith 2002; Marmullaku 1975; Jacques 1995; Mazower 2000; Winnifrith 1992; Falaschi 
1992; Hutchings 1992. 
171 See e.g. Bland 1992; Abrahams 2016; Jarvis 1999. The fictional works of Ismail Kadare are invaluable 
for attempting to understand this period. 
172 Hodges 2006; Hammond 1989; Ceka 2013; my personal communications with Albanian archaeologists. 
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 As a result of this scholarly focus, the battle of the River Aous between Rome and 
Macedon, two competing foreign imperialist powers, has been all but ignored. To date, 
there has been no Albanian scholarship on the location of the Battle of the River Aous.173  
 Livy and Plutarch each give narrative accounts of the first half of the 198 BC 
campaign, with Livy additionally supplying an alternate account attributed to Valerias 
Antias. Both Livy and Plutarch are understood to have derived their accounts from 
Polybius. Although we do not have the relevant Polybian passage, Polybius does refer to 
the Battle of the River Aous elsewhere in his narrative. 
Part I: Philip's movement from Macedon until encampment by the Aous 
 Livy reports that Philip spent the winter of 200/199 BC in Macedon (L.32.4.7) 
preparing and drilling his Macedonian and mercenary troops (L.32.5.8), after which: 
In the beginning of spring, Philip sent all the foreign auxiliaries and what 
light armed troops he had with Athenagoras into Chaonia via Epirus to 
occupy the narrows near Antigonea - the Greeks call it the Stena. Philip 
followed after a few days with the heavy troops. 
 
principioque ueris cum Athenagora omnia externa auxilia quodque leuis 
armaturae erat in Chaoniam per Epirum ad occupandas quae ad 
Antigoneam fauces sunt – Stena uocant Graeci – misit. ipse post paucis 
diebus grauiore secutus agmine; 
(Livy 32.5.9-10) 
  
 For the 197 BC campaign, Livy uses terms similar to principioque veris - initio 
veris (L.33.1.1) and primo vere (L.33.3.1) - to mean a time just before the spring equinox, 
which occurs between March 19th-21st in the Gregorian calendar.174 Philip then sent out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Taulant Rama (regional representative for Tepelenë for the Ministry of National Culture), pers. comm.; 
Albert Kasi (Regional Director of Culture, Gjirokaster) pers. comm. 
174 See Briscoe 1977 on the narrative issues that result from Livy turning Polybius' two season year into a 
Roman four season year. 
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Athenagoras to the Stena sometime in mid-March, and followed about a week later. This 
would have given Athenagoras time to secure the mountain pass through the Pindus 
before Philip began his mountain crossing, as well as establish a presence at the Stena 
before Philip moved north through Epirus. Philip did not have the intelligence network to 
know if the Romans had secured the pass or the Stena during the winter, and sending 
Athenagoras ahead showed due caution. 
 [Figure 3.3] Antigonea was located in the hills on the east side of the Drin valley 
[Figure 3.4], roughly due east of the modern city of Gjirokaster.175 [Figure 3.5] The Drin 
valley was, and is, the main route north-south between Epirus and Illyria.176 It is 
surrounded on both sides by high and rugged mountains which greatly restrict east-west 
movement. 
  [Figure 3.6] The Drin valley narrows as it extends north of Antigonea, 
culminating in the Stena by Antigonea, before it widens again where the Aous river joins 
the Drin river.177 The Stena is a roughly 3.25 km long (as the crow flies) extremely 
narrow section with its southern boundary just north of the modern day border between 
the administrative districts of Komuna e Qendrës Tepelenës and Kommuna e Odries, 
approximately at the modern bridge that leads east from the roadway to the village of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Hammond 1971, reporting the 1970 findings of Albanian archaeologists; Ceka 2013, pp151-4. Before 
the archaeological finds of 1970 settled the matter, Walbank 1957, p156 had argued Antigonea was at 
Tepelenë and Hammond 1966, p 46 had argued that Antigonea was at Lekel, just south of Tepelenë. 
Antigonea's extensive archaeological remains are today designated an Archaeological Park and well 
maintained. See Antigonea Archaeological Park Guide 2010. 
176 See Dalakoglou 2017 forthcoming on the history of this route. 
177 In contrast, the Drin valley gets wider as it extends south of Antigonea. 
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Hormova, and its northern boundary approximately at the modern bridge that leads east 
from the roadway towards Lekel and into the Aous valley.178  
 [Figure 3.3] The Stena near Antigonea were such a key chokepoint for 
controlling movement through the Drin valley that in 230 BC an Epirote army encamped 
at Phoenice divided their forces to hold the Stena to stop an Illyrian advance from the 
north, even though this division of forces directly contributed to their immediate defeat 
by the Illyrians already at Phoenice (Plb 2.5.6-8).179 
 Philip's potential movements between Macedon and the Stena were limited due to 
the Roman consul Sulpicius' military and diplomatic maneuvers in 200 and 199 BC. 
[Figure 3.7] As was discussed in chapters 1 and 2, Sulpicius had closed off the most 
direct routes between Macedon and Epirus: the garrison at Pelium controlled movements 
through the Korce valley, the Roman-allied Parthini controlled movement through the 
Genusus valley, and the Roman garrisons by where Berat had been controlled access to 
the Myzeqeja plain.   
 [Figure 3.8] Rather than force his passage, Philip instead took the Grevena pass 
route to the south, part of the long established road network in the Pindus that Ali Pasha 
rebuilt in the early 19th century.180 This route involved Philip exiting Macedon via 
Edessa and then continuing south for roughly 85 km through Eordaia and Elimeia.181 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Hammond 1967, p212 and 1971, p114 argued for this same stretch of the Drin valley to be the Stena, 
but accorded great value to the location of the village of Lekel in the hills directly to the east. However, the 
topography alone is enough to make this the key location to control movement through the valley. 
179 The Illyrians then marched home from Phoenice through the Stena (Plb.2.6.6). 
180 Makres and Papageorgiou 1990: for history of the route, pp 159-194 with maps; for Ali Pasha's 
rebuilding of long-established road networks through the Pindus, pp 13-133. Additionally, on this route see 
Hammond 1967, p 281. 
181 This route through Eordeia and Elimeia was similar to Sulpicius' return route in 199 BC, as discussed in 
chapter 2. 
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Once Philip was by the modern town of Kozani in Elimeia, he turned west-southwest and 
went roughly 25 km to the modern village of Siatista. From here he turned south-
southwest and entered the foothills of the Pindus, gradually climbing roughly 30 km to 
the modern village of Grevena. From here Philip climbed 61.3 km to the modern town of 
Metsovo, ascending from a height of 542.5m to a maximum height of 1512.6m, but 
ascending a total of 1648m due to the ruggedness of the terrain. The area by Metsovo, 
referred to as Tria Chania during the Ottoman period, was where the Grevena pass route 
intersected the east-west pass from Thessaly to Epirus. From here, Philip descended west 
58.9 km to Passaron in Epirus, located near the modern city of Ioannina, at an elevation 
of 484.3m.182 This march of roughly 260 km with one significant mountain pass would 
have taken two weeks at an average rate of 20 km per day. 
 Kromayer and Hammond have argued that Philip took a different route across the 
Pindus. Kromayer argued that from the modern village of Siatista Philip turned west into 
the Pindus rather than south, crossed the mountains and entered Epirus at the modern 
town of Konitsa.183 Hammond argued that Philip marched from the modern town of 
Kastoria southwest into the Pindus to the modern village of Eptachori, at which point 
Hammond's route joins Kromayer's route and continues west to enter Epirus at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Passaron is generally accepted to be the hilltop archaeological remains by the modern village of Gardiki, 
roughly 8km northwest of Ioannina (Dakaris 1987; French 1993-4, p 41; Blackman 1998-9, p 67). 
However, when I visited the site, the archaeologists working there said that there were four hilltop sites in 
the immediate vicinity that all had equal possibility of being Passaron. Additionally, Robin Waterfield 
reported to me that archaeologists working at the Ioannina museum told him that they believed Passaron to 
have been at Ioannina. All do agree that Passaron was close to, or at, Ioannina. 
183 Kromayer 1907, map "Übersichtskarte für die römisch-makedonischen Feldzüge der Jahre 198 u. 197 
v.Chr."  
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Konitsa.184 However, their proposed routes would not have been as viable for an army to 
march through, especially during an early season march.185 
 While the Siatista-Konitsa route is shorter in length than the Siatista-Passaron 
route (118.9 km vs.150.2 km), and ascends to a lower maximum elevation (1363m vs. 
1512m), the Siatista-Konitsa route is more rugged. As a result, the Siatista-Konitsa route 
actually climbs a greater total elevation (2075 m vs. 2048 m) over a shorter distance. 
Most importantly though, the western part of the Siatista-Konitsa route, the part where 
Kromayer's and Hammond's routes overlap, passes through certain exceptionally narrow 
sections that have no parallel on the Siatista-Passaron route. These narrow sections would 
have made this route much more difficult for an army to travel. In multiple places, as 
seen in Figure 3.9, a two-lane road has had to have been cut into the steep mountainside 
which would have otherwise gone down directly to the river. In many places, as seen in 
Figure 3.10, the steep mountainsides descend directly to the edges of the flood plain. The 
comparative difficulty of this route would have been increased by late winter snows; if 
the snow were already melting the flash-floods and mud would have made the difficulties 
even worse. The floods from the melting winter snows can be so severe that they even 
wash out modern roads, as seen in Figure 3.11 where the guard rail has been knocked out 
and the asphalt has cracked and is collapsing into the river bed due to damage from 
spring floods.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Hammond 1966, p46; Hammond 1967, pp 275-7, 280; Hammond and Walbank, 1988,  
185 Makres and Papageorgiou 1990 assign this proposed route very minor status in their history of the roads 
of the region. Ali Pasha did not deem the route important enough to build it up or install a system of khans 
along it, as he did the Grevena pass route. 
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 The presence of a much greater number of active year-round villages on the 
Siatista-Passaron route, especially from Metsovo to Passaron, also points to this being the 
easier route in difficult weather.186 Finally, the Siatista-Konitsa route goes through areas 
important to the Greek campaigns of 1940-1 and to the Greek Partisans in 1945-1949 
precisely because they were difficult areas for large armies to march through.187 In fact, 
the resupply operations by "The Women of the Pindus," namely carrying large packs 
through the landscape to the armies in this area, were viewed as so heroic that statues to 
them stand today in many of the villages on the Siatista-Konitsa route, as seen in this 
statue from Pendalofos [Figure 3.12]. 
 Additionally, entering Epirus at Passaron gave Philip political and logistical 
benefits.188 Passaron was a historically important Molossian administrative center.189 
While the capital of Molossia had been moved by Pyrrhus to Ambracia, Passaron's 
continued role as an important central location in Epirus can be seen in the events of 167 
BC: Passaron was the center of Epirote resistance to the Romans (L.45.26.5-9), then the 
center of operations for the Roman propraetor Anicius Gallus' Epirus campaign 
(L.45.26.5, 15), and, finally, the base of operations for the Roman proconsul Lucius 
Aemilius Paullus single day sack of 70 Epirote communities (L.45.33.8 - 45.34.6). 
Passaron's central location and regional administrative role made it an ideal place for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Hammond 1967, p 276 points out that there are year round villages on his proposed route. However, he 
clearly did not travel the Grevena pass route, as in Hammond 1966, p46 he advocates that his proposed 
route was the only possible route. 
187 Papagos 1949; Woodhouse 1976; Carr 2013. 
188 Epirus was allied to Macedon in 198 BC (L.32.14.5-6). The Epirotes had brokered the Peace of 
Phoenice in 205 BC and allied with Philip in the treaty (L.29.12).  
189 See Plut. Pyr. 5.2 on Passaron being where the king and the people customarily exchange oaths. On this 
practice and how it relates to the importance of Passaron, see Hammond 1991, p189; Meyer 2013, pp 58, 
72-3, 110-3, 126-7. On Passaron as important regional and administrative center of Molossia, see 
Douzougli and Papadopoulos pp 2, passim; Meyer 2015, p300. 
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Philip to establish his network of supply for the upcoming campaign immediately upon 
his arrival in Epirus. Since Philip now planned to campaign in territory new to him, 
establishing his network of supply at this point in the campaign was especially important.  
 [Figure 3.8] From Passaron, Philip continued "into Chaonia via Epirus," 
marching northwest from Passaron roughly 34 km before turning west and going roughly 
27 km across the foothills to the Drin valley, where the Kakavia border crossing to 
Albania is today. From here, Philip marched north up the Drin valley 57 km to the Stena. 
This 118 km route from Passaron to the Stena is remarkably flat for being in the midst of 
such mountainous terrain.190  
 Livy reports that once Philip and his army were at the Stena by Antigonea, 
When Philip had looked at every site of the region, he believed that the 
place most suited to being fortified was along the river Aous. The river 
flows in a narrow valley between mountains, of which the natives call one 
the Meropus and other the Asnaus, offering a narrow path on the bank. 
 
cum situm omnem regionis adspexisset, maxime idoneum ad muniendum 
locum credidit esse praeter amnem Aoum. Is inter montes, quorum 
alterum Meropum, alterum Asnaum incolae uocant, angusta ualle fluit, iter 
exiguum super ripam praebens.  
(Livy 32.5.10) 
 
 [Figure 3.6] Philip abandoned his strategic position at the Stena that controlled 
the Drin valley north-south for a new location by the river Aous.191 Livy specifies that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 The surprising lack of elevation changes on this route between Passaron and the Stena attests to the ease 
of use of this corridor and its resultant key role in the landscape. For the history of this route, see Makres 
and Papageorgiou 1990, pp 134, 215-234; Dalakoglou 2017 forthcoming.  
191 The Aous is called the river Vjose in Albania today. It begins in Greece from the Pindos mountains by 
the Vikos gorge and flows northwest by Konitsa and into Albania by Përmet and continues in this direction 
until it turns west by the village of Këlcyrë and continues west roughly 16 km until it joins with the Drin by 
Tepelenë. See Hammond 1967, p699; TIR; Ceka 2013, p212, passim. 
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Philip's motivation for choosing a campsite was his desire for the best place to fortify, 
rather than, for instance, the best place from which to control the Drin valley. 
 [Figure 3.13] The narrowest section of the Aous valley, as well as the section in 
which the mountains rise up most strikingly on either side, is the section that runs east-
west roughly 15 km between the modern villages of Këlcyrë and Tepelenë.192 From the 
northern end of the Stena to the western opening of this section of the valley is less than 3 
km; Philip did not have to move his army far for his improved position.  
 Plutarch's description of the location of Philip's camp at the Aous fits this location 
as well: 
This area has no less natural strength than the Vale of Tempe, but is 
without the beautiful trees, green woods, agreeable haunts, and pleasant 
meadows that there abound. Great and lofty mountains on either side slope 
down and form a single very large and deep ravine, and through this the 
Aous193 dashes with a volume and speed which make it the equal of the 
Peneius. Its water covers all the rest of the ground at the foot of the 
mountains, but leaves a cut, precipitous and narrow, for a path along past 
its current; this path would not be easy for an army to traverse at any time, 
and when guarded, it would be utterly impassible. 
 
εἰσὶ δ' ὀχυροὶ µὲν οὐχ ἧττον τῶν περὶ τὰ Τέµπη, κάλλη δὲ δένδρων ὡς 
ἐκεῖνοι καὶ χλωρότητας ὕλης καὶ διατριβὰς καὶ λειµῶνας ἡδεῖς οὐκ 
ἔχουσιν· ὀρῶν δὲ µεγάλων καὶ ὑψηλῶν, ἑκατέρωθεν εἰς µίαν φάραγγα 
µεγίστην καὶ βαθεῖαν συµφεροµένων, διεκπίπτων ὁ Ἄψος καὶ σχῆµα καὶ 
τάχος ἐξοµοιοῦται πρὸς τὸν Πηνειόν, τὴν µὲν ἄλλην ἅπασαν ἀποκρύπτων 
ὑπώρειαν, ἐκτοµὴν δὲ κρηµνώδη καὶ στενὴν παρὰ τὸ ῥεῖθρον ἀπολείπων 
ἀτραπόν, οὐδ' ἄλλως ῥᾳδίαν στρατεύµατι διελθεῖν, εἰ δὲ καὶ φυλάττοιτο, 
παντελῶς ἄπορον. 
(Plut. Flam.3.4-5) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Leake 1835 I, pp 383-5; Kromayer 1907, Karte 3; Hammond 1966, pp 47-8; and Ceka 2013, p212 also 
all sited Philip's camp just north of the Stena somewhere in the valley between Tepelenë and Këlcyrë. 
193 For corruption, scribal error, or mistake resulting in Αωος being transmitted as Αψος in the text of 
Plutarch, see Hammond 1966, p47; Leake 1835 I, p390.  
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 Tempe is an apt comparison, as both narrow valleys extend for similar distances 
and offer similar opportunities to control movement through mountainous terrain. 
Plutarch is correct that the Aous valley is not as lush or overgrown as Tempe, yet the 
Aous valley is quite beautiful today. The area where the Aous joins the Drin fits 
Plutarch's description of where the "water covers all the rest of the ground at the foot of 
the mountains" and Philip's camp is then somewhere deeper in the "precipitous and 
narrow" cut of the valley.194  
 East of where the Aous joins the Drin, the course of the Aous through the valley 
is the same today as it was in antiquity; the current course of the river Aous is the same as 
the ancient course of the river Aous.195  
Part II: Philip's encampment at the Aous 
  Livy reports that once Philip chose the new location for the encampment, he set 
to fortifying it:  
Philip ordered Athenagoras to hold and to fortify Asnaus with the light 
troops; he himself placed camp on Meropus. Where the cliffs were steep, a 
post of a few men were holding them; where they were less naturally safe, 
Philip was fortifying them in some places with ditches, some places with a 
palisade (vallo), and in some places with towers. Also a great quantity of 
catapults was placed in suitable places in order to stop the enemy with 
missiles at a distance. The king's tent was placed in front of the palisade 
(vallo) on a maximally conspicuous hill, in order to generate terror for the 
enemy and hope from confidence for his own men. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Leake 1835 I, pp 388-9; Kromayer 1907, Karte 3; and Ceka 2013, p213 proposed that Philip's camp was 
in this section where the Aous joins the Drin. 
195 Goga Beqiraj & Beqiraj 2015. University of Tirana Geology professors Dr. Arjan Beqiraj and Dr. 
Enkeleida Goga Beqiraj studied this valley as part of the 2015 VRVAP season and determined that the 
Aous cut its course through the bedrock of the valley in the Jurassic. I greatly thank them for extensive 
discussions on the geology of the valley. Hammond 1966, p41 had surmised that the bed for the river Aous 
in this valley was cut "aeons before the Battle." 
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Asnaum Athenagoram cum leui armatura tenere et communire iubet; ipse in 
Meropo posuit castra. qua abscisae rupes erant, statio paucorum armatorum 
tenebat; qua minus tuta erant, alia fossis, alia uallo, alia turribus muniebat. 
magna tormentorum etiam uis ut missilibus procul arcerent hostem idoneis 
locis disposita est. tabernaculum regium pro uallo in conspecto maxime 
tumulo, ut terrorem hostibus suisque spem ex fiducia faceret, positum. 
(Livy 32.5.11-13) 
 
 The location of Philip's encampment thus needs 1) sufficient space for troops on 
both sides of the river Aous, 2) cliffs or steep rocks abutting the camp in some places but 
not in others, 3) suitable places for catapults, and 4) a conspicuous hill for Philip's tent. 
[Figure 3.14] The area that best fits Livy's description is in the section of the Aous valley 
bounded to the west by the Neck of Mezhgoran, where the river turns from northeast to 
north and the banks are especially narrow, and to the east where the Zagori River joins 
the Aous from the south. 
 To determine the amount of space Philip's men required, we need to know how 
many men Philip had. However, neither Livy nor Plutarch specify this number. To make 
as accurate an estimate as possible, we can look to relative troop values in other 
Macedonian campaigns.  
 Philip had a larger army at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC than he had at the Aous, due 
to the fact that he held a major levy during spring 197 BC, by which he was able to get 
his army to a strength it had not been at in years (Livy 33.3.2-5).196 Livy's report of 
Philip's 16,000 heavy infantry troops, 2,000 cavalry, and 7500 combined light-armed 
troops, foreign allies, and mercenaries (Livy 33.4.4-5) at Cynoscephalae should then give 
us a ceiling for the number of Philip's troops at the Aous.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 This levy included troops previously considered too young or too old (L.33.3.4). For epigraphic support 
for this levy, see Hatzopoulos 2001; Sekunda 2010, p460; Sekunda 2013, pp 88-89. 
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 Antiochus had a smaller army at Thermopylae in 191 BC that Philip had at the 
Aous, as Livy reports that Roman consul Glabrio pointed out that the Romans faced more 
enemy soldiers at the Battle of the River Aous than were at Thermopylae (Livy 36.17.4). 
Livy's report of Antiochus' nearly (fere) 10,000 heavy infantry, 500 cavalry (Livy 
36.15.3), 2000 allied Aetolians (Livy 36.16.11), as well as unspecified numbers of light-
armed troops, dart-throwers, archers, slingers, and elephants (Livy 36.18.2-4) should then 
give us a floor for the number of Philip's troops at the Aous.197  
 First, Philip then had between 10,000 and 16,000 heavy infantry. Scholars have 
debated whether the organizational component of the Macedonian heavy infantry was of 
1000 men or of 4000 men, i.e. whether Macedonian heavy infantries were divisible by 
1000 or only by 4000.198 The Macedonian armies at Cynoscephalae (16,000 heavy 
infantry) and Pydna (21,000 heavy infantry) could indicate, respectively, 4 strategia and 
5 strategia.199 However, Antigonus Doson had 10,000 heavy infantry at the Battle of 
Sellasia in 222 BC (Plb. 2.65.2), and Philip V, himself, had 10,000 heavy infantry for the 
Social War in 219 BC (Plb. 4.37.7).200 Philip at the Aous then had a number of heavy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 We know that Antiochus is leading a Macedonian-style phalanx as Livy calls Antiochus' heavy infantry 
"Macedonians" (Livy 36.18.2, 4), and can only be referring to their phalanx fighting style - as Macedon 
was hostile to Antiochus at this time and not supplying him soldiers. There were 2000 additional Aetolians 
who chose to not fight with Antiochus but to stay in Heraclea instead (L.36.16.11). 
198 Sekunda 2013, pp88-92; Sekunda 2010, pp460-1; Matthew 2015 pp276-296; Hatzopoulos 2001. The 
Macedonian phalanx was organized in units of four, based off the 16-man file of the phalanx, the lochos: 4 
lochoi made a 64-man tetrarchia, 4 tetrachiai made a 256-man speira or syntagma (a 16x16 square), 4 
speirai made a 1024-man chiliarchia, and 4 chiliarchiai made a 4096-man strategia; what matters here is 
which of these units was the organizational component of the phalanx. 
199 For how to derive that there were 21,000 heavy infantry at Pydna, and how that is four strategia, see 
Sekunda 2013, p92. 
200 Livy's 10,000 heavy infantry at Thermopylae is potentially troublesome: Livy' report that Antiochus 
arrived in Greece with 10,000 infantry (L.35.43.6, L36.19.11 citing Polybius as his source) and still had 
10,000 infantry at Thermopylae due to specific reinforcements (L.36.15.3) could be read as an intertext to 
Herodotus' account of the Immortals at Thermopylae in 480 BC (Hdt.7.215-218, 223-4), whose number 
was similarly maintained at 10,000 (Hdt.7.83). This numerical connection would serve to align Antiochus' 
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infantry more than 10,000 but less than 16,000 and possibly divisible by four: 12,000 
infantry fits these requirements.  
 For light-armed troops, we have less evidence to work with, as the number of 
light-armed troops is not always specified, as at Thermopylae discussed above. However, 
if we look to Livy's accounts of the numbers of Macedonian soldiers at Cynoscephalae 
and Pydna, we see similar ratios of heavy-armed troops to light-armed infantry and allies:  
2.13 to 1 at Cynoscephalae and 2.16 to 1 at Pydna.201 Following this ratio, for 12,000 
heavy infantry we should expect roughly 6,000 light-infantry and allies.  
 Philip brought no cavalry or elephants to the Aous (L.32.12.7). This was a 
strategic move for a defensive campaign, as horses and elephants require great quantities 
of food and water to maintain.202     
 It remains to determine how much space these 12,000 heavy-infantry troops and 
6,000 light-infantry and allied troops required. There are no detailed literary descriptions 
or archaeological remains of Macedonian field camps. However, by using Polybius' 
detailed description of a Roman field camp alongside Dobson's recent analysis of the 
roughly contemporaneous Roman field camps by Numantia, we can get a rough idea of 
how much space armies required in the first half of the second century BC. 
 Polybius describes a Roman field camp designed to hold between 19,200 and 
22,400 troops (Plb.6.27-32).203 Polybius specifies that this camp was 2150 feet by 2150 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
troops with the Persians and, conversely, the Romans with the defenders of Greek freedom. However, 
Polybius' reports of the Macedonian campaigns of 222 BC and 219 BC support the possibility that Livy 
was depicting reality at Thermopylae. 
201 See Sekunda 2013, p114 for the breakdown of troops at Pydna, following L.42.51.3-9. 
202 Roth 2012, pp 61-5, 78-9, 125-9; Engels 1978, pp 144-5, passim. 
203 Polybius reports that the camp held two legions of 4200 to 5000 infantry and 300 cavalry each 
(Plb.6.20.8-9), and an equal number of allied infantry and three times as many cavalry (Plb.6.26.7). The 
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feet. Dobson demonstrated that the Polybian foot was .355m, which then results in a 
camp 763.25m by 763.25m with an area of 582,550.6 m2. However, one cannot just 
divide the area of the Roman camp by the number of men it was designed to hold to come 
up with an average amount of space needed per man, as there were significant aspects of 
Polybius' description that were particular to a Roman camp and not necessarily relevant 
to a Macedonian camp.204  
 First of all, Philip divided his camp into three component parts - heavy-infantry 
barracks, light-infantry and allies' barracks, and Philip's tent - in three separate places, 
whereas the Roman camp contained all three within one palisade. Second, the 
archaeological evidence from the Roman camps at Numantia shows that both the roads 
within the camp and the area between the tents and the palisade (intervallum) could be 
significantly smaller in practice than Polybius prescribed: Polybian camp roads were 50 ft 
(17.75m) wide, but in the Numantine camps were as narrow as 5m;205 the Polybian 
intervallum was 200 feet (71m) from the tents on all sides, but in the Numantine camps 
were much smaller, ranging from as little as 3m to a maximum of only 29m.206 Finally, 
the market and supply storage areas (the forum and quaestorium in the Roman camp) 
need not have been within the same palisade as the soldier's barracks.207 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
increase from 4200 to 5000 infantry (Plb.6.20.8, 6.32.1) involved no apparent change to the size of the 
whole encampment, or of the subdivisions within the encampment. 
204 For the record, 582,550.6 m2 divided by 19,500 men makes for 30.3 m2 per man. 
205 Dobson 2008, pp104-5. 
206 Dobson 2008, p109. 
207 See Dobson 2008, pp75-9 for it being a distinctly Roman practice to place the forum, quaestiorium, and 
praetorium inside a field camp, and that there were distinct spatial and religious relationships between 
these three Roman camp components. Additionally, Polybius reports that the forum and quaestorium were 
the camp components which could be reduced in size, if need be (Plb.6.32.4-5). 
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 What remains are the measured areas demarcated for the barracks for the 
soldiers.208 Polybius reports that each tent unit was 100 feet by 100 feet, which Dobson 
demonstrated was equal to 120 Roman feet by 120 Roman feet. The measuring unit of 
120 Roman feet is also the unit of Roman centuriation, which led Dobson to conclude 
that "the camp's grid system seems not to have been a military invention, but was simply 
transferred from a civilian to a military context. If the army had introduced the concept, it 
would be expected that the theoretical dimensions of each area would have been selected 
with a closer regard to the ideal required for a unit's tents, which would not necessarily 
correspond to a square of 120 feet or convenient multiples or fractions of this .... The 
actus quadratus as a basic unit of area nevertheless clearly could not have been unsuitable 
in either cramping or providing an unnecessary amount of space for units; otherwise an 
alternative would have had to have been found."209 The Roman tent unit was thus a 
reasonable size for the number of men assigned to it. 
 A Roman foot was 0.296 m, so each tent unit had an area of 1260.25 m2. Each 
1260.25 m2 unit housed 120 infantry plus 48 velites for a total of 168 men.210 Dividing 
the total area of the tent (1260.25 m2) by the number of men it held (168) results in the 
barracks supplying 7.5 m2 per man for a 4200 man legion.211 Taking this area per man as 
a reasonable estimate, Philip's camp at the Aous would have required a space of 90,000 
m2 for the heavy infantry barracks for 12,000 men. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Dobson 2008 demonstrates that the troop barracks in practice were equivalent to Polybius' precepts.   
209 Dobson 2008, p72. 
210 See Dobson 2008, p48-9, 82-90.  
211 For a 5000 man legion, each tent would have held 208 men, making for 6 m2 per man. 
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 [Figure 3.15] At the eastern end of the valley section are two fields with a dry 
river bed running between them: the larger western field measures roughly 350 meters by 
200 meters for an area of 70,000 m2, and the eastern field measures roughly 300 meters 
by 70 meters for an area of 21,000 m2, making for a total of 91,000 m2, which is enough 
room for Philip's heavy infantry barracks. Directly across the Aous from the heavy-
infantry barracks is a large field with more than enough room for the 300m by 150m 
barracks for the 6,000 light infantry and allies.  
 For both barracks, the steep mountains form the defenses on one side while built 
defenses form the defense works on the other three sides, in accordance with Livy's 
description that "Where the cliffs were steep, a post of a few men was holding them; 
where they were less naturally safe, Philip was fortifying them in some places with 
ditches, some places with a palisade (vallo), and in some places with towers" (L.32.5.12). 
 The area for the heavy infantry camp was protected to the south by the cliffs and 
steep rocks from the base of Mt. Golikut. To the north is a series of flat river terraces 
leading to the banks of the Aous, where Philip would have had built defenses. The river 
terraces were formed 17,000 years ago and the valley had the same topographic 
appearance in 198 BC as today.212 The proposed campsite for the heavy infantry is well 
positioned, being centrally located, partially hidden from the enemy's view from the west 
behind the small hill, and with access to an escape route to the east should the need arise. 
Additionally, the large open space west of the heavy infantry barracks provided an area in 
which the heavy infantry could fight, with more than enough room for a 16 man wide and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Goga Beqiraj & Beqiraj 2015. 
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16 man deep phalanx unit, the speira, with additional light armed troops on each side.213 
This made for a situation in which, unlike e.g. Thermopylae, once an enemy had fought 
through the initial defensive works they then had to fight an infantry battle on terrain 
favorable to the phalanx (Plb.18.31.3-6) before mounting an attack on the Macedonian 
encampments. 
 Livy is unclear whether the "suitable places" Philip placed catapults were on the 
towers from the camp defenses, natural locations such as hillsides, or both. Hellenistic 
catapult platforms preserved in towers indicate that a catapult needed a 5 m by 5m area in 
which to operate.214 Suitable places would have included the towers specified as part of 
the defensive works, as well as the southern side of the Neck of Mezhgoran [Figure 
3.16], and the gradually sloping hills on the southern bank of the Aous in the area just 
west of the Neck. 
 [Figure 3.15] Just to the west of the proposed location for the infantry camp is the 
"maximally conspicuous hill" on which Philip placed his tent in order to "generate terror 
for the enemy and hope from confidence for his own men." 215 [Figure 3.17] A tent on 
this hill would have been immediately visible for anyone entering the valley from the 
west, as well as from the infantry camp and everywhere else in this section of valley. 
Additionally, the steep sides of this hill would have made Philip's tent difficult to assault. 
Polybius specifies the area designated for the Roman consul's tent (praetorium) to be a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 On the Macedonian use of the speira, see Sekunda 2013; Matthew 2015. 
214 The best work on ancient catapults remains Marsden 1969, see esp. pp 116-163 for tower platforms. 
Marsden, pp 166-7 uses Philip at the Aous as one of his four examples of "catapults in field campaigns." 
See also Campbell 2011; Ober 1987 argues that multiple arrow-throwing catapults could fit on a 5m by 5m 
platform. For comparison, I measured the towers at the fortified Ptolemaic camp at Koroni to be 6m x 6m. 
215 Scipio had similarly encamped in view of Carthage in 203 BC in order to "strike the Carthaginians with 
terror and dismay" (Plb.14.10.3). 
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200 foot (71m) by 200 foot square of area 5,041 m2, and this seems a safe estimate for the 
area Philip's tent required as well. The top of this hill has a flat summit measuring 
roughly 80 m by 80 m, making for an area of 6,400 m2, more than enough for Philip's 
tent. 
 [Figure 3.15] After the heavy-infantry barracks and Philip's tent have been 
placed, it becomes apparent that there is something strange about Livy's description of 
the Macedonian camp: Livy reports that Philip chose a location for the camp due to its 
defensive location, indicating that Philip intended to hold this area against an attack. 
However, Philip then placed his tent on a hill outside the vallum, apparently exposing it 
to attack. As the Roman camp was centered entirely on the consul's tent (Plb.6.27), 
placing Philip's tent away from the infantry barracks and outside the camp's palisade is a 
jarring detail. 
 However, fragmentary inscription SEG 40.524 found near Amphipolis suggests 
that Philip's tent would indeed have been placed outside of the fortified infantry barracks 
[Figure 3.18].216 This inscription deals with Philip's own military field regulations and is 
dated to approximately 200 BC, the same time period as this camp.217 The inscription 
reads: 
Concerning the construction of the camp: 
When they have completed the enclosure218 for the king 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Hatzopoulos 1996 II, pp 32-36, plate 16; Hatzopoulos 2001, pp 161-4, plate 16; Sekunda 2013, pp 88-9.  
217 The other sections of the inscription concern other military regulations, i.e. 'patrols', 'discipline over war 
booty', 'foraging', and 'watchwords.' Hatzopoulos 2001, p144 proposed that Philip felt compelled to post 
these regulations sometime after 218 BC, when the division of campaign booty nearly led to a mutiny. 
Sekunda 2013, p88 follows Hatzopoulos. 
218 The term φραγµός is rare in Classical Greek. Herodotus, Xenophon, and Strabo all use φραγµός to mean 
more than a boundary but a built barrier of some significance: Herodotus uses φραγµός to mean a built 
barricade higher than a horse's head (Hdt.7.36) as well as the wooden palisade that surrounded the 
Acropolis (Hdt.7.142); Xenophon uses φραγµός to mean a fence built of wood higher than a lion or similar 
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and the rest of his quarters and an interval has been left, 
they shall straightaway build barracks for the infantry staff-officers... 
 
περὶ στεγνοποΐας· 
ὅταν δὲ τὸν φραγµὸνσυντελέσωσιν τῶ<ι> βασιλεῖ 
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σκηνοποιίαν καὶ γένηται διάστασις, 
εὐθὺ τοῖς ὑπασπισταῖς ποιείτωσαν ἐκκοίτιον 
(SEG 40.524: fragment A, Column 2, lines 5-8) 
 
 Philip was thus in the habit of camping in a separate fortified area away from the 
infantry barracks.219  
 The question remains, though, why Philip would camp outside his defensive 
works when the specified reason he was camping here was because it was a good place 
for defensive fortification. The layout of Philip's camp becomes more clear though, if we 
infer that Livy misunderstood his source material's description of the Macedonian camp, 
perhaps due to his only understanding the regularized Roman camp.220 Livy was dealing 
with a passage describing a fortified camp that had a palisade around the barracks for the 
infantry and then an additional set of defensive works in the direction of the expected 
Roman attack. Livy's two uses of vallo in the above passage would then refer to two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
wild beast can see over and stronger than it could break through (Xen. Cyn. 11.4); Strabo uses φραγµός to 
mean a wall made of stone (Strabo 13.4.14). Polybius does not use the word φραγµός. 
219 When building field camps, the Romans and Macedonians both built the commanding general's tent first 
before attending to the rest of the camp, but in contrasting manners: the Romans designated the central area 
within the infantry camp and the Macedonians designated a separate area surrounded by its own defensive 
wall. If Livy or Polybius intended to differentiate the difference between the Roman and Macedonian 
camps, marking the difference between the centrality of the consul's tent and the separateness of Philip's 
tent would have been a good way to do it. 
220 Scholars understand that Livy was relying on Polybius as his source for this section: Briscoe 1973, p1-2; 
Trankle 1977; Briscoe 2009, p462. Words used for the description of camps and components of camps in 
Polybius can have different meanings in different situations and scenarios. For instance, Polybius uses 
charax and parembole both as metonymy for camp (e.g. charax as camp: 3.43.5, 3.67.2; parembole as 
camp: 6.26.10, 6.42.3-5), but also uses charax to mean palisade (e.g. 10.41.5, 1.42.8) and parembole to 
mean where troops sleep (repeatedly in Bk.6). Polybius presents armies fortifying or surrounding a 
parembole with a charax (Plb. 3.68.5-6, 18.18.9) and an army approaching an enemy parembole (3.102.2), 
and expects the reader to understand this to mean camp including palisade, as Polybius later says that they 
dismantle the charax (3.102.4) of this camp. While charax can mean camp in some Polybian usages, 
charax can also mean a component of defensive works built for a seige that are not part of a camp at all 
(Plb.1.42.8). For further discussion on terms related to Greek camps, see Pritchett 1974. 
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different palisade features in the original that Livy has conflated to one vallum.221 If Livy 
were only familiar with Roman camps, this fort design would have been understandibly 
confusing as Roman camps always have only one palisade (Plb.6.31.10-14, 6.41.5).222 
 [Figure 3.19] In other words, Polybius originally described a camp in which there 
was an infantry barracks that had a palisade around it except where it abuts the cliffs, and 
Philip's tent was on a hill outside of this palisade that surrounded the infantry barracks 
(tabernaculum regium pro uallo in conspecto maxime tumulo). However, Philip's tent 
was within an additional set of defensive works (qua minus tuta erant, alia fossis, alia 
uallo, alia turribus muniebat) to the west. 
 First of all, we know that Greek infantry barracks had palisades around them (e.g. 
Plb.18.18).223 Additionally, there is literary and archaeological evidence of non-Roman 
camps in this time period that built additional defensive works towards the direction of 
expected attack, beyond the palisade around the infantry barracks. 
 Polybius reports that in 217 BC Hannibal established a palisaded encampment as 
well as additional defensive works, including a ditch and a palisade, directly between his 
camp and the hostile Roman camp (Plb.3.105.11).  
 [Figure 3.20] The archaeological remains from the Ptolemaic camp (265 BC -261 
BC) on the Koroni peninsula in southeastern Attica, and the Macedonian camps by the 
modern village of Karya in Perrhaebia and by the modern village of Rapsani in southern 
Macedon (both built before 169 BC) were similar to Philip's camp at the Aous: [Figure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Livy does not use vallum in any passage for which the Polybian source material is extant, even though 
Livy uses the word vallum 87 times in books 30 to 45. See Thompson 1968 for two instances where Livy 
used the term vallum that indicate that Livy misinterpreted his Polybian source material. 
222 Dobson 2008, p109, passim. 
223 See Pritchett 1974, p133-146 for discussion and additional examples. 
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3.21] each of these camps had an infantry barracks encircled by a defensive wall plus an 
additional stone wall that only faced the direction of presumed attack.224 These additional 
defensive works were thicker and more substantial at all three sites. All walls at these 
sites were built with local, readily available stone. 
 The archaeological remains found at Philip's camp at the Aous indicate where 
Philip's additional defensive works stood. [Figure 3.23] Looking at this photo taken from 
the hills along the north bank of the Aous, northwest from the hill on which Philip had his 
tent, one can see the Aous moving westward through the valley within it ancient banks. 
At the western end of the valley, south of the Aous, is an alluvial river terrace formed 
17,000 years ago.225 Directly on the alluvial sediments of this terrace were found the 
remains of the fortification wall of Philip's camp.226 [Figure 3.24] This wall runs 
approximately 60 m and was carefully built in courses of undressed river stones with a 
clear leveling course in places and stands between 1 m to 1.5 m high.  
 While this wall is currently used as a terrace wall, its careful construction, 
including the leveling course, indicate greater care was used in building this wall than 
was needed to create an agricultural terrace wall; such careful construction is associated 
with military purposes.227 Building a palisade on this solid, alluvial sediment terrace takes 
advantage of the natural environment to make a wall higher and more difficult to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 For Koroni: MacCredie 1966, pp1-16, with plan; Tsaravopoulos 2010-13; Lawall 2015. For Macedonian 
camp near Karya: Rizakis 1986; Pritchett 1991, pp101, 105-9. For Macedonian camp near Rapsani: Leake 
1835 III, p350; Pritchett 1991, pp 109-112. I visited, measured, and photographed all three forts.  
225 Goga Beqiraj & Beqiraj 2015. I greatly thank Dr. Beqiraj for walking me around the terraces and 
carefully explaining their geologic formation. 
226 That the wall sits directly upon the alluvial terrace indicates that it is an ancient wall (Dr. Beqiraj, pers. 
comm.). 
227 Archaeological architects David Scahill and James Herbst both asserted independently that this wall was 
so well-built as to indicate it was for military purpose rather than agricultural. Dr. Beqiraj, who has worked 
all over Albania for his whole career, confidently asserted, "This is no peasant wall." 
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overcome. Hellenistic Greek palisades are understood to have often had stone socles with 
the wooden palisade above.228 All the stone in this wall is locally harvested river stone 
and there was ample wood around to build the palisade.229 
 The local shepherds said that this wall used to be longer, running along the entire 
river terrace to the east, but agricultural collectives destroyed the eastern part of the wall 
during the Communist period. The part of the wall that survives was left standing 
apparently to support a concrete threshing floor on top of the terrace that this wall helps 
create.  
 [Figure 3.23] There are additional walls that were part of Philip's defensive 
strategy just to the east of the Neck on the southern bank. [Figure 3.25] This set of two 
carefully coursed walls was intended to prevent a Roman crossing just inside the Neck. 
These walls were built with stone harvested from adjacent Mt. Golikut, an easy to quarry 
and common source of stone in the region still.230 
 Figure 3.26 was generated by aerial photography by James Herbst in 2015 and 
gives a good view of Philip's entire encampment. In Figure 3.27, I annotated it to make it 
appear as Philip's camp looked.231 
 Finally, Livy's narrative of the events of the Battle of the River Aous indicates 
that Philip had an additional set of defensive works besides the palisade around the 
infantry barracks, as I will discuss in detail later in this chapter.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Pritchett 1974, p135, passim. Livy censors Perseus for not building a wall and towers out of the 
"abundance of stone and forest timber at hand" in Pieria in 169 BC (L.44.6.16).  
229 On the provenance of the stones, see Goga Beqiraj & Beqiraj 2015. Dr. Beqiraj assured me that the 
Aous is too rough to have been used to transport building materials to the site; the Aous is, indeed, used for 
white water rafting trips today in the area south of Përmet. 
230 I have seen men easily quarry this stone and then break it into flat building stones with just a long 
crowbar. 
231 For future publications, David Scahill will render formal plans and reconstruction drawings. 
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 Part of the reason Philip thought this location best for fortifying defensively was 
that it was well-suited for supplying Philip's army with water and food for an extended 
period of time. [Figure 3.28] There were four potential sources of fresh water for Philip's 
camp: First, the Aous river, itself, originates in the Pindos mountains to the southeast and 
would have thus been safe from potential interference from the Romans to the west.232 
Second, the Zagoria river flows from the Zagoria mountains from the south and empties 
into the Aous at the eastern edge of this section of valley.233 This water source was 
regularized most recently in the early 19th century by means of a water channel rebuilt by 
Ali Pasha,234 of which the first phase of construction might be from the second century 
AD.235 This source was also not liable to Roman tampering. Third, were the freshwater 
springs in the valley. There are currently two active freshwater springs, one at the east 
end of the valley on the south bank of the Aous, the other at the west end of the valley on 
the north bank on the property of the restaurant Sajmola.236 Both of these have been 
flowing, and being used, since beyond the local shepherds' communal memory. While 
these springs may or may not have existed in 198 BC, they indicate that there might have 
been constantly flowing underwater springs of potable water in this valley for Philip's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 The Aous river runs clean and clear today, except for when muddied by the building of a power plant on 
the river at Përmet (as in August 2015), or by sewage issues from Përmet (as locals told me has happened). 
Even when those issues are in effect, the Aous between Këlcyrë and Tepelenë is still used to water animals 
and for swimming. 
233 The riverbed is dry now, but local shepherds said that this is a relatively recent development due to 
human intervention, i.e. a failed attempt to redirect the river for private irrigation. 
234 Potable water was brought in from approximately 5 km to the south and was used for irrigation, 
powering a mill, and drinking into the 20th century. I have only hearsay from local shepherds as to how far 
the water channel goes up the Zagori as the gang-run marijuana growing operations in the Zagori valley 
prevented me from following the extent of the water channel to the south.  
235 David Scahill and I plan to continue work on the aqueduct bridge at the eastern end of the valley that, at 
first investigation, has a 2nd century phase. 
236 This freshwater spring flows at a high enough rate that it currently supplies all the drinking and cooking 
water used at Samjola. 
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use. Fourth, there is a dry river bed running also from the south through the heavy 
infantry camp that might have held water in antiquity, especially during the spring snow 
melt. All four of these sources were not liable to Roman interference from the west. 
 [Figure 3.29] While there was not sufficient nearby agricultural land, Philip's 
camp was well-placed to take advantage of the flat and secure route to the southeast 
through the Aous valley to Passaron. This route was roughly 110 km through allied 
territory, and its relatively gentle topography made it good for cart traffic. Prior to state 
investment in the road through the Drin valley in the last quarter of the 20th century, this 
had been a major north-south route.237 Philip had the opportunity to establish this supply 
line with the Epirotes when he passed through Passaron earlier in the season, and the 
allied Epirotes could be understood to want to support Philip, especially in light of their 
role in brokering the Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC to explicitly get the Romans out of 
Epirus (L.29.12). Additionally, Flamininus' ostentatious refusal to take Epirote foodstuffs 
to supply his campaign after the Battle of the River Aous (L.32.5.5) indicates that Philip 
was using Epirote foodstuffs to supply his camp at the Aous, and that Flamininus was 
trying to mark the contrast between himself and Philip.238 
 [Figure 3.30] Hammond had, in contrast, placed the heavy infantry camp on the 
slopes of the north bank of the river "because only on that side is there room for the road 
or path which Plutarch describes."239 However, on the south bank is an Ottoman road 
[Figure 3.31] and this was the main route through the area through the Communist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Leake 1835 I, pp 383-397; Winnifrith 2002. 
238 Livy reports that in winter 169/168 BC the Romans bought 30,000 modii of grain from the Epirotes. 
This demonstrates the Epirote capacity to generate sufficient surplus grain, especially as this grain was 
supplied during the winter, well after the harvest (L.44.16.2). 
239 Hammond 1966, p49, fig 5 map 4. 
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period.240 [Figure 3.32] Most importantly, the slopes on the northern side of the river are 
far too steep and uneven to have supported a camp of Macedonian infantrymen until one 
has climbed 550 m of elevation gain above the valley floor to where the village of 
Mezhgoran sits high above the valley today.241 [Figure 3.33] Besides being an 
impractical location for food and water supply, a camp at Mezhgoran would not accord 
with Livy's later narrative of the battle in which Philip employs an escape route to the 
east when attacked from both north and south.242  
 [Figure 3.22] Philip's placement of his camp components and additional 
defensive works in this section of valley demonstrate that this was, indeed, a "place most 
suited to being fortified." It would be extremely difficult to force a way through the Neck 
and through the valley to the barracks, and the reality behind the Roman consul's 
exhortation to his troops at Thermopylae that the defile at the Aous "was more difficult to 
traverse" than Thermopylae due to the fact that the "fortifications were then both more 
suitably situated and more strongly constructed" (L.36.17.3-4) becomes apparent. 
  By encamping at the Aous before the Romans have even left winter quarters, 
Philip has taken over the initiative, where the Romans had held it during the 200 BC and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 The importance of this Ottoman road is seen in the great effort taken to build and maintain over time the 
terrace walls that support the road. The shepherds of the area told me of the use and importance of this road 
in their lifetimes, however the Ottoman road has been superseded today by the paved road along the north 
bank of the Aous.  
241 I hiked up to the village of Mezhgoran, also visiting the radio towers and remains of walls built with 
large ashlar blocks just above them. Hiking through this area confirmed that this area would be too steep to 
place a camp until one got to either Mezhgoran.  
242 Additionally, placing the camp at Mezhgoran does not accord with Livy's description of some parts 
being less well naturally protected and some more protected. Hammond's reliance on a limited single 
autopsy 35 years before he wrote up the article caused him to use Plutarch and a topographic map to 
determine which bank Philip's camp was on, rather than analysis of the landscape. 
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199 BC campaign seasons. Philip was no longer reacting to Roman aggression but has 
turned the tables so that now the Romans had to react to his actions. 
Part III: Roman movements  
 Livy reports that the Romans were still in winter quarters at Apollonia when they 
learned that Philip was encamped by the Aous: 
The consul Villius had learned through Charopus the Epirote what passes 
the king had occupied with his army, and after wintering in Corcyra he 
crossed to the mainland at the coming of spring and began to lead his army 
against the enemy. When he was about five miles from the king's camp, 
after fortifying the place and leaving behind the legions, he himself went 
forward to reconnoitre with some light troops ... 
 
Consul per Charopum Epiroten certior factus quos saltus cum exercitu 
insedisset rex, et ipse, cum Corcyrae hibernasset, uere primo in 
continentem trauectus ad hostem ducere pergit. quinque milia ferme ab 
regiis castris cum abesset, loco munito relictis legionibus ipse cum 
expeditis progressus ad speculanda loca ... 
(Livy 32.6.1-2) 
 
 
 [Figure 3.29] After Philip was already encamped at the Aous, Villius learned of it 
and marched from the Roman winter quarters at Apollonia down the flat Drin valley 82 
km southeast to where the Aous joins the Drin. Roughly five Roman miles to the west of 
Philip's camp is the modern town of Tepelenë. [Figure 3.35] This is the only location in 
the vicinity that has space to hold a Roman two-legion camp.243 Additionally, the 
strategic value of this location is demonstrated by the fact that Ali Pasha chose it for his 
fortress to control the region. [Figure 3.36] The fortress of Ali Pasha looms over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Following Dobson's conclusions from Numantia that the intervallum could be reduced from Polybius' 71 
m to 3 m in practice, the streets could be reduced from Polybius' 17.75 m to 5m in practice, and Polybius' 
injunction that the forum and quaestiorium could be reduced in size leaves plenty of room for the Roman 
camp on the plateau on which the modern town of Tepelenë sits. 
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valley today, attesting to the strong position of the Roman camp there.244 When looking 
at the photo of the fortress, keep in mind that the fortress extends along the bank to the 
south for less than half as far as the Roman camp did. 
 This location was well served for keeping the Roman army supplied: The Romans 
could have relied on the Drin or the freshwater springs in Tepelenë today as source of 
fresh water. [Figure 3.29] Villius had a reliable supply route, with Apollonia only three 
to four days away by wagon on a flat, established route through allied territory, and the 
grain from Apollonia was essentially unlimited, as Rome’s own supply fleet directly 
supplied it.245 
 Livy reports that after Villius scouted Philip's camp:  
 
on the next day Villius held a council, whether he should try to force a 
passage through the ravine which was held by the enemy, although great 
labor and danger were involved, or should follow the same circuitous 
route by which Sulpicius had entered Macedonia the previous year. 
 
postero die consilium habuit, utrum per insessum ab hoste saltum, 
quamquam labor ingens periculumque proponeretur, transitum temptaret, 
an eodem itinere quo priore anno Sulpicius Macedoniam intrauerat, 
circumduceret copias. 
(Livy 32.6.2-3) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 No excavations have ever been conducted at the site that could confirm whether a Roman camp lay 
under the fortress (Taulant Rama, pers. comm.), however its dimensions and shape are what we'd expect 
from a Roman campsite, and I strongly suspect that there was a Roman antecedent to this Ottoman era 
fortification. The importance of the location is also shown in Tepelenë's outsized role compared to its 
population in Albania's 1997 revolution (Abrahams 2015). 
245 For laden Roman wagon trains traveling between 20 and 32 km/day, see Roth 2012, p 211. 
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 Livy reports that while Villius was spending many days in debate (L.32.6.4), the 
incoming consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus arrived at the camp, took over command 
(Livy 32.9.8),246 and then faced the same dilemma: 
Flamininus held a council, whether to attempt to force a passage straight 
through the enemy's camp or, without even trying so difficult and 
dangerous a feat, to proceed into Macedonia rather by the safe but longer 
route through the Dassaretii and by way of Lyncus.  
 
consilium habuit, utrum recto itinere per castra hostium uim facere 
conaretur an ne temptata quidem re tanti laboris ac periculi per Dassaretios 
potius Lyncumque tuto circuitu Macedoniam intraret;  
(Livy 32.9.8-9) 
 For both Villius and Flamininus, the choice is between forcing Philip's position at 
the Aous, or retracing Sulpicius' route from the previous year through the areas between 
Illyria and Macedon.247 For both consuls, the choice is presented as between a dangerous 
route and a safe route. [Figure 3.37] However, those two routes do not go to the same 
area or aim at the same result. The "safe" route involved either ravaging Macedon's 
western borderlands as Sulpicius had done, or invading Macedon; while the "dangerous" 
route involved a pitched battle with Philip. Philip's camp did not block the consul's 
movement by Sulpicius' route; going through Philip's camp did not open a route between 
Apollonia and Macedon. 
 Plutarch also reports that Flamininus faced this choice, but that fear of having a 
long lines of supply on Sulpicius' route convinced him to force Philip's position at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 This means that Villius did not get a campaign year, as Sulpicius had campaigned during Villius' 199 
BC consulship, as discussed in chapter 2.  
247 Sulpicius' route is discussed in detail in chapter 2.  
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Aous (Plut.Flam.4.1).248 While this was a legitimate fear, Sulpicius had been able to 
wage a long campaign by living off the produce from the plains of Dassaretia and 
Pelagonia. 
 Unmentioned potential factors in the consuls' decision-making process include 
that Rome was more concerned with protecting the coastal Illyrian cities under her 
protection (Apollonia, Oricum, Corcyra, and Dyrrachium) than actually invading 
Macedon, and that, given Philip's current position, heading into the interior via Sulpicius' 
route would have left these cities open to Philip's attack; and that withdrawing from their 
established encampment at the Aous would have demonstrated weakness that might have 
caused them to lose recent allies like the Aetolians and Athamanians. 
  Livy then reports the reason that effectively sways Flamininus' decision-making 
process:  
This latter view [i.e. following Sulpicius' route] would have prevailed had 
there not been the fear that, when he had moved farther from the sea, he 
would have let the enemy slip from his grasp, if, as had happened before, 
the King preferred to safeguard himself in wilderness and forests, and the 
summer would be spent without any accomplishment. 
 
uicissetque ea sententia ni timuisset ne, cum a mari longius recessisset 
emisso e manibus hoste, si, quod antea fecerat, solitudinibus siluisque se 
tutari rex uoluisset, sine ullo effectu aestas extraheretur. 
(Livy 32.9.10) 
 
 The choice is no longer between degree of danger or whether to invade Macedon, 
the choice is now about how best to get Philip to commit to a decisive battle. Philip had 
fought Sulpicius twice during the 199 BC campaign, but not in a decisive battle. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Hammond 1966, p47 accepts Plutarch's reasoning so fully that he argues that Philip's chose his camp 
placement solely in order to threaten the Roman lines of supply for Sulpicius' route.  
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Flamininus wanted the kind of battle that ends the war and leads to a triumph, or his 
consulship "would be spent without any accomplishment." 
 Livy reports that Flamininus only "delayed a few days" (L.32.9.8) before he 
decided to force Philip's position at the Aous (Livy 32.9.11; Plut. Flam.4.1), and that 
Philip took advantage of the change of Roman commanders to propose a council to 
discuss peace terms (L.32.10.1). Thus, both commanders moved to bring to an end a 
forty-day period in which neither army had taken any action (L.32.10.1).249  
 Rather than indecision, though, this 40-day standoff had been an active strategic 
choice by Villius and Philip. [Figure 3.29] As discussed above, both commanders had 
established secure supply lines on routes easily traversed by wagons, with sources of 
supply sufficient to last through the season. As such a supply line was a remarkable 
logistical achievement in such rugged and potentially hostile country, each commander 
could reasonably expect that the other one had not dealt with the logistics of a potentially 
season-long stationary campaign as impressively, especially when operating so far from 
their respective homes and with no opportunity for local foraging due to the lack of 
agricultural land near either camp.  
 These logistical issues were, without question, enormous. The Roman army 
required 2640 modii of grain, weighing 17.9 metric tons, per day for his two-legion 
army.250 A wagon could carry 500 kg, which means that over 1430 wagonloads were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Hamond 1966, pp51-2 and Briscoe 1973, p185 convincingly argue that there were no skirmishes during 
this 40 day period contra Walbank 1940, p151 who assigns skirmishes mentioned in Plutarch to this 40 day 
period. 
250 For Roman military food requirements, see Roth 2012, pp 14-23. For the weight of a modius of grain 
being 6.78 kg, see Roth 2012, p24.  
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required for the 40 days, averaging to 36 wagons per day.251 While indeed large, this 
number of wagons, and the draft animals needed to draw them, was not prohibitive, as the 
Roman army on campaign in Thessaly in 171 BC employed at least 1000 wagons for 
foraging (L.42.65.2-5). 
 Both commanders, then, each trusting in their own impressive system of supply 
and not realizing that the other army was equally well supplied, committed to inaction in 
order to try to starve the other army out, and thus force the opposite side to commit to 
battle in unfavorable conditions, or to retreat from the scene due to unwillingness to 
commit to battle in unfavorable conditions. For comparison, Polybius reports that if the 
Spartans in 222 BC holding the pass at Sellasia that controlled access to Sparta through 
the Eurotas valley had delayed "for merely a few days" longer before committing to 
battle, the invading Antigonid army would have been compelled to leave the area and 
would not have defeated the Spartans in battle (Plb.2.70.3). 
 After 40 days, both commanders presumably realized that both armies had 
secured supply lines that could have supported them through the season, and Livy reports 
that Philip set up a conference with Flamininus, mediated by the Epirotes, to discuss 
peace proposals (Livy 32.10.1). Livy reports that Epirote officials:252 
 brought the consul and king together for a conference where the river 
Aous is confined within its narrowest course.  
 
consulem et regem, ubi in artissimas ripas Aous cogitur amnis, in 
conloquium adduxerunt  
(Livy 32.10.2).  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 For the weight capacity of a Roman military wagon, see Roth 2012, pp 211-2. 
252 Briscoe 1973, p186 on the men who led Philip and Flamininus together, Pausanius the praetor and 
Alexander the Master of the Horse, being officials of the Epirote league. 
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 [Figure 3.38] This conference took place at the western edge of the large field 
directly to the west of the Neck. At this location, the Aous runs south-north, with a field 
on the east bank and a field on the west bank. Along the northern edge of the western 
field, the Aous runs east-west, and the mountains descend steeply here all the way to the 
north bank of the Aous and would have given no opportunity for anyone to walk along 
the northern bank.253 As a result, to walk east down the valley, Flamininus had to go 
along the southern bank of the Aous and through this western field. Where the Aous runs 
south-north, the river narrows to a width that would have allowed dialogue across it.254 
[Figure 39] Philip stood on the east bank and Flamininus on the west.255 The conference 
was held on neutral ground between the camps, as the area between the Roman camp to 
the modern village of Dragot was in view of the Roman camp and should be thought to 
have been in the Roman sphere of interest, while the field to the east of the conference 
point was in view of Philip's camp and should be understood to have been under the 
Macedonian sphere of interest. The conference was held in the no-man's land between the 
camps, from where neither commander could see the other's camp.  
 This conference failed so dramatically that Philip and Flamininus had to be 
restrained from trying to throw weapons at each other across the river (Livy 32.10.3-8).256  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Today there is a narrow 'two-lane' road that has been cut into the mountain. Without this cut, there 
would have been no passage. 
254 To verify that the river here would allow dialogue, on August 15th, 2015, Kyle Mahoney and I recreated 
the conference at this point. We could easily approach the banks cut into the ancient limestone, had clear 
views of each other, were able to converse in voices only slightly above conversational volume, and were 
able to easily understand each other.  
255 Walbank 1940, p151 placed the conference by Tepelenë, due to mistaken placements of Antigonea and 
the two camps. Hammond 1966, p51 placed the conference by Dragot, but the riverbed is too wide here for 
a conference and the location too close to the Roman camp for Philip to have agreed to it. 
256 What matters for the argument here is that the conference failed. I discuss the content of the conference 
and its relationship to the conference at Nicaia in chapter 4. 
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Part IV: The Battle of the River Aous 
 Livy reports that, with the conference having failed: 
The next day, in consequences of sallies from the outposts, there were 
numerous slight skirmishes in the plain, which offered ample space for 
them;  
 
postero die per excursiones ab stationibus primo in planitie satis ad id 
patenti multa leuia commissa proelia sunt; 
(Livy 32.10.9) 
 
 [Figure 3.40] These skirmishes took place in the field immediately to the west of 
the Neck of Mezhgoran. [Figure 3.41] Philip's camp at the Aous was too secure for him 
to have risked engagement anywhere west of Dragot, and this field is the only other area 
large enough to have held skirmishes. 
Then, as the royal forces withdrew to narrow and rough places, the 
Romans too, carried away by their zest for combat, forced their way to the 
same places.  
 
deinde recipientibus se regiis in arta et confragosa loca auiditate accensi 
certaminis eo quoque Romani penetrauere. 
(L.32.10.10) 
 
 [Figure 3.40] The Romans and Macedonians first skirmished in the center of the 
plain, before the Macedonian retreated towards the Neck, where the field does get 
significantly narrower towards the Neck, as Livy describes. The mountain descends to the 
plain at the neck at a very steep angle, too steep to climb from this side, forcing everyone 
into the bottleneck.257 
On the Roman side were the advantages of order and discipline and armor 
adapted to affording protection to the wearer; on the enemy's, the terrain 
and the catapults and ballistae ranged on almost all the cliffs as along a 
wall.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Two VRVAP team members were unable to ascend the cliff face here. 
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pro his ordo et militaris disciplina et genus armorum erat, aptum tegendis 
corporibus; pro hoste loca et catapultae ballistaeque in omnibus prope 
rupibus quasi in muro dispositae. 
(L.32.10.11) 
 
 Philip employed the catapults and ballistae Livy had earlier reported were part of 
Philip's defensive works at the camp. As the Romans approached the Neck, they were 
exposed to fire from four potential locations: [Figure 3.42] from sufficiently sized flat 
platforms that are accessible from the east on the northern side of the Neck roughly 143 
m in elevation above the valley floor, on the southern side of the Neck roughly 109 m in 
elevation above the valley floor - where there are remains of a stone watchtower or 
observation point -, and on the southern bank of the Aous just west of the Neck, as well 
as from the towers specified as part of Philip's defensive works built on the alluvial 
terrace. The hills to the north of the plain in which the skirmishes were are too steep to 
have held artillery.  
When many had been wounded on both sides, and a certain number had 
fallen, as in a regular engagement, night put an end to the fighting. 
 
multis hinc atque illinc uolneribus acceptis cum etiam, ut in proelio iusto, 
aliquot cecidissent, nox pugnae finem fecit. 
 (Livy 32.10.12) 
 The day of light skirmishes, less than a battle, had no serious consequences, but 
did establish for Flamininus the difficulty of forcing Philip's position. 
 Livy reports that Charopus the Epirote then returned to the Roman camp 
(L.32.11.1). Charopus had reported to Villius earlier in this campaign that Philip was 
encamped at the Aous, and now came again to the Romans to give them more 
information about Philip's camp. Charopus brought a shepherd to Flamininus, and likely 
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acted as interpreter between the shepherd and Flamininus, as shepherds in this valley on 
the border of Epirus and Illyria did not speak Latin and probably did not speak Greek: 
The shepherd said that he had been accustomed to pasture his flocks in the 
valley which the king's camp then occupied, and knew all the tracks and 
paths of those hills. If the consul wished to send some men with him, he 
would guide them by a road, not dangerous and not very difficult, to a 
place above the head of the enemy. 
 
is se in eo saltu qui regiis tum teneretur castris armentum pascere solitum 
ait omnes montium eorum anfractus callesque nosse: si secum aliquos 
consul mittere uelit, se non iniquo nec perdifficili aditu super caput 
hostium eos educturum. 
(Livy 32.11.2-3; cp. Plut. Flam.4.2-3258)  
 
 This area is understood to have always had shepherds working in it, and multiple 
shepherds today pasture their flocks in this valley using traditional methods.259 
Traditional shepherds, including the ones in this valley today, cover surprisingly large 
amounts of ground every day, and vary their routes within the territory they cover, 
indicating that Charopus' shepherd would indeed have known all the tracks and paths of 
the area.260 74-year-old active local shepherd Uncle Thoma told me that he had been at 
one time a 'path finder' in this region for the Communist government. The communists 
had wanted to understand the details of the regional topography and had turned to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Plutarch's version has multiple shepherds who brought Charopus, rather than one shepherd whom 
Charopus sent. 
259 Greater numbers of shepherds used to work in this area under communism, and even more so in the pre-
modern era. The local villages of Peshtan, Mezhgoran, and Dragot that served as summer residences for the 
shepherds used to be significantly bigger than they are now. Archaeological evidence indicates that the 
only times this valley was devoted to agriculture was during the three times that there was strong 
centralized government: under the Antonines, Ali Pasha, and the Communists (Morton 2015). This is 
consistent with Alexander's speech to his men at the Opis about how the centralized government of his 
father turned them from shepherds to agriculturalists (Arr.7.7.9). 
260 We would sometimes drive or hike to areas that we thought far from the site and would stumble upon 
one of the shepherds we knew from the site during his daily wanderings. 
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local shepherds for instruction, including for routes around and over Mt. Golikut - the 
same area through which Charopus' shepherd led the Romans.261  
 This valley is traditional summer pasture for the shepherds, which is the part of 
the year they consider themselves at home.262 Traditionally, shepherds in this region 
arrive in their summer pastures sometime in late April or early May.263 The shepherds in 
198 BC would have been surprised to find Philip encamped in the middle of both their 
pasturage and their community. Philip's camp would have greatly disrupted the 
shepherds' economic lives, disrupting the crucial milking period of the year as well as 
possibly consuming their flock, as well as their social existence, as this is the part of the 
year in which all weddings and festivals are traditionally celebrated.264 
 Taking these factors into consideration, the shepherds would have understandably 
wanted Philip out of the valley and been willing to help whoever would make that 
happen. That the shepherds went to Charopus to intervene with the Romans on their 
behalf indicates that Charopus must have been some kind of regional chieftain who 
protected the welfare of the people in his territory, and large shepherd communities 
traditionally have a single leader, the tselingas, who operates in this fashion for his 
community.265 This was likely a hereditary leadership position as Charopus' grandson 
also held a position of regional importance and conducted negotiations with the Romans 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 The degree to which local shepherds can be understood to have profound knowledge of the local 
topography was revealed to me when two of them individually told me not to use the shepherd Vini as a 
guide because he had not spent enough time in the area to understand the regional topography well enough 
to be a good enough guide; Vini had only been a shepherd there for 18 years, not nearly long enough to be 
considered knowledgeable of the area by the local shepherd community. 
262 Campbell 1964; VRVAP 2015 interview project with local shepherds; Taulant Rama pers. comm.  
263 Campbell 1964, p7-9, 23, passim. 
264 Campbell 1964, p8, passim. 
265 Campbell 1964. On anthropological Big Man and Chief theory, see Sahlins 1963; Lederman 2015. 
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on the locals' behalf in 167 BC.266 This area centered on the part of the Aous valley in 
which Philip had his camp was a fitting place for a local leader to carve out a territory of 
his own as it sat in a middle zone between Epirus to the south and Illyria to the north.267  
 Livy reports that Flamininus verified the shepherd's trustworthiness with 
Charopus and resolved to take the shepherd up on his offer (L.32.11.4-6).268 Flamininus 
demonstrated the same penchant for quick and decisive action in putting the shepherd's 
suggested plan into action as he had on his arrival at the Aous, when he committed to 
action in only a few days when his predecessor had been inactive for weeks. Flamininus 
also displayed a willingness to take risks and to put a dangerous level of trust in 
newfound allies, behaviors we will see him consistently display during his time in 
command. 
 Flamininus gave a tribune 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry (L.32.11.7): 
Flamininus ordered the tribune to take the cavalry as far as the ground 
permitted; when the road became impassable for cavalry, he should leave 
them on some level spot and go with the infantry wherever the guide 
conducted them. When he reached, as the guide promised, the place above 
the enemy, the tribune should send up a smoke-signal but raise no shout 
until, after the after the answering signal had been received by him, he 
could judge that the battle had begun. He instructed the tribune to march 
by night - and the moon happened to be full - and by day to take time for 
food and rest. 
 
equites quoad loca patiantur ducere iubet: ubi ad inuia equiti uentum sit, in 
planitie aliqua locari equitatum, pedites qua dux monstraret uiam ire.	  ubi, 
ut polliceatur, super caput hostium peruentum sit, fumo dare signum nec 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 The younger Charopus' betrayal of the Epirotes to the Romans in 167 BC led to Polybius' famous 
condemnation, "I believe there never was and never will be a man more brutal and more unprincipled than 
Charops" (Plb.30.12). On this younger Charops, see Plb.27.15; Diod. 30.5; Scullard 1945. 
267 Ali Pasha started out as a regional warlord in this exact valley. 
268 As the regional leader, Charopus would have been in charge of all the area's shepherds, meaning that he 
was both responsible for their welfare, and also responsible for their behavior. As such, checking on the 
shepherds with Charopus was the correct thing for Flamininus to do, in part because doing so let Charopus 
know that Flamininus was holding Charopus responsible should the shepherds betray the Romans. 
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antea clamorem tollere quam ab se signo recepto pugnam coeptam 
arbitrari posset.	  nocte itinera fieri iubet – et pernox forte luna erat – : 
interdiu cibi quietisque sumeret tempus 
(Livy 32.11.7-9)  
 First of all, smoke signals were a well-established and standard way for sending 
military messages by 198 BC.269 Second, the full moon gives us an opportunity for a 
secure date as the only full moon in 198 BC that fits into the narrative was on June 
24th.270  
 This fixed date gives us an opportunity to establish a rough calendar of events for 
the 198 BC campaign: 
Narrative Event Estimated Time involved Gregorian Calendar Date 
Philip sends out light armed 
troops to the Stena 
At the beginning of spring March 22 
Philip follows a few days 
later to the Stena with 
heavy troops 
2 weeks March 28 - April 11 
Philip looks for a place to 
encamp 
7 days April 12-18 
Philip establishes camp 7 days April 19-26 
Charops goes to Villius 4 days April 28 - May 1 
Villius hears that Philip is 
encamped and moves to 
Tepelenë 
7 days May 2-8 
Villius in council per 
multos dies 
35 days May 9 - June 12 
Flamininus replaces Villius 1 day June 13 
Flamininus waits a few days 3 days June 14-16 
Flamininus holds a council 1 day June 17 
The forty day delay 40 days May 9 - June 17 
Meeting at Aous 1 day June 18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 For the history of fire signals in Roman and Greek warfare, see Woolliscroft 2001, passim, incl. 
Appendix 1: References to signaling in ancient writers. Polybius has a lengthy digression on fire signaling 
and his singular contribution to the science in his Bk. 10.  
270 Goldstine 1973. That Livy specifies that the similar night mission at Thermopylae in 191 BC occurred 
when there was a new moon, and makes no mention of the phase of the moon during night missions in 
Spain (L.34.13.3, 34.14.1) inclines one to believe that there was a full moon and that full moons on night 
missions is not a literary trope of Livy's. 
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Skirmish day 1 day June 19 
Arrival of shepherd 1 day June 20 
Message to/from Charopus 2 days June 21-22 
2 days of skirmishes/ 2 days 
of surrounding 
2 days June 23-24 
Battle of the River Aous 1 day June 25 (fixed date) 
Table 3: Calendar of events for 198 BC campaign 
 One thing this calendar shows is that Charopus went to Villius to alert him to 
Philip's presence at the Aous right when the shepherds would have returned to the valley 
at the end of April and found Philip there. After the Roman army showed up at Tepelenë, 
Charopus then waited six weeks to send the shepherd to alert Flamininus to the 
surrounding route.  
  Flamininus told the tribune to move at night, but this would have been no 
problem for their guide as shepherds traditionally take their sheep out to graze each night 
from midnight for three hours during much of the year.271 Moving through these 
mountains at night would have been everyday behavior for Charopus' shepherd. 
 Livy reports that for this mission, Flamininus "loaded the shepherd down with 
huge promises, if he kept faith, nevertheless in chains" (Livy 32.11.9). We should see 
this, in part, as a contrast to Livy's narratives of Hannibal twice getting misled by local 
guides - once on purpose and once by a misunderstanding - whom he had comparatively 
trusted too much (L.21.35, 22.13). 
 Flamininus then attacked the Macedonians for two days, presumably on the same 
plain as the earlier skirmish, to distract Philip from thinking that he might attempt a new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Campbell 1964, p27. 
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strategy (Livy 32.11.6). This was the third set of skirmishes in the field just west of the 
Neck. 
Meanwhile, on the third day, when the Romans had sent up the smoke-
signal that they had reached and were holding the height which they had 
sought,  
 
interim die tertio cum uerticem quem petierant Romani cepisse ac tenere 
se fumo significarent,  
(Livy 32.12.1) 
 
 The shepherd thus took two nights to make this trip from the Roman camp at 
Tepelenë to the spot above the Macedonian camp from which he made the fire signal. 
This full moon was right around the summer solstice, the shortest night of the year, 
meaning that the Romans had just less than 8 hours of darkness per night in which to 
travel. 
 [Figure 3.43] On the first night, the shepherd led them south down the Drin 
valley for roughly 12 km before turning east and climbing roughly 13 km at an 8% 
average grade past the modern village Labovë e Madhe to a small plain at the pass called 
Fusha e Cajupit at 1219 m elevation.272 Using Naismith's Rule to estimate the time 
involved, this route would have taken just under seven hours.273 For comparison, 
Professor Thomas Rose and I, when climbing Mt. Olympus, ascended 9 km at an average 
19% grade in 4.5 hours, where Naismith's rule would estimate 4.74 hours of travel. The 
Romans could have completed this night's hike before light. The 300 cavalry escorted the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 The local shepherd guide should assure that they walked the most efficient route, and these are picked 
men and should be understood to have been fit. 
273 Naismith's rule is one hour for every 5km traveled plus 1 hour for every 600 meters climbed, see e.g. 
Scarf 2008. 25 km traveled plus 1036 m climbed makes for 6.83 hours of travel. 
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force down the Drin valley, acting as an advance force in case this were a Macedonian 
trap, particularly when moving through the Stena near Antigoneia.  
 Fusha e Cajupit is not visible from the Drin valley, nor is any pass over this 
mountain range apparent from the Drin valley. Although Philip had travelled north 
through this valley to the Stena and then spent multiple days scouting the area, it is easily 
understandable that he would not have seen this pass, as the mountain looks like a 
continuous, sheer wall. Since Philip passed through this area before the local shepherds 
had returned from their winter pastures, and the regional leader Charopus was inclined to 
help the Romans, it is reasonable to infer that no one told him about a pass over the 
mountain.    
 The next night, the shepherd led them northeast roughly 5km down the wash from 
Fusha e Cajupit toward the valley floor, descending at an average grade of 17%. They 
then continued northwest along the valley for roughly 8.5 km to where the modern 
village of Peshtan is today, at 365 m elevation. While Naismith's rule only adds 10 
minutes per 300 m of steep descent, I prefer to add the same estimate for steep descent 
that applies to steep ascent. By this method of estimation, it would have taken the 
Romans about 4.5 hours to get to Peshtan (13.5 km with 844 m steep descent and 200 m 
ascent). For comparison, Professor Thomas Rose and I at Mt. Olympus descended 9km at 
an average grade of 19% in just under 4.5 hours. The local workmen on VRVAP, Klaert 
Shehu and Bashkim Lika, have used this route from Fusha e Cajupit down into the valley 
and back to Peshtan for hunting. The local shepherds also attested to this being a 
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commonly used and viable route.274 Additionally, the shepherds said that there is an 
Ottoman road network that connects the villages of Leskaj, Limar, and Peshtan, further 
attesting to the viability of this route. Both the workmen and the shepherds agreed that 
from the pass to Peshtan should take no more than six hours, and this time estimate was 
given after they had witnessed our slow American hiking speeds on an attempt on Mt. 
Golikut.  
 The smoke signal needs to have been visible from the Roman camp at Tepelenë, 
but did not need to be sent from the top of Mt. Golikut. Instead, from the area on Figure 
3.44 marked with a blue thumbtack, only 400 m of elevation above Peshtan, one can 
clearly see where the Roman camp was at Tepelenë, and a smoke signal sent from this 
point would have been visible at the Roman camp. I was able to walk from Peshtan to 
this point in 50 minutes, making for a total time of travel on the second night of roughly 
5.5 hours. The Romans were able to complete this route during the night, and then put up 
the smoke signal at first light. 
 The majority of the Roman force would have stayed around the area of Peshtan, a 
location above and hidden from Philip's camp, and only the required personnel would 
have gone up to make the smoke signal. 
 Livy reports that once Flamininus saw the smoke signal:  
Then in earnest the consul formed the army into three parts and marched 
with the flower of his troops up the middle of the valley and hurled his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 I was unable to hike this route because it is too dangerous due to the massive marijuana growing 
operations in the valley. Early August is some kind of sensitive time for these growers, and the increased 
police activity at Lazarat was making the situation sensitive, and these gangsters had apparently gained a 
reputation as willing to shoot on sight. It appears that while the press and the Albanian government focus 
on the illicit marijuana-growing operations based just south of Gjirokaster in Lazarat, there is another 
operation in the Zagori valley. 
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right and left wings against the camp; the enemy came to meet him with 
no less vigor. 
 
tum uero trifariam275 diuisis copiis consul ualle media cum militum robore 
succedit, cornua dextra laeuaque admouet castris; nec segnius hostes 
obuiam eunt. 
(L.32.12.1) 
 
 [Figure 3.45] Flamininus saw the smoke from the Roman camp at Tepelenë just 
after sunrise at 6 am, and then drew up the army in formation and marched down the 
valley towards Philip's camp [Figure 3.35], covering the roughly 9 km to the field just 
west of the Neck where the skirmishes had previously been held by about 9 am. For the 
first time, Flamininus attacked in full force, as the previous attacks had been only 
skirmishes.276 
 In contrast, Plutarch reports that Flamininus attacked Philip's camp in full force 
and only then, when already in the midst of battle, saw the smoke that led to the arrival of 
the surrounding Roman force saving the day (Plut.Flam.4.4-6). This account makes less 
sense for two reasons: First, there would be no need to send a smoke signal to tell an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Livy's use of trifariam here indicates dividing the army into three parts which then all marched together 
to the same place. In contrast, Livy's twelve other uses of trifariam refer to three distinctly separate military 
actions in separate places: Livy refers to dividing an army trifariam with the three parts then acting in 
separate locations ten times (L.5.26.7, 6.2.7, 8.24.7, 26.41.20, 33.15.2, 34.38.5, 36.16.11, 38.20.6, 38.20.9, 
38.46.8) - including all six examples in Livy's fourth decade -, as well as to three nations being divided into 
three armies (L.3.22.7), and three wars in three places (L.2.31.7). At the Aous, though, the three parts all do 
the exact same thing at the same time, namely attack Philip's camp. Polybius elsewhere discusses that the 
Romans had a special three-part marching order for dangerous situations (Plb.6.40.10-11). Plutarch 's 
narrative uses a similar phrase to Livy's at this same point in the narrative, "τριχῇ νείµας τὴν δύναµιν" 
(Plut. Flam.4.4). As Plutarch and Livy are both understood to have had access to Polybius' account, this 
could reflect Polybius' original language which Livy then translated directly. This would mean that Livy 
uses trifariam to mean a military-related division into three parts and that the limited sample size has 
skewed it to seem to mean that the three parts have to act in separate places. 
276 Livy's report that Flamininus sent both wings at once could appear strange in light of the narrow 
constraints of the topography. However, we should view this as paired with the following clause about the 
Macedonians matching their vigor in attack as Livy indicating that this was a full battle with Flamininus 
committing all soldiers in contrast to a skirmish, rather than Livy commenting on Flamininus' specific 
tactics.   
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army that was already engaged in battle that you were going to enter the battle; one could 
just enter the battle. Second, the plan of the surrounding force sending a signal to set the 
main army into motion and then waiting to attack until the main army was within the 
defensive works assures that the surrounding force did not attack too soon, which would 
leave them liable to slaughter against the larger Macedonian army, or that the main army 
did not attack before the surrounding force was in position to help them. Plutarch's 
account makes for a more dramatic turn of events in the battle, but implies a distinct lack 
of functional planning on Flamininus part. 
 Livy reports: 
And while, carried forward by their desire to fight, they were struggling 
outside the defensive works, the Roman army enjoyed no small advantage 
in courage and skill and character of weapons; but after the king's troops, 
when many had been wounded or killed, retired to positions strengthened 
by art or strong by nature 
 
et dum auiditate certaminis prouecti extra munitiones pugnant, haud paulo 
superior est Romanus miles et uirtute et scientia et genere armorum: 
postquam multis uolneratis interfectisque recepere se regii in loca aut 
munimento aut natura tuta 
(L.32.12.2-3) 
 
  The battle began in the same field in which the previous skirmishes had 
occurred, but this time the Romans took control of the field.277 The Macedonians 
retreated within the Neck, across the river, and behind their additional defensive works 
built on the alluvial terrace, and were now protected by natural and man-made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 At the skirmish, Livy assigns the Roman advantages as 'ordo, disciplina militaris, and genus armorum', 
and at the Aous as 'virtute, scienta, and genere armorum', and that the Macedonians' advantage is the 
landscape in both cases. Perhaps Livy is engaging here with Polybius' book 18 description of the 
comparative merits of the phalanx and maniple fighting styles, in which Polybius attributes the 
Macedonians with the advantage in arms but the Romans with the advantage in using the landscape. 
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defenses.278 As seen in Figure 3.46, the river here is not wide, and it is not deep either 
and could have been easily crossed by the Roman army. 
then danger recoiled upon the Romans, who pushed forward impetuously 
over hostile ground and cramped spaces that hindered easy withdrawal. 
 
uerterat periculum in Romanos temere in loca iniqua nec faciles ad 
receptum angustias progressos. 
(Livy 32.12.3) 
 The Romans advanced through the neck and across the river and breached the 
Macedonians outer defensive works. However, now they were trapped with the 
Macedonian defensive works and the Neck obstructing their retreat and the palisaded 
Macedonian infantry barracks in front of them.  
Nor would the Romans have escaped with unpunished rashness, if first a 
shout heard from the rear and then fighting as well had not made the royal 
troops insane with sudden terror. 
 
neque impunita temeritate inde recepissent sese, ni clamor primum ab 
tergo auditus, dein pugna etiam coepta amentes repentino terrore regios 
fecisset. 
(Livy 32.12.4) 
 Just as laid out in the initial plan, the Roman force with the shepherd waited to 
engage until the battle had fully begun. [Figure 3.47] From Peshtan, the Romans rushed 
down into the valley in under 20 minutes, and so would have waited until the Romans 
had breached the outer defensive works before attacking. Livy had reported that Philip 
did not fortify the parts of his camp adjacent to these southern hills, so there would have 
been nothing stopping this Roman charge. As such, the Macedonians' terror is 
understandable.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 The river crossing just inside the Neck is a common swimming area today and would not have been a 
forbidding obstacle to cross or bridge. 
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Part of the Macedonians broke in a rout; others, when they had made a 
stand, more because they had no place to flee than because they had 
sufficient will to fight, were cut off by the enemy pressing on from both 
front and rear. The whole army could have been destroyed, if the victors 
had pursued the fleeing men; but the narrows and the rough country 
hindered the cavalry, the weight of their arms the infantry. 
 
Pars in fugam effusi sunt; pars magis quia locus fugae deerat quam quod 
animi satis esset ad pugnam cum substitissent, ab hoste et fronte et ab 
tergo urgente circumuenti sunt. deleri totus exercitus potuit si fugientes 
persecuti uictores essent; sed equitem angustiae locorumque asperitas, 
peditem armorum grauitas impediit 
 (Livy 32.12.5-7) 
 
 The Macedonians fled east down the Aous valley and the Romans declined to 
pursue [Figure 3.48]. After the high-risk tactics of the battle, Flamininus now played it 
safe.279 
Part V: Aftermath 
The king at first fled in disorder and without looking back; then, having 
progressed an interval of five miles, when he surmised, which was true, 
that the enemy was not able to follow on account of the dangerousness of 
the terrain, he stopped on a certain hill and he sent his men through all the 
ridges and valleys in order to collect all the men roaming about into one 
place.  
 
rex primo effuse ac sine respectu fugit; dein quinque milium spatium 
progressus cum ex iniquitate locorum, id quod erat, suspicatus esset sequi 
non posse hostem, substitit in tumulo quodam dimisitque suos per omnia 
iuga uallesque qui palatos in unum colligerent.  
(Livy 32.12.8) 
 Roughly five Roman miles east of Philip's camp, in the hills above the modern 
village of Këlcyrë, sit the remains of Old Këlcyrë.280 This location gave Philip a great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Notice that Livy presents both the landscape and the Roman arms as aiding the Macedonian retreat. 
When it comes to retreating, the Macedonians have the advantage over the Romans in all ways. 
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vantage point to view [Figure 3.49] the Aous valley and [Figure 3.50] the general 
region, to both keep track of the potential Roman pursuit as well as find his scattered 
men.  
 Philip's retreat down the Aous valley was indeed unfavorable ground for the 
Romans: the Romans had no opportunity to have seen this ground previously, and the 
narrow path and steep wooded mountainsides could have made this a great place for an 
ambush. Flamininus could have reasonably feared that the Macedonians' quick retreat 
was part of a trap designed to draw the Romans down the valley into an ambush.  
With not more than 2,000 men lost, the entire rest of the multitude, as if 
having followed some signal, gathered into one place and sought Thessaly 
with a regular military formation.  
 
non plus duobus milibus hominum amissis cetera omnis multitudo, uelut 
signum aliquod secuta, in unum cum conuenisset, frequenti agmine petunt 
Thessaliam. 
(L.32.12.9) 
 
 With the Romans pressing on both sides, having breached all the Macedonian 
natural and man-made defenses, one could have expected the total slaughter and capture 
of the entire Macedonian army at the Aous. Instead the Macedonians only lost 2000 men 
and all the rest escaped. The organized behavior of Philip's men after their defeat 
indicates that their retreat had been previously planned. They knew the route south down 
the Aous valley towards Thessaly well, as it had been their supply route. Philip had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 The inhabitants were moved from Old Këlcyrë to Këlcyrë in the 1960s by the communist government. 
When Hammond 1966 refers to Këlcyrë, he means Old Këlcyrë as he was referring to the situation in 1931 
when he had been there. The ruins of Ali Pasha's fort at Old Këlcyrë might have incorporated ancient 
blocks (Leake 1835 I, p 385 says he saw them, Hammond 1966 says he did not.) David Scahill saw my 
photos and thought that they might be Trajanic blocks; we plan on returning to investigate further. 
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prepared to abandon his position by the Aous should his defenses get breached; Philip 
was not making his final stand at the Aous. 
 However, in direct contrast to his own report of the events of the Battle of the 
River Aous, Livy also provides Valerius Antias' alternate account: 
Valerius Antias writes that Villius, because he could not use the direct 
road, since the whole country was held by the king, entered the defile, 
followed the valley through the midst of which the river Aous flows, and, 
hastily throwing a bridge over the river to the bank on which the king's 
camp lay, crossed and engaged the enemy; that he defeated the king and 
put him to flight and expelled him from his camp; that he killed twelve 
thousand of the enemy in that battle and captured two thousand two 
hundred, together with one hundred thirty-two standards and two hundred 
thirty horses; and that he vowed a temple to Jupiter in this battle, if 
success attended him. The other Greek and Latin writers, at least those 
whose annals I consulted, report that Villius did nothing of remark, but 
handed over to the next consul, Titus Quinctius, the war in the same state 
that he had received it. 
 
Ualerius Antias intrasse saltum Uillium tradit, quia recto itinere nequiuerit 
omnibus ab rege insessis, secutum uallem per quam mediam fertur Aous 
amnis, ponte raptim facto in ripam in qua erant castra regia transgressum 
acie conflixisse; fusum fugatumque regem castris exutum; duodecim milia 
hostium eo proelio caesa, capta duo milia et ducentos et signa militaria 
centum triginta duo, equos ducentos triginta; aedem etiam Ioui in eo 
proelio uotam, si res prospere gesta esset. ceteri Graeci Latinique auctores, 
quorum  quidem ego legi annales, nihil memorabile a Uillio actum 
integrumque bellum insequentem consulem T. Quinctium accepisse 
tradunt. 
(L.32.6.5-8) 
  
 Livy's report of Antias' account works as counterpoint to his own version of 
events. Compared to the account that Livy endorses, not only did Antias get which 
Roman consul fought the battle wrong, he got certain other key details wrong as well: 
while Livy makes clear, by going through it twice, that both consuls had a choice 
between a safe option that avoided Philip's camp at the Aous and a dangerous option that 
151 	  
	  
went through Philip's camp at the Aous (L.32.6.2-3, 32.9.8-9), in Antias' account the 
consul's only route was through Philip's camp; in Livy's account the Romans overcame 
many difficulties in storming Philip's camp, but crossing the Aous was not enough of an 
obstacle to warrant mention, while in Antias' account it is the only obstacle worthy of 
mention; and, in Livy's account Philip escaped with minimal casualties, while Villius' 
account reports so many casualties as to have made this a major Roman victory.281 
 My own research and analysis also suggests that Antias' version of events lacks 
validity as Livy's account aligns better with the landscape: Philip's camp did not block the 
main east-west corridor, and crossing the Aous would not have been a serious obstacle. 
Additionally, a major Roman victory on the scale of Antias' account would make Philip's 
subsequent military actions in 198 BC after his retreat from the Aous difficult, if not 
altogether impossible, to have carried out.282   
 Returning to Philip's retreat after the battle:  
The king on the first day reached the Camp of Pyrrhus; the place called by 
this name is in Triphylia and belongs to the territory of Molottis. The next 
day - a huge march for an army, but fear drove them on - they reached 
thence the Lyncus Mountains. This range is in Epirus, lying between 
Macedonian and Thessaly; the side which overlooks Thessaly faces east, 
the northern Macedonia. It is clothed with abundant forests; the summits 
of the ridges offer open fields and ever-flowing springs. There Philip 
remained in camp for several days, uncertain in mind whether he should 
straightaway return to his kingdom or try to beat the enemy into Thessaly.  
 
rex primo die ad castra Pyrrhi peruenit; locus quem ita uocant est in 
Triphylia terrae Molottidis. inde postero die – ingens iter agmini, sed 
metus urgebat – in montes Lyncon perrexit. ipsi Epiri sunt, interiecti 
Macedoniae Thessaliaeque: latus, quod uergit in Thessaliam, oriens 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Antias' account also reports Villius' vowing of a temple, if he was victorious. While we do not have 
enough evidence to know for sure, if this temple did not exist in Livy's day, Livy could have been using 
that absence as evidence that Villius had not been victorious at the Aous.  
282 See discussion of Philip's actions in the remainder of the 198 BC campaign in chapter 4. 
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spectat, septentrio a Macedonia obicitur. uestiti frequentibus siluis sunt; 
iuga summa campos patentes aquasque perennes habent. ibi statiuis rex 
per aliquot dies habitis fluctuatus animo est utrum protinus in regnum se 
reciperet an praeuerti in Thessaliam posset. 
(L.32.13.2-4) 
  
 We do not know what the Camp of Pyrrhus was. [Figure 3.51] However, 
understanding that Philip left Old Këlcyrë about 12pm gave him roughly 10 hours of 
daylight in which his fear-driven men could have covered just over 50 km, which would 
have put them in the Konitsa plain. This well watered area would have been a fitting 
place for them to camp. The next day's march ended in the area between Metsovo and the 
modern village of Kranea.283 This is the one area from which one can go north to 
Macedon or east to Thessaly, via, respectively, the Grevena and Zygos passes. 
Additionally, the high mountain plateau landscape in this area during the summer 
matches Livy's description. From the Konitsa plain to this area, though, would have been 
an impressive march. Whether Philip retraced his steps from earlier in the campaign and 
went south to Passaron before heading east into the Pindus to Metsovo, or if he headed 
east into the mountains from the Konitsa plain to Kranea, would have entailed a 100 km 
day. Although Livy specifies this as one long day, it makes more sense if this route took 
Philip two days. Three days to get from Old Këlcyrë to near Metsovo was still an 
impressive amount of ground to have covered in a limited time.  
 The same strategic and logistical planning skills that Philip had displayed in 
taking the early-season initiative and establishing a camp with secure supply routes, he 
again displayed in his efficient and orderly retreat from the Aous with limited casualties. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Kranea sits roughly 25 km north-northwest of Metsovo. 
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 Livy reports while the Macedonians fled: 
The Romans followed as far as it was safe, killing and despoiling the slain, 
and plundered the king's tent, which, even when undefended was difficult 
to approach; and spent that night in their own camp. The next day the 
consul followed the enemy along the defile through which the river makes 
its way down the valley. 
 
Romani quoad tutum fuit insecuti caedentes spoliantesque caesos castra 
regia, etiam sine defensoribus difficili aditu, diripiunt; atque ea nocte in 
suis castris manserunt. postero die consul per ipsas angustias quas inter 
ualle se flumen insinuat hostem sequitur. 
(Livy 32.12.10 - 32.13.1) 
 After the battle, the Romans only pursued as far as the Zagori river at the eastern 
edge the section of valley that held Philip's camp before returning to their camp at 
Tepelenë. The next day the Romans went as far as Modern Këlcyrë before returning to 
their camp at Tepelenë. Flamininus continued to play it safe after the battle. The Battle of 
the River Aous was over.  
Conclusions 
 After Philip retreated into the Pindus, the Romans controlled all the east-west 
routes between Macedon and Illyria, as well as all the north-south routes between Illyria 
and Epirus. Rome had been periodically fighting to establish and maintain control of the 
Illyrian ports and their extended hinterland since 229 BC through the First Illyrian War, 
Second Illyrian War, First Macedonian War and Second Macedonian War. However, 
after the Battle of the River Aous, the Illyrian ports were protected, and the Adriatic was 
secure. Rome did not operate in this theater of war again over the time period covered in 
this dissertation.  
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 After Philip retreated into the Pindus, however, it was in no way predetermined 
what Flamininus would do next. Flamininus had multiple choices that would all have 
been reasonable: Flamininus could have returned to Apollonia, having defeated Philip in 
battle and further secured Roman regional control, and set about petitioning for a triumph 
or ovation at Rome; Flamininus could have resumed the logical progression of events 
from the previous two years' campaigns and acted to push the boundary further eastward, 
extending Sulpicius' work; Flamininus could have continued south and shored up 
diplomatic relations and alliances with the Epirotes and Aetolians; or, Flamininus could 
pursue Philip into the Pindus.284 Philip's early season encampment at the Aous had 
disrupted the Romans' plans, and now that Philip had fled, Flamininus' path forward was 
unclear.285  
 Colonel Leake wrote about the Battle of the River Aous that "It was on this 
singular field, in the year 198 BC, that the Romans obtained the first and therefore the 
most important of a series of victories, which extinguished forever the independence of 
Greece."286 However, this analysis was only apt after the battles of Cynoscephalae and 
Pydna had been fought. Immediately after the battle, there was no reason to think that this 
battle had been significantly more important than, say, the skirmish at Otolobum the 
previous year. It retrospect, the Battle of the River Aous can be looked at as a watershed 
moment when Rome and Macedon first clashed and thus the beginning of the end for 
Macedon. But at the time there was no reason to think that Flamininus had intended to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Sulpicius had chased Philip the previous season as well. 
285 However, Flamininus had learned through his and Sulpicius' successive treatments of Viilus that it was 
easier for a consul to get replaced if he was in a location easier for his replacement to reach. 
286 Leake 1835 I, p383. 
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greatly expand the scope of the war and to go to Thessaly. Much as Sulpicius had chased 
Philip into Pelagonia after the skirmish at Otolobum in 199 BC, seemingly changing his 
campaign program in direct response to Philip's flight, Flamininus would in fact chase 
Philip into Thessaly later in 198 BC. It was the events in the aftermath of the Aous that 
pulled Flamininus' attentions into Thessaly rather than east into the areas between Illyria 
and Macedon. When Flamininus returned to his encampment at Tepelenë on the evening 
of June 25th, 198 BC his choices were wide open and his actions not predetermined, and 
the history of Roman involvement in Greece could have gone any of a number of 
directions. 
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CHAPTER 4: THESSALY 
 
Introduction 
 After the Battle of the River Aous midway through the 198 BC campaign season, 
Philip fled to Thessaly and Flamininus initially stayed in Illyria near the Adriatic coast. 
However, Flamininus soon made the momentous decision to cross the Pindus into 
Thessaly and opened a new Roman theater of war. From Flamininus' crossing into 
Thessaly through the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC, the Roman theater of war never returned 
to Illyria and Thessaly became the center of Roman activities in Greece. 
 This chapter is about the Roman military's presence in Thessaly from 198 BC 
through 168 BC. [Figure 4.1] Chapters 1-3 have focused on the Roman military in Illyria 
and the western edges of Macedon and how this related to Rome's concerns about 
sheltering the eastern Adriatic port cities under Rome's protection. This chapter, however, 
signals a shift in focus - both for the Romans and this dissertation - to a new region: 
Thessaly. Throughout this chapter, Thessaly serves as the battleground for control of 
Greece for the Macedonians, Aetolians, Athamanians, Seleucids, and Romans.  
 Thessaly was not viewed in antiquity as a singular area, but divided into four 
geographic districts, as Strabo describes: 
Due to its natural features, Thessaly was divided into four parts. One part 
was called Phthiotis, another Hestiaeotis, another Thessaliotis, and another 
Pelasgiotis. Phthiotis occupies the southern parts which extend alongside 
Oeta from the Maliac, or Pyliac, Gulf as far as Dolopia and Pindus, and 
widen out as far as Pharsalus and the Thessalian plains. Hestiaeotis 
occupies the western parts and the parts between Pindus and Upper 
Macedonia. The remaining parts of Thessaly are held, first, by the people 
who live in the plains below Hestiaeotis (they are called Pelesgiotae and 
their country borders on Lower Macedonia), and, secondly, by the 
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Thessaliotae next in order, who fill out the districts extending as far as the 
Magnetan sea-coast. 
 
Τοιαύτη δ' οὖσα εἰς τέτταρα µέρη διῄρητο· ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ τὸ µὲν Φθιῶτις τὸ 
δὲ Ἑστιαιῶτις τὸ δὲ Θετταλιῶτις τὸ δὲ Πελασγιῶτις. ἔχει δ' ἡ µὲν Φθιῶτις 
τὰ νότια τὰ παρὰ τὴν Οἴτην ἀπὸ τοῦ Μαλιακοῦ κόλπου καὶ Πυλαϊκοῦ 
µέχρι τῆς Δολοπίας καὶ τῆς Πίνδου διατείνοντα, πλατυνόµενα δὲ µέχρι 
Φαρσάλου καὶ τῶν πεδίων τῶν Θετταλικῶν· ἡ δ' Ἑστιαιῶτις τὰ ἑσπέρια 
καὶ τὰ µεταξὺ Πίνδου καὶ τῆς ἄνω Μακεδονίας· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ οἵ τε ὑπὸ τῇ 
Ἑστιαιώτιδι νεµόµενοι τὰ πεδία, καλούµενοι δὲ Πελασγιῶται, 
συνάπτοντες ἤδη τοῖς κάτω Μακεδόσι, καὶ οἱ ἐφεξῆς τὰ µέχρι Μαγνητικῆς 
παραλίας ἐκπληροῦντες χωρία. κἀνταῦθα δ' ἐνδόξων ὀνοµάτων ἔσται 
ἀρίθµησις καὶ ἄλλως [καὶ] διὰ τὴν Ὁµήρου ποίησιν· τῶν δὲ πόλεων ὀλίγαι 
σώζουσι τὸ πάτριον ἀξίωµα, µάλιστα δὲ Λάρισα. 
(Strabo 9.5.3) 
 
 [Figure 4.2] Thessaly is divided by the Keradag ridge running northwest-
southeast through the center of the plain. This ridge divides Thessaly into three landscape 
zones: two large plains and a hilly area. The entire plain north of the Keradag ridge, 
bound by the mountains to the north and Magnesia to the east, is Pelasgiotis. The plain 
west of the ridge bound by mountains to the north, the Pindus mountains to the west, and 
the hills of Dolopia to the south forms the regions of Hestiaeotis and Thessaliotis. The 
southeast quadrant of Thessaly, Phthiotis, is a much more hilly landscape compared to 
the two plains. This area extends east from where the western plain ends by Pharsalus and 
extends north to where the northern plain ends by Pherae.   
Part I: 198 BC - 194 BC 
 
 After his victory at the Battle of the River Aous in 198 BC, Flamininus did not 
immediately do anything.287 Rather than follow Philip right away, Flamininus waited at 
the Roman camp at Tepelenë established before the Battle of the River Aous. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 For the events of the Battle of the River Aous in 198 BC, see chapter 3. 
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inaction allowed Flamininus to watch events develop before he took his own decisive 
action. This also suggests that Flamininus either did not have a plan in place for what to 
do if he dislodged Philip from his encampment at the Aous, or that Flamininus' plan was 
to stay put and further establish Roman control and protection of the Illyrian ports. 
 While Flamininus waited by the Aous, Philip fled across Thessaly leaving a path 
of destruction in his wake, and the Aetolians and Athamanians each ravaged a section of 
Thessalian borderland. 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, Philip retreated from his defeat at the Battle of the 
River Aous down the Aous valley towards Passaron, and then east into the Pindus 
Mountains. [Figure 4.3] When he reached the crossroads by the modern town of 
Metsovo, Philip chose to not continue north via the Grevena pass, the route he had taken 
from Macedon earlier that year. Instead, Philip continued east via the Zygos pass and 
emerged into the northwest corner of Thessaly. 
 This route via the Zygos pass was the only viable route for an army over the 
Pindus between Thessaly and Epirus from antiquity until 2009, with the completion of 
the building of the modern A2 highway (the Odos Egnatia).288 As a result, this route was 
also of prime economic importance. The value of this route for trade in the pre-modern 
era is perhaps best exemplified by the great effort and expense undertaken by Ali Pasha 
to build up a road here as well as establish and maintain a system of khans to control and 
support the trade along this corridor at the end of the 18th century.289 As Ali Pasha is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 The route was roughly similar to the modern A6 roadway. 
289 On this route, see Makris & Papageorgiou 1990, pp159-181; Leake 1835 I, pp 409 - 419, esp. p417 for 
the description of the khans along the route. On Ali Pasha's road network in general, see Makris & 
Papageorgiou 1990, pp171-233. 
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thought to have only built upon and enhanced existing road networks, rather than create 
new ones, scholars believe there was previously a Roman road here and perhaps even an 
earlier predecessor; however, it is worth noting that dating the archaeological remains of 
roads is notoriously tricky.290 
 Beyond trade, this would have been a crucial route for transhumant shepherds. 
While Thessaly is dedicated to agriculture today, Jason of Pherae's ability in 370 BC to 
requisition more than 1000 cattle and over 10,000 other herd animals from the cities of 
Thessaly with no delay, and without putting the onus on any particular city, indicates how 
much of Thessaly was devoted to pasturage in antiquity (Xen.Hell.6.4.28-9). That this 
situation continued through the pre-modern era is indicated by Leake's statement that in 
the western Thessalian plains, "notwithstanding the fertility of these plains, cultivation is 
confined to the vicinity of the villages; the remainder supplies only winter pasture to 
sheep and cattle."291 The route of this transhumance is indicated today by the village at 
the eastern edge of the pass named Dhiava, named for the twice-yearly sojourn shepherds 
take from the mountains to the plains.292  
 Livy reports that Philip, on his arrival in northwest Thessaly, first went to 
Tricca293 (L.32.13.5) and then: 
…from there he rapidly traversed the towns in his way. He summoned 
from their homes the men who could follow; the towns he burned. The 
owners were allowed to carry with them what they could of their 
possessions; the rest was booty for the army. Nor was there any hardship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 See e.g. Pritchett 1980; Makris & Papageorgiou 1990; Fachard & Pirisino 2015.  
291 Leake 1835 I, p433. 
292 Salmon, 1995; Salmon, 1997. 
293 For ancient toponyms, I use the spelling Livy used, when possible. Talbert 2000, which I used as the 
base layer for some of my accompanying maps, employs a mix of Greek and Latin spellings, including 
Trikka instead of Tricca. 
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unexperienced, which an enemy could inflict, greater than what they 
suffered at the hands of their allies. Such actions were distasteful to Philip 
even as he did them, but he wished to rescue, from a land that was soon to 
belong to his enemies, at least the persons of his allies. So Phacium, 
Iresiae, Euhydrium, Eretria, and Palaepharsalus were destroyed. Excluded 
from Pherae, when he tried to take it, because it would require time if he 
wanted to capture it, and he had no time, he gave up that undertaking and 
crossed into Macedonia for it was rumored that the Aetolians were 
approaching. 
 
inde obuias urbes raptim peragrauit. homines qui sequi possent sedibus 
excibat, oppida incendebat. rerum suarum quas possent ferendarum secum 
dominis ius fiebat, cetera militis praeda erat; nec quod ab hoste crudelius 
pati possent reliqui quicquam fuit quam quae ab sociis patiebantur. haec 
etiam facienti Philippo acerba erant, sed e terra mox futura hostium 
corpora saltem eripere sociorum uolebat. ita euastata oppida sunt Phacium 
<P>iresiae Euhydrium Eretria Palaepharsalus. Pheras cum peteret 
exclusus, quia res egebat mora si expugnare uellet nec tempus erat, omisso 
incepto in Macedoniam transcendit; nam etiam Aetolos adpropinquare 
fama erat. 
(L.32.13.6-9) 
 [Figure 4.4] This passage gives us information that enables us to determine 
Philip's route as well as to better understand his actions. Philip began at Tricca and ended 
in Macedonia. Tricca was located at the modern city of Trikala in the northwest corner of 
Thessaly and was the first city one would have come to after crossing the pass over the 
Pindus.294  
 The quickest way for Philip to reach Macedonia from Tricca would have been to 
go due east through the northernmost pass to Pelasgiotis. And, in fact, this is what Philip 
appears to have been doing when he proceeded from Tricca to Phacion, located in the 
Peneus valley between the ancient sites of Atrax and Pharcadon.295 However, from 
Phacion, instead of continuing east to Larisa and Macedon, Philip turned south and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Tricca: Stahlin 1924; Leekley 1980, pp 156-7; Lauffer 1989, pp 690-1. 
295 Phacion: Decourt 1990, pp 155-158. 
161 	  
	  
moved along the southern edge of the Karadag ridge along the Enipeus river to Iresiae, 
Euhydrium, and Palaepharsalus.296 He then continued along the Peneus into the hills of 
Phthiotis and to Eretria and Pherae.297 Livy lists all these places in the geographic order 
that Philip would be expected to have encountered them on his route, except that Eretria 
and Palaepharsalus are reversed, as Livy ended the list of the five cities Philip sacked 
with Palaepharsalus to emphasize its evocative quality for Roman readers.  
 Philip's retreat was not an aimless path of destruction through his own allied 
settlements, but a carefully chosen, strategic maneuver. As Bequignon first proposed, 
Philip's route was designed to greatly hinder an invasion of Pelasgiotis.298 To invade 
Pelasgiotis, one had to use one of the routes across the Karadag ridge, marked with the 
black, dotted lines on Figure 4.4.299 Each of these routes was controlled by a Macedonian 
city (Atrax, Crannon, or Scotussa) that lay to the north of the Karadag ridge, and to 
invade Pelasgiotis successfully, one would have had to besiege one of these cities. 
However, Philip's destructive retreat along the southern side of the Karadag ridge greatly 
reduced the resources available for a besieging army to live off the land. Beyond 
destroying the cities themselves, Philip presumably destroyed or took whatever food and 
supplies were stored in the towns as well as laid waste the adjacent agricultural lands. 
Additionally, removing the existing population would prevent an invading army from 
selling them as slaves, enlisting them as recruits, or working them in the fields. Thus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 Iresiae (=Peirasia): Stahlin 1924. Euhydrium: Stahlin 1924; Decourt 1990, 214-5; Leekley 1980, p137. 
Palaepharsalus: Morgan 1983. 
297 Eretria: Stahlin 1924, Leekley 1980, p136. Pherae: Stahlin 1924; Leekley 1980, pp 157-8. 
298 Bequignon 1928, esp. p445. The subsequent discussion of the mechanics of how this would hinder an 
invasion is my own analysis. 
299 For the road network across Thessaly, see Hammond 1988, p62, passim. 
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Philip economically crippled the area to prevent it from being a resource for an invading 
army. 
 Looking at the relationship of the places Philip sacked to the cities of Atrax, 
Crannon, and Scotussa makes this even more clear: Phacion was in the region of Atrax; 
Iresiae was in the region of the western pass that controlled by Crannon; Euhydrion and 
Palaepharsalus were located in the region of the grain supplying lands for the eastern 
route that Krannon controlled and the route Scotussa controlled. Eretria did not control 
grain land, but controlled the route east through the Phthiotic hills. 
 Philip's action here in Thessaly can be compared to a similar strategy he (or his 
son Perseus) later adopted further north. Polybius reports that in 169 BC Perseus sent 
envoys through "the so-called Desert Illyria, which not many years previously had been 
depopulated by the Macedonians in order to make it difficult for the Dardanians to invade 
Illyria and Macedonia" (Plb.28.8.3; cp. L.43.20.1).300 The success of this Macedonian 
policy is seen here in that the envoys had trouble just crossing this region, much less 
leading an army through it (Plb.28.8.4; L.43.20.1). Both in this instance and in Thessaly 
in 198 BC, the Macedonians used a scorched earth policy with the goal of hindering an 
invasion. 
 After destroying Eretria, Philip started but then quickly abandoned a siege of 
Pherae, before returning to Macedon via the Vale of Tempe. Livy reports that Philip was 
influenced to abandon Pherae because "it was rumored that the Aetolians were close at 
hand." However, Livy's account of the concurrent Aetolian campaign, discussed below, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Perseus took up the crown from Philip in 179 BC; it is unclear which monarch oversaw the creation of 
‘Desert Illyria’ given the imprecise nature of Polybius’ phrase “not many years previously.” 
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indicates that this was indeed only a rumor, as the Aetolians were not campaigning near 
enough to threaten Pherae. Furthermore, examination of the landscape suggests other 
reasons that might have factored into Philip's decision. Pherae was not crucial to Philip 
for controlling the easternmost north-south route in Thessaly, because Phthiotic Thebes 
and Demetrias were already strong Macedonian cities on the route, and Philip's army by 
this time must have been swollen with civilian refugees and wagons of supplies from the 
previously sacked cities, making for a less than ideal situation for conducting a siege. 
 Livy stresses the speed of Philip's movements after the Battle of the River Aous 
across the Pindus to Thessaly. However, once in Thessaly Philip undertook a strategic 
course of action beyond just a speedy retreat home. By destroying the settlements along 
the southern side of the Karadag ridge, Philip acted to prevent an invasion of Pelasgiotis 
while simultaneously demarcating it as the area of Thessaly which he would fight to 
control.301   
 [Figure 4.5] The Aetolians and Athamanians conducted their own Thessalian 
campaigns after they heard about Philip's defeat at the Aous. Livy presents the 
Macedonian, Aetolian, and Athamanian campaigns as "wasting Thessaly all at once" 
(L.32.14.4), and frames them as three parallel campaigns working together to achieve a 
singular outcome of "reaping, through plundering, the fruits of another's [Rome's] 
victory" (L.32.14.4). However, these three campaigns were also each serving to secure 
what each party considered was the key border zone in regards to Thessaly. The distinct 
goals of the three campaigns are indicated by the fact that they were not in competition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 As discussed below, this accords with the Macedonian holdings in Thessaly in 229 BC, which had been 
their smallest holdings in Thessaly in a long time. 
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with each other geographically. A unifying factor, however, was that all three campaigns 
were directly motivated by apparent Macedonian weakness revealed by the loss to the 
Romans at the Battle of the River Aous. However, rather than merely working for the 
same abstract goal of plunder, each party was campaigning in their own self-interest 
based on their own localized concerns.  
 Livy reports that the Aetolians heard of the Macedonian defeat at the Battle of the 
River Aous and as a result they began their Thessalian campaign (L.32.13.10). They 
began on the way to Thessaly by devastating the lands around Sperchiae and Macra 
Come (L.32.13.10) in the Sperchios valley at the western edge of the Malian plain.302 The 
Aetolians then continued north into Dolopia, the hill country north of the western 
Sperchius valley and west of lake Xynias, and captured the settlements of Cymene and 
Angeia (L.32.13.10).303 Continuing northwest, the Aetolians attacked and were repulsed 
from Metropolis and Kallithera (L.32.13.11-12), two towns at the southwestern edge of 
Thessaliotis where the plain meets the hills.304 Rather than advance from here into the 
Thessalian plain, the Aetolians then turned back southeast into Dolopia and sacked the 
villages of Teuma and Celathera, received the surrender of Acharrae (L.32.13.12),305 and 
intercepted and slaughtered the citizens of Xyniai as they fled towards Thaumaci 
(L.32.13.14).  This indicates that the Aetolians went from Acharrae east, going north of 
Lake Xynias to the area between Thaumaci and Xyniai, before turning south and looting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Sperchiae: Stahlin 1924; Bequignon 1937, pp313-315. Macra Come: Stahlin 1924; Bequignon 1937, 
pp316-322; Lauffer 1989, pp401-402. 
303 Cymene (= Ctimenes = Ktimeni): Helly 1992, pp 64-75 & carte 1. Angeias: Helly 1992, pp 64-75 & 
carte 1. 
304 Metropolis: Stahlin 1924; Helly 1992, pp 82-91; Kallithera: Stahlin 1924; Helly 1992, pp 82-91. 
305 Teuma: Helly 1992, p80 (located at the modern village of Thrapsimi); Celathera: Helly 1992, p80 
(located at the modern village of Ano Ktimeni). Acharrae (=Ekkara): Helly 1992, pp79-81 & carte 1. 
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Xyniae (L.32.13.14). From here they turned back west and captured the fort Cyphaera 
before returning to Aetolia (L.32.13.14).306 
 Livy reports that this was "a swift campaign of only a few days" (L.32.13.15). 
During these few days, however, the Aetolians managed to ravage the territory of three 
settlements, capture seven other settlements, and unsuccessfully attack two more, which 
begs the question of just how long "raptim intra paucos dies" means for Livy, a question 
to which we will return later in this chapter. 
 Livy's focus on the speed of the campaign, the brutality of the Aetolians against 
the Xyniaeans, and the fact that it was in Thessaly, frames the campaign as parallel to 
Philip's. However, close examination of the route the Aetolians took indicates that this 
was instead a well-designed and executed campaign to take control of Dolopia. The 
Aetolians started at the Malian plain south of Dolopia and then went in a clockwise circle 
up to the border with Thessaliotis to the north and Achaea Phtiotis to the east before 
returning back to Aetolia.  
 Livy reports that Amynander, the king of the Athamanians, also heard about the 
Roman victory at the Aous. However, instead of just waging an independent campaign as 
the Aetolians did, Amynander asked Flamininus for a "modicum praesidium" with which 
to do some raiding (L.32.13.15 - 32.14.1), exhibiting proper behavior for a Roman ally. 
With Roman permission and praesidium, Amynander then waged his own concurrent 
campaign with Philip's and the Aetolians'. 
 The Athamanians first assaulted the oppidum Phaecam, which sat between 
Gomphi and the pass (L.32.14.1).307 Phaecam must then have been in the area of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Cyphaera (=Kypaira), see Helly 1992, pp79-80 & carte 1. 
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modern villages of Pyli and Paleomonastiro as these sit between Gomphi and the 
entrance to the pass across the Pindus that exits at Ambracia on the other end. The 
Athamanians then besieged Gomphi, which capitulated after nine days, followed by the 
surrender of six named settlements "and other insignificant forts in the vicinity" 
(L.32.14.1-3). The Athamanians thus quickly took control of an area at the western 
border of Thessaly focused on the key city of Gomphoi. Gomphoi had great strategic 
importance because it controlled the southernmost of the two passes over the Pindus from 
Thessaly. Livy similarly frames this campaign as parallel to Philip's and the Aetolians’ in 
that it is swift, brutal, and in Thessaly. Close examination of the route shows that the 
Athamanian's campaign was very localized in order to secure the area of most strategic 
importance to themselves, as it controlled their access - as well as Aetolian and 
Acarnanian access - to Thessaly via the pass that ran from by Ambracia to Thessaly. 
  The Aetolians waged their 198 BC campaign in a manner consistent with their 
behaviors and concerns over the past forty years. Looking at the history of Aetolian 
actions in Thessaly over that period thus helps us to better understand the events of 198 
BC. This is not the first time that the Aetolians had made inroads into Dolopia and 
Thessaly. [Figure 4.6] In, or just before, 239 BC and the death of the Macedonian king 
Antigonus, the Aetolians gained control of much of the Sperchios valley and Dolopia.308 
During the 230's BC, Aetolia moved into western Phthiotic Achaea, including Thaumaci, 
Melitaia, and Xynias.309 Joseph Scholten has used epigraphic evidence to prove that 
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307 Gomphi: Lauffer 1989, p235-6; Stahlin 1924. 
308 Graninger 2010, p320; Scholten 2000, pp59-130; Grainger 1999, 105-146. 
309 Scholten 2000, pp154-155. 
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expanded into Thessaly and claimed cities including "Limnaion, Trikka, Eurymenai, 
Phaloria, and Gomphoi in Hestiaiotis; Pharsalos in Thessaliotis; and Pteleon. Larisa 
Kremaste, Melitaia, Thaumakoi, and Thebes in Phthiotic Achaea"310 into the Aetolian 
League.311 However, in 228 BC Antigonus Doson promptly took back all of the gains 
made by Aetolia in Thessaly during 229 BC, with the exception of Phthiotic Achaea.312 
 Upon the death of Macedonian king-regent Antigonus Doson in 222/221 BC, 
Aetolia again followed this already established pattern of aggressive offensive action 
whenever there was a change of kings at Macedon. This time, the resulting conflict was 
the Social War, which involved three successive Aetolian campaigns in Thessaly, each 
based out of Phthiotic Thebes. In 219 BC, the Aetolians marched from Phthiotic Thebes 
through Pelasgiotis, through Tempe, all the way into Pieria, and sacked Dion before 
marching back (Plb.4.62.1-4). Polybius asserts that the Aetolians only aimed to raid and 
pillage rather then gain territory in their campaigns, including this one (Plb.4.62.5). They 
made a further attempt in 218 BC, but the Macedonians were waiting for them in the 
plain and so the Aetolians stayed in the hills of Phthiotis (Plb.5.17.5-7). They raided 
again in 217 BC, this time inflicting serious damage on the people of Demetrias to the 
east at the border of Pelasgiotis and Phthiotis, Pharsalus to the west at the border of 
Phthiotis and Thessaliotis, and Larisa to the north (Plb.5.99.3-5). Philip responded by 
forcing Phthiotic Thebes to surrender and replacing the inhabitants with Macedonian 
colonists (Plb.5.99.1 - 5.100.8). The Aetolians and Macedonians then brokered a peace 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Scholten 2000, p166. See p166n5 for epigraphic bibliography for the Aetolian claims to these cities. 
311 Scholten 2000, pp164-168, map 8.  
312 Scholten 2000, pp168-183. 
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with both parties retaining what they held at that moment (Plb.5.101.8 - 5.105.2, esp. 
5.103.7-8), indicating that the Aetolians still held Phthiotic Achaea and Dolopia. 
 Livy reports that in 205 BC "Philip compelled the Aetolians to sue for peace and 
make a treaty on terms of his own choosing" (L.29.12.1) to end the Aetolian involvement 
in the Roman's First Macedonian War. The Aetolian 198 BC campaign in the Sperchius 
valley and Dolopia indicates that the Aetolians had lost those holdings in the 205 BC 
settlement. 
 The Aetolians continued their consistent behavior in the Second Macedonian 
War. In response to their brief, yet successful, 200 BC campaign season, the Romans 
gained the Athamanians as allies (L.31.18.1) and tasked them with bringing the Aetolians 
into the fold (L.31.18.3). However, the Aetolians had previously learned in the First 
Macedonian War that Roman alliance alone was not enough to keep them safe from the 
Macedonians.313 The Aetolians had learned from this that they were best served by 
waiting for perceived evidence of Macedonian weakness before making a treaty against 
them. Thus, it was after Philip lost the battle by Otolubus in 199 BC and was then 
distracted by a threefold attack on Macedonia by the Roman army from the west, the 
Dardani from the north, and the Roman navy from the East, that the Aetolians took 
advantage by invading Thessaly and joining the Roman alliance (L.31.40.9 - 31.41.1). 
(L.31.41.1). [Figure 4.7] Livy reports that a combined Aetolian and Athamanian force 
promptly sacked Cercinium, terrorized the inhabitants of the Boebe marsh district, and 
then moved to Perrhaebia, sacking Cyretiae and receiving the surrender of Maloea 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 As they had been compelled to sue Philip for peace in 205 BC, despite their Roman alliance (L.29.12.1). 
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(L.31.41.1-5).314 They were then put to flight by Philip near Pharcadon, a city just west of 
Atrax (L.31.41.6 - 31.42.9), supposedly having been on their way to Gomphi, due to 
Amynander's influence.315 As Gomphi was key to Amynander's 198 BC campaign 
(L.32.14.1-3), it makes sense that he had wanted it assault in 199 BC as well.   
 The Aetolian's route is reminiscent of their 219 BC route: they came up north via 
Phthiotis along the eastern edge of Pelasgiotis and then raided one of the two routes 
between Thessaly and Macedon, the difference being that in 219 BC they went through 
Tempe and in 199 BC they focused on the route into Macedon through Perrhaebia.316  
 Between 239 BC and 199 BC, the Aetolians had lost all the territory they had 
acquired as a result of expansion with regard to Thessaly, Dolopia, the western Sperchios 
valley, and Phthiotic Achaea. Additionally, since their territorial gains of 229 BC, their 
campaigns were reduced to only raids, and they lost more territory with each new 
conflict. However, in 198 BC the Aetolians again acted to gain territory. Perhaps they 
had gained an irredentist dream of looking beyond raiding and trying to regain their 
holdings from before the 205 BC settlement - or maybe even the 229 BC pinnacle of their 
expansion.317  
 The Aetolians also showed a consistent propensity to invade Thessaly when they 
perceived weakness in Macedonia, such as at the deaths of the Macedonian kings in 239 
BC, 229 BC, and 221 BC; as well as the Roman alliance against Macedon of 211 BC; 
and the military setback and new Roman alliance in 199 BC. These examples, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Cercinium: TIB Hellas. Cyretiae: Stahlin 1924; Leekley 1980, p136. Malloea: Stahlin 1924. 
315 Pharcadon: Stahlin 1924; Lauffer 1989, p535. 
316 See discussion in chapter 5 on the importance of the route between Thessaly and Macedon via 
Perrhaebia.  
317 On Greater Aetolia's vicissitudes and attempts at irredentism, see Scholten 2000, pp 131-234.  
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importantly, also demonstrate the Aetolian's hyper-awareness to perceived Macedonian 
weakness alongside their preparedness to respond instantly, even within the same 
campaign season. That the Aetolians, and now Athamanians, responded to perceived 
Macedonian weakness by promptly invading Thessaly indicated the importance to them 
of territorial gains in Thessaly. 
 The flipside of the previous account from the Aetolian perspective is that since 
Philip became king in 221 BC he had consistently acted to protect and increase 
Macedonian holdings in Thessaly, e.g. in the Social War campaigns and the 205 BC 
treaty. In 199 BC, Philip led his army to drive the Aetolians and Athamanians out of 
Thessaly. He was facing attack on three fronts at this time and chose Thessaly as the front 
he would deal with personally. Philip continued south from Pharcadon, where he drove 
away the Aetolians and Athamanians, to Thaumaci at the edge of Phthiotic Achaea and 
the Thessalian plain but was driven away by Aetolian aid to the city (L.32.4.1-7).  
 Livy reports that while the Aetolians and Athamanians were plundering in 
Thessaly, "the consul marched into the country of Epirus through the pass which had 
been laid open by the enemy" (L.32.14.4-5).318 Livy tells us that Flamininus acted to 
secure the goodwill of the Epirotes for the future, rather than punish them for their past 
Macedonian alliance (L.32.14.5-6).319 Flamininus took this so far as to not forage from 
their fields (L.32.15.5) and presumably not requisition grain from the settlements either. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 The route of Philip's flight is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. For now what matters is that it is in 
Epirus. 
319 Livy is potentially also foreshadowing a contrast here with Paullus' devastation of Epirus in 167 BC 
(L.45.34.2-6; Plut.Aem.29; Strabo 7.7.3). 
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As a result, Flamininus needed a way to get food and supplies for his troops, if he wanted 
to continue the season's campaign. 
 Flamininus "sent messengers to Corcyra, that the cargo ships should proceed to 
the Ambracian gulf" (L.32.14.7). This action indicates a change in Roman policy, as this 
moved the Roman base of operations south from where it had been based previously. 
Moving the cargo ships could be understood to indicate that Flamininus intended to move 
his base of operations from Illyria and northern Epirus into Aetolia. This would indicate 
great trust in the Aetolians on Flamininus' part, as the Aetolians controlled movement 
into the Ambracian gulf. Flamininus apparently did not fully trust this alliance, however, 
as he later felt compelled to send scouts to see if the cargo ships had indeed been able to 
enter the gulf or had stayed just outside it at Leucas (L.32.15.5).  
 However, instead of marching south towards Ambracia, Flamininus made the 
unprecedented move of marching a Roman army east across the Pindus and "advanced by 
easy marches and on the fourth day encamped on Mount Cercetius" (L.32.14.7), and thus 
became "the first Roman who had crossed to Greece in command of an army" 
(Plb.18.12.5).  
 Crossing the Pindus was a momentous and unprecedented step. However, this did 
not mean that Flamininus would then necessarily campaign in Thessaly. It would have 
been consistent with Sulpicius' behavior in 200 BC and 199 BC to have secured the 
Thessalian side of the pass through the Pindus, left a garrison there, and returned to 
winter on the Adriatic coast. This would have served to extend the Roman buffer zone 
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around the Adriatic ports to the next major geographical boundary, as the two previous 
campaigns had. 
 Flamininus' arrival at Mt. Cercetius, the mountain ridge running north-south at the 
northwestern edge of the Thessalian plain, allows us to determine Flamininus' route.320 
[Figure 4.3] The route from Passaron over the Pindus to Thessaly is just over 125 km, 
starting at roughly 480 m elevation and ascending to a maximum height of 1680 m 
elevation, but with roughly 3000 meters of total elevation gain due to the rugged terrain, 
and then descending to roughly 200 meters. This could have been completed in the four 
days Livy specifies, though they would have been more strenuous than "modica itinera" 
(L.32.14.7).  
 This was the same route over the Pindus that Philip had just taken, however, 
Flamininus did not proceed directly to the Thessalian plain as Philip had done. [Figure 
4.8] Instead, Flaminius turned south roughly 9km before where the pass enters into the 
plain by the modern town of Kalabaka, and continued into the valley of the tributary of 
the Peneus there, the Kleinovitimos river. Continuing 6km down this valley put 
Flamininus in the western foothills of Mt. Cercetius. Flaminius could not enter Thessaly 
from here without returning to the Peneus valley, however it gave him a chance to 
prepare to enter Thessaly before he got to Philip's garrisons of Phaloria and Aeginion 
located by Kalabaka. Roughly 11km down the valley is a fitting spot for the Roman 
camp, with enough room for the encampment and with access to fresh water. 
Furthermore, this area was protected from any potential Macedonian garrisons in western 
Thessaly by Mt. Cercetius to the east.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 Mt Cercetius (= Mt. Koziakas = Mt. Kerketio): Stahlin 1924; Hammond 1967, p284. 
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 Livy reports that once Flamininus encamped here, he summoned Amynander 
(L.32.14.7). Amynander had been campaigning in the area of Gomphi, as discussed 
above, and would have traveled to Flamininus by entering the Pindus northwest of 
Gomphi by the modern village of Pili, continuing east roughly 5km and then cutting 
behind Mt. Cercetius and going due north to the Roman camp.  
 Livy reports that Amynander's troops, as well as some Epirote volunteers, were to 
guide the Romans into Thessaly (L.32.14.8). The part of the route into Thessaly for 
which one might have expected Flamininus to have needed guides was the segment that 
involved crossing the Pindus. From where Flamininus was at that point, all he needed to 
do was continue a short distance down the Peneus to enter Thessaly. However, 
Flamininus must have needed guides to explain the layout of the Macedonian garrison 
network in Thessaly, to lay out the loyalties of the local communities and regions, and to 
provide council on how an advance into Thessaly could proceed and what the logistics 
would involve. Amynander would also have been able to report how his own campaign in 
Thessaly around Gomphi had gone, which had included Roman troops. 
 Once reunited with Amynander, Flamininus marched back north to the Peneus 
valley and then fought his way into Thessaly. Livy reports that "the first city of Thessaly 
to be attacked was Phaloria. It had a garrison of two thousand Macedonians" (L.32.15.1). 
[Figure 4.9] Phaloria sat on the west bank of the Peneus across the river to the south 
from where the modern city of Kalabaka, the site of ancient Aeginium, sat in the 
foothills.321 Philip had left a significant garrison of 2000 men at Phaloria and an unknown 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Phaloria and Aeginium: Stahlin 1924, esp. pp121-4. Hammond 1967, pp 681, 284 argued that Aeginium 
was 20 miles north-west of Stahlin's placement at the modern village of Koutsoufliani. However, this 
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number at Aeginium presumably with the intention of controlling this pass, and 
protecting his rear as he fled from here across Thessaly.  
 Phaloria was besieged, captured, burned, and destroyed (L.32.15.1-3). This led to 
the immediate surrender of Metropolis and Cierium (L.32.15.3), to the south, on the 
westen edge, and in the middle of, Thessaliotis respectively. Metropolis had successfully 
resisted the Aetolian assault earlier in this 198 BC campaign season. Perhaps the arrival 
of the Romans after the flight of the Macedonians convinced them that now was the time 
to switch allegiances. Cierium was roughly 13km east of Metropolis by the modern 
village of Pyrgos Kieriou. 
 Livy reports that Flamininus then gave a token attack against Aeginium, but 
"seeing as the place was very strong and almost impregnable, with even a small garrison, 
he hurled a few weapons against the nearby outpost and turned his course towards the 
region around Gomphi" (L.32.15.4). Flamininus abandoned an assault in Aeginium, as 
his attack on the Phaloria had already caused cities in Thessaly to start capitulating, and 
he had opened the pass sufficiently to be able to move his army into Thessaly. He could 
not have a long siege because he was short on provisions.  
 [Figure 4.8] Flamininus continued past the Macedonian garrisions into Thessaly, 
but instead of continuing southeast to Tricca, as Philip had done, Flamininus turned south 
to Gomphoi (L.32.15.4), a city, and region, recently taken by the Athamanian and Roman 
allied force (L.32.4-5).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
placement makes less sense in the narrative - as it would have involved Flamininus having marched right 
by it with no issue to Mt Cercetius and then marching back to it. Hammond's placement makes less sense 
archaeologically too, as the inscription identifying Aeginium was found at Kalabaka. Hammond's assertion 
that Kalabaka was an unfit location for a fortified town is mistaken. 
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 Livy reports that Flamininus, upon entering Thessaly, was short on provisions 
because "he had spared the fields of the Epirotes" (L.32.15.5). Presumably he did this to 
gain their goodwill, as they had been allied to the Macedonians in 198 BC (L.32.14.5-
6).322 Not requisitioning their food supply (and raw materials for trade) would have 
created a stark contrast for the Epirotes, as Philip had been getting directly supplied by 
the Epirotes for the 198 BC campaign.323  
 Once in Thessaly, Flamininus continued this policy, neither reaping in the fields 
nor requisitioning from settlements, again directly contrasting himself with Philip who 
had just sacked many of his own allied Thessalian settlements. Flamininus' army would 
not have been the destructive force and economic burden that Philip's had just been, as 
had the Aetolian and Athamanian destructive raids earlier in the campaign. Flamininus' 
behavior in Epirus and upon his arrival in Thessaly created an important contrast between 
himself and Philip.  
 Flamininus' novel behavior here is different and worth noting - Flamininus 
appears to have been concerned with winning the hearts and minds - or at least the 
stomachs and pocketbooks - of Greeks he viewed as potential allies from the beginning. 
As a result of this policy, though, Flamininus needed a way to get provisions for his 
army. 
 Livy reports that, Flamininus, once at Gomphi, chose to supply his troops by 
marching them in relays across the Pindus to Ambracia and back (L.32.15.5). While this 
might at first seems a strange choice, i.e. to cross the Pindus then promptly recross the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Additionally, The Epirotes had brokered the Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC and allied with Philip in the 
treaty (L.29.12). 
323 See chapter 3 discussion. 
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Pindus in order to cross the Pindus again, this move makes strategic sense. Livy's 
narrative of events indicates that Flamininus developed and executed a plan after the 
Battle of the River Aous to secure both routes across the Pindus from Thessaly and 
establish Roman control at the Thessalian side of both routes. Building on the campaign 
of 199 BC, Rome would now have cut off all the routes between Macedonia and the 
Adriatic coast, i.e. the two passes between Macedonia and Illyria, as well as, now, the 
two passes west out of Thessaly. 
 A brief review of the events shows how early Flamininus set into motion the 
events that led to his second crossing of the Pindus: 
1) Flamininus gave Roman troops to Amynander to secure the area around Gomphi, the 
Thessalian side of the pass across the Pindus between Gomphi and Ambracia. 
2) Flamininus sent the cargo ships to Ambracia. 
3) Flamininus crossed the Pindus via the more northerly Zygos pass to a safe spot near 
the Thessalian border. 
4) Flamininus had Amynander come meet him to help him invade Thessaly. This served 
a) to make sure Amynander was not switching sides, as well as b) to get information on 
Amynander's campaign, and c) to get intelligence on the state of Macedonian defenses 
between the Roman position and Tricca. 
5) Upon entering Thessaly, Flamininus went straight to Gomphi, and crossed the Pindus 
to the Ambracian Gulf.  
 One could reasonably expect that if Flamininus were marching the army to 
Ambracia, he was planning to stay there for the winter: the supply fleet was there, all the 
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routes west from Thessaly had been secured, and wintering on the Adriatic coast had 
been the Roman behavior in the east up till then. Instead, however, Flamininus brought 
the supplies from Ambracia back to Gomphi. Livy reports: 
the route from Gomphi to Ambracia although difficult and hard to travel is 
yet a very short distance. And so in a few days, the supplies having been 
transported from the fleet, the camp was full of an abundance of all things 
 
et est iter a Gomphis Ambraciam sicut impeditum ac difficile, ita spatio 
perbreui. intra paucos itaque dies transuectis a mari commeatibus repleta 
omni rerum copia sunt castra.  
(L.32.15.6-7) 
 
Livy's brief description of an apparently simple act, in fact, points to a significant 
undertaking. First of all, this is a significant mountain crossing. This route across 
the Pindus started by the modern village of Paleomonastiro, by ancient Gomphi, 
and ended 143 km later at the modern city of Arta, located on top of ancient 
Ambracia This ancient route roughly followed the modern A30 roadway. [map] 
Although this was a rugged route, close examination of HMGS topographic maps 
along with personal autopsy make clear that this pass was the route of least 
resistance across these mountains. This route starts at 167 m elevation and climbs 
to a maximum height of 1210 meters, with a net loss of 137 m. However, the 
ruggedness of the terrain makes for 3252 m of total ascent over the route. This 
route is then longer (140 km vs. 126.8 km) than the Zygos pass route, and while it 
does not rise to as high a maximum elevation (1210 m vs. 1680 m), the 
ruggedness of the terrain makes for a greater total elevation gain (3252 m vs. 
3000 m).  
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 The second factor that points to this having been a significant undertaking was 
that the Romans would have needed to bring back a substantial amount of food across the 
Pindus to make this exercise worthwhile. This operation would have employed mule 
trains at least, but presumably wagon trains also would have been involved.324 Flamininus 
would have required at least enough food for his impending campaign on Atrax.  
 We do not know how many days Flamininus originally planned for his Atrax 
campaign, but we can work backwards from how many days it took him to get from 
Thessaly to the port of Anticyra, where he was planning to get resupplied. To travel the 
roughly 60 km between Gomphi and Atrax would have taken three days due to the 
logistical issues of traveling with a siege train.325 Livy does not specify the length of the 
aborted siege of Atrax, reporting only that "the siege took longer and was more difficult 
that anyone had expected" (L.32.17.4). However, as there were a series of stages to the 
siege and Livy reports that Flamininus thought success in this siege important, fourteen 
days seems a reasonable estimate. To travel the roughly 200 km from Atrax to Anticyra 
involved passing through enemy territory (by Pharsalus), crossing two passes (into the 
Malian plain and into Phokis), and then successfully assaulting Phanotea and Anticyra.326 
As Flamininus would have been driven on by the knowledge that he was running out of 
food, 10 days seems a reasonable estimate. Thus, for his Atrax campaign, Flamininus 
would have brought at least 27 days of food across the Pindus.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 See Roth 2012, pp 79-90, 198-211 for the difference between mule trains and wagon trains, including 
the relative cost/benefit of each, as well as for the basic logistic requirements for all kinds of military trains. 
325 See Roth 2012, p91 on siege trains and their specific logistical complications. 
326 Details of Flamininus' Phokian campaign will be discussed below. 
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 Flamininus' army consumed 17.9 tons of grain per day, which required 36 wagons 
to carry it.327 For the minimum 27 days of food Flamininus that brought on his Atrax 
campaign, Flamininus would have required roughly 483 tons of grain, transported in 
nearly 1000 wagons. 1000 carts was a reasonable amount for a Roman army to bring on 
campaign, as Perseus later seized 1000 carts of grain from the Romans on campaign in 
Thessaly in 171 BC (L.42.65.2-5), and 30 days seems to have been the maximum amount 
of food that the Romans regularly brought with them into the field in the middle 
Republic.328 
 Although Livy says that the route was short and that the whole operation only 
took a few days, it would have taken a good number of days to get men and mule trains to 
Ambracia and back to Gomphoi. This pass is longer and more rugged than the northern 
(Zygos) pass route, which Livy says took four days. It seems reasonable to assign four 
days each way for this route as well, with an additional day to load up and deal with 
logistical concerns at Ambracia. Each round trip would then have taken nine days. Livy 
reports that Flamininus "sent the cohorts in relays to Ambracia to get foodstuffs" - 
frumentatum Ambraciam in vicem cohortes misit (L.32.15.5), meaning that there were 
multiple trips, presumably so that the wagon trains would not be too large when going 
over the rugged mountain pass. Five relays each taking 200 wagons seems a reasonable 
estimate, which would have resulted in the whole affair taking about two weeks (13 days 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 See Roth 2012, pp 7-43 for disscussion and estimates of Roman military food requirements and food 
weights, and pp 208-212 for discussion of Roman military wagons and wagonloads.  
660 modii x (2 legions + equal number of allies) = 2640 modii of grain per day.  
6.78 kg per modius x 2640 modii = 17.9 tons of grain per day.  
17.9 tons of grain / 500 kg per wagon = 36 wagons per day. 
328 Roth 2012, pp 68-116, esp. pp 68-71. 
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= 5 trips (each taking 9 days) leaving on successive days and each bringing back 200 
wagons). However, had a need for smaller trains required more relays, this crossing could 
have taken significantly longer.  
 The third factor that points to this having been a significant undertaking is the 
Romans' need to rely on the Athamanians for guidance and protection. This route across 
the Pindus went through the heart of Athamania, and Livy had specified earlier that the 
Athamanians were acting as guides for the Romans. A brief survey of two earlier 
examples and two later examples will serve to illustrate to what degree the Athamanians 
held control over this mountain crossing. 
 Livy reports that Philip, in 207 BC, gave the island of Zacynthos to Amynander 
"as payment to induce him to permit Philip to lead his army through Athamania into the 
upper part of Aetolia" (L.36.31.11).329 Amynander is able to extract a substantial 
payment from a much more powerful monarch in exchange for safe passage; the 
Athamanians seem to wield disproportionate power in negotiations here with the 
Macedonians compared to their respective military sizes and might.  
 In 199 BC, when Philip flushed the combined Aetolian and Athamanian force out 
of Thessaly, "the Athamanians, being knowledgeable of the routes, led the Aetolians back 
to Aetolia over the high mountains on paths unknown to the pursuing enemy" 
(L.31.42.8). The Athamanians are shown to have been able to grant their allies safe and 
quick passage, and prevent their enemies from following. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 That Livy is referring to Philip's 207 BC campaign, see Walbank 1967, p 278. Philip's route took him 
from Gomphoi across the mountain pass in question, but at the modern village of Panagia roughly 12 km 
northeast of Ambracia, he turned southeast along the Inachos river and then south along the Achelous to the 
western shore of lake Trichonis before proceeding to Thermon (Plb.11.7.2). See Walbank 1967, p 278 for 
further discussion of Philip's 207 BC Aetolian campaign and support of this route. 
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 Without Athamanian help, however, crossing the Pindus by the southern route no 
longer appeared to be as simple a process as Livy describes for 198 BC. Livy supplies a 
quite different description of this same route when the Romans took it in 171 BC: "The 
Roman consul, being on his way to Thessaly with his army during these same days, first 
made a rapid march through Epirus; then, after he crossed into Athamania, a land of 
rough and almost pathless terrain, with great difficulty by small roads he barely got 
through to Gomphi" (L.42.55.1-2). The help of the Athamanians is what turned this route 
from "difficult and hard to travel" but still "a very short distance" that the Romans could 
cross back and forth in "a few days" in 198 BC to a route the Romans "barely got 
through" going in one direction in 171 BC. 
 How a smaller and weaker army such as the Athamanians could control the 
movements across the Pindus of much larger and more powerful armies can be better 
understood by looking at Philip's Athamanian campaign of 189 BC, Manlius Vulso's 
march through Thrace in 188 BC, as well as the logistics of mountain warfare in the 
Pindus in the Greek civil war of the 1940's. 
 In 189 BC, Philip invaded Athamania with an army.330 The Athamanians took 
advantage of the rugged terrain and their superior knowledge of the landscape to employ 
guerrilla warfare tactics to harry and terrify the invaders, causing them to flee without a 
battle.331  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 After the Aetolians had helped Amynander expel the Macedonians from Athamania (L.38.1.9-11). 
331 The Macedonians had advanced into Athamania and were moving towards Argithea (L.38.2.5). Argithea 
was located on a secondary, and more difficult, southern route between Gomphi and Ambracia, roughly 
16km southwest of Gomphi, but taking approximately 30km of mountain track and 800m net elevation gain 
to get there (For Argithea, see Hammond 1967, pp252-3, map 11). Livy reports that "suddenly as they were 
advancing the Athamanians appeared, hurrying towards hills that commanded the route" (L.38.1.6). The 
Athamanians were thus able to appear suddenly yet also conspicuously take a threatening position. The 
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 Conceptually similar behavior can be seen in Livy's report of the Roman 
proconsul Manlius Vulso's march from Asia in 188 BC through a "difficult route" of "ten 
miles of wooded, narrow, and rough terrain" in hostile territory (L.38.40.6). A 
significantly smaller force of Thracians was similarly able to harry and repeatedly 
ambush the Romans specifically on account of their superior knowledge, and strategic 
use, of the terrain (L.38.40.7-12).332 The Thracians also gained extra advantage 
specifically because the Romans were hindered by their wagon train (L.38.40.6 - 
38.41.3). Similar to their situation in Athamania, the Romans had formerly had safe 
passage across this area due to different political relations with the locals.333  
 Much about the logistics of warfare in the Pindus can be gained from studying the 
campaigning in the Pindus during World War II and the Greek Civil War (1941-1949). In 
his account of the Greek civil war, C.M. Woodhouse compares the respective forces of 
the Democratic and National armies at the end of 1948: the Democratic army had "in the 
neighborhood of 25,000 men and women" while the National army had "over 200,000" 
soldiers far stronger in equipment and weaponry.334 Yet, Woodhouse viewed as 
"inconclusive" which army had the advantage.335 General Papagos, the commander of the 
National army, also viewed the National army as not large enough to win the war and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Macedonians were thrown into a panic and Philip decided to lead them back to Thessaly (L.38.1.6-8). 
While the Macedonians retreated, the Athamanians were able to take advantage of their knowledge of the 
terrain and landscape to harass the Macedonian rear and flanks (L.38.1.9), take short cuts to get in front of 
them to block their route (L.38.1.10), and cause such confusion among the Macedonians that they lost 
discipline and composure (L.38.1.10).  
332 Only when the Romans got out of the wooded and difficult terrain was the Thracian force no longer an 
issue (L.38.41.5-10). The Thracians, however, had briefly stopped harassing the Romans during their 
passage when the Thracians had "got tired of so many spoils" (L.38.40.15). 
333 Such protection having been acquired, and then removed, by Philip (L.37.7.9-16; 38.40.8). 
334 Woodhouse 2002, pp257-8. 
335 Woodhouse 2002, p258. However, the Partisan army was in the end eliminated, as, likewise, "the 
Athamanians became extinct" (Strabo 9.4.17). 
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was demanding an increase to 250,000 men.336 25,000 men were equal to 200,000 men 
because those 25,000 men were holed up in the Pindus Mountains. Much as the 
Thracians' advantage was neutralized in 189 BC by the Romans getting out of wooded 
terrain, the National army pioneered the use of napalm to deforest sections to try to create 
a similar effect.337 Woodhouse, reflecting on his time fighting with the Greek resistance 
in German-occupied Greece in WWII, signaled the importance of the Pindus for a smaller 
force: "Thanks to the nature of these mountains, we could travel at will, without 
precautions, many days at a time in a single direction, throughout great tracts of Greece 
which the Germans could only occasionally penetrate (and never hold) even with the 
most strongly held expeditions."338 Smalls bands of resistance fighters could prevent the 
German army from holding the Pindus due to the nature of the landscape, much as the 
small army of Athamanians could control the movements of the great powers of their day 
in the Pindus. 
  Flamininus was thus heavily relying on his recent alliance with the Athamanians 
for this resupply mission over the Pindus to succeed. The Romans' 171 BC campaign 
showed how difficult this crossing could be with no local guides, while Philip's 189 BC 
campaign showed how hostile locals could prevent passage, and the Roman 189 BC 
campaign showed the additional liability of a wagon train in hostile, rugged terrain. The 
Romans had no great reason to trust the Athamanian loyalty. They had only been allies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 Woodhouse 2002, p237.  
337 Woodhouse 2002, p237. 
338 Woodhouse 2002, p xix. 
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since winter 200/199 BC and the Athamanians had offered alliance apparently only due 
to the Romans' recent show of strength.339 Flamininus' choice was a risk, but it worked.  
 Similarly, this plan relied on Flamininus also heavily relying on his recent 
alliance with the Aetolians. The Aetolians could have prevented the Roman fleet access 
to the Ambracian gulf - a possibility Flamininus clearly considered as he later "sent 
scouts in advance to ascertain whether the supply-ships had headed for Leucas or the 
Ambracian gulf" (L.32.15.5), as Leucas sits just outside of the Ambracian gulf and is 
where the supply-ships would have docked had they been denied access to the gulf. The 
Aetolians had only recently joined the Roman cause after the Roman victory at Otolobum 
in 199 BC after they previously refused to choose sides. Their open behavior of waiting 
to see who was winning and then joining that side (eg. L.31.32.5) could have reasonably 
caused Flamininus not to trust them.  
 I discussed earlier that Flamininus displayed novel behavior by not ravaging the 
fields of potential new allies. We can now pair that behavior with a surprisingly high 
level of trust in his Aetolian and Athamanian allies - trust that seems based on little 
evidence and with risk that could come with great costs.  
 We return now to Flamininus at Gomphi and freshly provisioned. Livy reports 
that Flamininus marched east to the city of Atrax at the northwestern entrance to 
Pelasgiotis (L.32.15.8). [Figure 4.10] As discussed above, Atrax controlled access for the 
most direct route into Macedonian-controlled Pelasgiotis. Beyond control of this route, 
control of Atrax would also have given Flamininus a bridgehead from which to continue 
the attack eastward to Larisa. Larisa was the key Macedonian holding for maintaining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 The Athamanians would, in fact, already be fighting against the Romans in 192 BC. 
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control over Pelasgiotis as well as an ideal place from which to launch a campaign into 
Macedon. In fact, the Romans later based their attacks into Macedon in the Third 
Macedonian War on Larisa.   
 The Roman assault on Atrax was a major operation involving battering rams 
(L.32.17.6) and a "tower of great height" (L.32.17.10). Moving these specialized 
weapons as well as other materials required for siege warfare would have involved 
bringing a siege train from Gomphi to Atrax.340 For comparison, Plutarch reports that 
Antony needed 300 wagons to carry his siege equipment and battering ram on his 
Parthian campaign in 36 BC (Plut.Ant.38.2). The use of this train, the preparation of the 
rams, and the preparations for building the tower (presumably built on site but with 
timber harvested and prepped for this purpose from the forests by Gomphi) reveal that 
this siege of Atrax was no ad hoc operation, but instead one methodically planned by 
Flamininus.341 
 Livy reports that Flamininus was unable to take Atrax quickly (L.32.17.4-17) and 
"realized that there was no immediate prospect of capturing the town nor any way to 
winter his troops far from the sea and in a region wasted by the calamities of war" 
(L.32.18.1-2). Flamininus knew that he had not brought over from Ambracia sufficient 
provisions for a protracted siege. To get more provisions, Flamininus had two options: to 
continue to resupply via Ambracia or to forage from the surrounding district. The route 
between Atrax and Ambracia was secure and the Roman supply ships safely at port at 
Ambracia were able to resupply Flamininus' army, as well as be resupplied themselves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 See Roth 2012, p91 on siege trains and their specific logistical complications. 
341 On carrying rams, rather then sourcing them on-site, because of their special size, see Roth 2012, p91; 
Plut. Ant. 19.2. Athamania is, and was, a heavily forested region. 
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from Italy and North Africa. However, soon the difficult mountain route between 
Thessaly and Ambracia would be expected to start receiving heavy snow and could not 
be counted on for the regular crossings for resupply that would be required were 
Flamininus to attempt to continue to use this method to resupply his forces.342 
 Flamininus' next option was to forage from the surrounding fertile Thessalian 
plain. However, here is where the brilliance of Philip's scorched earth strategy from 
earlier in the 198 BC campaign season is revealed. As discussed above, Philip's route 
across Thessaly went from Tricca due east across the northern edge of the plain to 
Phacium and then south to Iresiae burning the towns and removing all the people on his 
way (L.32.13.5-9). We learn here that Philip also devastated the grain land, as Flamininus 
understood that he would not be able to forage provisions from the area to winter his 
troops - which this area of the Thessalian plain should otherwise have been more than 
able to supply.343 We should understand that Philip devastated the fields to such an extent 
between Tricca and Phacium as well as the areas around and between Phacium and 
Iresiae, while also burning or taking away all of the stored provisions of the settlements, 
so that this fertile area could no longer supply an army. As a result, Philip left any army 
besieging Atrax in a bind: they could not forage east of Atrax as that was hostile, 
Macedonian controlled territory, and they could not forage to the west or south either; 
Philip had made an extended siege of Atrax untenable. 
 Turned away from Atrax and in need of provisions, Flamininus could reasonably 
have been expected to move his army one last time this season across the Pindus and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 See discussion of regional weather patterns in chapters 1-3.  
343 While Flamininus had been loath to use local crops to supply his army up to now, he seems to have had 
no such concerns concerning the territory of an actively hostile city. 
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winter at Ambracia since this would put him in allied territory, with the supply fleet, and 
would accord with recent consular behavior as at the end of the 200 BC and 199 BC 
campaign seasons the consul had returned to winter quarters on the Adriatic coast. This 
allowed, among other things, for easy handover of command to the incoming consul.  
 Although Livy says that "there was no harbor on the whole coast of Acarnanian 
and Aetolia which could both accommodate the fleet which brought supplies to the army 
and at the same time provide shelter for wintering the troops" (L.32.18.3), Ambracia had 
already been housing the supply fleet and could have wintered the troops.344 One is left to 
assume that Livy either was trying to make sense of Flamininus' unexpected action or 
that the Aetolians were unwilling to let the Romans winter in Acarnania or Aetolia. 
 Flamininus, instead, went south all the way to Anticyra a port on the Corinthian 
gulf in Phocis. This was a significant march of roughly 200 km that involved crossing the 
mountains between the Thessalian plain and the Malian plain and then from the Malian 
plain into Phocis.  
 Anticyra was not chosen at random by Flamininus, but was a known entity to the 
Romans, as they had previously sacked it and replaced its inhabitants in 211 BC during 
the first Macedonian War (L.26.26.1-3).345 This port had the capacity to house the Roman 
supply fleet and Phocis had the capacity to winter the troops. Anticyra fulfilled 
Flamininus' immediate needs, but also looked ahead to the following year's campaign. 
Livy reports that "Anticyra was not far from Thessaly and the enemy's country" 
(L.32.18.3-5), which would allow Flamininus to campaign more easily against Philip 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 It was a large enough city with a large enough hinterland to have had room for Flamininus' army. 
345 Philip was able to dock his fleet at Anticyra in 207 BC (L.28.8.7), indicating that the replacement 
inhabitants either were not hostile to Philip or had, themselves, been replaced. 
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than if he had wintered on the Adriatic coast. Additonally, if Flamininus wanted to 
campaign the following season, he had learned from Sulpicius' and his own treatments of 
Villius' consulship, that it was more difficult to replace a consul in the field the further 
they were from Rome.  
 Once in Phocis, Flamininus conducted a quick and effective campaign that both 
secured safe winter quarters for the Roman army and shored up the southern boundary of 
Thessaly by securing the land routes approaching Thessaly from the south. Livy reports 
that Flamininus took control of, in order, Phanotea, Anticyra, Ambrysus, Hyampolis, 
Daulis, and Elatia, and 'other unimportant castella' (L.32.18.6-9; 32.24).346 [Figure 4.11] 
Analysis of the locations of these settlements, when taken alongside the order in which 
Flamininus took them, reveals that this was a well-executed campaign to quickly control 
all routes through Phokis.347 This campaign relied on effective use of knowledge the 
topography. 
 The first city taken, Phanotea, was centrally located at the crossroads of the pass 
leading northeast to the coast of the Malian gulf, the route southwest to Anticyra, and the 
Kephisos valley running northwest-southeast. This city was at a key crossroads at the 
center of the Kephisos valley, offering control of the main northwest-southeast corridor 
of the Kephisos valley, as well as the routes northeast to the coast, and southwest to the 
port Anticyra. The next city taken, Anticyra, was southwest of Phanotea and the key port 
the Romans needed for resupply. Next was Ambrysus which sat between Phanotea and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 For the six settlements in Phocis, see McInerney 1999, esp. pp295-6 (Phanotea (=Panopeus)), pp71-76 
& 323-4 (Anticyra), pp313-5 (Ambrysus), pp290-2 (Hyampolis), pp297-9 (Daulis), p287 (Elatia). 
347 For the network of fortifications in Phocis, see De Staebler 2016; Laufer 2016. For the state of the field 
on fortifications and fortification networks, see Frederiksen et al. 2016. 
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Anticyra and controlled movement between the port up the steep incline to the central 
Phokian plain, past which the Romans would need to move provisions from Anticyra to 
their eventual winter quarters at Elatia. Hyampolis was northeast of Phanotea and 
controlled movement along the important pass from the coast at Opous.348 Daulis sat 
southwest of Hyampolis and further secured the corridor that ran from Kephisos valley to 
Anticyra as well as worked together with Phanotea to control the central plain.  
 Finally, Elatia lay north of Daulis at the northern edge of the Kiphisos valley and 
was understood in antiquity to have held "the most advantageous position, because it is 
situated in the narrow passes and because he who holds this city holds the passes leading 
into Phocis and Boiotia" (Strabo 9.3.2) and "commands the passes from Thessaly" 
(Strabo 9.3.15). In fact, Philip II (Dem.18.169) and Philip V (Plb.5.27.1) had previously 
held Elatia for this reason.349  
 When the Romans went into winter quarters in 198 BC, they controlled both 
passes over the Pindus from Thessaly, and the land routes into Thessaly from the south, 
had obtained a safe port for their supply fleet, established winter quarters, and secured a 
safe line of communication between that port and their winter quarters. 
 Livy's account, however, omits when Flamininus told the supply fleet to move to 
Anticyra from Ambracia. This is important, because it would shed light on Flamininus' 
plans for his 198 BC Thessalian campaign due to the fact that it would have involved 
significant time to move the fleet. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 McInerney 1999, p58-59. 
349 Mcinerney 1999, pp55-56, 246-251. 
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 The first option to explore is that Flamininus ordered the fleet to Anticyra right 
when he finished resupplying from his base at Gomphi, but before he moved on Atrax. 
This seems most unlikely, though, as Anticyra was yet not a friendly port. If, then, 
Flamininus had not yet told the fleet to move when he moved from Gomphi, it follows 
that Flamininus did think he could take Atrax and potentially winter there. This would 
mean that the siege of Atrax was not a feint. This then points to a situation in which 
Flamininus sent a messenger, or messenger party, from Atrax to cross the Pindus and tell 
the fleet to move.350 Flamininus then raced to take Anticyra before the fleet got there.  
 This plan was risky on two counts: first, because the messenger needed the 
Athamanians to help his passage over the Pindus. Since the Athamanians had only 
recently become Roman allies on account of a Roman show of force, the more recent 
show of Roman weakness at Atrax could reasonably be expected to weaken their support. 
If that messenger were waylaid en route, Flamininus would have arrived at Anticyra and 
not been met by the fleet and run out of provisions. Second, because the timing of the 
operation would have been delicate. If the fleet had arrived at Anticyra before the 
Romans had managed to take control of it, the fleet might have been turned back to 
Ambracia or otherwise compromised, and Flamininus would have run out of provisions. 
Flamininus' plan to meet the fleet at Anticyra again displayed high-risk behavior that 
involved trusting his allies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 The Roman messenger(s) should have been able to get from Atrax to Ambracia, with Athamanian 
assistance, in four to five days; and the fleet should have been able to get from Ambracia to Anticyra in 
roughly three days (Casson 1991, pp 292-6). As discussed above, Flamininus took approximately 10 days 
to get from Atrax to Anticyra. 
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 When Flamininus wintered the troops, he did this he did not yet know if he would 
be prorogued for the next campaign season. Before finding this out, Flamininus held a 
conference at Nicaea on the Malian gulf with Philip (L.32.32.9 - 32.36.10).351 Similarly 
to the conference at the Aous, they came together to discuss peace terms at Philip's 
request; Flamininus gave his demands, and Philip refused them. Neither conference 
resolved anything: the failed conference at the Aous immediately led to a battle and this 
failed conference led to ambassadors being sent to the senate.  
 Livy's report of each conference, however, does work to foreshadow the 197 BC 
campaign.352 At the Aous, Philip had a violent reaction to Flamininus' demand for 
Thessaly (L.32.10.7-8), and, at Nicaea, Philip was unwilling to cede specifically Phthiotic 
Thebes (L.32.35.11). As we will see, the 197 BC campaign would take place in Thessaly 
and Flamininus first attacks Phthiotic Thebes. If the conferences transpired as Livy 
reports, one could conclude that Flamininus used them to learn directly from Philip just 
what Philip was willing to fight for.  
 Livy posits that Flamininus' negotiations at Nicaea were designed to leave the 
situation open for war with Philip if he were prorogued, but for peace if he got replaced 
(L.32.32.6-8). And, indeed, the senate did prorogue Flamininus to continue the war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 This is where Polybius' narrative begins. The Ides of March in 197 BC occurred in the Gregorian 
calendar on either December 15th or January 6th (Briscoe 1981, pp 17-25). This means that this council 
occurred between wintering the troops, presumably in early November, and mid-January at the latest as 
Flamininus should have heard the news quite close to the decision on the Ides. Anticyra would have given 
Flamininus ready access to information from abroad and having his brother in charge of the military fleet 
would only have increased this. 
352 Livy does accent details that pair the conferences: at each conference, Flamininus and Philip were 
separated by water, exchanged in witty banter, discussed details of Greece's political geography, and Philip 
got mad, and nothing was resolved. 
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(L.32.28.1-9, 32.37.5-6; Plb.18.12.1) and Livy reports that, once prorogued, Flamininus 
would not meet again with Philip to discuss peace (L.32.37.6). 
 Beyond merely extending Flamininus' command, the senate voted to send him 
reinforcements, demonstrating the senate's resolve to continue this war.353 This contrasts 
with the senate's behavior during the First Macedonian War, when they kept continuing 
Sulpicius' command, but did not prioritize the war.  
 Repeatedly we have seen that Flamininus was willing to take risks in the field, put 
great trust in his allies, and change his plans to react to situations. Importantly, his risks 
had all paid off so far: arriving early in his province was high-risk that he would be 
violating unwritten, agreed upon behavior that the consuls had been engaging in during 
the previous years, but high-reward in defeating Philip; forcing the position at the Aous, 
leading a Roman army across the Pindus for the first time, moving the fleet to Aetolia, 
resupplying through Athamania, besieging Atrax, and racing the supply fleet to Anticyra 
were all successfully executed risks.  
 Now that Flamininus had his command extended, he had one campaign season to 
win a decisive battle against Philip and receive the resulting triumph in order for his 
consulship and succeeding proconsulship to be considered a success (At the least, 
Flamininus had to show such gains in the war that he could not be replaced). It follows 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 The senate voted for troops for both the Spanish and Macedonian fronts, demonstrating a generally 
active commitment to war in 197 BC. See Potter 2012. Livy reports that the senate at this time also sent 
both Sulpicius and Vilius, the two consuls in command of the previous two years of the Macedonian War, 
as legates to Flamininus (L.32.28.12). This was probably confusion on Livy's part with when they both 
were sent from Rome to Flamininus in 197 BC as part of the Ten Legates to assist with arranging the peace 
with Philip after Cynoscephalae (L.33.24.7). 
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that this situation would compel Flamininus into a high-risk/high-reward strategy and that 
understanding this could help us interpret his actions.  
 At the beginning of spring (initio veris (L.33.1.1); primo vere (L.33.3.1)), 
Flamininus and Philip each took action to prepare for the upcoming summer's campaign. 
Livy frames the 197 BC campaign as a series of paired actions of Flamininus and Philip, 
with this as the first. While we do not know if this was originally Polybius' framing 
device or a technique of Livy's, maintaining these pairings shapes Livy's narrative. 
 Flamininus took advantage of his position at Elateia to make a sudden, surprise 
appearence at Thebes that resulted in his securing Boiotia (L.33.1-2). This allowed 
Flamininus to invade Thessaly with no worry of land attack from the rear on himself or 
on his stronghold at Elatia and its supply route to Anticyra. With the Achaeans, 
Aetolians, Athamanians, Athenians, and Boiotians all now allied to the Romans, 
Flamininus could focus his attention on forcing Philip into a confrontation. Additionally, 
Numidia, Sicily, and Sardinia sent grain to cover Flamininus' needs for the upcoming 
campaign (L.32.27.2), resolving this logistics issue from the previous year.354   
 During this same period, Philip conducted a major levy through his kingdom, 
even drafting men normally considered too young or old (L.33.3.1-5). Just after the 
spring equinox (secundum vernum aequinoctium) Philip mustered his troops at Dion for 
daily drilling (L.33.3.5), and per eosdem ferme dies Flamininus moved his army north out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Livy says that Masinissa sent 200,000 modii and that "item ex Sicilia Sardiniaque magni commeatus et 
vestimenta exercitui missa." 200,000 modii at 2640 modii/day for Flamininus' army would cover 75 days. 
If Sicily and Sardinia sent an equal amount, Flamininus would have 225 days of grain, which would be 
more than enough for the campaign season. 
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of Elatia (L.33.3.6). The spring equinox falls between March 19th-21st in the Gregorian 
calendar, placing these actions sometime in late March.  
 Livy specifies that Flamininus went via Thronium and Scarphea to Thermopylae 
and Heraclea (L.33.3.6-7). The first part of this route would have been the same route 
that Flamininus took from Elatia to the conference at Nicaea:355 after going roughly 7km 
west from Elatia, he turned due north and crossed the pass that starts at the modern 
village of Modi and ends roughly 18 km later at the modern village of Rengini. This is a 
steep pass, climbing from 163 m elevation to 692 m elevation in only 8.7 km (6% grade) 
and then descending at the same grade. He continued north roughly 7 km and then turned 
northwest at Thronium and continued in a westerly direction along the ancient shoreline 
roughly 28 km past Scarphea, Nicaia, and Thermopylae to Heraclea.356  
 Livy reports that Flamininus met with the Aetolians at Heraclea to discuss the 
proper Aetolian contribution to the war effort, then led the Roman army to Xyniae "in 
three days" and waited there for allied reinforcements (L.33.3.7-8).  
 This gives us a good opportunity to explore Flamininus' speed of movement. 
From Heraclea to Lamia is roughly 10 km of relatively flat agricultural land. The route 
from Lamia to Xyniae is roughly 33km, but involved crossing a pass, climbing 17 km at a 
steady 4.5% grade, from 83.8 m elevation to 765 m elevation, and then descending at the 
same grade to 466 m elevation before leveling out. Flamininus thus covered 43 km with 
one roughly 700m climb in three days; 14.3 km per day is slower than one might expect. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 See Pritchett 1982, pp130-8 and map fig. 6. 
356 Thronium: Lauffer 1989, p 684; Pritchett 1982, pp151-5. Scarphea: Pritchett 1982, pp166-7. Nicaia: 
Pritchett 1982, pp 162-4. Heraclea: Pritchett 1965, pp81-2; Leekley 1980, p122-3; Lauffer 1989, pp264-5. 
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At this rate, it would have taken Flamininus five days to go from Elatia to Heraklea (60 
km with a larger climb). 
 Livy reports that the Aetolians promptly arrived at Xyniae with 6000 infantry and 
400 cavalry and Flamininus immediately broke camp (L.33.3.9).357 500 Cretans, 300 
Illyrians, and 1200 Athamanians joined Flamininus on the march from Xyniae to 
Phthiotic Thebes (L.33.3.10).  
 Now that all Flamininus' forces had assembled, it is necessary to determine the 
numbers of troops involved in the Roman and Macedonian armies in order to understand 
the logistics required in moving the armies through the landscape and the scale of the 
campaign. Livy supplies us with the numbers for Philip's army: 16,000 phalanx troops, 
2000 peltasts, 2000 Thracians, 2000 Illyrians, 1500 axillaries - making for a total of 
23,500 infantry in a roughly 2:1 ratio of phalanx troops to other infantry (16,000:7500) - 
and 2000 cavalry (L.33.4.3-5). Livy reports that "the Romans had about the same number 
because of the arrival of the Aetolians their numbers were superior, " (L.33.4.6).358 
Plutarch reports that "Flamininus had over 26,000 soldiers, of whom six thousand 
infantry and four hundred cavalry were furnished by the Aetolians. Philip's army also was 
about the same size" (Plut.Flam.7.2).359 There has been scholarly debate about how to use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 While earlier editors had the Aetolians bringing 600 infantry, Briscoe and Walbank have each 
convincingly argued that this number is too small for the role the Aetolians later claim to have played. The 
larger Aetolian numbers (6000 and 400) also accord with the numbers supplied in Plutarch (Plut. Flam. 
7.2), who had probably also derived them from Polybius. 
358 This text of this passage is debated and was emended by Gronovius to read "the number of their cavalry 
was superior." See Briscoe 1973, pp253-4 for the history of textual criticism here. I follow Briscoe's 
reading, even if he does find the Latin "extremely inelegant." 
359 Walbank 1967, p584-5 argues that both Livy's and Plutarch's number derive from the same lost section 
of Polybius. 
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these passages to determine both the Roman troop numbers and the composition of the 
Roman army.360 
 According to Polybius, the standard Roman legion was 4200 infantry and 300 
cavalry (Plb.6.20.8-9), with "the total number of allied infantry being usually equal to 
that of the Romans, while the cavalry are three times as many" (Plb.6.26.7). Flamininus 
had two legions, which would make for, in the system Polybius' describes, 19,200 troops, 
composed of 9000 Roman troops and 10,200 allied troops. However, as Dobson notes, 
"These ratios given by Polybius must have been only theoretical" as Polybius and Livy 
each cite instances of allied and Roman forces that do not fit these distributions, e.g. only 
500 allied cavalry per legion (Plb.2.24.3; L.21.17.5).361 If the allies were roughly equal in 
number to the Roman troops, there would have been 18,000 troops with Flamininus to 
which 6400 Aetolians and 2000 other Greeks joined between Xyniae and Thebes, making 
for 26,400 total troops, which aligns with the number in Plutarch and Livy.  
 Upon leaving Xyniae, Flamininus had a two-stage plan to force a land battle with 
Philip which, if successful, would end the Second Macedonian War and get Flamininus 
his triumph. The first stage was a surprise move on Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias. This 
was intended to create a threat that would compel Philip to move into Thessaly to fight. 
Flamininus could reasonably think that an aggressive move into Thessaly, especially one 
that threatened Demetrias, would induce Philip to fight for several reasons.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Hammond 1988, p66, n13 assigns Flamininus' army here 32,000 men. Hammond 1988, p66 and Briscoe 
1973, pp253-4 each summarizes the question and its bibliography. For further discussion, see Kromayer 
1907, p103n3; Pritchett 1969, p135; Walbank 1940, p167; Walbank 1967, p585. 
361 For further discussion, see Dobson 2008, pp51-52 
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 First, Livy reports that at the conference at the Aous control of Thessaly was the 
point over which Philip broke off negotiations and at the conference at Nicaia Phthiotic 
Thebes was the city over which Philip would not negotiate. However, we should rely on 
the content of these conferences that left no record, as reported by Livy and Polybius, 
only with great caution. The contents of these conferences could have been fabricated 
whole cloth by Polybius and Livy. The historians knew how Philip did later act, and the 
content of the conferences made it so Philip gave clues to the reader about what he would 
fight over. The conferences then do represent the reality of the importance of Thessaly to 
Philip, but the question remains whether Flamininus learned this at the conferences. 
 Second, that Philip, the Aetolians, and the Athamanians all responded to Philip's 
loss at the Aous by immediately campaigning in Thessaly indicated the importance of 
controlling Thessaly to all three parties. When half way across the Pindus, Philip could 
have turned north and taken the Grevena pass back to Macedon, but instead he went to 
Thessaly and his campaign there appeared to stake out the line he intended to defend.  
Additionally, Philip has demonstrated over the past twenty years that he was quick to 
defend his control of Thessaly from the Aetolians. 
 Third, within Thessaly, Demetrias was one of Philip's "three fetters" of Greece - 
the only three places Philip had said that he needed to hold to control all of Greece. These 
three fetters became part of the narrative in Polybius and Livy in the winter of 198/197 
BC on the senate floor in the speeches of the Roman allies against Philip (L.32.37.3-4; 
Plb.18.4-5). However, the Roman and allied naval campaigns of 200 BC and 199 BC had 
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demonstrated that Rome already understood the importance of Demetrias, Chalcis, and 
Corinth to Philip.362 
 If this first stage of the plan did not work, Flamininus planned to establish a camp 
just south of the Karadag ridge - along the line of Philip's trail of destruction through 
Thessaly after the Battle of the River Aous. Flamininus could then shut off Macedonian 
access to the lucrative harvest at the beginning of June, in about a month.363 This harvest 
was a source of food for Macedonian cities and a source of revenue for Macedon.364 
 The Thessalian economy worked in such a way that the cities each controlled a 
large hinterland of the most fertile agricultural land in Greece, e.g. the cities Philip 
destroyed in 198 BC each controlled significant tracts of agricultural land. A Roman 
camp just south of the Karadag range would control access to the grain from Hestiaeotis 
and Thessalitis from Macedon, as well as control the movement of grain from western 
Thessaly to Macedon, or perhaps more importantly, to Demetrias for movement by ship 
to Macedon or elsewhere for trade. This second stage would be intended to disrupt the 
Macedonian economy so much that Philip would be compelled to come down and fight. 
 The combination of the Roman senate dismissing the Macedonian envoys, the 
senate extending Flamininus' command to finish the war, and Flamininus' subsequent 
refusal of peace negotiations would have made clear to Philip that Flamininus would be 
waging war on Macedon in spring 197 BC. A war on Macedon could be reasonably 
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362 On the Roman naval campaigns of 200 BC and 199 BC, see Thiel 1946, pp 223-239. 
363 On timing of the harvest in ancient Greece, see Halstead 2014, pp71-77, esp. p73, "both cereals and 
pulses may be cut or grazed well before the seed fills and even in a vegetative state." Flamininus could 
have begun reaping as soon as he encamped in central Thessaly. 
364 Hatzopoulos 1996, pp 431-442; Graninger 2010, pp 318-324. 
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move on Larisa, the strongest city in Pelasgiotis and a suitable bridgehead from which to 
base an invasion of Macedon. The route of such an invasion would have followed the 
central north-south route across Thessaly: [Figure 4.4] the extant road network from 
Xyniae north past Macedonian-controlled Pharsalus to Larisa.365 This would have been 
the most efficient route to get from Flamininus' winter quarters at Elatia deep into 
Thessaly to mount an invasion on Macedon. This is the route, for example, that Paullus 
took in 168 BC from Anticyra to get to the Roman army as fast as possible before 
launching his invasion of Macedon.366 
 [Figure 4.12] But instead of moving towards Macedon, in what was surely seen 
as a surprise move by Philip, Flamininus marched NE cross-country via the Enipeus 
valley and appeared at the walls of Phthiotic Thebes (L.33.5.1). Phthiotic Thebes was a 
Macedonian controlled city (Plb.18.3.12), whose inhabitants, in fact, had been entirely 
replaced by Macedonian colonists in 217 BC (Plb.5.99.1 -5.100.8), located on the hill by 
the modern village of Mikrothives.367 Phthiotic Thebes offered a strategic point to 
threaten, or base an attack on, Demetrias, as well as to control the easternmost north-
south route across Thessaly. As such, Flamininus moving on Phthiotic Thebes could be 
expected to have a high chance of drawing Philip down from Macedon, allowing 
Flamininus to try to force a land battle with him. King Perseus similarly employed this 
tactic in 171 BC, but with the parties reversed, when he devastated the area around 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 Macedonia controlled Pharsala and Larisa at this time (Plb.18.3.12; L.32.35.11). On the road network of 
Thessaly, see Hammond 1988, passim, summarized in map fig. 1. On Greek roads and road networks more 
generally, see Pritchett 1980, pp 143-196, as well as pp197-288 on the routes of the Peutinger Table. 
366 This route is discussed later in this chapter.  
367 Phthiotic Thebes: Stalin 1924, esp. p171 w/plan, map; Leekley 1980, 155-6; Lauffer 1989, 434-5. 
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Pherae to try to draw out the Roman army that was near Larisa and force them to commit 
to a decisive land battle (L.42.56.8-9).   
 Flamininus took two days to march the roughly 60 km through flat valley from 
Xyniae to Phthiotic Thebes. Speed would have been of the essence to maintain the 
element of surprise, and his marching times should reflect that. The route through the 
Enipeus valley has no road network through it today, but not because it is impassable. 
Instead, the valley is currently actively cultivated agricultural land, and as is the way of 
agricultural land-poor areas, roads are minimized or go around the valuable agricultural 
areas. The urban survey at Kastro Kallithea has explored the road networks in this area 
through time and concluded that there was a viable ancient route that went northeast 
through the Enipeus valley from Xyniae. When the route reached the part of the valley 
just northwest of the settlement of Kastro Kallithea, there is evidence of three possible 
options: a route that ran due east indicated by the archaeological remains of a medieval 
road; a central route through the valley in a more southeast direction; and a more 
southern route that hugged a line of Aetolian-sympathizing forts, including Kastro 
Kallithea. All three routes continue northwest to Phthiotic Thebes. The southernmost 
route is the most likely one that Flamininus took, due to its protection by the fort 
system.368 
 My personal experience supports the idea that this cross-country route was a 
viable one for the Roman army. On February 20, 2014, I spoke with several men in a gas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 I thank Dr. Laura Surtees for extensive discussion of this system of routes and of the Kastro Kallithea 
project. For more on the Kastro Kallithea project, the Aetolian controlled system of forts in the area, and 
the regional route networks, see Chykerda, C. M., Haagsma, M., & Karapanou, S. (2014); Surtees, L., 
Karapanou, S., & Haagsma, M. (2014). 
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station in the village of Metallio near ancient Xyniae about the viability of travelling by 
bicycle to Thebes via the Enipeus valley. All agreed that this route was doable, i.e. the 
landscape would not obstruct the route, but that I would never be able to navigate the 
labyrinth of dirt roads the farmers had constructed. I took their advice and did not attempt 
the route, however Laura Surtees from the Kastro Kallithea Survey assures me that she 
and other members of the project have walked this route. 
 Livy reports that Flamininus had hoped for Phthiotic Thebes to be turned over to 
him by a certain city leader, but instead the city defended itself (L.33.5.1-3).  
  Let's return now to Philip. Philip was at Dion with his army when Flamininus left 
Elateia (L.33.3.5-6) and Livy reports that he was still there when he learned that 
Flamininus had left Elateia (L.33.3.11). At some point between when Flamininus left 
Elatia and arrived at Phthiotic Thebes, Philip led his army to Larisa, as Polybius reports 
that when Philip heard that the Romans were at Thebes, Philip led out his army from 
Larisa (Plb.18.19.3). That Philip waited at Larisa reinforces the idea that Philip did not 
anticipate Flamininus' move on Thebes, as Philip would then have moved to Demetrias 
immediately after he heard that Flamininus left winter quarters. 
 Livy reports that Flamininus, while at Phthiotic Thebes, learned that Philip was 
now somewhere in Thessaly (L.33.5.4). Incidentally, this is the moment where our 
surviving text of Polybius picks up the narrative (Plb.18.18.1). After reporting that 
Flamininus did not know where in Thessaly Philip was, Polybius supplies a substantial 
digression on the differences between Roman and Macedonian camp spikes (Plb.18.18.1-
18). This digression demarcates the beginning of Polybius' narrative of the battle of 
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Cynoscephalae, which then lasts until another substantial digression, this one on the 
differences between the Roman and Macedonian militaries, demarcates its end. For now, 
what matters is that Livy also follows his statement of Flamininus' ignorance of Philip's 
position in Thessaly with a slightly condensed version of Polybius' stake digression, then 
follows Polybius' order of events, thus indicating that he is following Polybius as his 
source here.369 As such, I will be following Polybius as my main source for the battle of 
Cynoscephalae.  
 [Figure 4.13] Flamininus now knew that he had effectively pulled Philip into 
Thessaly. In another surprise move, Flamininus promptly abandoned Phthiotic Thebes 
and "advanced slowly/by foot with his whole force and established his camp at a distance 
of about fifty stades from Pherae" (Plb.18.19.1; cp. L.33.6.1-2).370  
 Abandoning Phthiotic Thebes and moving towards Pherae would have been a 
surprising move to Philip for two reasons: First, Flamininus sustained his attack on this 
Macedonian controlled city that was strategically placed to both control an important 
north-south corridor as well as base a sustained attack on Demetrias for less time than it 
would have taken to even properly set up siege equipment. Second, instead of moving 
east towards Demetrias directly, Flamininus moved north towards the independent city of 
Pherae.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 That Livy followed Polybius for the following narrative, see Trankle 1977; Walbank 1967, ad loc., and 
Briscoe 2009. 
370 That Flamininus did not press the fight or prepare for a siege but instead quickly gave up on the venture, 
indicated that Thebes itself was not important to Flamininus for itself. 
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 Pherae lay just west of the modern town of Velestino, roughly 14km due north of 
Phthiotic Thebes.371 Livy consistently converts 8 Polybian stadia into one Roman mile, as 
he does here, converting "	  περὶ πεντήκοντα στάδια" to "sex ferme milia" (i.e., 50/8 = 
6.25).372 One Roman mile is 1480 meters,373 which indicates that Flamininus camped 
roughly 9km south of Pherae.374 
 For Flamininus to end up roughly 9km from Pherae would means that he only 
moved his army about 5km. Such a march would have given Flamininus virtually a full 
day to scout the region and place his camp in a position he considered advantageous, i.e. 
Flamininus had the time and opportunity to choose the location of a potential battle. 
Philip now expected to encounter Flamininus at Phthiotic Thebes, south of where 
Flamininus now was, and Flamininus has had the opportunity to choose the location for 
this surprise meeting. 
 Polybius reports that, while Flamininus moved his camp,  
Philip, at the same time, learning that the Romans encamped near Thebes, 
left Larisa with his whole army and set out, making the journey towards 
Thebes. When he was about thirty stades away, then having encamped 
there in good time, he ordered everyone to take care of their persons. 
 
Φίλιππος δὲ [καὶ] κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν πυνθανόµενος τοὺς Ῥωµαίους 
στρατοπεδεύειν περὶ τὰς Θήβας, ἐξάρας ἀπὸ τῆς Λαρίσης παντὶ τῷ 
στρατεύµατι προῆγε, ποιούµενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς Φεράς.ἀποσχὼν 
δὲ περὶ τριάκοντα στάδια, τότε µὲν αὐτοῦ καταστρατοπεδεύσας ἐν ὥρᾳ 
παρήγγειλε πᾶσι γίνεσθαι περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώµατος θεραπείαν  
(Plb.18.19.3-4; cp.L.33.6.3375) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Pherae: TIB p133, Leekley 1980, 157-8; Lauffer 1989, 700-702. 
372 See Leake 1839, p2, p2 fn2 for discussion, with examples, on for the consistency of Livy's and Strabo's 
understanding of the length of a Polybian stade. 
373 OCD, p943 "measures". 
374 Hammond 1988, p63 is in agreement on the distance but with no explanation. The Roman camp is still 
closer to Thebes than Pherae.  
375 Livy reports that Philip left Larisa the day after Flamininus left Thebes. Walbank sees this as a mistake 
by Livy (Walbank 1967, p574), while Briscoe sees it as intentional by Livy, or perhaps a mistake in the text 
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 From Larisa to Philip's new campsite roughly 6km north of Pherae was a journey 
of nearly 40km.376 This is an exceptionally long march for a single day, even if on flat 
ground - especially for a march into potentially hostile territory. While doable in a day, it 
would not have been possible to have completed such a march and then established camp 
with enough time left in the day that Polybius commented on it (ἐν ὥρᾳ) and specified 
how they filled it. While it is possible that they established camp at the end of one long 
day of marching and that Polybius mentioned Philip telling the men to get their bodies 
ready to focus the reader on the Macedonians' focus and preparation for battle rather than 
as a telling detail relating to the march itself, it seems more likely that the Macedonians 
took two days to make the march, which would have enabled them to establish camp in 
the afternoon on the second day. 
 The Roman and Macedonian camps were now about 25 km apart, with the 
Macedonian army encamped roughly 6km north of Pherae and the Roman army roughly 
9km south of Pherae. 
 Polybius reports that early the next morning, Flamininus sent out scouts to find 
where the enemy was camped, since he still only knew that Philip was somewhere in 
Thessaly (Plb.18.19.2; cp.L.33.6.2). At the same time, Philip sent out advance troops to 
"cross the hilly country above Pherae", while he led the rest of the army out of the camp 
(Plb.18.19.5; cp.L.33.6.4).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Polybius Livy was using (Briscoe 1973, p256). All agree, though, that Livy is using only Polybius as his 
source here. 
376 Livy reports that Philip encamped four miles north of Pherae, which is consistent with his previous 
conversion of 8 Polybian stades to the Roman mile (i.e., 30/8 = 3.75), in each case Livy rounds to the 
nearest whole number. Four Roman miles (4 x 1480m) is 5.9 km and 8 Polybian stades is 5.56 km. 
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 Philip was not scouting for where Flamininus was as Philip thought him to be at 
Thebes still.377 Instead, Philip was likely attempting to gain a surprise advantage over 
Flamininus by cutting southwest across the hills directly to the west of Pherae before 
turning east by Eretria and appearing behind where he thought Flamininus was camped at 
Phthiotic Thebes. This tactic would have cut off Flamininus' supply and escape routes to 
the south as well as served to get Philip's army into more open country which would 
benefit his phalanx tactics. This plan would also explain why Philip led all his men out of 
the camp, i.e. to cross the hills once the advance troops had determined the best route. 
 Polybius specifies that Flamininus and Philip sent out their advance troops "early 
in the morning," in each case using the same phrase "ὑπὸ τὴν ἑωθινὴν" (Plb.18.19.2, 
18.19.5). However this phrase indicates a time of the day earlier than one might think, as 
Philip after sending out the advance troops moved the rest of his forces at first dawn, "τῆς 
ἡµέρας διαφαινούσης". It follows that both armies sent out their advance troops in the 
dark, before the dawn. 
 Polybius reports: 
The advanced sections of both armies very nearly came into contact at the 
pass over the hills; for when they caught sight of each other in the 
darkness, they halted when already quite close and sent at once to inform 
their respective commanders of the fact and inquire what they should do. 
 
παρ' ὀλίγον µὲν οὖν ἦλθον ἀµφοτέρων οἱ προεξαπεσταλµένοι τοῦ 
συµπεσεῖν ἀλλήλοις περὶ τὰς ὑπερβολάς· προϊδόµενοι γὰρ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς 
ὑπὸ τὴν ὄρφνην ἐκ πάνυ βραχέος διαστήµατος ἐπέστησαν, καὶ ταχέως 
ἔπεµπον, ἀποδηλοῦντες ἀµφότεροι τοῖς ἡγεµόσι τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ 
πυνθανόµενοι τί δέον εἴη ποιεῖν. 
(Plb.18.19.6-7; cp.L33.6.4-5) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Contra Livy 33.6.3: Philip had not learned any new news about the Roman movements. If he had, he 
would not have changed his intended movements and returned to camp after just seeing some scouts.  
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 Scholars have interpreted this passage to mean that the advance troops searched 
all day from dawn to night and then found each other just a few km from the Macedonian 
camp.378 This would imply that the Roman scouts were unable to find the Macedonian 
camp in a day of searching and that the Macedonian army sat outside their camp waiting 
for their advance troops to return all day, both of which seem improbable. If, instead, we 
understand the darkness to be the morning darkness, then the Roman scouts promptly 
moved towards the north, from where they expected the Macedonians to come, and 
sought out high ground to better view the landscape - both sound strategic moves. The 
Macedonian advance troops had quickly found the pass and were determining the best 
route. The main body of the army was outside of the camp because they were expecting 
to soon follow.  
 Both advance forces sent back for instruction, and both were told to retire to their 
respective camps (Plb.18.19.8; L.33.6.6). Neither scouting party had to opportunity to 
learn where the other was camped. 
 Polybius reports that the next day both commanders sent out 300 each of cavalry 
and infantry who then met on the north side of Pherae for an inconclusive skirmish before 
retiring back to their respective camps (Plb.18.19.9-12; cp.L.33.6.6) As the skirmish was 
north of Pherae, the Roman advance troops had travelled further from their camp than the 
Macedonian advance troops had; the Romans were aggressively looking for the enemy 
camp. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Paton 2006 (1926) translates "ὑπὸ τὴν ὄρφνην" as "in the early dusk"; Walbank 1967, p575: ""'in the 
darkness'; Paton's 'early dusk' is wrong." Walbank seems to imply a time later in the evening than Paton's. 
Hammond 1988, p63 combines both this day's skirmish with the next day's into one event. 
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 Polybius reports that on the next day both armies left the area due to mutual 
dissatisfaction with the terrain (Plb.18.20.1; cp.L.33.7.7-8). 
 However, while Philip had reason for dissatisfaction with this terrain, Flamininus 
had reason to want a conflict here. Flamininus had had time to explore his options and 
choose where he wanted his camp and his future encounter with Philip to happen, and he 
chose this location to intercept Philip's expected march to relieve Phthiotic Thebes. 
Flamininus had demonstrated his willingness to use his allies' knowledge of local 
topography to his strategic advantage: in 198 BC, he relied on local allied shepherds for 
his surrounding tactic at the Battle of the River Aous, on Epirote and Athamanian guides 
for his repeated crossings of the Pindus, on what were presumably Aetolian advisors for 
his very efficient Phokian campaign; in 197 BC he had repeatedly demonstrated use of 
scouts, "including Aetolians owing to their acquaintance with the area" (Plb.18.19.2, 9). 
It follows that Flamininus would have also taken advantage of these resources when he 
was planning the strategic location for this campsite.379 Additionally, terrain in general is 
less likely to have been an issue for Flamininus, as a later passage in Polybius says that 
the Roman maniple system is adaptable to all terrains (Plb.18.32.10-11).  
 On the other hand, the Macedonian Phalanx can only succeed on one terrain - flat 
and obstacle-free (Plb.18.31.2-7). The terrain that Polybius describes here, "all under 
cultivation and covered with walls and small gardens (Plb.18.19.1)" would be too rough 
for the phalanx as Polybius specifies that "the phalanx requires level and clear ground 
with obstacles such as ditches, clefts, clumps of trees, ridges and water courses, all of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 As well as when he was planning the general geographic and topographic details of this season's 
campaign at Heracleia and Xyniae. 
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which are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation (Plb.18.31.5-6)". 
Additionally, Philip had not encamped in a spot to hold and fight from, as the Romans 
had, but one from which he planned on moving the next day. It follows that it was only 
Philip who did not want to get caught in a major land battle here.  
 This helps explain Philip's next move, described by Polybius. 
Philip began to march towards Scotussa, hoping to procure supplies from 
that town and afterwards when fully furnished to find ground suitable for 
his own army. But Flamininus, suspecting Philip's purpose, put his army 
in motion at the same time as Philip with the object of destroying the grain 
in the territory of Scotussa before his adversary could get there. 
 
µὲν οὖν Φίλιππος ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Σκοτοῦσσαν, σπεύδων 
ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως ἐφοδιάσασθαι, µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα γενόµενος εὐτρεπὴς 
λαβεῖν τόπους ἁρµόζοντας ταῖς αὑτοῦ δυνάµεσιν· ὁ δὲ Τίτος ὑποπτεύσας 
τὸ µέλλον ἐκίνει τὴν δύναµιν ἅµα τῷ Φιλίππῳ, σπεύδων προκαταφθεῖραι 
τὸν ἐν τῇ Σκοτουσσαίᾳ σῖτον.  
(Plb.18.20.2-3) 
 
 Polybius says that Philip and Flamininus both headed west at the same time. 
However, this is unlikely. It makes sense for Philip to have left before Flamininus 
realized he was leaving in order to prevent his being attacked while on the move, 
especially on terrain he believed to be disadvantageous. Additionally, as Hammond has 
pointed out, if Flamininus were to leave the area at the same moment as Philip, Philip 
could cut back and get to Demetrias.380 If the threat to Demetrias had indeed pulled Philip 
into Thessaly, this could potentially eliminate any need for him to fight with Flamininus. 
If Philip got to Demetrias, it would certainly change the method of fighting and relevant 
tactics, in part by removing Flamininus' advantage gained by his initial surprise move, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Hammond 1988, p63. Hammond's reason is that if Flamininus had moved at dawn, irrespective of 
Philip's move, Philip could have proceeded to Demetrias. 
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and would put Flamininus into a position of having to react to Philip. Thus, it is 
extremely probable that Philip left before Flamininus, and that Flamininus did not leave 
until Philip had at least a half-day's start.381  
 We also learn from Polybius that Philip had a two-stage plan: First, "to procure 
supplies from Scotussa"; and second, "when fully furnished to find ground suitable for 
his own army". This means that Philip also wanted a land battle instead of waiting out the 
season, but a battle on terrain advantageous for the Macedonian phalanx. As discussed 
above, we know from Polybius that such terrain is flat, such as the Thessalian plain west 
of the central N-S route, in central Thessaly. Scotussa was located in the hills about 1km 
west of the modern village of Aghia Triada, east of the modern village of Skotoussa.382 It 
follows that Philip planned to first move northwest and then circle counterclockwise 
around Mt. Mavrovouni to get near enough to Scotussa to resupply, and then proceed 
west across the Karadag range into central Thessaly. Philip had previously gathered his 
forces at Scotussa in 207 BC before campaigning (L.28.5.12), indicating this to be 
familiar country for Philip and a logical place to move his army. 
 Polybius specifies that Flamininus, for his part, planned to destroy the grain in the 
territory of Scotussa. There is little arable land around Scotussa and what is there is not 
very productive. Scotussa would instead be getting supplied from the exceptionally fertile 
grain lands to the west, in central Thessaly. Flamininus should then be heading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 Perhaps the compression of events is due to Polybius maintaining his narrative framing device for this 
episode of paired simultaneous actions of Philip and Flamininus. 
382 Scotussa: Leake 1835 IV, pp 454-6; Stahlin 1924, esp, pp108ff, with plan, map; Misailidou-Despotidou 
1993; Decourt 1990, pp109-114, passim; Leekley 1980, p154; Lauffer 1989, p626. 
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somewhere on the southwestern side of the Karadag ridge to destroy or prevent access to 
grain for Scotussa.  
 Returning to Polybius:  
As there were high hills between the two armies in their march neither did 
the Romans perceive to where the Macedonians were marching nor the 
Macedonians the Romans. 
 
τῆς δ' ἑκατέρων πορείας µεταξὺ κειµένων ὄχθων ὑψηλῶν, οὔθ' οἱ Ῥωµαῖοι 
συνεώρων τοὺς Μακεδόνας, ποῖ ποιοῦνται τὴν πορείαν, οὔθ' οἱ 
Μακεδόνες τοὺς Ῥωµαίους. 
(Plb.18.20.4) 
 
 For this to be the case, the armies have to be on either side of a view-blocking 
hill. To get near Scotussa, Phillip must be heading west to the north of the Karadag ridge 
and then Flamininus is heading west to the south of the Karadag ridge.   
 But if Flamininus did not know where Philip was going, why was he trying to cut 
off the grain to specifically Scotussa? Flamininus might not have known where Philip 
was going, but Flamininus wanted to separate Philip from the grain supply from the 
Thessalian plain. A camp in central Thessaly in the area marked on the map would cut off 
the grain supply from the Thessalian plain for all Macedonian Thessaly, including for 
Scotussa. It is only coincidence that where Flamininus is going happens to be where 
Philip is also going.  
 In fact, Philip's movement north from his camp by Pherae, from Flamininus' 
perspective, could have indicated that Philip was going back to Larisa. Philip would have 
then demonstrated that he could quickly get to Pherae/Phthiotic Thebes/Demetrias, and 
then returned to his base of operations. In this situation, Flamininus, understanding that 
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Philip was returning to Larisa, was moving to central Thessaly to try the second stage of 
his plan as outlined earlier to draw Philip back down to commit to a decisive battle.  
 Polybius reports: 
After marching all that day, Flamininus having reached the place called 
Eretria in Phthiotis and Philip the river Onchestus, they both encamped in 
those spots, each ignorant of the position of the other's camp. 
  
ταύτην µὲν (οὖν) τὴν ἡµέραν ἑκάτεροι διανύσαντες, ὁ µὲν Τίτος ἐπὶ τὴν 
προσαγορευοµένην Ἐρέτριαν τῆς (Φθιώτιδος χώρας), ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐπὶ 
τὸν Ὀγχηστὸν ποταµόν, αὐτοῦ κατέζευξαν, ἀγνοοῦντες ἀµφότεροι τὰς 
ἀλλήλων παρεµβολάς 
(Plb.18.20.5) 
  
 [Figure 4.14] The ancient path of the river Onchestus, and thus Philip's camp, is 
uncertain.383 Philip's camp needs to be close enough to have been directly supplied by 
Scotussa, within one day's travel distance, in a well-watered area to supply his troops and 
horses, and potentially where the river Onchestus was. The location of the modern village 
of Kalo Nero fits these requirements: it lies less than 7 km due north of Scotussa at the 
northern edge of the Karadag ridge, is a roughly 18 km march from Philip's camp, the 
modern name indicates the presence of good water, and is near enough to be within 
reason to all proposed locations of the Onchestus. 
 Flamininus encamped at Eretria, located on the ridge just southwest of the modern 
day village of Eretria.384 [Figure 4.15] Impressive remains of the curtain wall stand 
today, demonstrating this location's defensible position and clear view over the 
immediate landscape [Figure 4.16]. Eretria would be expected to be friendly to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Walbank 1967, p576; Kromayer 1907, p68; Pritchett 1969, pp 135-9; and Hammond 1988, pp 64, 64n9 
have all proposed courses for the ancient Onchestus. None are certain, and all are within reason for Philip's 
camp at Kalo Nero to have been near them. 
384 Eretria: Blum 1992, with maps, plans, drawings, and bibliography.  
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Roman army, as it was one of the cities Philip had sacked the previous year (L.32.13.9). 
Flamininus traveled 12 km, which his army could have traveled in half a day considering 
how flat this route is. And, this makes sense if he left half a day after Philip. 
 Polybius is again explicit that neither camp knows where the other is. As one can 
see on the map and I verified by autopsy, the part of the Karadag ridge between the two 
campsites indeed blocks the sightline between the two camps. 
 Polybius continues:  
Next day they again advanced and encamped, Philip at the place called 
Melambium in the territory of Scotussa and Flamininus at the Thetideum 
in that of Pharsalus, being still in ignorance of	  each others' whereabouts. 
 
τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ προελθόντες ἐστρατοπέδευσαν, Φίλιππος µὲν ἐπὶ τὸ 
Μελάµβιον προσαγορευόµενον τῆς Σκοτουσσαίας, Τίτος δὲ περὶ τὸ 
Θετίδειον τῆς Φαρσαλίας, ἀκµὴν ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλους.  
(Plb.18.20.6) 
 
 [Figure 4.17] First, let's look at Flamininus's encampment. Strabo reports that the 
Thetideum was "near the two Pharsaluses, the old and the new" (Strabo 9.5.6), meaning 
Pharsalus and Palaepharsalus. Pharsalus was located at modern Farsala.385 Although the 
location of Palaepharsalus is still disputed, J.D. Morgan convincingly argued that that 
Palaepharsalus was modern Krini [Figure 4.18], moving the location of Palaepharsalus 
further west than Kromayer, Pritchett, and Bequignon had placed it.386 Decourt has 
summarized all past arguments for Palaepharsalus, and argued that two issues disproved 
Morgan's placement: first, Krini was not on the route between Pharsalus and Larisa; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Pharsalus: Stahlin 1914; Stahlin 1924; Leekley 1980, pp150-1; Lauffer 1989, pp535-7. 
386 Morgan 1983, Pritchett 1969, p141 with discussion of the history of the question; Pritchett 1969, p115-
116 with discussion of bibliography. 
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second, the Thetideum was east of Pharsalus, so Palaeharsalus must be even further east 
rather than north.387 
 To defend his first point, Decourt says that "la route directe, approximativement 
la meme qu'aujourd'hui, par Kalkhiades, devait exister, car la distance est beaucoup plus 
courte, et la relief bien moins rude." However, autopsy and close examination of maps 
prove this incorrect as the two routes are less than 5km difference in length and both have 
to climb only over the Karadag ridge over an equivalent distance - with the highest point 
in Decourt's "much less harsh" route only about 20m lower than the other. 
 We know that a Thetideum was a sanctuary of Thetis, but we do not know what 
one looked like. Scholars have proposed locations for this Thetideum based on what they 
considered to be a distinctive feature of the landscape or concentration of pottery 
fragments.388 However, we have no description of this or any other Thetideum and cannot 
know what appearance it had - it might have been a spring or a grove of trees lost to the 
archaeological record. In fact, since the site was known in antiquity from its mention in 
Euripides' play Andromache (E.Andr.17-20), one can imagine in the 220+ years since 
Euripides' play something (perhaps something archaizing) having been built or even, say, 
a sign put up identifying an area as the Thetideum by locals to drive religious tourism.389 
Every reader of Pausanius understands the value of religious tourism to the ancients, and 
to the ancient economy. In sum, we have no idea what this Thetideum entailed, except for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 Decourt 1990, p219-220 
388 See Pritchett 1969, pp 114-117 with bibliography on the history of the question. Decourt 1990, p218 
follows Pritchett. 
389 See Russell 2012 on ancient religious tourism in the second century BC. 
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Strabo's report that it was near the two Pharsaluses. Discounting both of Decourt's 
objections leaves no objections to Morgan's placement for Palaepharsalus. 
 Hammond, following Morgan's placement of Palaepharsalus, proposed a location 
near the two Pharsaluses as the site for the Roman camp.390 He placed the camp at the 
modern village of Zoodochos Pigi based on its water source and an outcrop that he 
suggested was the Thetideum. [Figure 4.19] However, there is no evidence that this 
outcrop is the Thetideum or that a Theitideum would involve an outcrop. Hammond 
theorized that a water source would be an essential component for a shrine to Thetis, 
since Euripides called her "Thetis of the sea".391 The idea of a "remarkable source of 
water" being part of a shrine to Thetis is intriguing, but perhaps more important is the 
need for a water source for a camp for 26,000 men with their horses and elephants, 
especially if one might be staying at this location for an extended period of time, i.e. until 
Philip can be drawn into battle.392 
 With the outcrop put aside, the only reason Hammond specifically chose 
Zoodochos Pigi as the campsite was because it has a water source. However, in the area 
that can reasonably be called "near the two Pharsaluses" there are a whole cluster of 
villages with modern names reflecting the fact that they have access to water sources 
besides Zoodochos Pigi (life-giving spring): the aforementioned Krini (spring), Dendraki 
(little trees), Mega Evidrio (Big Good-Water), Mikro Evidrio (Little Good-Water), and 
Polyneri (Much-Water). In fact, Zoodichos Pigi is the only one of these names that might 
not indicate the presence of a spring, as the name can have a religious meaning beyond its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Hammond 1988, pp 66-7. 
391 Hammond 1988, p67. 
392 For Roman military water requirements, see Roth 2012, pp 119-123. 
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practical one: it is a name, and common iconographical image, for the Virgin Mary in the 
Greek Orthodox Church. 
 With the presence of a water source near the two Pharsaluses being the criteria for 
placing the camp, any of these other sites could suffice. To supply 26,000 troops with 
water it makes more sense for the camp to have been placed in the midst of several water 
sources rather than relying on just one. Placing the camp west of Zoodochos Pigi puts the 
camps near the two Pharsaluses and close to many water sources that fulfill the practical 
requirements.393  
 Following Polybius' detailed description of a Republican military camp 
(Plb.6.27.1 - 6.31.14), we know that the camp must have been about 775 meters by 775 
meters, and this flat area where the camp is marked on the map is large enough to 
accommodate the camp.394 This high concentration of water sources, paired with access 
to grain-land and a resupply route from allied Aetolia to the south (including Xyniae and 
the Roman base at Anticyra), makes this an ideal place for a camp. The Roman army 
could have covered the 30km from Eretria in a day's march and a camp here prevents 
Macedonian access to the fertile Thessalian plain. [Figure 4.20] 
 We have no archaeological evidence for Philip's camp "at the place called 
Melambium". Hammond suggested the modern town of Chalkiades for the location of 
Philip's camp.395 [Figure 4.21] I find Hammond's proposal convincing because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 If Hammond is correct and the Thetideum did require a spring, then this location fulfills the religious 
requirements as well. 
394 For detailed exegesis of Plb.6.27.1 - 6.31.14, see Walbank 1957, pp709-716; Dobson 2008, pp67-72. 
See Dobson 2008 for the relationship of this passage to archaeological evidence for Republican Roman 
military camps. 
395 Hammond 1988, p65 
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Chalkiades is less than 12km from Scotussa, making it qualify as "Melambium in the 
territory of Scotussa" and because it seems to be the best well watered location between 
Philip's previous camp and the flat plain towards which Philip is aiming. Philip would 
have travelled roughly 12km from Kalo Nero, and a half day's march seems reasonable if 
Philip had spent the morning preparing supplies from Scotussa.  
 Although it might not appear so on a map, autopsy demonstrates that it is indeed 
hilly enough that you could not see an army on the other side of the ridge between the 
camps nor when both armies were en route. 
 Polybius reports that in the night were violent rain and thunder storms and "at 
early dawn all the mist from the clouds descended on the earth, so that owing to the 
darkness that prevailed one could not see even people who were close at hand" 
(Plb.18.20.7). 
 This fog could be reasonably read as a literary device of Polybius, not reflecting 
reality, with the fog perhaps showing divine disfavor for the Macedonians, or perhaps a 
Polybian predecessor to Clausewitz's now proverbial "fog of war". However, thick fog is 
a regular occurrence in Thessaly. I was in Thessaly in mid-October 2013 and it rained all 
night and in the morning thick fog indeed descended on the earth. In early March 2014 
Morgan Condell witnessed this fog on the highway between between Pharsala and Larisa 
in the direct vicinity of where the battle of Cynescephalae occurred. In both cases, the fog 
was so thick that vision was greatly limited, just as Polybius describes. While these 
events were in October and March, and the fog in question in 197 BC was in May, in 
each case I asked many Thessalian natives about this fog and all agreed that this thick fog 
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was a normative occurrence after rain all year long, including May, and that the fog can 
be much worse than what I witnessed. 
 Returning to Polybius:  
Philip, being in a hurry to effect his purpose, broke up his camp and 
advanced with his whole army, but finding it difficult to march owing to 
the mist, after having made but little progress, he encamped his army in a 
palisaded camp and sent off his covering force with orders to occupy the 
summits of the hills which lay between him and the enemy. Flamininus 
lay still encamped near the Thetideum. 
 
οὐ µὴν ἀλλ' ὅ γε Φίλιππος κατανύσαι σπεύδων ἐπὶ τὸ προκείµενον, 
ἀναζεύξας προῄει µετὰ πάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς. δυσχρηστούµενος δὲ κατὰ 
τὴν πορείαν διὰ τὴν ὀµίχλην, βραχὺν τόπον διανύσας τὴν µὲν δύναµιν εἰς 
χάρακα παρενέβαλε, τὴν δ' ἐφεδρείαν ἀπέστειλε, συντάξας ἐπὶ τοὺς 
ἄκρους ἐπιβαλεῖν τῶν µεταξὺ κειµένων βουνῶν. Ὁ δὲ Τίτος 
στρατοπεδεύων περὶ τὸ Θετίδειον 
(Plb.18.20.8 - 18.21.1) 
 
 Since Polybius was explicit that Philip did not know where the Roman army was 
(Plb.18.20.6), [Figure 4.22] Philip's march must have kept the Keradag ridge between the 
armies, and thus Philip must have been continuing northwest before he stopped. Polybius' 
report of Philip's command "to occupy the summits of the hills which lay between him 
and the enemy" helps the reader understand the armies' relationship to the topography 
rather than indicating that Philip knew where the enemy was. 
 Flamininus, in contrast, did not attempt to move from his camp, and no mention is 
made that the weather influenced this decision. Not moving made sense if Flamininus 
was where he wanted to be because his location was strategically and intentionally 
chosen. 
 Let's step back briefly before the battle. Flamininus was able to begin the 
campaign season by drawing Philip into east Thessaly. Philip avoided a battle near 
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Pherae on terrain unfavorable for his phalanx and headed west towards land favorable for 
his phalanx. Flamininus also headed west, his aim being to block Philip's access to the 
grain from the Thessalian plain, wherever Philip might be - and Polybius is explicit that 
Philip and Flamininus have been completely ignorant of each other's whereabouts or 
movements from the moment they left their camps by Pherae. 
 And at this moment in the narrative, the Roman and Macedonian armies, each 
ignorant of the other's presence, were encamped only a few kilometers from each other 
on either side of the Karadag ridge. [Figure 4.23] As Philip established the new camp 
and sent out his covering force, his ignorance of the proximity of the Roman army was 
further shown by the fact that he sent out a significant portion of his army to forage 
(Plb.18.22.1). Polybius reports the number of men sent to forage as "most of the men in 
the camp" -- πλείους ἐκ τῆς παρεµβολῆς (Plb.18.22.1), although Philip was later able to 
then draw up "the majority of the army" -- τὸ πλέον µέρος ἤδη τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάµεως 
(Plb.18.24.1), at a time when "the majority of the phalangites" -- τῶν πλείστων µερῶν τῆς 
φάλαγγος (Plb.18.24.7) were still not ready for action. Although Polybius' numbers are 
not precise, it seems safe to assign half of Philip's 16,000 phalangites to this foraging 
expedition. Flamininus simultaneously sent out roughly 300 cavalry and 1000 light-
armed infantry to scout the ridge to the north of his camp (Plb.18.21.1).396 
 [Figure 4.24] These Macedonian and Roman advance forces encountered each 
other in the hills unexpectedly (Plb.18.21.2), as they had four days earlier near Pherae, 
and sent messengers back to their commanders (Plb.18.21.3), again as they had by 
Pherae. In contrast to that earlier event, though, these advance forces then fought: the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 For the numbers of men, see Walbank 1967, p575, 580; Dobson 2008, p50. 
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Macedonians drove the Romans from the ridge down to the plain (Plb.18.21.4, 18.22.6). 
Then, Flamininus sent 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry reinforcements (making for a total 
of 800 cavalry and 3000 infantry now involved) who turned the tide and pushed the 
Macedonians back up the hill (Plb.18.21.5-8). After which Philip, "as the mist began to 
clear," sent significant reinforcements of his own who drove the Romans back down from 
the ridge and almost to the plain (Plb.18.22.2-6).  
 As the Roman camp was at roughly 120m elevation on the plain and the 
Macedonian camp was at roughly 250m elevation, the ridge between the camps at 
roughly 350m elevation was high enough to obscure the two camps from each other. This 
area of the ridge marked on the map would have given a scouting force the best view of 
the area. The Roman retreat would have been down the gentle slope towards their camp. 
 Polybius reports that Flamininus then "led out all his forces and drew them up in 
order of battle close to the hills" (Plb.18.22.7), and Philip "ordered his army to be led out 
of the palisaded camp" (Plb.18.22.10). The Romans losing the skirmish independently 
prompted both Flamininus and Philip to commit all their troops. 
 Importantly, though, many of Philip's troops are not in the camp but out foraging. 
[Figure 4.25] Philip ordered a man nicknamed "The Elephant" to assemble these troops, 
including the entire left wing of the phalanx, and advance as soon as they were able 
(Plb.18.24.2). Flamininus, on the other hand, ordered the right wing of his infantry and 
his actual elephants to stay put (Plb.18.23.7).  
 [Figure 4.26] Polybius reports that Flamininus then absorbed his retreating 
advance troops into his maniples (Plb.18.23.1, 18.24.10), advanced with the Roman left 
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wing (Plb.18.23.7-8), and began driving the Macedonian advance troops back up the 
ridge (Plb.18.23.8, 18.24.4-5). Meanwhile, Philip led the right wing of the phalanx and 
the peltasts (Plb.18.24.1) up the ridge between the camps (Plb.18.24.1), and "when the 
leading ranks reached the top of the pass, he wheeled to the left, and occupied the 
summits above it" (Plb.18.24.3). 
 The Romans drove the Macedonian advance forces back up the hill to where 
Philip was, and Philip received them and placed them "towards the right wing" -- ἐπὶ τὸ 
δεξιὸν κέρας (Plb.18.24.8). Philip placed them on the right of his phalanx.397 [Figure 
4.27] Polybius reports that, at this point, Philip made a curious tactical decision: 
Philip ordered the peltasts and the phalangites to double their depth and 
tighten up on the right.  
 
τοῖς δὲ πελτασταῖς καὶ τοῖς φαλαγγίταις παρήγγελλε διπλασιάζειν τὸ 
βάθος καὶ πυκνοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιόν. 
(Plb.18.24.8) 
 
 This tactic has confused scholars. Walbank argued that this meant that "they were 
to change from a marching depth of eight men to the battle line of sixteen men .... to 
reduce the space occupied by each man from 6ft to 3 ft."398 However, Philip, when he 
climbed to the top of the ridge, had already "drawn the phalanx up in battle order from 
the left" (Plb.18.24.3).399 [Figure 4.28] This means that Philip already drew up his men 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 For standard Macedonian placement of light-armed troops and allies to the sides of the phalanx, see 
Sekunda 2013, pp 88-126. 
398 Walbank 1967, p582; Kromayer 1907, p81n1. Polybius reports that the normative phalanx was 16 men 
deep (Plb.18.30.1) and each soldier took up 3 feet of space (Plb.18.29.2). 
399 LSJ translates παρεµβάλλω as "draw up in battle order" in Polybian usage. Walbank 1969, p582 
translates this phrase "formed them into line from the left." There is an important contrast here with Philip's 
left wing, which never changed from marching formation into 16 man deep phalanx formation after it 
climbed the ridge (Plb.18.25.6). 
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from marching depth into the 16 man deep battle formation and can't do it again. Instead, 
we should understand that Philip here doubled the depth from 16 men to 32 men.  
 Hammond has argued that Philip here drew up his phalanx 32 men deep, but his 
reasoning is confusing: Hammond says that the 32 man deep phalanx "gave an additional 
impetus at the moment of impact."400 However, Hammond bases this assertion on 
Polybius' claim that the Macedonian phalanx derives its superior impetus at impact over 
Roman forces from the 16 man deep phalanx. If the 16 man deep formation was already 
superior to the Roman army, a 32 man deep phalanx against a Roman army would be 
unnecessary.  
 Additionally, Hammond confuses his argument by saying that "in making his 
analysis of the Macedonian phalanx Polybius was thinking not of this battle 
[Cynoscephalae] but of the battle of Pydna, when the two battle-lines did engage in an 
orthodox manner."401 Hammond's evidence for Macedonian tactics at Pydna is not from 
Polybius (whose description of Pydna is lost) or even Livy (whose narrative of Pydna 
was derived from Polybius)402 but from Frontinus, who said only that Perseus drew up his 
troops in a phalangem duplicem (Frontinus Strat. 2.3.20).403 It is not clear what this 
phalangem duplicem was. Rather than double-deep it was probably double-tight, as this 
was a tactic Antigonus used at the battle of Sellasia when he turned the tide of the see-
saw battle by packing his phalanx double-tight for the decisive push (Plb.2.69.7-9).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Hammond 1988, p74 n28. 
401 Hammond 1988, p74 n28.  
402 Briscoe 2012, pp 2, 537. 
403 Hammond 1984, p42.  
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 In sum, Polybius says that a 16 man deep phalanx had a stronger force at impact 
than the Roman maniple system and that a 16 man deep phalanx with the men packed 
twice as close together has a stronger force at impact than a standard 16 man deep 
phalanx. Polybius does not say anything about the merits of a double-deep phalanx, and 
we have no other attestations of a double-deep phalanx. 
 So where does that leave us? Polybius reports that Philip drew up his men into a 
16 man deep phalanx when he got to the ridge, and then drew them into a 32 man deep 
phalanx after he received his retreating advance forces. However, we still need a reason 
why Philip's doubling up of the phalanx makes sense, other than fulfilling the narrative 
role of making it easier to defeat his phalanx later - i.e. there must be a strategic reason 
for this maneuver. 
 Adapting to the landscape, especially in light of the importance of the landscape 
to Polybius' discussion of the phalanx, is a plausible strategic reason. Polybius makes 
clear that generally the more level the terrain, the more successful the phalanx will be 
(Plb.18.29.1, 18.31.2-6, 18.31.11) and that specifically in this case Philip had anxieties 
about fighting on the terrain on in the vicinity of the ridge between the two camps 
(Plb.18.22.9-10). Additionally, Polybius tells us that a phalanx cannot move laterally, the 
hedge of long spears that is the phalanx's strength prevents it from any movement besides 
straight ahead. It follows that Philip doubled up his line to avoid having to march over 
this hill marked on the map but instead to go in a straight line to the east of it.  
 Philip had one wing of his phalanx and all his peltasts with him on the top of the 
ridge, roughly 8000 phalangites and 2000 peltasts. Polybius's discussion of the 
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Macedonian phalanx (Plb.18.29-30) supplies a guide to determine the size of Philip's 
phalanx: 10,000 soldiers drawn up 16 men deep would be 625 men across, with each man 
taking up three feet in breadth. When describing the Roman camp in book 6, Polybius's 
'foot' indicated a Hellenistic foot of length .355m, and I understand Polybius' foot to be 
the same length here.404  625 men each requiring three Polybian feet would be 665.6 
meters across (= 3x.355x625). If each man took up roughly three Polybian feet front to 
back as well, then the 16 man deep phalanx would be 17 meters deep. Once Philip then 
doubled their depth, his phalanx became 312 men across and 32 men deep, making for a 
phalanx 332.3 meters across and 34 meters deep. An unspecified number of advance 
cavalry and light armed troops, but likely less than 4000 and perhaps significantly less so, 
were packed as close as possible to the right of the phalanx.405 However, as these were 
light-armed troops and cavalry, even packed closely we should expect them to be further 
apart from each other than the phalanx (3 feet per man) and perhaps even the maniple (6 
feet per man) due to the nature of their weapons and horses. These men would then 
extend 265 - 310 meters to the right of the phalanx ((maximum 4000 men / 32 men deep) 
x (6-7 feet per man X .355 m per foot). 
 [Figure 4.29] Polybius reports that the Macedonian right wing charged into the 
advancing Roman left wing (Plb.18.24.9-10), and started pushing them back down the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Dobson 2008, p71. See Leake 1839 for the consistency of measurements in Polybius. 
405 Following Livy's numbers allows us to make an estimate. During the preliminary skirmish Philip 
committed "all the mercenaries except those from Thrace" and the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry 
units, which implies a high percentage but not all of the cavalry (Plb.18.22.2). Philip had 3500 mercenaries 
that were not Thracian and 2000 total cavalry. Flamininus had turned the tide by sending 500 cavalry and 
2000 infantry (Plb.18.21.6), so Philip's larger numbers, but numbers within the same skirmish ballpark, 
seem within the range of probability. Taking into account deaths and wounds in the losing skirmish, 4000 
men seems a plausible maximum. It could be significantly less if many of these were out foraging. 
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slope (Plb.18.25.2, 18.25.4).406 However, the Macedonian light-armed troops, stationed to 
the right of the phalanx, did not advance as far as the phalanx did (Plb.18.25.3). 
 [Figure 4.30] The doubled-up phalanx thus avoided the hill and pushed back the 
Roman line. The light armed troops climbed the hill to the right of the phalanx in order to 
shoot missiles down at the Roman infantry during the phalanx charge - a strategically 
sound maneuver - and stayed on the hill as the phalanx pushed the Roman left beyond the 
hill towards the plain. 
 [Figure 4.31] The Macedonian left wing now arrived at the top of the ridge and 
stopped (Plb.18.25.3, 5). Flamininus at this point sent the Roman right wing and 
elephants, from where they had been waiting, up the hill towards the Macedonian left 
(Plb.18.25.5). Polybius gives two accounts of what then happened to the Macedonian left. 
In the first account, the Macedonian left fled before the Roman right finished climbing 
the hill (Plb.18.25.7). In the second account, the Macedonian left were nearly all killed 
when they tried to surrender (Plb.18.26.9-12). 
 [Figure 4.32] Polybius reports, and this could apply to either situation with the 
Macedonian left, that while most of the Roman right chased toward the Macedonian left 
(Plb.18.26.1), a Roman Tribune from the Roman right with "not more than twenty 
maniples", i.e. not more than 2400 men,407 saw the Roman left in trouble and swung 
around behind the advancing Macedonian right (Plb.18.26.2-3). He got behind 10,000 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 The Roman maniples were more flexible in arrangement and thus harder to predict the size of - but since 
no author makes issue during the battle of outflanking by the heavy infantry - I take each wing of the 
Roman army to be roughly the same width. For logistics of the Roman maniple system, see Livy 37.39.7-
13; Plb.18.29.5-8, 18.30.5-11, 18.32.2, 18.32.10-11. 
407 See Dobson 2008, p48 for the size of a maniple and for Polybius' terminology for the Roman maniple. 
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men in a rectangle 32 people deep who were all unable to turn around (Plb.18.26.4-5). It 
was a slaughter, with the surviving Macedonians fleeing (Plb.18.26.5). 
 Polybius reports a great disparity in casualties (Plb.18.27.6), which accords with 
his description of events: the Romans lost about 700 men, and presumably the majority of 
these were lost when the Macedonian right was successfully pushing back the Roman 
left. The Macedonians lost about 8000 men with at least 5000 captured, with the 
Macedonian right presumably almost completely killed or captured once it was attacked 
from behind and most of the remainder coming from the broken Macedonian left.  
 Philip escaped from the Macedonian right a short distance from the action and 
watched the end of the battle (Plb.18.26.7). Since the Romans were to Philip's east, it 
follows that Philip escaped to the west, and this elevated ground marked on the map 
would have offered a fitting place to survey the scene. Philip then fled north, spending 
the night at a place called "Alexander's Tower" before waiting at Gonnoi to gather the 
troops and return to Macedon via the Vale of Tempe (Plb.18.27.1-2).408 
 Gonnoi, at the mouth of Tempe, was nearly 70 km from the battle.409 Philip would 
have wanted to as far as possible the first day because he did not want the Romans to 
overtake him during his flight. Presumably Alexander's Tower was a natural feature of 
the hills not a man-made tower.410 The hills to the west and northwest of Larisa offer a 
likely place for such a feature and Philip probably camped there the night of the battle. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 There are distinct similarities to Philip's behavior after the Battle of the River Aous: the immediate 
retreat before the losses are total, Philip's waiting for the men to gather, Philip's stopping at a place named 
for a Hellenistic general/king, Philip's safe return to Macedon. 
409 Gonnoi: Helly 1973. 
410 Philip had similarly stopped at an area called Pyrrhus' Camp, not thought to have contained an actual 
camp of Pyrrhus, on his retreat after the Aous (L.32.13.2). Alexander's Tower is otherwise unattested 
(Walbank 1967, p584), and Livy did not include it in his narrative of Philip's flight to Gonni (L.32.10.6). 
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Philip and the men with him would have been on horseback and could have covered this 
roughly 35 km after the battle. Philip then probably waited at Gonnoi for a couple of 
nights for his men to make the 70 km walk. 
  Polybius reports that, in the immediate aftermath of the battle, tensions arose 
between the Romans and the Aetolians over who was responsible for the victory and who 
should receive what plunder (Plb.18.27.4). In terms of the larger narrative, this was the 
beginning of the split of the Roman/Aetolian alliance that culminated in the Syrian-
Aetolian War. 
 The troop movements that led to the battle of Cynoscephalae resulted, in essence, 
from two generals repeatedly trying to outmaneuver the other while relying on poor 
intelligence: Flamininus made a surprise cross-country march from Xyniae to Phthiotic 
Thebes. This drew Philip from Larisa towards Thebes. While Philip was en route, 
Flamininus moved north to place himself in Philip's path. Neither knew where the other 
was at this moment and their scouts stumbled upon each other. Philip moved west, but 
gave the impression of returning north to Larisa. Flamininus then moved west. As a 
result, Philip thought Flamininus was by Pherae, and Flamininus thought Philip was by 
Larisa. Both generals were putting plans into action based on false intelligence when their 
scouts again stumbled upon each other (which this time escalated into the battle). Both 
generals took action to draw the other into a battle on terms they considered 
advantageous, but based their plans on faulty intelligence. As a result, the armies 
stumbled into a battle. 
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 Scholars have proposed alternate locations. [Figure 4.33] These are based on 
their interpretations in which they differ from me, and from each other, on the locations 
of Palaepharsalus and the Thetideum, as well as in their understanding of Polybius, and 
the logistical requirements of an army on the march.411  
 Polybius marks the end of his Cynoscephalae narrative two ways: first by saying 
"Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae between the Romans and Philip" 
(Plb.18.28.1) and then, directly following this statement, by giving a lengthy discourse on 
the differences between the Roman maniple and the Macedonian phalanx (Plb.18.28.1 - 
18.32.13). This discourse should be seen as paired with Polybius' discourse on the 
difference between Roman and Macedonian camp stakes, with these two discourses 
working together to demarcate the beginning and end of Polybius' Cynoscephalae 
narrative.412  
 There is a potentially troubling relationship between Polybius' discourse after the 
battle and his narrative of the battle itself. In his discourse after the battle, Polybius says 
that the phalanx will lose to the Romans in the following situations, in order: if the 
ground is not suitably flat and devoid of obstacles; if the phalanx attacks with less than its 
total force at once; and if the Romans initially attack with less than their total force and 
then employ these reserved troops once the phalanx has exposed its flank or rear, such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Kromayer 1907; Stahlin 1924; Pritchett 1969; Hammond 1988. Each has bibliography and critique of 
previous scholarship. 
412 These two discourses are incompatable on a fundamental level as the first discourse says that Romans 
have a better system than the Macedonians because it is such a rigid system, and the second discourse says 
that the Romans have a better system than the Macedonians because it is so much more adaptable. Further 
analysis of the relationship between these two discourses is beyond the scope of this paper, but relevant to a 
separate analysis of Livy's critique of Polybius.  
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by pursuing a retreating enemy. Finally, the phalanx can only operate as a wing-sized 
mass while the Romans can work independently as smaller units.413 
 Rather than a conceptual discussion of Roman and Macedonian fighting systems, 
this could be read as a discussion of the specific circumstances that led to Philip's defeat 
at Cynoscephalae: Polybius specified, in order, that the ground was too rough for the 
phalanx (Plb.18.22.9-10), Philip initially attacked with only roughly half his troops, 
Flamininus intentionally kept half his troops in reserve and then attacked with them once 
the Macedonian phalanx' right was pursuing the Roman retreating left, and a Roman 
tribune with a subdivision of the battle line was able to make a decisive tactical move in 
the battle. 
 If Polybius crafted his theoretical analysis to match his specific account, then 
there is no problem. The problem would be if Polybius shaped his narrative of the battle 
to match his theoretical analysis. This is an intractable problem, yet since Polybius' 
narrative aligns with the realities of the landscape, I feel confident trusting Polybius' 
account of the battle. 
 After the battle of Cynoscephalae, the Second Macedonian War was over and the 
Romans were able to dictate their peace terms to Philip (L.33.13.3-7; 33.30). At the 
Isthmian games of 196 BC, these peace terms were made public when Flamininus 
famously 'declared the freedom of the Greeks' (Plb.18.46.5; L.33.32.5, 33.34.6-7).414 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 L.44.41.6-9, in a passage so similar in tone to this Polybian passage that it must derive from Polybius, 
explains that the Romans won at Pydna only because their many independent smaller units could break up 
the unity of the Phalanx. The most telling Polybian detail is that Livy reports that the Romans would have 
lost had they attacked the phalanx head on en masse. 
414 Flamininus' declaration of the freedom of the Greeks can be seen as part of Flamininus' larger program 
of attempting to behave in Greece in a manner fitting for a Hellenistic king, based on the model initially 
established by Demetrius Poliorcetes. In addition to fighting for, and declaring, the freedom of the Greeks, 
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[Figure 4.34] Relevant to this chapter, this involved the Thessalians, Perrhaebians, 
Magnesians, Phthiotic Achaeans, and Dolopians were all declared to be "free, 
independent, and subject to their own laws."415   
 The Roman army then wintered at Elatia (L.33.27.5), and garrisoned the 'three 
fetters' - Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias - as well as Oreus and Eretria (L.33.31.3-4). 
The Romans maintained these positions through the next two years (L.34.48.2). In 194 
BC, Flamininus sent the army wintering at Elatia through Thessaly and the northern pass 
over the Pindus to Oricum (L.34.50.10), while he, himself, led the troops out of Corinth, 
Chalcis, Oreas, Eretria, and Demetrias, across Thessaly and the northern pass over the 
Pindus to Oricum as well (L.34.50.8, 34.51.1-4, 34.52.1). Flamininus then sent the entire 
Roman army back to Italy (L.34.52.2), and there were no longer any Roman soldiers in 
Greece. 
Part II: 191 BC - 190 BC 
 The Roman army next returned to Thessaly in 191 BC.416 Whereas the Romans 
previously had fought Philip in Thessaly, the Romans were now called into Thessaly by 
Philip to help him against the combined forces of the Aetolians and the Seleucid king 
Antiochus III. Philip alerted the Roman propraetor Marcus Baebius Tamphilus, who was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
other 'kingly' behaviors Flamininus exhibited between Cynoscephalae and 194 BC include: striking over 
100,000 gold coins directly modeled on Philip's coinage but with his image and name on them (see 
Thonemann 2015, pp169-170); receiving divine honors from cities (e.g. IG v.1, 1165); establishing a 
Roman precedent for giving the king-appropriate gift of golden crowns to Delos (IDelos 442); establishing 
government systems and lawcodes for cities (IG IX2 338 = SIG3 593 (see Armstrong and Walsh 1986); 
L.34.51.4-6). For the establishment of these behaviors as part of the program of kingly behavior in the 
Hellenistic world, see Thonemann 2016, pp49-68; Rose 2018 (forthcoming). 
415 The Phocians were initially freed, then annexed to the Aetolians. However, the Romans maintained 
winter quarters in Phocis for the next two years. 
416 Rome has had ambassadors, including Flamininus and Villius, involved in Greece, but no land army 
(L.35.34, 39). 
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stationed at Apollonia, that the Seleucid king Antiochus III was campaigning in Thessaly 
(L.36.8.6). Baebius, whom the senate had sent to Apollonia with 4-5,000 men the 
previous year in preparation for Antiochus potentially invading the west (L.35.20.11, 
35.24.7),417 agreed to meet Philip in Dassaretia (L.36.10.10), which was then the eastern 
boundary of Roman controlled territory due to their control of Pelium.418 After their 
conference, Baebius sent Appius Claudius with 2000 men east through Macedon and 
down into Thessaly via the Vale of Tempe to Gonnoi (L.36.10.10-11; App.Syr.16), and 
thus the Roman army returned to Thessaly. 
 In 192 BC, the Aetolians had invited Antiochus to come and liberate Greece from 
the Romans, even though there were currently no Roman troops in Greece (L.35.33.8). 
The Aetolians then took control of Demetrias (L.35.34.5-11), and Antiochus arrived there 
with 10,000 infantry (L.35.43.6-7). [Figure 4.34] Antiochus was joyously received at 
Phalara and Lamia, indicating Aetolian control of the Malian gulf and Malian plain 
(L.35.43.8-9).419 Antiochus then gained the Athamanians and Boiotians as allies (L. 
35.47.7-8, 36.6.5), before taking Chalcis by force, causing the rest of Euboea to capitulate 
(L.35.51.6-10).420 Antiochus now controlled the two fetters that related to control of 
Thessaly and central Greece, as well as the southern access to Thessaly. The Aetolians, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 It is unclear how many men Baebius brought with him due to confusion with the names in the 
manuscript tradition in Livy, as well as inconsistencies of numbers over the course of Livy's narrative of 
the war. See Briscoe 1981, pp175, 37-8 with bibliography on the issue. I follow Briscoe's number for 
Baebius' men. 
418 For Roman control of Pelium, as well as its geographically strategic role, see chapter 2 discussion.  
419 Phalara: Lauffer 1989, p533. 
420 A Roman force of 500 soldiers from their allied naval campaign tried to stop Antiochus' assault on 
Chalcis and was slaughtered at Delium (L.35.51.1-5). That these were soldiers from the naval campaign, 
see Briscoe 1981 p216 and Thiel 1946, p288.   
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Athamanians, and Antiochus met in late 192 BC in Demetrias to plan their upcoming 
campaign (L.36.6.6-10).  
 Livy supplies our fullest narrative for their 191 BC campaign, albeit not in the 
most straightforward manner. Livy gives an account of Antiochus' campaign followed by 
an account of the Roman reprisal campaign of the same year in which Livy reports that 
the Romans took back many cities that Livy had not mentioned in his account of 
Antiochus' campaign. Since all the cities of Thessaly were free before Antiochus' arrival, 
we can safely say that all the cities that the Romans attacked had recently been taken by 
Antiochus. Combining Livy's two narratives gives a fuller picture of Antiochus' 191 BC 
campaign [compare Figure 4.38 with Figure 4.39]. 
 In early 191 BC, the Aetolians, Athamanians, and Antiochus gathered their forces 
at Pherae (L.36.8.2, 36.9.1), and then managed to take Pherae by siege (L.36.9.12), as 
well as Scotussa (L.36.9.13) and Crannon (L.36.10.1) within ten days (L.36.10.1). 
[Figure 4.36] Antiochus' allied forces had moved west from Demetrias along the 
Karadag ridge, methodically taking the cities that controlled three of the four routes into 
Pelasgiotis across the Karadag ridge. Antiochus' campaign so far seemed to have been 
modeled on how Philip had attempted to control Thessaly in 198 BC: hold the fetters and 
control the Karadag ridge to secure the southern border of Pelasgiotis. Comparing 
Antiochus' campaign with Philip's 198 BC campaign [Figure 4.5] shows the similarities 
in their behaviors. Antiochus understood what cities were important to control movement 
across Thessaly. 
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 [Figure 4.38] Antiochus then moved further west and "took Cierium, Metropolis 
and the castella around them" (L.36.10.2). Antiochus had now moved through the fertile 
region of Thessaliotis, advancing all the way to the border with Dolopia. In 198 BC, the 
Aetolians were able to quickly take control of Dolopia, a region that had been under 
Aetolian control from at least 239 BC to 205 BC. Part of the way that the Aetolians took 
Dolopia in 198 BC was by securing key castella, to which Livy could be referring to 
here. Metropolis and Cierium resisted the Aetolians then, instead offering their surrender 
to the Romans. One can reasonably infer that Antiochus and the Aetolians retook control 
of Dolopia in 191 BC, and exhibited retribution worthy of note on the cities that had 
resisted them seven years earlier. 
 With Thessaliotis and the southern boundary of Pelasgiotis secured, the Aetolians, 
Athamanians, and Antiochus split their forces. Antiochus went northeast and besieged 
Larisa, the main city of Pelasgiotis (L.36.10.3-4), and the Athamanians and Aetolians 
went north towards Perrhaebia.  
 The Aetolians and Athamanians took Phacium, Limnaeum, and Phaestum 
(L.36.13.3, 36.13.7-9) all located in the region just west of Atrax.421 They did not assault 
Atrax (L.36.10.2), which understandable as Atrax had been able to resist a Roman siege 
seven years earlier, and this current campaign seems focused on speed. The Athamanians 
and the Aetolians then split up. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 Phacium: Decourt 1990, pp 155-9, Fig. 25. Phaestum (= Phayttos (Stahlin 1981, p 239)): Stahlin 1924, 
esp. p115. Limnaeum: Fossey 1990. 
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 The Athamanians first took Pellinaeum and Ericinium near Atrax (L.36.10.5, 
L.36.13.6).422 They then continued west and took Aeginium, Silana, Meliboea, Phaloria 
(L.36.13.6), four settlements which controlled the Thessalian access to the northern pass 
across the Pindus.423 The Romans had campaigned against Aeginium and Phaloria in 198 
BC in order to complete their crossing of the Pindus. The Athamanians then turned south 
and took Gomphi (L.36.13.6), as they had done in 198 BC, which controlled the 
Thessalian access to the southern pass across the Pindus. They continued northeast to 
take Tricca (L.36.13.6), the large city centrally located between these two passes, before 
continuing east to meet Antiochus at Larisa (L.36.10.6).  
 There are two, not mutually exclusive, ways to interpret this Athamanian 
campaign: that the Athamanians were taking advantage of the opportunity to shore up 
their own personal interests in Thessaly, and that the Athamanians were serving a 
strategic role within the larger Antiochan campaign of securing the passes over the 
Pindus to prevent Roman interference. Either way, the Athamanians now controlled 
access to crossing the Pindus to or from Thessaly. 
 The Aetolians continued north from the Atrax region into Perrhaebia and took 
Malloea, Eritium, and Cyretiae and laid waste the fields of Tripolis (L.36.10.5, 
36.13.4),424 before also moving to meet Antiochus at Larisa (L.36.10.6).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 Pellinaeum (=Pelinna (Briscoe 1981 p234)): Stahlin; Lauffer 1989, p523; TIB Hellas p161; Leekley 
1980, p149. Ericinium: Lucas 199.5. 
423 Silana: "Not otherwise known" Briscoe 1981, p240; BA places Silana tentatively in the "Trikka and 
Aiginion area". Meliboea: Otherwise unknown, BA places tentatively "near Aiginion and Trikka". 
424 Eritium: Otherwise unknown, Stahlin 1924 thought it to have been close to Cyretiae, which makes 
logistical and geographic sense. Tripolis: "The Tripolis consisted of the towns Azorus, Pythium, and 
Doliche in the north of Perrhaebia" Briscoe 1981, p234. See chapter 5 discussion. 
234 	  
	  
 The Aetolian campaign suggests the same two interpretations as the Athamanian: 
That this a reprisal of previous Aetolian raids in Perrhaebia, such as the Aetolians' 
Perrhaebian campaign against Malloea and Cyretiae in 199 BC (L.31.41.5), or that the 
Aetolians were serving a strategic role within the larger Antiochan campaign of laying of 
the groundwork for invading Macedon via Perrhaebia. 
 Antiochus' combined forces at Larisa received the surrender of Pharsalus 
(L.36.10.9) and now controlled almost all of Thessaly.425 As Livy specifies that 
Antiochus did not hold Gyrton at this time (L.36.10.2), we can infer that Antiochus had 
waged an unsuccessful campaign in the areas near Tempe while he was besieging Larisa. 
This is important, as it shows that Antiochus had made attempts to control the Thessalian 
side of Perrhaebia and Tempe, the routes of invasion between Macedon and Thessaly.  
 At some point during Antiochus' campaign, Philip wrote to Baebius both to report 
that Antiochus had invaded Thessaly, and to request a meeting (L.36.8.6). While 
Antiochus was at Larisa, Philip met Baebius in Dassaretia (L.36.10.10). As discussed 
above, Baebius then sent Appius Claudius with 2000 men east through Macedon under 
Philip's protection and through Tempe to Gonnoi (L.36.10.10-11; App.Syr.16). Claudius' 
sudden appearance frightened away Antiochus, the Aetolians, and the Athamanians into 
their respective winter quarters. Claudius then installed a Roman garrison at Larisa 
(L.36.10.10-14). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 During his narrative of the campaign, Livy reported that now "everything in that region except Atrax 
and Gyrton was in Antiochus' power" (L.36.10.2). This has caused scholars, most aggressively Walsh 1990, 
p86, to doubt Livy's understanding of geography, as Atrax and Gyrton were not adjacent (Gyrton: Stahlin 
1924; Lauffer 1989, p242; Helly 1999, p113). Combining Livy's two narratives makes clear that Livy 
meant all of Thessaly rather than the region around Atrax, and that this statement accords with Livy's 
narrative. 
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 Livy presents Antiochus' 191 BC campaign as an ineffectual and haphazard affair, 
that came about as a result of Antiochus failing to form an alliance with Philip. However, 
analysis of where Antiochus' 191 BC campaign took place reveals it to have been a well-
planned campaign to lay the groundwork for an invasion of Macedon. Antiochus had 
come to Greece in order to take Philip's kingdom and add Macedon to his own realm.426  
 Antiochus began from Demetrias, which Philip had said was all he needed to hold 
Thessaly, and first secured the southern border of Pelasgiotis, restricting Macedonian 
influence. Had Antiochus had time to take Larisa and not been scared away by the 
unexpected appearance of the Romans, then Antiochus would have begun the proper 191 
BC campaign season based at Larisa, the ideal place from which to launch an invasion of 
Macedon via the Tempe, as well as established a bridgehead to launch an invasion of 
Macedon through Perrhaebia - the Romans will later successfully invade Macedon by just 
this method in the Third Macedonian War.427 In addition to laying the groundwork to 
invade Macedon, Antiochus secured both the mountain passes into Thessaly from the 
west, assuring that the Romans would be unable to interfere, should they want to. 
 Beyond his strategic tactics in Greece, Antiochus, who called himself 'The Great', 
had spent the previous year making public gestures that indicated that he intended to 
invade Macedon.428 When beginning his campaign, he went and sacrificed at Troy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 Livy should be understood to have been giving a commentary on how Antiochus' campaign could have 
been successful, as gained by Livy's benefit of hindsight, rather than a portrayal of an actual potential 
alliance. In Livy, the strongest case for this this alliance is made by Hannibal (L.36.7.2-16). In his fourth 
decade, Livy uses Hannibal as his authorial mouthpiece to give comment on how things could have 
developed if different choices had been made, seen with the benefit of hindsight.  
427 See discussion in chapter 5. 
428 Antiochus had demonstrated that he did not believe in maintaining the balance of power between the 
Hellenistic kingdoms when he took advantage the death of Ptolemy IV to try to carve up and end the 
Ptolemaic kingdom (Plb.15.20; L.31.14.5).  
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(L.35.42.3) as Alexander had before his campaign (Plut.Alex.15.7), thus directly linking 
himself with Alexander, king of Macedon. He sacrificed at Delphi (L.36.11.6), and while 
it can be difficult to know just what the valences of this act were, when Perseus did this 
in 174 BC, the Achaeans interpreted it as an open play for kingship over all Greece 
(L.41.23.13-18). Additionally, Antiochus displayed open hostility towards Philip before 
he had even begun his 191 BC campaign at Pherae, as seen in his propping up of Philip 
of Megalopolis as a rightful descendant of Alexander and heir to the throne of Macedon 
(L.35.47.5-8), even sending this Philip to collect the bones of the Macedonians from 
Cynoscephalae and give them a new and "proper" burial (L.36.8.3-5; App. Syr. 15), 
giving public censure to Philip V's treatment of his dead and calling attention to Philip's 
defeat. Antiochus' support of this pretender was so public that Philip V knew of it before 
Antiochus' campaign began (L.36.8.5, L.36.14.3-4). Even after his 191 BC campaign, 
Antiochus did not aim for alliance as he publicly boasted of his having taken Thessaly 
from Philip (L.36.17.10).429  
 What Antiochus did not anticipate was that Philip would call in the Romans for 
help - as the Tarentines had called in Pyrrhus against the Romans or the Athenians the 
Romans against Philip - and give the Roman army safe passage across Macedon and 
through Tempe into Thessaly. This key play on Philip's part disrupted Antiochus' 
strategically laid plans. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 The Aetolians and Athamanians had been at war intermittently with Philip for more than 20 years at this 
point and one could suppose they would never have called in Antiochus in order to team up with Philip. 
However, the Aetolians and Athamanians were nothing if not opportunistic. If Antiochus had wanted 
alliance with Philip, offering Demetrias to Philip would have been a logical move. 
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 While Antiochus, the Aetolians, and the Athamanians were all still away from 
Thessaly, the Romans and Macedonians "at the beginning of spring joined their forces 
and marched down into Thessaly" (L.36.13.2). [Figure 4.40] They entered Thessaly via 
the Vale of Tempe and continued southwest towards Atrax. Philip then split off and went 
northwest into Perrhaebia and besieged Malloea (L.36.13.3). This valley in Perrhaebia 
served as an entrance into Macedonia and was thus a logical place for Philip to initially 
focus his energies, as it most related to his kingdom's safety. 
 Baebius took back the settlements near Atrax (Phacium and Phaestum) 
(L.36.13.3) before stopping at Atrax (L.36.13.4). He then turned north and retook the 
Aetolian gains in Perrhaebia (L.36.13.4), before he joined forces with Philip and they 
together caused Malloea to capitulate (L.36.13.5). The Roman-Macedonian campaign 
thus first dealt with the most direct threats to Macedon, Larisa and Perrhaebia. 
 [Figure 4.41] The Romans and Macedonians then went together to the west to 
retake all the towns that the Athamanians had taken (L.36.13.5-6), before returning to the 
Atrax region to besiege Pellinaeum and Limnaeum (L.36.13.7-9).  
 Now that the Thessalian access to the northern pass had been secured, Manius 
Acilius led a new Roman army across it. Acilius marched east from the pass, keeping the 
cavalry at Limnaeum and then Pellinaeum, causing each to capitulate, and sending the 
infantry on to Larisa (L.36.14.1). Metropolis and Cierium offered their surrender to the 
arriving Romans (L.36.14.6), just as they had in 198 BC. 
 The consul then went to Larisa for a war council, presumably with Philip and 
Baebius (L.36.14.6), after which the Romans and Macedonians split up and led separate 
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campaigns. Philip marched on Athamania (L.36.14.7), and soon "all Athamania came 
under the sovereignty and power of Philip" (L.36.14.9).  
 [Figure 4.42] Acilius led the Roman army south to Crannon, and received the 
surrender of Pharsalus, Scotussa, and Pherae (L.36.14.10-11). Now, of all Thessaly, only 
Demetrias was not under Roman control. Thessaly was now more firmly under Roman 
control than it had ever been, with garrisons now potentially placed in all 18 named 
settlements recently taken, as well as possibly in more. 
 Acilius continued due south, taking "Proerna and the forts surrounding it" and 
Thaumaci (L.36.14.12), stopping near Hypata at the southern edge of the central Malian 
plain (L.36.14.15).430  
 At some point during this Roman campaign, Antiochus moved his army from 
Chalcis to Lamia to join forces with the Aetolians (L.36.15.1-3). [Figure 4.43] Upon 
Acilius' march towards Lamia from Larisa, Antiochus led his army from Lamia to the 
pass of Thermopylae (L.36.15.5), roughly 12 km to the southeast.431 Livy reports that, 
once at Thermopylae, "Antiochus pitched his camp within the gates to the place and 
besides blocked the pass with fortifications, and he strengthened everything with a double 
rampart and a ditch and, where the situation demanded, with a rampart of stones which 
were scattered all about" (L.36.16.1-3). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Proerna: Leekley 1980, pp 125-6; Lauffer 1989, p568; Stahlin 1924. Hypata: Bequignon 1937, pp 307-
312; Lauffer 1989, pp 713-714. 
431 The bibliography on the topography of Thermopylae is immense, in great part due to interest in the 480 
BC campaign. See e.g. Kromayer 1907, 1922; Bequignon 1934, 1937; Burn 1951, 1977; Pritchett 1958, 
1965, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994, 2001; Mackay 1963; Koder 1976; Wallace 1980; Chaplin 2010; 
Sanchez-Moreno 2013. 
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 The pass of Thermopylae consists of three choke-points, or gates: The west gate is 
located just south of km 201 on the Athens-Lamia highway;432 the central gate is less 
than 3km to the east of the west gate and is marked by the Colonus hill and Phokian 
wall;433 the east gate is situated just south of km 197 on the Athens-Lamia highway.434 
The ancient coastline is understood to have run roughly equivalent to where the roadway 
runs today.435 In 480 BC, for comparison, the Greeks had encamped at the central gate, 
and the Persians were to their west.  
 [Figure 4.44] Livy reports that in 191 BC, however, Antiochus encamped at the 
east gate (L.36.17.10-11), where the archaeological remains of a wall from his 
fortifications stands today.436 The remains of the wall today extend roughly .4 km north-
northeast and .1 km southeast from where the walls join, but earlier accounts indicate that 
the remains used to extend for 1800 meters.437 The remains of the wall have become so 
much smaller, and continue to keep shrinking, due to demolition for road construction 
and agriculture, and erosion. The accompanying map indicates where the remains are 
today and how the wall would have extended in antiquity.438 Each of these walls served 
distinct strategic functions: The wall that ran north-northeast extended to cut off the pass 
and faced the direction from which the Roman attack would come. The wall that ran 
southeast ran along the edge of a ditch and extended until it turned to a steep face. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Bequignon 1937, esp. fig 1; Sanchez-Moreno 2013, pp342-3. See Hdt.7.216. 
433 Sanchez-Moreno 2013, pp343-5, with bibliography. See Hdt.7.225, 228. 
434 Sanchez-Moreno 2013, p347. See Hdt.7.216. 
435 The alluvial plain extending north of the gates had already begun forming in a swampy fashion by 
Livy's and Strabo's day.  
436 Dated to 191 BC by Bequignon 1934. See Bequignon 1937; Sanchez-Moreno 2013, p347; Pritchett 
1965, p73. I visited the wall on March 29, 2015.  
437 Pritchett 1965, p73. 
438 My proposed extensions for the walls make for a total of 1800-2000 meters of wall. 
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wall prevented the Romans from attempting to go around the other wall and get to the 
camp by cutting southeast up the wash. This southeast running wall was well placed to 
take advantage of the natural defenses of the valley descending on the other side of it.439 
 As depicted in Figure 4.44, Antiochus' encampment sat at the corner of these two 
fortification walls. As discussed in chapter 3, a Hellenistic military camp required 
roughly 7.5 square meters per man. Antiochus' 10,000 men would then have required 
roughly 75,000 m2. A square roughly 275 m by 275 m would have fulfilled that 
requirement.  
 Livy reports that while Antiochus completed the fortifications of his encampment 
at the east gate, the Romans were ravaging the area around Hypata (L.36.16.4). From 
Thermopylae, Antiochus then sent the entire Aetolian force of four thousand men to 
fortify Heraclea and Hypata (L.36.16.4),440 but the Aetolians, instead, only "shut 
themselves up in Heraclea" and did not prevent the Romans from devastating the fields of 
both cities (L.36.16.5).441 In 207 BC, the Aetolians had also holed up in Heraclea rather 
than fight to hold Thermopylae when Philip came to force his passage through 
(L.28.7.3).442  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 See chapter 3 discussion on Hellenistic Greek field fortifications as described by Livy and Polybius and 
evident in the archaeological record and how these different from contemporary Roman practice.  
440 Heraclea: Bequignon 1937, pp 244-252 with map; Pritchett 1965, pp81-2; Leekley 1980, 122-3; Lauffer 
1989, 264-5. 
441 While the number of Aetolians present is disparaged in Livy, 4,000 Aetolians is not so much less than 
the 6,400 sent to the Romans in 197 BC, and that number enabled the Aetolians to feel justified to a large 
amount of the credit for that victory. 
442 Livy reports that Philip was able to drive the Aetolians out of Thermopylae as just part of a long one-day 
march (L.28.7.3). Additionally, the Aetolians escaped from Philip's approach towards the same direction 
from which Philip was approaching. It follows that the Aetolians offered no resistance at Thermopylae in 
207 BC, but instead stayed in Heraclea. 
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 Livy reports that the Romans then "encamped within the pass itself near the 
springs of the hot water facing the king" (L.36.16.5). The Roman camp was at the middle 
gate, extending west to the eponymous hot springs. 
 Antiochus then told the Aetolians to occupy the summits of the mountains to the 
south to prevent the Romans from going around (L.36.16.6-8). Livy reports that 2000 
Aetolians instead stayed at Heracleia, but that 2000 Aetolians did come to help Antiochus 
(L.36.16.9-11), and these latter two thousand, "divided into three parts, occupied 
Callidromum and Rhoduntia and Tichius - these are the names of peaks" (L.36.16.11). 
 Livy reports that Acilius sent 2000 men under Lucius Valerius Flaccus to take 
Tichius and Rhoduntia as well as 2000 men under Marcus Porcius Cato to take 
Callidromum (L.36.17.1-2). As Pritchett has pointed out, "the key to the study of the 
topography of the battle of 191 BC lies in the identification of the three forts, 
Kallidromos, Teichious, and Rhoduntia, garrisoned by Aitolian troops serving under the 
Seleucid Antiochos III."443  
 To establish the location of the three Aetolian garrisons, we need to determine the 
three peaks that can be designated Callidromum, Rhoduntia, and Tichius (haec nomina 
cacuminibus sunt), and then the location on each one of these peaks for each of the three 
castella Aetolorum.  
 The Asopus gorge (Hdt.7.199, 216; Strabo 9.4.14) opens up just west of the 
central gate and extends south into the hills. Strabo informs us that the mountain due 
south of the gates, east of Asopus gorge, was named Callidromum (Str.9.4.13).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 Pritchett 1965, p71. 
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  To locate Tichius, we turn to linguistics and archaeology. Appian spells Livy's 
Tichius as Τειχιους, and scholars have understood this name to derive from the Greek 
word τεῖχος, meaning 'wall', which seems an appropriate name for a location that held a 
fortification wall.444 [Figure 4.45] On the hill forming the west side of the Asopus gorge, 
there are remains of an extensive wall built with many phases of construction, indicating 
that this location was understood to be a strategically important place for a wall for many 
hundreds of years.445 The hill forming the west side of the gorge is Tichius, labelled 
Liaditsa on the Hellenic Military Geographical Survey (HMGS) map. The wall extends 
from Tichius across the low point between Tichius and the next hill to the south. 
 There is a strategic reason for placing a wall here, at the low point between 
Tichius and the hill to the south of it. Since the narrow gates are difficult to attack, an 
alternate strategy is to go around Callidromum to get around the gates and behind 
whomever is blocking them. [Figure 4.46] As one cannot go directly up the gorge itself, 
due to the hostile nature of the terrain, the path of least resistance to get to the ridge 
behind Callidromum starts by the modern village of Dhamasta and goes through this 
wall. The Aetolian garrison placed here at this wall prevented the easiest Roman route for 
going around Callidromum. 
 The placement of Rhoduntia is complicated by its varying treatment in the ancient 
sources.446 Appian omits it, saying that there only two peaks at Thermopylae, Tichius and 
Callidromus (App. Syr. 4.18); Strabo's discussion of the locations of Rhoduntia, Teichius, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Pritchett 1965, pp 76-7, with bibliography; Pritchett 1994, p280. 
445 Mackay 1963. 
446 Pritchett 1965, pp 74-5. 
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and Heraclea is open to varied scholarly interpretation (Strabo 9.4.13); and Plutarch 
makes no mention of the assault on Tichius and Rhoduntia. 
 Working under the understanding that there was a Rhoduntia, i.e. that Livy's 
account of Flaccus assaulting Tichius and Rhoduntia depicted real events, Rhoduntia 
needs to have been near enough to Tichius for Flaccus to have be able to assault both 
Rhoduntia and Tichius at once with a contingent of only 2000 men, but to also have been 
its own peak. [Figure 4.47] The hill directly south of Tichius fulfills these requirements. 
This hill rises in two distinct steps: The first rises from the location of the Tichius wall at 
roughly 550 meters elevation to a height of roughly 860 meters, where it flattens out, 
before rising to the second peak of roughly 1240 meters. The flattened area at the top of 
this first step would be a strategically sound place for a garrison.447 This area fulfills the 
practical minimum of being large enough to hold the approximately 600 Aetolians 
(needing only to be roughly 70 m by 70 m).448 [Figure 4.48] This location has important 
strategic value for a fort: a garrison here adds help to the Aetolians at the wall at Tichius, 
helping control that route; it protects against an approach from the west from where the 
Monastery sits today, and the remains from two later defensive walls between the 
monastery and this point demonstrate that this route from the monastery was a route to be 
protected against;449 and a garrison here would have views of the greater landscape that a 
garrison at the Tichius wall would not have.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 This might be where Pritchett 1965, pp77-8; 1994, pp 288-9 suggests Rhoduntia was. Pritchett's 
description of his location for Rhoduntia is confusing, with neither map nor even reference to a map. 
448 Using my camp requirements of 7.5 square meters per soldier, as discussed in chapter 3, a 70 meter 
square would be 4900 square meters, which could hold 650 soldiers. The absence of archaeological remains 
where I predict the fort to be could be from the extensive reuse of ancient blocks in later construction, as 
well as from never having been properly looked for. 
449 Mackay 1963. 
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 [Figure 4.49 and Figure 4.50] For someone standing at the mouth of the gorge, 
by the hot springs themselves, these are the three most visible and striking peaks.   
 [Figure 4.51] Flaccus mounted an unsuccessful assault on these two Aetolian 
garrisons (L.36.19.1), presumably taking the direct route from Dhamasta against the two 
garrisons.  
 It remains to establish the Aetolian position on Callidromum. Livy, however, 
gives us no information about where the Aetolians positioned themselves to protect 
Callidromum. Livy only reports that the Roman frontal assault would have failed, 
Had not Marcus Porcius, having dislodged the Aetolians from the heights 
of Callidromum and killed a large part of them - for he had caught them 
off their guard and many of them asleep - shown himself on the hill which 
overlooked the camp. 
 
ni M. Porcius ab iugo Callidromi deiectis inde Aetolis et magna ex parte 
caesis – incautos enim et plerosque sopitos oppresserat – super 
imminentem castris collem apparuisset. 
(L.36.18.8) 
 
 Livy's brief account of Cato's assault on the Aetolian position leaves many 
topographic questions unanswered. Plutarch, however, gives an alternative and much 
more detailed account of Cato's actions.   
 Plutarch's account derives authority from the fact that it likely derives from Cato's 
own account of events. That Plutarch was using Cato's own account for Cato's actions at 
Thermopylae rests on three points: First, that Plutarch cites Cato as his source for Cato's 
boastings about the events of the battle (Plut.Cato.14.3).450 Second, Plutarch has an 
extended thesis in the 'Life of Cato' and in the 'Comparison of Cato and Aristides' that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 Livy claims that for the events of 195 BC he had access to Cato's own account, and references its 
boastful nature (L.34.15.9). 
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Cato always presents himself one way but is in reality the opposite. Plutarch first 
presenting Cato's own grandiose account for his battle exploits, but then later denigrating 
all Cato's military achievements as insubstantial (Plut.Comp.Cato&Arist.5) would accord 
with this thesis. Third, and most important, Plutarch's account accords with the realities 
of the landscape so accurately as to suggest that it is Cato's firsthand account.451  
 I will break up Plutarch's narrative of Cato's exploits and analyze how each 
section relates to the topography of the area. 
Cato, calling to mind the famous compass and circuit of the pass which the 
Persians had once made, took a considerable force and set out under cover 
of darkness. 
  
τὴν δὲ Περσικὴν ἐκείνην περιήλυσιν καὶ κύκλωσιν ὁ Κάτων εἰς νοῦν 
βαλόµενος, ἐξώδευσε νύκτωρ, ἀναλαβὼν µέρος τι τῆς στρατιᾶς. 
(Plut. Cato 13.1) 
 
 We learn here that Cato left at night, after it was fully dark.452 In Greece, between 
June 15th and July 15th, the sun sets at about 8:50 pm. Based on personal experience, it 
does not get fully dark during that time before 9:30 pm. As such, it is safe to assume that 
Cato left about 10 pm. 
They climbed the heights, but their guide, who was a prisoner of war, lost 
the way, and wandered about in impracticable and precipitous places until 
he had filled the soldiers with dreadful dejection and fear. Cato, seeing 
their peril, bade the rest remain quietly where they were, 
  
ἐπεὶ δ' ἄνω προελθόντων ὁ καθοδηγῶν αἰχµάλωτος ἐξέπεσε τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ 
πλανώµενος ἐν τόποις ἀπόροις καὶ κρηµνώδεσι δεινὴν ἀθυµίαν καὶ φόβον 
ἐνειργάσατο τοῖς στρατιώταις, ὁρῶν ὁ Κάτων τὸν κίνδυνον ἐκέλευσε τοὺς 
ἄλλους ἅπαντας ἀτρεµεῖν καὶ περιµένειν, 
(Plut. Cato 13.2) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 This is based on my personal autopsy experience hiking in the area as research for this chapter on 
November 22, 2014 and on March 28 and 29, 2015. 
452 In 195 BC, Cato had similarly led a night mission to surround the enemy position (L.34.14.1-2, 34.16.1-
2), as well as nighttime marches (L.34.13.3), and daytime surrounding missions (L.34.20.5, 34.21.5).  
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 [Figure 4.52] Cato climbed to the ridge that ran east-west behind Callidromum, 
understandably called here "the heights" as it is a ridgewalk at an elevation higher than 
Callidromum. Cato began began climbing from Ano Damasta, near from where Flaccus 
will begin his assault the next morning. While Flaccus will take the Damasta Spur route, 
Cato will instead take a parallel route southeast but on a line roughly 1.5 km southwest 
from Flaccus' route. Cato's movements were protected from sight from Rhoduntia by 
intervening the hill to Cato's east. Cato continued to where the monastery sits today 
before he turned southwest and continued to where the modern village of Eleftherochori 
sits at the saddle.  
 Cato then crossed over the saddle at Eleftherochori climbed east for two more 
kilometers. Cato was now on the ridge ("the heights"), roughly 950 m elevation above 
where he started.  
 Cato then continued along the ridge east along the route that cuts behind 
Callidromum. Cato turned east until he got lost in 'impracticable and precipitous places'. 
Two things happened to make this so: First, Cato missed the turn to the north that one 
needs to take to go north to come out by the east gate. If one misses this turn, one has to 
walk very far east before one has the opportunity to turn north again. However, this turn 
north that Cato missed is much earlier than one would expect, as after the turn one still 
needs to continue east for a significant distance.453 Second, Cato continued following the 
ridge after missing the turn north, however this ridge then gradually turns south, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 e.g. I missed this turn north, myself, and got quite lost. 
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led Cato the wrong direction. Cato was now in a thickly forested area full of ravines, and 
going the wrong way.  
 The key detail that explains how this happened is that Cato's guide was a POW 
rather than a local. In 480 BC, Ephialtes was a local Malian (Hdt.7.213), and as such 
could be expected to have known the mountain routes in the area. As discussed in chapter 
3, nobody knows local topography as well as shepherds, and shepherds are used to long 
walks in the middle of the night. These hills behind Thermopylae have been used, and are 
used today by shepherds, including use as summer pasture for shepherds who used the 
Malian plain as winter pasture. As such, Ephialtes could have been expected to be an 
effective guide, even in the dark. An Aetolian POW, though, could understandably get 
lost in this confusing terrain at night. 
 Cato realized, presumably from the stars, that he was going the wrong way and 
stopped. 
while Cato himself, with a certain Lucius Manlius, an expert mountain 
climber, made his way along, with great toil and hazard, in the dense 
darkness of a moonless night, his vision much impeded and obscured by 
wild olive trees and rocky peaks, until at last they came upon a path. So 
they put marks and signs towards some conspicuous cliffs which towered 
over Mount Callidromus  
 
αὐτὸς δὲ Λεύκιόν τινα Μάλλιον, ἄνδρα δεινὸν ὀρειβατεῖν, παραλαβὼν 
ἐχώρει πολυπόνως καὶ παραβόλως ἐν ἀσελήνῳ νυκτὶ καὶ βαθείᾳ, κοτίνοις 
καὶ πάγοις ἀνατεταµένοις διασπάσµατα πολλὰ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ ἀσάφειαν 
ἐχούσης, ἕως ἐµβαλόντες εἰς ἀτραπόν, ὡς ᾤοντο κάτω περαίνουσαν ἐπὶ τὸ 
στρατόπεδον τῶν πολεµίων, ἔθεντο σηµεῖα πρός τινας εὐσκόπους κεραίας 
ὑπὲρ τὸ Καλλίδροµον ἀνεχούσας.  
(Plut. Cato 13.3) 
 
 Cato worked his way back north through the forest until he got to an elevated 
point, marked on Figure 4.53, from which he could see Callidromum below him to the 
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north and cliffs that rose up higher than he was to the northeast. A shepherd's path went 
east-west through the swampy area to the south of those cliffs. He marked his way to get 
back to that hill and that path and returned to his men.454 
 We also learn here the date, as the possible new moons in 191 BC were June 13th 
or July 13th;455 June 13th accords better with Livy's narrative. 
and then made their way back again to the main body. This too they 
conducted to the marks and signs, struck into the path indicated by these, 
and started forward. But when they had gone on a little way, the path 
failed them, and a ravine yawned to receive them. Once more dejection 
and fear were rife. They did not know and could not see that they were 
right upon the enemy whom they sought. But presently gleams of daylight 
came, here and there a man thought he heard voices, and soon they 
actually saw a Greek outpost entrenched at the foot of the cliffs.  
 
οὕτω δὲ πάλιν ἐπανελθόντες ὀπίσω, τὴν στρατιὰν ἀνέλαβον, καὶ πρὸς τὰ 
σηµεῖα προάγοντες ἥψαντο µὲν ἐκείνης τῆς ἀτραποῦ καὶ κατεστήσαντο 
τὴν πορείαν, µικρὸν δὲ προελθοῦσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπέλιπε φάραγγος 
ὑπολαµβανούσης, καὶ πάλιν ἦν ἀπορία καὶ δέος, οὐκ ἐπισταµένων οὐδὲ 
συνορώντων ὅτι πλησίον ἐτύγχανον τῶν πολεµίων γεγονότες. ἤδη δὲ 
διέλαµπεν ἡµέρα, καὶ φθογγῆς τις ἔδοξεν ἐπακοῦσαι, τάχα δὲ καὶ καθορᾶν 
Ἑλληνικὸν χάρακα καὶ προφυλακὴν ὑπὸ τὸ κρηµνῶδες.  
(Plut. Cato 13.4) 
 
 [Figure 4.54] Cato returned to his men and then led them back to the path he had 
sighted. They proceeded east but lost the trail in the darkness, which is understandable as 
the only trail that would be here would be a shepherd's trail and there is no reason to 
expect it to be continuous. Cato continued northeast rather than due east and ended up at 
the edge of a steep ravine and he stopped. This is an understandable mistake, as Cato 
wanted to get north.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 I understand this to mean that Cato made cairns and slashes in trees that were sighted off of the cliffs to 
the northeast. 
455 Goldstine 1973, p68. 
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 At this point the sun rose and daylight came. We know that sunrise in Greece in 
mid-June is just about 6am. If Cato had left at 10pm, roughly eight hours would have 
gone by until when he stood on this cliff. This length of time accords with my personal 
experience. For comparison, I climbed the 13.9 km from the west gate to Eleftherochori 
in three hours and ten minutes climbing to 765 m elevation. I then covered the 8.23 km 
from Eleftherochori to the turnoff off the path to the north in two hours and thirteen 
minutes, climbing to a max elevation of 1129 m, and being at 1099 m elevation at the 
turnoff. From the turnoff to the point where Cato saw the sunrise, including getting lost in 
a potentially similar way as Cato, took 3 hours and fifteen minutes. Thus, I covered a 
similar distance to what Cato covered in roughly equivalent length of time of eight and a 
half hours. While I did this in daylight, I am no Roman soldier when it comes to walking. 
Taking into account the distances and elevations involved and the time constraints, this 
indicates that Cato did not spend much time being lost. 
 Once daylight came they saw a Greek fortified camp at the base of the cliffs. 
Figure 4.55 is a photo taken from where Cato stood and shows where the Aetolian camp 
was located. The Aetolians had not occupied an existing castellum on Callidromum, as 
Livy had said, nor had they occupied the strategic location that the Phocians had in 480 
BC. Instead, consistent with all their activity in 191 BC, they had expended the minimum 
amount of effort and exposed themselves to the minimum amount of danger. They had 
only gone up the valley from Antiochus' camp to the flat area at the eastern end of 
Callidromum.456 [Figure 4.54] Here they encamped and waited, planning to intercept the 
potential Roman route via the Anopaia path, which they did. This location would have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Just east of 'Strongylovouni' on the HMGS map. 
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been closer to the main Syrian camp than a hilltop location would have been and thus 
allowed them to run back to it should the Romans appear.  
 It is worth briefly comparing this Aetolian position with the Phokian position in 
480 BC. [Figure 4.56] A Phokian detachment had been assigned to prevent the Persian 
movement on the Anopaia path around Callidromum (Hdt.7.212, 218), and we know 
from the work of previous scholars that the Phokians took their position just west of a 
seasonal lake called Nevropolis today.457 The Persians, as Cato did 289 years later, 
headed east from Eleftherochori along the ridge behind Callidromum.458 The Phocian 
position was well chosen to intercept the Persian route, as Herodotus reports that the 
Persian route did indeed pass right them, causing the Phokians to flee (Hdt.7.218). 
 At first look, this might seem a strange location to place a defense of 
Callidromum, being further west than one might expect and perhaps randomly placed. 
However, anyone walking the area immediately realizes that this is in fact the key choke 
point. The Phokians were locals who knew where to place their defensive stand. From 
wherever else the Persians started from, they had to pass through Eleftherochori in order 
to get to the north of the ridge labeled Agorasia on the HMGS map and then between the 
ridges marked Kalambokia and Koryphi on the HMGS map. At the east end of this 
section of the route lay Nevropolis. The spot would have been well known to the 
Phokians as well, due to the fact that it directly controlled the route going south from 
here, the only southern route from this ridge, which led one into the northern borders of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 See e.g Burn 1951, 1977; Kromayer 1907; Mackay 1963; Pritchett 1958, 1982, 1985, 1994; Sanchez-
Moreno 2013; Wallace 1980. 
458 How far west the Persians began their climb into the hills is a source of scholarly dispute, however all 
agree that they have to of started west of the west gate in order to avoid the notice of the Greeks at the 
central gate. See e.g. Burn 1951, 1977; Pritchett 1958, 1982; Wallace 1980. 
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Phokis.459 Finally, in contrast to the Aetolians, the Phokians were prepared to fight to the 
death (Hdt.7.218), even if they were similarly ineffectual. They were positioned so far 
from the main Greek camp that they had no possibility of running back to it for safety as 
the Aetolians later did.  
So then Cato halted his forces there, and summoned the men of Firmum to 
a private conference 
 
οὕτως οὖν ἐπιστήσας ἐνταῦθα τὴν στρατιὰν ὁ Κάτων, ἐκέλευσεν αὐτῷ 
προσελθεῖν ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς Φιρµανούς 
(Plut. Cato 13.5) 
 
 Cato sent these Firmian troops down on the Aetolian camp and they captured one 
sentinel (Plut.Cato.13.6). Cato learned the layout of the enemy forces and led the Roman 
troops down the cliff into the valley, causing the Aetolians to flee back to Antiochus 
(Plut. Cato 13.7). [Figure 4.57 and Figure 4.58] Cato poured down the cliffs towards 
this camp, the Aetolians ran back towards Antiochus, and Antiochus' men were thrown 
into confusion.460 Once Antiochus' men are thrown into confusion by Cato's actions, our 
different ancient narratives re-converge. Acilius' charge with the main body of the army 
caused Antiochus' shaken army to flee (Plut.Cato.14.1; L. 36.19.3). The battle of 
Thermopylae was over. 
 The question remains, why did Antiochus go to Thermopylae, since he had 
enough time to have left Greece, or even holed up at Eretria, once he realized that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 This is an area of sheherds today, and has been in the recent pre-modern past, as indicated on older maps 
by Eleftherochori being designated Kalyvia Eleftherochori, Kalyvia being a toponym traditionally used to 
demarcate seasonal shepherd huts. We should understand that this was an area of shepherds in 480 BC and 
in 191 BC as well, as it is at an ideal altitude for summer pasture with the Lamian plain as well as the 
lowland sections of Phokis nearby for winter pasture. No one understands topography as well as shepherds 
and the Phokians' choice of defensive position reflected this knowledge. 
460 Plutarch says that the retreating Aetolians threw Antiochus' forces into confusion; Livy says that it was 
Cato's troops but that Antiochus' forces first thought that they were Aetolian troops (L.36.18.8 - 36.19.3). 
252 	  
	  
combined Roman and Macedonian armies were waging war on him with overwhelming 
comparative force? Antiochus went to Thermopylae for the theatrical gesture of it, 
consistent with his past behaviors at Troy, Delphi, and Cynoscephalae. Since Demetrius 
Poliorcetes, kings had been competeing to grant the Greeks freedom and Antiochus 
gambled that the Romans would not be willing to be cast in the role of the invading 
Persians against Antiochus' metaphorical Spartans protecting this Greek freedom. A stand 
at Thermopylae just might endear him to the Greeks and salvage this campaign, as well 
as potentially alienate the Greeks from the Romans.461   
 Before continuing, an aspect of Livy's understanding of Greek geography needs to 
be addressed. After Livy first mentions Thermopylae, he gives a description of how 
Thermopylae fits into the geography of Greece (L.36.15.6-12). Scholars have faulted this 
description, using it as evidence that Livy did not understand Greek geography.462 
However, Livy's presentation of the geography is consistent with Strabo and with map 
portrayals of the region up until fairly recently. Additionally, Livy's presentation shows a 
firm grasp of the political geography relevant to his narrative. 
 The geographical concept in Livy's geographical digression most censured by 
scholars is that Greece is cut in two by one mountain range that runs east west from 
Thermopylae to the Adriatic Sea opposite Aetolia. However, Strabo also refers to "one 
mountain that extends from Thermopylae in the east to the Ambracian Gulf in the west" 
(Str.9.4.12), showing that this perception of Greece's geography was not held by Livy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 Since Antiochus did not believe that the Romans would attack, he did not build a wall covering the 
eastern side of his camp. The lack of defensive works here was part of the reason that the sudden arrival of 
the fleeing Aetolians caused so much panic to Antiochus' men, i.e. they were coming from an essentially 
undefended direction.  
462 e.g Briscoe 1981, p242; Sage 1935, p204. 
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alone, but even Greek speaking geographers. Additionally, a survey of maps from the 
15th to 19th centuries shows that this single east-west mountain chain was a common 
way to represent the topography of Greece.463  
 Livy's digression also shows a remarkable grasp of Greek topography as it relates 
to his own narrative. On one side of the pass are, in order, Epirus, Perrhaebia, Magnesia, 
Thessaly, Phthiotic Thebes, and the Malian Gulf; on the other side are Aetolia, 
Acarnania, Phocis with Locris, Boeotia, Euboea, Attica, and the Peloponnese. Starting in 
the west, where the Romans landed when coming to Greece, lies Epirus. Moving east, 
and not naming the Pindus mountains, but crossing at the Zygos pass and staying in the 
mountains rather than descending into the plain (as the most recent Roman campaigns are 
portrayed as doing) one comes to Perrhaebia. Continuing around Thessaly clockwise one 
comes to Magnesia. Thessaly lies to the west of Magnesia and south of Perrhaebia. South 
of Thessaly in Achaea Phthiotis and south of that is the Malian gulf. This is essentially 
Acilius' route into Greece, not including Macedonia - fittingly, as it was not then 
considered part of Greece. The Romans, at this moment in Livy's narrative, controlled all 
of these lands. Antiochus holds Thermopylae. On the other side of Thermopylae sit the 
lands not in Roman control starting from the west with Aetolia and Acarnania and then 
continuing with Phocis with Locris, Boiotia, Euboea, Attica, and the Peloponnese in the 
order geographically of how you would come upon them after you came through 
Thermopylae. Livy's geographical digression established the relationship of the political 
landscape to the geographic landscape and demonstrated that Thermopylae was the key to 
controlling the rest of Greece, politically and geographically. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 See Navari 2013 and Livieratos 2012 for a survey of maps of Greece from the 15th - 19th centuries. 
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 After his defeat at Thermopylae, Antiochus fled via Elatia to Chalcis and then 
back to Asia (L.36.19.9-10; L.36.21.1). The Aetolians holed up in Heraclea (L.36.19.6-
7), which the Romans then successfully besieged in 25 days (L.36.23.6 - 36.24.11).  
 Philip took advantage of Roman absence from Thessaly to retake Demetrias (the 
last remaining Aetolian/Antiochus holding in Thessaly), as well as the regions of 
Dolopia, Aperantia, Perrhaebia, and Athamania (L.36.33, 36.34.9). Philip's control of 
Thessaly now rivaled what he had in 205 BC. 
 In 190 BC, the consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio, together with his brother Scipio 
Africanus, disembarked at Apollonia, took the northern pass to Thessaly, as the southern 
pass was not available due to continuing Aetolian hostilities (L.37.6.1). They brokered a 
truce at Amphissa, ending the Roman siege of the Aetolians there (L.37.7.6-7), and then 
led their army through Thessaly, into Macedonia via the Vale of Tempe, and through 
Thrace to Asia (L.37.7.7). Thessaly had become an area the Roman army marched 
through on its way somewhere else, rather than a place to fight in or fight over. 
 There was a related distinct change of Roman foreign policy in 189 BC, as one 
consul was assigned to Asia and one to Aetolia (L.37.50.1-2). The Romans were taking 
their armies directly into their enemies' lands instead of fighting over, and in, middle 
zones, as they had in the wars and battles discussed so far in chapters 1-4.  
 With the Romans gone, the Aetolians and Macedonians returned to warring over 
Thessaly and its borderlands. By the end of 189 BC, the Aetolians had taken back 
Athamania (L.38.1, 38.2.1-11), Aperantia and Dolopia (L.38.3.3-5, 38.5.10, 38.7.1, 
38.8.2). However, in their peace dealings with the Romans at the end of the year, the 
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treaty terms appear to have made Dolopia and Aperantia again free of Aetolian control 
(L.38.11.9; Plb.21.32.13)  
 The Romans left Greece again in 188 BC, as they had in 194 BC. However, the 
threat the Romans were still able to wield from afar was shown in 185 BC, when Philip 
was forced to concede his holdings in Perrhaebia, Athamania, Magnesia, and significant 
parts of Thessaly and Dolopia by decree alone - no military force was required 
(Macedonian holdings: L.39.24.6-8, 39.24.11, 39.26.1; treaty terms: L.39.26.14, 39.28.4).  
Part III: 172 BC - 168 BC 
 In fall 172 BC, Rome again sent an army to Illyria (L.42.36.8).464 After sixteen 
years, the Romans returned to Greece, in part because they feared that if a military 
alliance between Antiochus IV, Perseus, and Prusias II were allowed to develop, Roman 
supremacy in the Mediterranean could be threatened. This time, however, instead of 
planning to fight the Antigonids and Seleucids in the neutral areas of Thessaly and Illyria, 
the Romans aimed to invade Macedon.  
 A potential alliance between these three kings was not beyond the realm of 
possibility or probability in 172 BC. These three men had all ascended to kingship within 
a brief time (Prusias in 182 BC, Perseus in 179 BC, and Antiochus in 175 BC); were all 
relatively young (in 175 BC Prusias was 45, Antiochus was 40, and Perseus was 37); had 
close personal ties (their fathers all had interpersonal relationships) that had recently been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Rome also sent five envoys each with 200 soldiers to travel around Greece, including one who went 
through Thessaly. These 'envoys with troops' were part of new Roman activity in Greece that lay 
somewhere between military and diplomatic activity, one that involved 'occupying cities' with small 
garrisons 'for the protection of those cities', (L.42.37.5-6). The envoys in Thessaly, Marcius and Atilius, 
met with Perseus at Larisa to discuss possible peace terms before a potential outbreak of war, resulting in 
Perseus sending envoys to Rome (L.42.39-42), as Philip had done in 198 BC before the battle of 
Cynoscephalae. 
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reaffirmed (in 178 BC Perseus married Antiochus' sister and Prusias married Perseus' 
sister); had recently made extravagent displays of wealth (Antiochus had just begun an 
unprecedentedly large building program in at least seven cities around Greece and Asia in 
174 BC, including the Olympieion (L.40.20; Plb.26.1)); and demonstrations of influence 
and alliance at Delphi (at sometime after 182 BC Perseus and Prusias had paired columns 
on either side of the temple of Apollo at Delphi dedicated to them by the Amphictyonic 
council (SIG 632), in 178 BC Perseus was on the Amphictyonic council, and in 174 BC 
Perseus marched with great fanfare to Delphi and back from Macedon). Additionally, 
these kings appeared to have been popular in the Greek-speaking world.465 
 Antiochus' great displays of wealth in 174 BC must have shocked and surprised 
the Romans since they had taken away so much of the Seleucid Kingdom in 188 BC 
kingdom as well as imposed giant indemnities. That he could still have this much money 
for gifts must have hinted at enormous reserves and capabilities for the future. A military 
alliance of Antiochus' wealth with the military experience of Perseus and Prusias would, 
indeed, have been a potent 'triumvirate'. Rome reacting with maximum force to perceived 
threat by a Hellenistic king and using this as reason for military action in Greece would 
be consistent with their behavior in 200 BC and 191 BC.  
 In late 172 BC, the Romans installed a garrison at Larisa (L.42.47.10), and in late 
March/early April 171 BC the Romans crossed an army to Apollonia (L.42.49), 
continued through Epirus, took the southern pass through Athamania to Gomphi in 
Thessaly (L.42.55.1-2), and then joined the garrison at Larisa (L.42.55.5-6).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 For details of Perseus' popularity in Greece in the 170s, see Eckstein 2010, p240.  
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 [Figure 4.59] Meanwhile, Perseus invaded Perrhaebia from the north, and took 
cities including Cyretiae (L.42.53.9). This same area of Perrhaebia had been involved in 
the 199 BC, 198 BC, and 191 BC campaigns due to the fact that it offers the only route 
into Macedon from Thessaly besides Tempe. Shoring up this corridor was a logical first 
step for Perseus' program of defense against invasion. Perseus then took Mylae and 
Phalanna at the border of Pelasgiotis and Perrhaebis before turning northeast towards 
Tempe and taking Gyrton (L.42.54.1-6), which caused Elatia and Gonnoi surrender 
(L.42.54.7, L.42.54.8). Perseus now controlled the Thessalian access of both routes into 
Macedon. Perseus then moved to Sycurium to wait for the Roman attack (L.42.54.9-11).  
 Perseus then attempted to get the Romans to commit to a decisive battle in 
Thessaly. [Figure 4.60]  First, Perseus devastated the area around Pherae to try to draw 
out the Romans (L.42.56.8-9), mirroring Roman behavior from 197 BC, as I discussed 
above. The Macedonians then marched to the Roman camp (L.42.57.6), where there was 
a small skirmish (L.42.57.8-9), after which Perseus returned to Sycurium (L.42.57.9).  
After a series of failed attempts to draw out the Romans (L.42.57.10-12), Perseus moved 
his camp closer to the Roman camp (L.42.58.1). This did indeed induce the Romans to 
fight (L.42.59), and Perseus won the battle - but not so effectively as to end the war 
(L.42.60.1-3). Romans moved camp across the Peneus river at night to diffuse the 
situation (L.42.60.3-4), and Perseus moved camp back to Mopselus (L.42.61.11) then 
Sycurium (L.42.62.15). 
   [Figure 4.61] In response to Perseus' threats on their camp, the Romans moved 
southwest to Crannon (L.42.64.7); Perseus in turn moved to Mopselus (L.42.65.1); and 
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the Romans then moved to the Phalanna area (L.42.65.1). In a series of events 
reminiscent of the Roman victory at Otolobus discussed in chapter 2, the Romans relaxed 
their discipline while out reaping and as a result got surprised by Perseus while out in the 
fields, which then escalated into a bigger battle which the Romans won (L.42.65.6 - 
42.66.10).466 In response to this defeat, Perseus garrisoned Gonnoi and returned to 
Macedonia (L.42.67.1). [Figure 4.62] The Romans mounted a brief assault on Gonnoi, 
before abandoning it to instead take Malloea, Tripolis and the rest of Perrhaebia, before 
returning to Larisa (L.42.67.6-7).  
 171 BC was a campaign season full of camp movements and feints, but nothing 
substantial was accomplished. At the end of the season, Rome still held Perrhaebia and 
all of Thessaly except for Tempe.  
 The 170 BC campaign remains largely enigmatic because Livy's text for 170 BC 
is mostly missing. Rome seems to have to lost ground in Thessaly over the course of the 
year, as indicated by the fact that Perseus was able to march an army across Thessaly and 
Athamania to Stratus and back.  
 In 169 BC, the Roman army moved from winter quarters at Palaepharsalus 
(L.44.1.5) and promptly invaded Macedon through Perrhaebia.467 The Romans again 
garrisoned Larisa, from where they also launched an invasion of Macedon via Tempe 
(L.44.7.1). At this point, Thessaly largely disappeared from the narrative as Rome moved 
their theater of war to Macedon. This is perhaps best exemplified when, in 168 BC, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Perseus siezed 1000 laden carts of grain (L.42.65.2-5) in the first stage of this conflict. 
467 See discussion of Roman activities in Macedon in chapter 5. 
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Paullus was able to move unhindered from Anticyra through Thessaly and then on 
through Tempe to meet the Roman army (L.45.41.3-4; App.Mac.19).  
Part IV: Conclusions 
 In the thirty years between Rome's first appearence in Thessaly in 198 BC and 
their defeat of Macedon in 168 BC, the value and role of Thessaly developed and 
changed for Rome and for the peoples Rome fought there.  
 When Flamininus crossed the Pindus into Thessaly in 198 BC, Rome did not have 
the same economic or strategic needs to be in Thessaly that they'd had to be in Illyria. 
Since 229 BC, Rome had specific economic concerns, i.e. maintaining control of 
shipping through the Adriatic, for using the military to establish and maintain control 
over the Illyrian ports. Since 215 BC, Rome had specific strategic concerns, i.e. 
preventing Macedon using the Illyrian coast as a launching point for an invasion of Italy, 
for using the military to maintain control the Illyrian ports. Rome had used offensive 
military force in Illyria to protect against what could be reasonably understood to be 
direct economic and military threats. In the two and a half campaign seasons from 200 
BC through the Battle of the River Aous in 198 BC, Rome had maintained her military 
focus on these Illyrian ports and these defensive concerns.  
 However, Rome had no similar pre-existing economic concerns in Thessaly and 
faced no direct military threat. Instead, the military threat came from Macedon, and 
Thessaly was merely the battleground on which to fight them. Desire for decisive battle 
with Macedon pulled Flamininus, and with him Rome, into Thessaly in pursuit of Philip. 
As Philip crossed the Pindus after the Battle of the River Aous, if he had turned north into 
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Macedon via the Grevena pass, Flamininus would have retraced Sulpicius' route and 
aimed to compel Philip to fight at the western borders of Macedon. Instead, Philip went 
into Thessaly, Flamininus followed him, and thus Flamininus shifted the theater of war. 
When Rome did not recall Flamininus back to the Adriatic coast but rather sanctioned 
this shift, Rome effectively began a new foreign policy in the east. 
 While Rome was not fighting over her own territory in Thessaly in 198 BC - 197 
BC, neither was anyone they were fighting with or against; none of the combatants in 
Thessaly were fighting in or over their homeland. However, all acknowledged that 
control of Thessaly was on some level control over Greece. When Rome defeated Philip, 
they won Thessaly, not Macedon, but gaining control of Thessaly allowed them to grant 
freedom to the Greeks. 
 During the war in Thessaly in 191 BC - 190 BC, however, the role of Thessaly 
had changed. Thessaly had become a locus of competing narratives of irredentism and 
liberation. In the vacuum of power created by Rome's removal of external rule from 
Thessaly, followed by the removal of her own armies, Thessaly had become conceptually 
important to the imperial dream of many peoples. The Aetolians wanted to regain the 
control of Thessaly they had held in 229 BC. The Athamanians wanted control of western 
Thessaly as they had it at the end of 197 BC, as well as to act on new, outsized dreams of 
gaining the throne of Macedon through an obscure bloodline. The Macedonians wanted 
to take it back as they had it in 199 BC.  Antiochus wanted both to rule Macedon as the 
true heir of Alexander the Great's empire, and wanted credit and control over the idea of 
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the "Freedom of the Greeks". Rome simply wanted to control the narrative of the 
"Freedom of the Greeks" for their own benefit. 
 In 198 BC - 197 BC, Rome had aimed to fight a decisive battle in Thessaly. In 
191 BC - 190 BC, Rome aimed to fight over control of every city in Thessaly. However, 
by 172 BC, Thessaly had become merely the gates of Macedon and Rome fought only 
over access to the routes into Macedon of Perrhaebia and Tempe. There was no aim to 
fight a major battle in Thessaly; there was no longer need to fight over the cities in 
Thessaly. Thessaly had become simply the border to Macedon. 
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CHAPTER 5: MACEDON 
Introduction  
 Rome had been at war against Macedon between 214 BC and 205 BC, but did not 
invade Macedon. Rome declared war on Macedon again in 200 BC, and in 199 BC, 
Sulpicius marched an army east from the Illyrian coast to within 30 km of the entrance to 
Macedon at Edessa, but did not invade Macedon. In 198 BC, Flamininus defeated Philip 
at the Battle of the River Aous, but did not follow this up by invading Macedon, but 
rather Thessaly. Philip, newly allied, escorted the Roman army from the western edge of 
Macedon to Tempe in 191 BC, and from Tempe east across Macedonian territory to Asia 
in 190 BC. In neither situation did Rome take advantage of the opportunity to wage war 
inside Macedon. In 188 BC Manlius Vulso led an army back across Thrace and into 
Macedon, and faced great difficulties thought to have occurred because Philip had 
removed his protection, but Vulso still did not wage war in Macedon when he was in its 
territory.  
 After 26 years of peace, Rome again declared war on Macedon in 171 BC, and in 
169 BC Rome took the unprecedented step of invading Macedon. This chapter covers the 
two successive years of Roman invasion of Macedon in 169 BC and 168 BC that 
centered on the routes between Thessaly and Macedon of Perrhaebia and Tempe and the 
region of Pieria in southern Macedon. This invasion culminated in the decisive Roman 
victory at Pydna in 168 BC and the end of the Macedonian empire.  
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Part I: The 169 BC campaign 
 [Figure 5.1] Livy reports that, in 169 BC, the new consul Quintus Marcius 
Philippus took control of the army encamped at Palaepharsalus (L.44.1.5-8), ordered his 
troops to take with them grain for a month (L.44.2.4),468 and nine days later broke camp 
and moved north to invade Macedon (L.44.2.2-3, L.44.2.4).469  
After a day's march, Philippus summoned the guides for various routes, 
bade each explain before the council the route by which he would guide 
them, and them after dismissing the guides, laid before the council the 
question of which route to choose. 
 
et unius diei progressus iter conuocatis itinerum ducibus cum exponere in 
consilio iussisset, qua quisque ducturus esset, summotis iis, quam 
potissimum <uiam> peteret, rettulit ad consilium. 
(L.44.2.5) 
This passage makes clear that Philippus had loaded his men with thirty days of grain and 
broken camp before deciding on a plan for exactly where to go, much less how long it 
would take.  
  A thirty-day supply of grain for Philippus' two-legion army would have weighed 
roughly 537 tons.470 This would have resulted in logistical issues beyond each soldier 
carrying a very heavy pack. Roman soldiers ground the grain they carried and baked it 
into bread while on campaign; this required each tent group of eight men to be 
accompanied by at least one donkey in order to carry the necessary food-processing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 See Briscoe 2012, pp 468-9, for menstruum here being "a term of the military register" meaning "corn 
for a month." Livy describes Roman soldiers carrying 30 days frumentum  with them in two other places 
(L.43.1.8, Per.57). Madvig had emended frumentum into the line after menstruum, which was subsequently 
removed by Briscoe 1986. See Roth 2012, p 68-71 for discussion of how much grain and equipment 
soldiers carried and were issued, including Philip V distributing 30 days grain to his men (Plb.4.63.10).  
469 This land invasion would be supported by a concurrent naval campaign against the Macedonian 
coastline (L.44.2.3). 
470 Roth 2012, pp 22-3. 
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equipment including the stone mill (27 kg) and cookpot.471 Donkeys, and likely carts as 
well, were also employed to carry the grain itself.472 Furthermore, on this campaign 
Philippus brought cavalry and elephants (L.44.5.1-9, 44.5.12-13), which would have had 
their own significant food requirements that required more pack animals.473 Thirty days 
of grain was not just a great quantity of supplies, but the maximum amount that Roman 
commanders regularly took into the field.474 Thus, Philippus had set out from 
Palaepharsalus with more than just a considerable pack train, but as large a train as 
possible. We can infer from this choice that Philippus was not intending to rely on supply 
lines, and that he was not intending to move quickly or through particularly harsh terrain.  
 Philippus' one-day march north from the Roman camp by Palaepharsalus, located 
at the modern town of Krini, would have put him near Larisa, which lay roughly 25 km 
north on an established and secure route.475 Larisa was the major city of Pelasgiotis and 
strategically located as a base from which to invade Macedon through either Perrhaebia 
to the northwest or Tempe to the northeast. 
 Once at Larisa, Philippus employed local guides to lay out the possible routes into 
Macedon. It is understandable that local Perrhaebians would have been inclined to help 
the Romans. Flamininus had freed Perrhaebia from Macedonian control in 196 BC 
(L.33.34.6) and established Perrhaebian cities' law codes and governments (IG IX2 338; 
L.34.51.4-6). More recently, Rome had freed Perrhaebia immediately after attacks by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 Roth 2012, pp 44-51, 77-8. 
472 Roth 2012, pp 68-90. At roughly 500 kg/cart, this would amount to at least 1000 carts and 2000 donkeys 
to transport the grain alone for Philippus' troops. 
473 Roth 2012, pp 78, 125-9, 144-5.  
474 Roth 2012, pp 68-116, esp. pp 68-71. 
475 Palaepharsalus: Morgan 1983. Larisa is at the modern city of Larisa. For the road network through 
Thessaly, see Hammond 1988, p62. 
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Antiochus and the Aetolians in 191 BC (L.36.13.4) and then Perseus in 171 BC 
(L.42.67.1). Nevertheless, Philippus still demonstrated proper wariness of these guides, 
dismissing them before discussing their proposed routes in council.476  
 Livy reports the council's debate: 
Some preferred the road via Pythous; others the one over the Cambunian 
Mountains used the preceding year by the consul Hostilius; others, a route 
past Lake Ascuris. For a certain distance yet there was no divergence in 
the routes; therefore the discussion as to this choice was postponed until 
they should encamp near the point of separation of the roads. Thence the 
consul led his army into Perrhaebia and settled down between Azorus and 
Doliche for further conference as to the road to take. 
 
aliis per Pythoum placebat uia, aliis per Cambunios montes, qua priore 
anno duxerat Hostilius consul, aliis praeter Ascuridem paludem. restabat 
aliquantum uiae communis; itaque in id tempus, quo prope diuortium 
itinerum castra posituri erant, deliberatio eius rei differtur. in Perrhaebiam 
inde ducit, et inter Azorum et Dolichen statiua habuit ad consulendum 
rursus, quam potissimum capesseret uiam. 
(L.44.2.6-8) 
 Notably, all three proposed routes went through Perrhaebia; going through Tempe 
was not presented as an option by the guides, nor suggested by the council itself. This 
follows the precedent set in 171 BC, when the Romans had deemed Tempe too well 
protected by its garrisons and likewise focused their attentions on Perrhaebia (L.42.67.6-
7). 
 [Figure 5.2] The first route proposed was via the settlement Pythous, located in 
the northeast corner of the central Perrhaebian plain by the modern village of Pythio at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 For proper wariness to be shown to guides and the hazards of trusting guides too much, see discussion in 
chapter 3. 
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western foot of Mt. Olympus.477 Pythous anchored the southern end of the route that went 
north into Macedon via the Petra Pass (Plut.Aem.15.2).478 This route was understood to 
have had the most difficult terrain of the three proposed (Plut.Aem.15.2; Zon.9.23). 
 The second route over the Cambunian Mountains entered Macedon at Elimia, 
located at the modern city of Kozani, significantly further west than the first route.479 
This was the most often used military route of the three; e.g. Perseus used this route in 
171 BC to invade Thessaly from Macedon (L.42.53.5 - 42.54.6), and the consul Hostilius 
had used it to invade Elimia from Thessaly in 170 BC (Plut.Aem.9.4). The strategic 
importance of this route was further attested to during the First Balkan War, when the 
Greeks attempted to invade Ottoman-controlled Macedon. At the outbreak of war in the 
Macedonian theater, the Turkish army focused all their defenses to control this same 
pass, while the Greek army simultaneously focused all their energies on breaking through 
it.480 The successful Greek attack on Oct. 9, 1912 led directly to the Greek capture of 
Thessaloniki and control over the Macedonian theater.481 
 The third route, by Lake Ascuris, was the easternmost route. Lake Ascuris was 
later called Lake Nezero and subsequently drained between 1907-1911 to create 
agricultural land.482 This route extended east from the Roman camp to the Karya plain 
and Lake Ascuris. Pritchett convincingly argued that in 480 BC Xerxes established a 
route between the Pierian coast and Lake Ascuris when he employed a full third of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 Pythous: Leake 1835 III, pp341-3; Stahlin 1924; Hammond 1972, pp 117-8, maps 11 & 12; Papazoglou 
1988, maps 1 & 20, passim; Lucas 1992. Pythous was from where Xenagoras measured the height of 
Olympus (Plut.Aem.15.10). 
478 On the Petra Pass: Hammond 1972, pp123-4. 
479 Elimia: Papazoglou 1988, 177-80. 
480 HAGS 1998, pp 28-35, map 4. 
481 HAGS 1998, pp37-72. 
482 Hammond 1972, p137; Lucas 1991, p135; Zoukas 2015 B, p34. 
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enormous army for "quite a few days" to cut a track west from the coast into Perrhaebia 
(Hdt.7.131).483 This track developed over time into the easternmost section of this third 
route, entering Macedon by the modern village of Skotina.484  
 Pritchett's route between the drained Lake Nezero and Skotina is used by the local 
timber industry today and even housed a large timber camp in 1961.485 As the area 
between Lake Ascuris and the coast was called "Beautiful Pines", Callipeuce, in 169 BC 
(L.44.5.11), and pine played a key role in Macedon's economically vital timber industry, 
one could reasonably assume that the local timber industry maintained the easternmost 
part of this route in antiquity as well.486 
 [Figure 5.3] Philippus delayed his decision of which route to take by entering 
Perrhaebia and encamping between Doliche and Azorus, a point from where he could 
choose any of the three routes.487 Doliche was located at the northwest corner of the 
central Perrhaebian plain by the modern village of Sarantoporo, and Azorus was located 
towards the southwestern corner of the central Perrhaebian plain by the modern village of 
Azoros.488 The settlements of Pythous, Azorus, and Doliche together formed Perrhaebian 
Tripolis (L.42.53.6), an area roughly coterminous with the central Perrhaebian plain.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 Pritchett 1961. 
484 Pritchett 1961. 
485 Pritchett 1961, p374. 
486 On the role of the timber industry to the Macedonian economy, see Hatzopoulos 1996, pp 431-442; 
Borza, 1987. On the role of pine in the modern Macedonian timber industry, see Zoukas 2015 A, p12. It 
would be worth investigating how the track cleared by Xerxes had potentially enabled an increase in 
exploitation of the timber in that region by the Pierian coastal communities. 
487 Polybius himself joined the Roman camp at Tripolis as an Achaean envoy (Plb.28.13.1), and then 
marched with the Romans through their march east. Polybius' autopsy and account could account for the 
Polybian-like attention to mechanical detail in Livy's account of the Roman elephant-moving contraptions 
later in the narrative. 
488 Doliche: Lucas 1992; Girtzy 2001, map 4. Azorus: Leake 1835 III, p341-3; Stahlin 1924; Hammond 
1972, pp 117-8, 137, maps 11 & 12; Papazoglou 1988, maps 1 & 20, passim; Lucas 1992. 
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 Perrhaebian Tripolis was strategically important for its role as a crossroads 
between Thessaly and three separate areas of Macedon: southern Pieria, central Pieria, 
and Elimia. Tripolis controlled the only entrances to Macedon from Thessaly apart from 
Tempe; thus, control of Tripolis, and the three towns that controlled the southern entrance 
to Tripolis - Chyretiae, Olosson, and Malloea, was key for controlling access to 
Macedon.489 As a result, in 191 BC the Aetolians and Antiochus had taken Malloea, 
Cyretiae, and Tripolis (L.36.10.5) as the first stage of their invasion of Macedon, and it 
had been Philip's primary concern to retake these towns as soon as possible (L.36.13.4). 
Similarly, in 171 BC Perseus took Tripolis, Malloea, and Cyretiae (L.42.53.9, 42.67.7) 
before securing Tempe (L.42.54.7-8) as part of his swift campaign to secure the entrances 
to Macedon in the face of the impending Roman invasion. The Romans then immediately 
responded by taking back the Perrhaebian cities (L.42.67.7). The resulting control of 
Tripolis enabled the Romans to encamp here in 169 BC while deciding what route to 
pursue. 
 [Figure 5.4] Furthermore, by encamping in Tripolis, Philippus not only 
postponed his own choice of routes, but, importantly, also prevented Perseus from 
learning by which route the Romans would invade Macedon. 
During the same time, Perseus, knowing that the enemy was approaching, 
but unaware which route he would choose, decided to occupy all the 
passes with forces. 
 
per eosdem dies Perseus cum adpropinquare hostem sciret, quod iter 
petiturus esset, ignarus, omnis saltus insidere praesidiis statuit. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 Chyretiae: TIB pp147-8; Leekley 1980, p136; Lucas 1995. Olosson: Lauffer 1989, 207-8. Malloea: 
Lucas 1995, p123. There were two approaches from Larisa to Olosson at the entrance of Tripolis: a lesser 
used route that involved a steep pass southeast of Olosson, and the longer yet easier and more frequented 
route that approached the pass from the southwest and passed by both Malloea and Chyretiae. 
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(L.44.2.9) 
 
 [Figure 5.5] Livy reports that Perseus chose to defend all three routes, sending 
10,000 men to the summit of the Cambunian mountains to prevent invasion by the 
westernmost route, and 12,000 men to hold the easternmost route by Lake Ascuris, while 
he himself encamped near Dium (L.44.2.10-12; Zon.9.22), from where he could guard 
the Petra Pass route.490 As Livy reports that Perseus had 30,000 troops after the 169 BC 
campaign (L.44.20.4), diverting 22,000 troops would have left Perseus with a force of 
only 8,000. Furthermore, Livy reports that Perseus raced (percurrebat) between Dium, 
Heracleum, and Phila (L.44.2.12); this passage should be understood as an attempt by 
Perseus to determine if the Romans were attacking via the Petra pass (Dion), Lake 
Ascuris pass (Heracleum), or Tempe (Phila), as well as if they were attacking by sea 
against Heraclion or Phila.491 Philippus had seized the initiative and compelled Perseus to 
split his forces and feel threatened by the prospect of an attack on multiple fronts.  
Meanwhile the consul had settled on the plan of proceeding by the pass 
where the king's officer was encamped near Otolobus. It was decided, 
however, to send ahead 4,000 men to seize valuable positions; the 
commanders of the force were Marcus Claudius and Quintus Philippus, 
the son of the consul. Immediately the whole Roman army followed. 
 
interim consuli sententia stetit eo saltu ducere, ubi propter Otolobum dux 
regius castra <habebat>. praemitti tamen quattuor milia armatorum ad loca 
opportuna praeoccupanda placuit, qui<bus> praepositi sunt M. Claudius, 
Q. Philippus consulis filius. confestim et uniuersae copiae sequebantur. 
(L.44.3.1-3) 
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 Hammond and Briscoe understand that Perseus sent another unmentioned garrison to guard the Petra 
Pass. However, as that would have left him with very few troops with himself, I see no reason not to take 
Livy at his word here. 
491 Heracleum:  Papazoglou 1988, pp 154-6. Phila: Papazoglou 1988, pp 115-6. 
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 Philippus chose a route before knowing that Perseus had indeed split his forces to 
cover all the possible routes. Philippus used a feint to try to get Perseus to split his forces, 
but did not then wait to find out if it worked before he acted. In fact, as we will learn 
below, Philippus chose the Lake Ascuris route, the route that Perseus had sent the 
greatest number of men to guard, indicating that Philippus had no intelligence on Perseus' 
actions before committing to one of the routes.  
 Similarly, once Philippus had chosen a route, he sent out an advance force, but 
rather than wait for his advance force to report back to him on the viability of the route 
and the state of its Macedonian defenses, Philippus immediately followed with his whole 
army. In both situations, Philippus committed to action before getting full intelligence. 
 This is alarmingly similar behavior to that which Philippus had displayed in 186 
BC in Liguria. Livy reports that in that campaign,  
While Marcus was following the Ligurians into secluded forests which 
had always been their hiding place and place of refuge, he was surrounded 
on unfavorable ground in a narrow pass which had been occupied in 
advance. 
 
dum penitus in abditos saltus, quae latebrae receptaculaque illis semper 
fuerant, persequitur, in praeoccupatis angustiis loco iniquo est 
circumuentus.   
(L.39.20.6) 
 
 Once trapped in the pass, Philippus was soundly defeated and lost 4,000 men 
(L.39.20.7-8). Philippus had not acted to gather intelligence on where the Ligurians had 
hidden in the past or where their troops were then stationed before he committed to 
action. Since Livy reports that this pass was then named 'Philippus' (L.39.20.10), in order 
to point out that Philippus could not erase the memory of this defeat no matter what 
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action he might take, it is especially striking that, in Perrhaebia, Philippus again headed 
into enemy territory without advance intelligence of the area, similarly moving through 
mountain passes which the Macedonians in fact had occupied in advance. Philippus had 
not learned from his mistake, but was repeating it. 
 Livy reports on the Roman army's movements: 
However, so steep, rough, and rugged was the road that the advance 
forces, travelling light, barely completed in two days a march of fifteen 
miles before pitching camp. The place they occupied is called + Dierus. 
From Dierus, on the following day they advanced seven miles, seized a 
hill not far from the enemy's camp, and reported by messenger to the 
consul that they were in contact with the enemy, that they had occupied a 
place safe and suitable for all purposes, and that he should follow them as 
rapidly as he could march. While the consul was worrying both over the 
difficulty of the journey upon which he had entered and over the fate of 
the small force which he had sent ahead into the midst of hostile garrisons, 
he was met by the messenger near Lake Ascuris. 
 
ceterum adeo ardua et aspera et confragosa fuit <uia>, ut praemissi 
expediti biduo quindecim milium passuum aegre itinere confecto castra 
posuerint + fuerimque +. Dierum quem cepere locum appellant. inde 
postero die septem <milia> progressi, tumulo haud procul hostium castris 
capto, nuntium ad consulem remittunt peruentum ad hostem esse; loco se 
tuto et ad omnia opportuno consedisse; ut quantum extendere iter posset, 
consequeretur. sollicito consuli et propter itineris difficultatem, quod 
ingressus erat, et eorum uicem, quos paucos inter media praesidia hostium 
praemiserat, nuntius ad Ascuridem paludem occurrit. 
(L.44.3.3-5) 
  
 We learn at the end of this passage that Philippus had chosen the Lake Ascuris 
route. [Figure 5.6] Pritchett proposed the route east from Tripolis to the Karya plain that 
takes the pass between the modern villages of Flampouro and Sikaminea, and Rizakis 
proposed the route via the pass between the modern villages of Olimpiada and 
Sikaminea.492 Each of which covers roughly 24 km, and are thus equivalent to Livy's 15 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 Pritchett 1969, p172; Pritchett 1991, pp 105-109; Rizakis 1986, p335. 
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miles.493 However, the terrain alone of either of these routes is not difficult enough to 
warrant such slow movement. Examining Rizakis' route more closely, from the Roman 
camp this route heads east for 10 km across the Perrhaebian plain before climbing 500 m 
of elevation over 9 km for an average grade of 5.5% and then descending into the plain 
200 m of elevation loss oven 5 km for an average grade of 4%. Using Naismith's Rule, 
this route should have only taken five hours and forty minutes.494 Even taking into 
account that the Romans were moving especially slowly due to the unknown and 
potentially hostile territory, this seems too long to travel this route, especially since the 
Romans had local guides.   
 However, these guides' knowledge of the topography was, in fact, responsible for 
the Romans taking a different route. [Figure 5.7] There was a Macedonian fort on the hill 
just west of the modern village of Karya.495 This fort had views of the entire Karya plain 
from the modern village of Sikaminea to the west, to the eastern edge of the plain 
[Figures 5.8 - 5.11]; from this fort the Macedonian garrsion could have seen any 
movement in the plain. Additionally, this fort had a clear sightline with the Macedonian 
settlement Libethra on the Pierian coast, near the modern village of Leptokarya.496 This 
means that the Macedonians at the fort could have alerted the soldiers on the coast by fire 
signal that the Romans were coming this way.497 Local guides would have known of this 
fort and have led the Romans to avoid being seen. [Figure 5.12] To avoid being seen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 8 Polybian stades equal a Roman mile (Leake 1839). A Roman mile is .92 of a mile. 
494 Both routes are equivalent in distance covered, elevation climbed, and difficulty of travel. Naismith's 
Rule accords one hour for every 5km traveled plus 1 hour for every 600 meters climbed, see e.g. Scarf 
2008, and discussion in chapter 3. 
495 Rizakis 1986; Pritchett 1991.  
496 Libethra: Papazoglou 1988, pp 113-4. 
497 Philip was accustomed to use fire signals (Plb.10.42.7). On the use of ancient military fire signals, see 
Woolliscroft 2001. 
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from the Macedonian fort by Karya, the Romans would have had to stay south of the 
mountain ridge at the southern edge of the Karya plain. The extremely rugged nature of 
this route would account for the slow movement of the Roman army.  
 After two days of slow travel, the Roman advance party camped at a place called 
Dierus. We do not know what or where Dierus was, as we have no other attestation of 
this toponym and the verb capere can be used for occupying an area or a settlement, and 
locus could mean a settlement or an area. That there is no mention of a skirmish and that 
armies in the Second Macedonian War camped at named areas (e.g. Camp of Pyrrhus 
(L.32.13.2), Alexander's Tower (Plb.18.27.1)) suggests that Dierus was an area.498 The 
most likely candidate is an area on the south face of the hills at the southern edge of the 
Karya plain due south of the modern village of Sikaminea.499 This area lay roughly 15 
miles from the Roman camp at Tripolis and could have warranted a toponym because it 
served as a crossroads for the only route south out of the central Karya Plain. 
 From Dierus, the Roman advance party advanced seven miles to a hill. [Figure 
5.13] Roughly seven miles to the east of Dierus are the hills just east of Lake Ascuris. 
Once the advance party had seized a hill here, they sent a messenger back to Philippus, 
who was already at Lake Ascuris. This means that the entire Roman army was at that 
moment only three miles behind the advance force. This means that Philippus and the 
entire army with its elephants and thousands of donkeys had been so close to the advance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 For the argument that Dierus was a fort, see Pritchett 1991, with bibliography.  
499 The toponym Dierus could conceivably have derived from the Greek dieros, meaning "wet, liquid" 
(LSJ), which would be appropriate for where I place Dierus, as a seasonal stream would have run through 
this pass. Another possibility is that it derived from dierchomai, meaning "to pass through" (LSJ), which 
would also be appropriate for this placement as it sits at a pass. It is worth noting that the manuscript is 
corrupt immediately before the mention of this toponym; the crux is the preceding word 'fuerimque', which 
bears some similarity to 'Dierum' in form, and given its position perhaps renders the toponym even less 
certain in the manuscript. 
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force on this third day as to suggest that they had been this close all along, perhaps 
camping at Dierus the previous night as well. By moving this closely behind his advance 
forces, Philippus was continuing to act without first gathering intelligence.  
 The Macedonian camp was near the Roman camp, and so was in the hills east of 
Lake Ascuris as well. This camp consisted of the 12,000 men Perseus had recently sent to 
block the pass (L.44.4.1). Previously, Livy had reported that this garrison was near 
Otolobus (L.44.3.1), but we have no way of determining which hill that name would have 
indicated.500 [Figure 5.14] Pritchett convincingly argued that this Macedonian garrison 
ascended from the Pierian coast by roughly the same route that Xerxes had established in 
480 BC, ascending from Skotina towards the modern village of Kallipefki.501 [Figure 
5.15] A camp on the hill northeast above Kallipefke would have blocked this pass, as 
well as had clear views of the Lake Ascuris district, the fort above Karya, and the Pierian 
coast.502 This fort was thus in a strategic location to report by fire signal to the coast any 
enemy movement in the Lake Ascuris district or the Karya plain, as well as to control the 
pass itself. The wide, flat expanse at the top of this hill had ample room to hold the fort 
for the 12,000 Macedonians.503 
 Livy reports that once Philippus got his report from his advance troops, he 
promptly acted. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Pritchett 1967 (again in 1991, tentatively followed by Briscoe 2012) argued that there is one hill that, 
when viewed from a specific angle, looks definitively more like an earlobe than any other hill in this 
mountainous region, and thus must be this Otolobus. His photo and description fail to convince. I have 
traveled through this area and many hills in the foothills of Olympus could be thought to look abstractly 
earlobe-like. 
501 Pritchett 1961, 1967, 1991.  
502 Pritchett 1991 proposed this location, but for different reasons. 
503 At 7.5 m2 per man, 12,000 men required 90,000 m2, which is a 300 m by 300 m encampment. 
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The consul therefore gained confidence, and after joining the advance 
force encamped on the slopes of the hill which had been seized, in the 
place where the lay of the land was most suitable. Not only the enemy 
camp, a little over a mile away, but the whole region to Dium, Phila, and 
the seashore was before their eyes from such a lofty ridge.  
 
addita igitur et ipsi fiducia est, coniunctisque copiis castra tumulo, qui 
tenebatur, qua aptissimum ad loci naturam erat, sunt adclinata. non 
hostium modo castra, quae paulo plus mille passuum aberant, sed omnis 
regio ad Dium et Philam oraque maris late patente ex tam alto iugo 
prospectu oculis subicitur.  
(L.44.3.6-7 - Chaplin assisted on this trans.) 
 
 [Figure 5.16] The Romans seized the hill roughly one mile south of the hill on 
which the the Macededonians were encamped.504 [Figure 5.17] Once the Roman advance 
force had alerted the main body of the army as to the location of the Macedonian camp, 
the Roman army would have marched around the southern edge of Lake Ascuris and 
approached where they then camped with the Roman-seized hill between them and the 
Macedonian camp. The Roman advance forces on the hill would have protected the 
Roman army's approach. [Figure 5.18] The Romans camped on the western slope of this 
hill, an area large enough and at a gentle enough grade to have held the Roman camp.505 
Additionally, there are numerous old spring houses today in the area east of Kallipefki, 
whose previous Slavic name had meant "spring", indicating that this area could have the 
supplied the Roman camp's water requirements.506  
 [Figure 5.19] From the hill that the Romans seized one can see the Pierian shore, 
but from the next hill south, today called Mt. Metamorphosis and the largest hill in the 
vicinity, one could indeed see from the area around Dion to the area around Phila, if not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 Pritchett 1969, 1991. 
505 A Roman camp was roughly 750m by 750m. See discussion in chapter 3. 
506 Zoukas 2015 B, pp 114-5. 
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the actual cities themselves.507 As the Roman camp lay between Mt. Metamorphosis and 
the Macedonian camp, the Romans would have had access to the view from Mt. 
Metamorphosis. 
 [Figure 5.18] Livy reports the Macedonians and Romans fought skirmishes for 
the next two days with light-armed troops on the ridge and slopes between the 
Macedonian camp and the Roman camp and Roman-held hill (L.44.4.1-6). We have 
previously seen similar situations in which the Macedonians and Romans fought 
skirmishes with light-armed troops while their main forces stayed in camp by the river 
Bevus in Dasseretia in 199 BC (L.31.34.9 - 31.34.7, L.31.36.1-3), at Pherae in 197 BC 
(L.33.6.6), and at the river Aous in 198 BC (L.32.11.6). Additionally, at Cynoscephalae 
in 197 BC (Plb.18.21.4), the initial skirmish escalated to a decisive battle. Both armies 
were thus accustomed to feel each other out by means of light-armed attacks, which then 
either led to one of the armies leaving the field (Bevus and Pherae), or committing to 
decisive battle (Aous and Cynoscephalae). 
On the third day the Roman commander was at a loss; for he could neither 
remain on the ridge without supplies nor retreat without disgrace and even 
danger. 
 
tertio die egere consilio Romanus imperator; nam neque manere in iugo 
inopi neque regredi sine flagitio atque etiam periculo 
(L.44.4.7) 
 Philippus could not stay on the ridge indefinitely as he had no line of supply, and 
retreat would be dangerous, especially taking into consideration his extensive train. 
Philippus had originally set out this season before he had determined a plan, and in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 The Romans would not have encamped on Mt. Metamorphosis as it does not have a large enough flat 
area at the summit to hold the Roman camp, and the sides are too steep to have held a camp. 
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manner not suited to quick movement or movement over harsh terrain. His retreat from 
this position would now require both.  
 Philippus conducted an organized retreat from his camp designed to offer as much 
protection as possible. Philippus left an unspecified number of Roman troops on the 
Roman-controlled hill to protect the Roman retreat (L.44.4.11). The retreat was then led 
by a unit of soldiers clearing a route, with African and Pergamene allied troops protecting 
the soldiers doing the clearing, followed by the cavalry and impedimenta - which here 
included all the baggage animals and elephants -, followed by the legions and Philippus 
(L.44.4.11-12).  
 However, Philippus offset this concern for safety by retreating from his position 
east into the 'pathless' hills rather than back towards the way he had come. Livy reports 
that "the toils of the descent and the damage to the baggage-animals and their loads 
cannot be put into words" (L.44.5.1), and great pains were taken to move the elephants 
through the rugged terrain (L.44.5.2-7). On this first day, the Romans advanced barely 
seven miles (L.44.8.1), but were not pursued by the Macedonians (L.44.4.9, 44.5.8, 
44.5.10).  
 [Figure 5.20] The Macedonian camp prevented the Romans from taking the most 
direct northeast route to the coast by Skotina, the route by which the Macedonians had 
ascended. [Figure 5.21] Instead, the Romans went southeast and then east towards the 
modern village of Aigani. This route would have accounted for their slow movement as 
well as why the Macedonians did not pursue them. First, if the Romans had continued 
southeast, they would have ended up by the Macedonian garrison by Rapsani, which will 
278 	  
	  
be discussed below. [Figure 5.22] Second, the Pierian coast is composed of four 
successive bottlenecks, from south to north, Tempe, by Heracleum, by the Elpeus, and by 
Pydna. If Philippus emerged on the southern side of the bottleneck by Heracleum, then he 
would have been trapped between the two southernmost and easiest to defend 
bottlenecks. His southeastern movement indicated that this was, indeed, where he would 
emerge.  
 Philippus then did not move for the entire second day but waited for the covering 
force left behind by their initial camp to catch up with them (44.5.10). While this 
indicates that the covering force they left behind was substantial and thus worth waiting 
for, these troops were also not pursued by the Macedonians (L.44.5.10). Presumably 
Philippus spent this day of inactivity discussing with his guides where they would go next 
and how they could still emerge north of the Heracleum bottleneck.  
 [Figure 5.23] Now with his entire army reunited, Philippus headed north, passing 
through the Callipeuce pass (L.44.5.11) on the third day of the retreat and [map] finally 
reached the plain between Heracleum and Libethrum on the fourth day (L.44.5.12). This 
route involved the Romans marching north-northwest for the third day, passing to the 
west of the modern village of Poroi and stopping southwest of the modern village of 
Panteleimonas. We do not know where the Callipeuce pass was, but its name ("beautiful 
pines") suggests the forested area on this route, and the valley crossing between Poroi and 
Panteleimonas is a likely candidate for the pass as it is the last especially rugged area of 
the route. [Figure 5.24] On the fourth day the Romans continued north and emerged into 
the plain well north of the Heracleum bottleneck. Once there, they encamped where the 
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hills meet the plain east of Skotina, with part of their camp in the hills and part in the 
plain (L.44.5.12-13).  
 [Figure 5.25] While encamped at Dion, Perseus heard that Philippus had 
bypassed the garrisons that Perseus had sent to stop him and entered Pieria north of the 
Heracleum bottleneck (L.44.6.1; Diod.30.10.1). Perseus promptly gathered the regional 
population and valuables from Dion and moved to Pydna (L.44.6.3).  
 Livy censures Perseus for this action, arguing that Perseus could have trapped the 
Romans between the Tempe and the pass at the Elpeus river (L.44.6.5-17; cp. 
Diod.30.11). However, as Perseus had sent a large percentage of his troops to guard the 
passes, Perseus could have reasonably believed that he could not hold the pass by the 
Elpeus with this limited number of men against the entire Roman army and was thus not 
willing to risk a decisive engagement.  
 Perseus' move is also reminiscent of his father's behavior after his defeat at the 
Battle of the River Aous, when he took the population and food supplies from certain 
strategically placed Thessalian towns with him on his retreat.508 By doing this, Philip 
made it so that the Roman army was unable to live off the land and had to leave Thessaly. 
  Finally, if the Roman navy had attacked Pydna when Perseus was at the Elpeus, 
then Perseus would have been trapped between two bottlenecks himself. As it stood 
though, Perseus had removed himself to a more defensible position, made it more 
difficult for the Romans to live off the land in Pieria, and still left the Romans in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508 See discussion in chapter 4. 
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position where they could not get resupplied due to the Macedonian garrisons at 
Tempe.509  
 [Figure 5.26] Livy reports that Tempe was protected by four garrisons, Gonnus, 
Condylus, Charax, and one in the middle of the Vale itself (L.44.6.9-11). [Figure 5.27] 
Gonnus was located at the western entrance to the Tempe and was a significantly sized, 
well-walled settlement that controlled access to Tempe from the Thessalian side.510 
 [Figure 5.26] Condylus was a permanent fortified garrison up the valley 
northwest from Gonnus.511 Condylus served to help control the western entrance of 
Tempe as well as control the easiest route by which to bypass Tempe, namely going 
directly north from Condylus to Lake Ascuris.  
 Charax, Greek for fortified camp, was on the hill northwest above the modern 
village of Rapsani, where impressive remains of its fortification wall still stand.512 
Besides controlling the eastern access to Tempe, Charax served to control the easiest 
route to Lake Ascuris from Pieria, which ascended from just north of the eastern entrance 
to Tempe to Ascuris via Charax. 
 The most likely possibility for the location of the garrison within the Vale was on 
the southern bank, where the ruins of the Byzantine castle Kastro tis Oraias that used to 
control Tempe stand.513 The 1967 Blue Guide reports that beneath the ruins "are the 
remains of an ancient fortress," however those remains are no longer extant.514 However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 The Roman navy was unwilling to attempt a resupply by sea at this time (L.44.7.10). 
510 Gonnus: Helly 1973. 
511 Condylus: Pritchett 1967, 1991; Helly 1973. 
512 Charax: First identified by Leake 1835 III, p350. See Pritchett 1991, pp 109-112, with bibliography. 
513 Zoukas 2012 B, p 128; Rossiter 1967, p479. 
514 Rossiter 1967, p479. 
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the ancient blocks could be associated with an alternate location on the opposite bank 
where a 13th century church to Aghia Paraskevi was built over an underground 
freshwater spring [Figure 5.28]. However, we cannot know if ancient blocks were 
incorporated into this Byzantine church, as it was razed and rebuilt in 1920 by the 
railway, although the underground spring was preserved.515  
 Philippus realized that he needed to open a supply line through Tempe before the 
30 days of supplies he originally brought with him ran out, and so sent a messenger to the 
Roman garrison at Larisa to tell him to seize the forts controlling Tempe (L.44.7.1).516 
We cannot be sure what route this messenger took, but retracing Philippus' route would 
have taken too long and going through Tempe would have been too risky for such an 
important message. It seems most likely that Philippus sent this messenger with one of 
his local guides through the northern foothills of Mt. Ossa (modern Mt. Kissavos), where 
today there is a network of hiking trails.517 This route would have been too rugged for an 
army but not for a messenger and a local guide. 
 Philippus' inability to resupply his army by sea at this point, even though the navy 
was at Magnesia with cargo ships full of grain (L.44.7.10), casts into stark relief how 
adept Flamininus had been in 198 BC at coordinating his movements with his grain fleet 
over much greater distances.518 Philippus' naval praetor Marcius Figulus (L.44.1.3) 
demonstrated competence both sailing in and landing in hostile areas in this region, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515 Zoukas 2012 B, pp 121-2; Alexander Clapp [pers. comm.]. 
516 When Livy says here that the forts had been abandoned by the Macedonians, he does not mean they are 
without garrisons, as then he could bypass them himself. He means that Perseus has left them without hope 
for reinforcements. 
517 Zoukas 2012 B, pp 182-8, passim. 
518 See discussion in chapter 4. 
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still could not get supplies to Phillipus at the critical juncture as Flamininus' naval 
praetor, and brother, had been able to do repeatedly for him.519 
 [Figure 5.25] Having sent the messenger, Philippus sent an advance force to 
scout the approach to Dium (L.44.7.1), including the crossing of the Elpeus river. 
Similarly to his behavior at Ascuris, Philippus followed closely behind with the army and 
covered the roughly 25 km to Dium on the second day after sending the advance party 
(L.44.7.1). After a day's delay at Dium, Philippus marched north for two days, but did not 
approach Perseus' encampment by Pydna before returning to Dium (L.44.7.4-7). Since it 
is only 25 km of flat ground between Dium and the narrows in front of Pydna, Philippus 
was not covering much ground each day.  
 Knowing that Philippus set out with 30 days of food and has not had the 
opportunity to resupply, examining the events since he set out reveals that he was, 
indeed, out of food. 
Philippus' action Days involved Total days 
Moves Palaepharsalus to 
Larisa 
1 1 
Debates routes at Larisa Approx. 2 3 
March to Tripolis Approx. 3 6 
Wait at Tripolis Approx. 5  11 
March to Dierus 2 13 
March to hills 1 14 
Skirmishes 2 16 
Retreat from hills 4 22 
At camp in Pieria and sends 
messenger 
Approx. 2 24 
March to Dium 2 26 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 After Figulus ferried the army between Italy and Ambracia (L.44.1.3-4), he waged an effective 
campaign of terror on the Macedonian shoreline between Heracleum and Thessalonica (L.44.2.3, 44.9.2, 
44.10.5), and on Pallene (L.44.10.11-12). On the psychological impact of Figulus' seaborne raids, see 
Bragg 2010, pp 52-7. For coordination between Flamininus and his supply fleet, see discussion in chapter 
4. 
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March north and back to 
Dium 
3 29 
Wait at Dium At least 1 30 
Table 4: Calendar of events for 169 BC campaign 
 However, at this moment of crisis, Philippus received word that the forts around 
Tempe and Phila had been secured, and Marcus moved south to Phila to resupply 
(L.44.7.11 - 44.8.1).520  
 [Figure 5.22] At that point, Philippus controlled the southernmost bottleneck of 
Pieria at Tempe, and Perseus controlled the northernmost bottleneck at Pydna. Each then 
acted to control the nearest central bottleneck, as Perseus moved south to Dium and then 
fortified a position on the Elpeus (L.44.8.5-7), and Philippus successfully besieged 
Heracleum (L.44.8.8 - 44.9.10; Plb.28.11).521 Once Heracleum had been taken, Philippus 
moved the army back to Thessaly for winter quarters (L.44.9.9-10) due to a lack of 
supplies in Pieria (Zon.9.22), and the Roman Macedonian campaign in 169 BC was 
over.522  
 Livy reports that Philippus began the campaign audacter (L.44.4.8), which led to 
his getting trapped on the ridge above Lake Ascuris. Philippus remedied this with 
pertinax audacia (L.44.4.8) which he executed audaciter (L.44.4.11) and was able to 
reach the Pierian plain. However, Livy makes plain that Philippus succeeded in 
completing this route safely solely due to incompetence on the Macedonians' part 
(L.44.4.9, 44.5.10, 44.6.6-17), going so far as to say that Perseus' ineptitude turned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520 The forts were secured by force (L.44.35.7). 
521 After the capture of Heracleum, there is a substantial naval campaign in Macedon (L.44.10.5 - 44.12.8). 
522 Philippus did still wage a small campaign in Thessaly before he went into winter quarters, 
unsuccessfully sending 5000 men to attack Meliboea while the fleet made a failed attempt on Demetrias 
(L.44.13.1-6).  
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Philippus' temeritas into audacia (L.44.6.4). Philippus was successful in the 169 BC 
campaign in that he did not lose a battle, but he was also not successful in that he did not 
win a battle either. At the end of the campaign he has gained only Tempe. Philippus' 
reliance on audacia led to a campaign that fizzled out due to lack of supplies and was not 
enough to defeat Perseus. 
Part II: The 168 campaign 
 Livy reports Philippus' winter dispatches back to the senate concerning how he 
had forced the pass into Macedon, and had diligently coordinated the food supply for the 
troops for the winter, as well as his report of the army's needs for the upcoming season 
concerning grain supply, clothes, and horses (L.44.16.1-3).523 Philippus' stress on 
logistical preparation here seems striking compared to his more free-wheeling behavior 
during the 169 BC campaign. The narrative of the Macedonian campaign, in fact, now 
shifts its focus from boldness to careful preparations and concern over logistics.  
 Livy reports that during winter 169/168 BC, Lucius Aemilius Paullus was elected 
consul (L.44.17.4) and assigned Macedon by lot (L.44.18.10).524 Not willing to rely upon 
only Philippus' dispatches, Paullus requested the senate525 to send envoys to Macedon to 
gather intelligence and report back on logistical concerns for the upcoming campaign: 1) 
how many reinforcements the army required, 2) how many men the Macedonians had, 3) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 The senate acted to remedy all Philippus' stated needs (L.44.16.4), including arranging to pay for the 
grain Philippus had already purchased. It is worth noting that the 30,000 modii of grain mentioned as 
supplied by Epirotes was only eleven days worth of grain for Philippus' two legion army; substantially 
more grain had been purchased by Philippus for the winter. 
524 Plutarch reports, in contrast, that Macedon was assigned to Paullus and that he was elected consul 
specifically to prosecute the war (Plut.Aem. 10.1-5). Livy, as well, hints at such a possibility (L.44.17.1-3).  
525 Paullus' display of using the proper diplomatic channels here in notable in contrast with his inscription at 
Delphi which mentions neither the senate nor people of Rome. 
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what areas were under Roman control, 4) what areas were under Macedonian control, 5) 
what was the nature of the Roman camp in relation to the topography, 6) were the allies 
loyal, 7) what was the state of the food supply, and 8) what were the lines of supply 
between this food supply and the Roman camp (L.44.18.2-4).  
 19th and 20th century theorists of waging war, such as Clausewitz and Burne, 
have likewise focused on these same concepts of manpower, control of terrain, 
importance of allies, food supply, and lines of supply and communication as being crucial 
for military victory.526 Eric Marsden argued that since Polybius understood the 
importance of these very concepts, Polybius was an "advanced, even modern'" military 
mind.527 This leaves the question whether Paullus also had such a military mind or 
whether Polybius and Livy had shaped Paullus' behavior to be more focused on logistics 
than it actually was. While this is an intractable problem, we can still look at this passage 
as at least a clarification of what Polybius and Livy thought were the middle Republican 
logistical concerns that directly led to military success.  
 Livy reports that Paullus refused to make or discuss with the senate his plans for 
the upcoming campaign until he had heard the intelligence report from the envoys sent to 
Macedon, going so far as to postpone his expected report to the senate on his upcoming 
campaign (L.44.19.1-3). This directly contrasts with Philippus' behavior, who began his 
campaign before he had a plan, repeatedly acted without gathering sufficient intelligence, 
and repeatedly sent out advance forces but then acted before they had reported back.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 Clausewitz 1832-7; Burne 1944. 
527 Marsden 1973, with a history of 19th century theorists of war on p275, and discussion of Burne's 
principles on pp 276-8. 
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The envoys report that the army has been led into Macedonia by trackless 
passes at a risk disproportionate to the gain. Pieria, which the army had 
reached, the king holds; the encampments are so nearly in contact that 
hardly more than the Elpeus river separates them. The king does not offer 
battle, and our forces have not the strength to compel him to do so.  
 
ii nuntiant maiore periculo quam emolumento exercitum per inuios saltus 
in Macedoniam inductum. Pieriam, quo processisset, regem tenere; castra 
castris prope ita conlata esse, ut flumine Elpeo interiecto arceantur. neque 
regem pugnandi potestatem facere, nec nostris uim ad cogendum esse. 
(L.44.20.2-3) 
 
The next section of the report is corrupt (L.44.20.4), but the sense seems clear that "the 
soldiers had to be fed at a time when they could not undertake foraging operations."528 
The report concludes by reporting that the Macedonians had 30,000 troops (L.44.20.4),529 
and that the Roman army at Lynchnidus was in danger, the Pergamene navy had gone 
home, and that the Sicilian allies had deserted the Roman fleet (L.44.20.5-7). 
 In their report, the envoys directly addressed all eight of Paullus' logistical 
questions: 1) The Romans did not have enough men to force battle, so we know that they 
needed significant reinforcements. 2) The Macedonians had 30,000 men. 3) The Romans 
had been in Pieria during the previous campaign, but 4) Perseus currently held Pieria. 5) 
The Roman camp was at the Elpeus. 6) Certain allies were wavering in their loyalty. 7) 
Although imprecise due to the state of the text, the food supply was neither bountiful, nor 
8) its supply route secured, especially with the navy in disarray due to Sicilian defections.  
 The envoys were markedly successful in gathering the information Paullus had 
wanted. Additionally, they introduced their report with a censure of the previous year's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528 Briscoe 2012, p528. See Briscoe 2012, p527-8 for full discussion of the passage and proposed 
emendations as well as Briscoe 1986, 227 for the app. crit. 
529 cf. L.42.55.11 where the Macedonians have 43,000 troops. The difference is that many of those troops 
are stationed around the different active fronts. 
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campaign based on a cost-benefit analysis, i.e. the risk outweighed the gain. Excessive 
risk, one might say audacia, was deprecated on the senate floor compared to careful 
preparation, of the kind in which they, and Paullus, were then engaged. 
 However, one aspect of the envoys' report did not reflect the current 
circumstances in Pieria, as the Roman position on the Elpeus referred to a future 
situation. While the Romans had been in Pieria the previous season, as the envoys 
reported, they were at that moment not encamped on the Elpeus but in Thessaly. As 
discussed below, it was only after Paullus arrived there in the spring and moved the camp 
from Thessaly that the Romans encamped at the Elpeus.  
 The rest of the envoys' report did address the current situation, including the need 
for additional troops. In response, the senate decreed that each legion in the two-legion 
army in Macedon would be increased to 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry (L.44.21.8), from 
its standard size of 4200 to 5000 infantry and 300 cavalry (Plb.6.20.8).530 According to 
Polybius' description of the Roman army, this would make for 26,400 land troops for the 
Macedonian war (Plb.6.20, 26), a number relatively close to Perseus' reported 30,000 
troops.531 
 Livy reports that Perseus spent the winter failing to secure alliances for military 
and diplomatic assistance with the Illyrians (L.44.27.8-12; App.Mac.18.1; Dio 20.1), the 
Pergamenes (L.44.24.7 - 44.25.12, 44.27.13; App.Mac.18.1; Dio 20.1; Plb.29.5-8) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
530 See Dobson for a survey of Middle Republican legion sizes in Polybius and Livy. It is worth noting that 
the senate did not panic and send a third legion, and in fact a limit of two legions was explicitly instituted 
(L.44.21.8). The senate was not yet making this an extraordinary military situation. 
531 26,400 land troops equals two Roman legions at 6300 men each plus an equal number of allied infantry 
with three times as many allied cavalry as the legions supplied (6000 + 6000 + 6000 + 6000 + 300 + 300 + 
900 + 900). 
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the Gauls (L.44.26; Plut.Aem.12.3 - 13.1; App.Mac.18.1-3; Diod.30.19). While the 
ancient sources censure Perseus for miserliness for these failed alliances (L.44.26.1, 
44.27.1,8; Plb.29.9; Plut.Aem.12.3 - 13.3; App.Mac.18; Dio 20.1; Diod.30.19), Livy's 
report of Perseus' reasoning that having 10,000 Gallic cavalry and 10,000 Gallic infantry 
march from the northern border of Macedon through to the camp at the Elpeus in Pieria 
might result in the Macedonians "finding the Gauls more deadly as allies than the 
Romans were as enemies" (L.44.26.13) is a compelling and convincing reason for 
Perseus to have refused their help. 
 Livy proposes a campaign that Perseus could have had the Gauls wage, had 
Perseus not bungled the alliance. [Figure 5.1] The Gauls could have moved through 
Perrhaebia into Thessaly and then ravaged Thessaly so badly that the Romans would not 
have been able to forage from Thessaly to feed their troops, and thus would have had to 
retire from their camp at the Elpeus (L.44.27.4-6). This route from Macedon through 
Perrhaebia into Thessaly is the same route that Perseus had taken in 171 BC, but where 
that campaign was designed to secure the routes between Thessaly and Macedon, this 
proposed campaign was designed to disrupt the Romans' line of supply. Cutting off their 
line of supply from Larissa through Tempe would have, indeed, forced the Romans back 
into Thessaly and out of Pieria as there was not enough arable land to forage in Pieria to 
support an army. In fact, Appian censures Perseus for not adopting a similar strategy 
himself, arguing that "Perseus was so foolish that while wintering with a large army at 
Phila [in 169/168 BC] he made no incursion into Thessaly, which furnished supplies to 
the Romans" (App. Mac. 18.3). In the 169 BC campaign and then in the following winter, 
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Perseus did not act to move the theater of war out of Macedon, but acted to secure the 
Macedonian end of the routes by which the Romans would invade. In contrast, Philip had 
repeatedly taken the initiative to keep the Roman theater of war in Illyria and then 
Thessaly.   
 At some point during the winter of 169/168 BC, Perseus moved from Phila to the 
north bank of the Elpeus where he built a well-placed and extremely well-fortified 
encampment (L.44.32.10; Plut.Aem.13.5; Zon.9.23). However, fear of a Roman attack on 
multiple fronts again compelled Perseus to split his forces: at least 3,000 soldiers were 
sent to guard Thessalonica and the coasts (L.44.32.6-8) from potential naval assault, and 
5,000 to garrison Pythous and Petra (L.44.32.9) to prevent a Roman surrounding 
movement through Perrhaebia.  
 In the spring, Paullus met the Roman camp in Thessaly after a rapid journey from 
Italy and took over control of the army (App. Mac.19; Plut.Aem.12.1). Livy reports that 
once Paullus was in control of the army, he continued his behavior of focusing on careful 
logistical preparation before taking decisive action. Paullus made the system of 
communications within the army more efficient (L.44.33.5-7, 44.34.2, 4-5),532 changed 
both the sentries' equipment and system of operation (L.44.33.8-11), and imposed new 
regulations concerning the soldiers maintenance of their personal health, equipment, and 
personal supply of cooked rations (L.44.33.4, 44.34.3). Paullus moved the Roman camp 
to Phila and found nearby freshwater wells for the camp's water supply (L.44.33.1-3), and 
scouted the area for a new camp by the Elpeus (L.44.33.4). As Livy and Appian report 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 Polybius highly praises the Roman system of communications within the army as a key element of their 
military success in book 6.  
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that from when Paullus showed up at the camp until the battle of Pydna was only fifteen 
days (L.45.41.3-5; App.Mac.19), these preparations and innovations were accomplished 
rather quickly. 
 [Figure 5.29] Livy reports that Paullus then moved the Roman camp from Phila 
to opposite the Macedonian camp at the Elpeus (L.44.34.10), in which camp Plutarch 
reports that Perseus still had almost 40,000 heavy-infantry as well as 4000 cavalry 
(Plut.Aem.13.4).533 This is a significantly larger number than the 30,000 troops that the 
Roman envoys had reported to the senate. We are left to infer that either the envoys had 
deliberately reduced the number in their report - perhaps in order to make the war seem 
less of a risk -, or that Perseus had increased the number of troops at his camp through 
some combination of levy, allied reinforcements, and movement of troops from other 
Macedonian theaters of operations such as their northern and eastern borders. The latter 
option seems more likely as we have no evidence of such deceitful activity in the senate 
at this time, but we do know that Perseus knew that the Romans were going to try to 
engage him in a decisive battle in the upcoming season. 
 Plutarch reports that Perseus planned to use his fortified location to delay battle in 
order to force the Romans to abandon the area due to the expense of maintaining their 
army in Pieria (Plut.Aem.13.4-5). This was a similar strategy to that employed by Philip 
at the Battle of the River Aous, namely embedding oneself in a secure location with a 
secure line of supply and trusting that the Romans could not, or would not, maintain an 
army in the field so far from Italy. Additionally, Perseus' plan to force the Romans to 
leave on account of the difficulties in maintaining their supply line aimed at the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 This is the placement of the Roman camp to which the envoys' report had referred.  
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conceptual goal as the plans for cutting the supply line through Tempe that Livy and 
Appian had previously censured him for not enacting. 
 While encamped on opposite sides of the Elpeus, both armies heard of the Roman 
defeat of Gentius' Illyrian army (L.44.35.1-2). While Livy stresses the impact this had on 
the morale of both armies, in fact both generals knew Gentius was not coming. Perseus 
had alienated Gentius by not paying him, and Paullus knew that the Romans had 
committed a praetor with two legions to Illyria and that Gentius would have had to stay to 
deal with this. 
 Paullus now faced a situation similar to that faced by the Romans at the Aous in 
198 BC and at Thermopylae in 191 BC. The enemy was encamped in a spot that the 
consul understood to have been "impregnable by nature and by fortification" (L.44.35.8), 
while the secure supply lines for each army suggested that the standoff could last 
indefinitely. Livy reports Paullus' dismissals of both a frontal attack on the Macedonian 
camp and combining a frontal attack with a naval attack on Thessalonica (L.44.35.6-9). 
Livy's reader understands Paullus was right to reject these plans as Livy had previously 
described Perseus' camp's extensive defensive works (L.44.32.10-11, 44.35.9) and 
reported that Perseus had already sent troops to Thessalonica to counter just such an 
attack (L.44.32.6-8). 
 Instead, Paullus chose a plan similar to that Flamininus had employed at the 
Aous, namely, to use local guides to lead a surrounding force around and behind the 
Macedonian camp by a route that the guides had revealed to him (L.44.35.10-13).534 
There are differences in the relationships of Paullus and Flamininus with their respective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534 At Thermopylae in 191 BC, in contrast, the guides were POWs. 
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guides, in that Paullus summoned the guides to him, whereas it had been the guides' 
initiative to go to Flamininus, and that Paullus had previously known his guides and had 
already established a relationship of trust with them, whereas Flamininus had to check 
with the local headman Charopus on their trustworthiness. Just when it was that Paullus 
had met, and established this relationship, with these local Perrhaebian guides in the six 
days that he had been in Pieria is not explained.535 However, Paullus' behavior here is 
consistent with his previous focus on careful preparation to minimize risk with no 
reliance on luck. Whereas Flamininus had been at an impasse at the Aous and was saved 
by the fortuitous arrival of the local guides, Paullus took the initiative to get the local 
guides to solve his problem. Paullus' behavior here contrasts with Flamininus' similarly to 
how Paullus' behavior elsewhere in this campaign contrasts with Philippus'. 
 Livy reports that the guides told Paullus that the Macedonians had forces guarding 
the Petra pass (L.44.35.11) and this accords with Livy's earlier report that Perseus had 
sent 5000 men to guard Pythous and Petra. In contrast, Plutarch reports that the route via 
Pythium and Petra was unguarded (15.2).  
 Livy reports that Paullus ordered the fleet to sail to Heracleum with "tens days' 
cooked rations for 1000 men" (L.44.35.13), from the Roman naval base at Oreus 
(L.44.30.1).536 Paullus then sent 5000 men under his son Quintus Fabius Maximus and 
Publius Scipio Nasica from the Elpeus camp south to Heracleum (L.44.35.14).537 
Plutarch, stating that he was using a letter of Nasica as his source, reports that Nasica 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 See below for a calendar of events for Paullus in Pieria. 
536 The Roman naval positions at Oreus and Sciathus (L.44.13.10-11) would have served, in part, to 
blockade the Macedonian port of Demetrias. 
537 Both of these were one-day journeys. 
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instead took 8,000 infantry and 320 cavalry with him to Heracleum, in contrast to an 
unspecified number that Plutarch claims Polybius had reported (Plut.Aem.15.5-7).  
 There is a potential way to reconcile these numbers. At the Aous, Flamininus had 
similarly sent 300 cavalry to act as an advance force for the first stage of the surrounding 
mission who were then not to continue into the rugged terrain (L.32.11.7). The 320 
cavalry here could have served the same purpose for Nasica from Heracleum south to 
where they entered the mountains, and for the first part of their movement into the 
mountains to the west.538 3,000 of Nasica's men could have been left with the fleet, as 
Zonaras reports that four days from Nasica's arrival at Heracleum the fleet sailed north 
from Heracleum along the Pierian coast (Zon.9.23).  
 Livy reports that Nasica's 5000 men were to pretend to get on the ships at 
Heracleum in order to feign that they were mounting a naval attack (L.44.35.14), but 
instead pick up the cooked rations that the fleet had waiting for them and follow the 
guides on the overland surrounding route through Perrhaebia (L.44.35.15-16).539 Paullus' 
strategy of using a small raiding party with cooked rations was similar to that employed 
by Cato in Spain in 195 BC (L.34.12.7) and Scipio in Asia in 190 BC (37.37.5). Cooked 
rations weighed less and took up less volume than grain.540 Additionally, bringing cooked 
rations eliminated the need for food preparation equipment, mules to carry that 
equipment, the time needed to prepare and cook food, and cooking fires that could alert 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
538 The path becomes too steep for the cavalry where the houses at the western end of the modern village of 
Pyrgetos end. 
539 This strategy is pretty identical to that of Cato's in Spain in 195 BC (L.34.12.7ff). Additionally, there 
was a similar action before Magnesia in 190 BC (L.37.37.5). 
540 Roman cooked rations were hardtack. For discussion of Roman cooked rations, see Roth 2012, pp51-3.  
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the enemy to one's presence. As a result, bringing cooked rations indicated that quick, 
decisive action would be taken. 
  Livy reports that "the guides were instructed to arrange to stages of the journey 
so that they could attack Pythous in the fourth watch of the third day" (L.44.35.15). 
Plutarch adds to this that the route went "through Perrhaebia past the Pythium and Petra" 
(Plut.15.2).541 Ten days of food for 1,000 men is two days of food for 5,000 men, and as 
Paullus had recently established in his logistical innovations upon his arrival at the camp 
that each soldier was to always have a personal supply of cooked rations always prepared 
(L.44.34.3), we should understand that Nasica's force now had food for roughly four 
days. Since they were to arrive at Pythous on the third day and Petra was one day's march 
from there, Nasica had just the right amount of food for the mission. Paullus planned the 
route in advance and then arranged for the men to have exactly the amount of food they 
needed to complete the route, which was in direct contrast with Philippus' march through 
Perrhaebia for which he had brought 30 days of food and then later chose a route.  
 Nasica's force traveled the roughly 20 km to Heracleum to make a show of going 
to the fleet, picked up their cooked rations, and that night began their route through 
Perrhaebia (Plut.Aem.15.2). There were three potential routes for Nasica to get from 
Heracleum to Pythous. [Figure 5.29] The first route went southwest through Tempe and 
then turned northwest and entered Perrhaebia at the southern entrance to the central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 Similar to his narrative of the Battle of Thermopylae in 191 BC, Plutarch gives an alternate account 
from Livy of the encircling mission and claims to rely on personal accounts that other historians had not 
used. 
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Perrhaebian plain.542 However, this route is just over 100 km and would have been very 
difficult to complete in the specified time.  
 The second route followed the track that the Macedonian garrison had taken in 
169 BC from by Skotina to the Lake Ascuris district before continuing through the Karya 
plain to Pythous.543 This route was significantly shorter than the Tempe route, being less 
than 60 km, however this route still went through the rugged and heavily wooded north 
face of the foothills of Mt. Olympus. 
 However, there was a third route that offered a much less rugged passage between 
Pieria and Lake Ascuris to which the Romans had access due to their control of Tempe. 
Starting from Phila, the route ascends west to Charax and then continues northwest to 
Lake Ascuris, from where it then continues by the same route as the second potential 
route. [Figure 5.30] This route from Phila to Rapsani to Lake Ascuris is easy enough to 
today be a scenic hiking trail. Additionally, the Macedonian army at the Elpeus might 
have seen the Nasica's force setting off into the mountains, while they could not have 
seen any movement between Heracleum and Phila.	  
 [Figure 5.31] Over the course of this night they ascended to Lake Ascuris and 
stopped at the western end of the lake. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542 Supported by Leake 1835 III, p430; Kromayer 1907, p303. Pritchett 1969, p159 argues against this 
route. 
543 Supported by Pritchett 1969, pp 159-160; Hammond & Walbank 1988, p545. 
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 Livy reports that during the next day, while Nasica's force rested, Paullus attacked 
the Macedonian camp with light-armed troops to keep the king from "investigating the 
other projects" (L.44.35.16).544  
 That night Nasica's force went west across the Karya plain, moved north to the 
northwest corner of the plain, and then crossed the low pass before stopping by the 
modern village of Olimpiada. At the end of this night's journey, Nasica's force had 
consumed the two days of cooked rations they had picked up at Heracleum and were now 
relying on their own prepared rations. 
 While Nasica's force rested the next day, Paullus again attacked the Macedonian 
camp with light-armed troops (L.44.35.21-22).  
 On this third night of their mission, Nasica's force was supposed to attack Pythous 
during the fourth watch, between 3am to 6am.545 This was only a roughly 12 km march, 
which would have allowed Nasica to surprise the garrison at Pythous before dawn. 
However, Livy's text breaks off here and we have only Plutarch's narrative for what 
happened, and Plutarch mentions no battle, focusing instead on Pythous' role in 
Xenagoras' measurement of Mt. Olympus. Plutarch's account has other anomalies, such 
as that Nasica marched from Heracleum to Pythous in one night (Plut.Aem.15.8), an 
impossible journey.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
544 Which is the opposite from Plutarch's account, in which Paullus keeps Perseus from suspecting an 
encircling maneuver by not attacking the Macedonian camp (16.1). 
545 On the fourth watch being between 3 am and 6 am, see Hammond & Walbank 1988, p346. 
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 The next day, while Nasica rested and presumably resupplied at Pythous, Paullus 
changed tactics and did not attack the Macedonian, but instead feigned a crossing of the 
Elpeus by the sea to hold Perseus' attention (L.44.35.23).546  
 On the fourth night, Nasica marched roughly 25 km from Pythous to Petra where 
they successfully attacked the Macedonian garrison there. Plutarch reports that Polybius 
wrote that the Macedonians were asleep when the Romans attacked but that Nasica wrote 
that the Romans won a hard fought victory (Plut. 16.3). Plutarch and Livy differ in their 
reports of what Macedonians Nasica defeated. Livy had previously reported that the 
Perrhaebian guides had told Paullus that the pass was already protected, and that Perseus 
had sent 5000 troops to guard Petra and Pythous.547 However, Plutarch reports that while 
that Nasica was camped at Pythous a Cretan deserter told Perseus that the Romans were 
attempting this surrounding route (Plut. 16.1), and Perseus responded by sending 12,000 
men to occupy the pass, a roughly 25 km march from the Macedonian camp. Either way, 
Nasica defeated a Macedonian garrison, forced the pass, and was now in the Pierian plain 
behind Perseus' camp on the Elpeus (Plut.Aem.16.3).  
 [Figure 5.32] Once Perseus realized that the Romans had again gotten through 
the mountains and into the plain as they had the previous year, he retreated his position 
back towards Pydna (Plut.16.3-5; Z.9.23), as he had also done in the previous year. 
Zonaras reports that Perseus also saw the Roman fleet going north up the coast and that 
this factored into his decision to pull back to Pydna (Z.9.23). Perseus had to retreat to 
Pydna not because he was concerned that his camp at the Elpeus would be surrounded, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546 At this point in the narrative the text of Livy breaks off. 
547 Zonaras also reports that the pass was already being occupied by a garrison  (Zon.9.23). 
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but because Nasica and the fleet could each threaten his single line of supply through the 
Pydna bottleneck. Feeding more than 40,000 people required an enormous amount of 
food - on the order of 35 tons of grain a day. However, Perseus had stockpiled sufficient 
grain to feed an army this large for this campaign as well as for years to come (L.42.12.8; 
cp. Plut.Aem.13.4). Perseus needed to protect his supply line through the Pydna 
bottleneck and thus immediately abandoned his impregnable position on the Elpeus when 
he thought Pydna to be threatened. Perseus' immediate abandonment of his position on 
the Elpeus was not cowardice but a swift and decisive strategic move. 
 Perseus moved from the Elpeus roughly 25 km north along the Pierian coast to the 
camp he had established the previous year, and perhaps even earlier, roughly 3.5 km 
south of Pydna and 2.5 km east of the modern village of Kitros. While this camp would 
have required a minimum of 330,000 m2 at 7.5 m2 per man, the larger the defensive 
works associated with the camp, the more that Perseus could block the bottleneck and 
make his position more impregnable. [Figures 5.33 & 5.34 ] As such, estimating Perseus' 
camp to have been the size of a double-consular Roman camp for approximately the same 
number of men seems reasonable, and would have then extended 1500 m by 750 m. 
Since Perseus promptly moved to this camp in 169 BC and in 168 BC when threatened, 
we should understand that Perseus had an established fortified camp there, as it already 
having a rampart and many towers built (L.44.39.8) would attest. This already prepared 
camp would have greatly aided the speed with which Perseus was able to reestablish his 
defensive position. Perseus was prepared to quickly march his troops north to his camp 
by Pydna should his supply line be threatened. 
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 Perseus' camp by Pydna had the advantage over the camp at the Elpeus of having 
before it "a plain for his phalanx" (Plut.Aem.16.8), as the phalanx needed a large flat 
plain, ideally 20 stades wide, to succeed (Plb.18). As shown on Figure 5.33, in front of 
the camp there was a flat plain 20 stades wide that ran northwest-southeast between the 
rolling hills to the west (Plut.Aem.16.8) and the shore to the east. Plutarch mentions that 
two seasonal rivers ran through this area (Plut.Aem.16.9), but a survey of the landscape 
shows that the rolling hills to the west channel seasonal streams from the high foothills of 
Mt. Olympus through this area that would have changed courses over time, making a 
definite identification of these rivers impossible, but confirming that this landscape 
accords with Plutarch's general description. 
 [Figure 5.32] Paullus did not attack the organized and efficient Macedonian 
retreat, but instead moved to rejoin with Nasica's forces (Plut.17.1). Paullus moved 
roughly 13 km northwest to the plain just north of the modern village of Vrontou and 
southwest of the modern village of Kondariotissa. After defeating the Macedonian 
garrison at Petra, Nasica continued east from Petra into Pieria and then turned north and 
to meet Paullus' army in the plain by Vrontou, covering a total of roughly 15 km. Paullus 
then took the rest of the day to allow Nasica's men to rest and to plan for the upcoming 
assault on Perseus' new encampment. 
 The next morning the Roman army marched northeast across the low rolling hills 
20 km towards the Macedonian camp in roughly 4 hours, arriving in the heat of midday 
(L.44.36.1-2). [Figure 5.35] Perseus already had his phalanx drawn up in front of the 
camp (L.44.37.4, 44.38.5, 44.38.11; Plut.Aem.17.2), and took advantage of the 
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topography and the direction of the Roman approach to align it at a northwest-southeast 
angle. The Romans approached from the southwest across the rolling hills to keep from 
walking directly into the phalanx and to stay on ground better fit for the maniples than the 
phalanx. Once the Romans were roughly 3.5 km west of the phalanx, they drew up into 
their battle formation (L.44.36.4-5) in a roughly north-south direction in the foothills. 
This was a strategic choice as it gave them two advantages: first, that they would be 
fighting downhill; and second, that lining up his army in these rolling hills meant that  
 
Paullus had posted his forces in a position to which the phalanx could not 
be advanced, since even slightly unfavorable terrain makes a phalanx 
useless. 
 
eo loco signa constituisset, quo phalanx, quam inutilem uel mediocris 
iniquitas loci efficeret, promoueri non posset. 
(L.44.37.8) 
  Paullus managed to set up camp behind his troops to the west and withdraw into it 
and avoided battle that day, and Perseus made no attack while the Romans did this 
(L.44.36.6-8, 44.37.1-4, 11; Plut.Aem.17.5-6).548 Livy reports that Paullus gave an 
encomium to the Roman camp and explained to his officers the importance of securing 
food, water, and a palisade before committing to battle (L.44.38.5 - 44.39.5), which 
served to further emphasize how Paullus left nothing to chance and attempted to 
minimize risk at all times through continual careful logistical planning. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548 Livy reports that at this point Nasica laments that if they did not attack immediately, they would have 
greater danger wandering about the wilderness chasing Perseus as previous leaders had done (L.44.36.10). 
This is reminiscent of Vilius' and Flamininus' choices at the Aous whether to take the more dangerous route 
or wander around in the wilderness after Philip as earlier leaders had done (L.32.6.3, 32.9.10), except that 
at Pydna delay leads to both choices from the Aous, i.e. danger and wandering. 
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 The Battle of Pydna occurred the next day, which we know was June 21, 168 BC, 
as the previous evening there was an eclipse (L.44.37.5-9; Plut.Aem.17.7-9).549 Since 
Appian reports that it was fifteen days from when Paullus took over the army in the field 
to when he fought the battle of Pydna (App.Mac.19), we can determine a calendar of 
events for Paullus' activities in Pieria: 
Paullus'	  action	   Days	  involved	  per	  action	   Total	  days	   Date	  Arrives	  in	  Thessaly	   0	   0	   June	  6	  Moves	  to	  Phila	   1	   1	   June	  7	  Institutes	  military	  reforms	   2	   3	   June	  8-­‐9	  Moves	  to	  Elpeus	   1	   4	   June	  10	  News	  of	  Illyria	  arrives	   1	   5	   June	  11	  Meets	  with	  guides	   1	   6	   June	  12	  Message	  to	  Oreus	   1	   7	   June	  13	  Fleet	  to	  Heracleum	   1	   8	   June	  14	  Nasica	  to	  Petra	   4	   12	   June	  15-­‐18	  Perseus	  retreats/	  Romans	  join	  forces	   1	   13	   June	  19	  Romans	  march	  to	  Perseus	   1	   14	   June	  20	  Battle	  of	  Pydna	   1	   15	   June	  21	  
Table 5: Calendar of events for 168 BC campaign 
This calendar of events makes clear that Paullus acted decisively and rapidly throughout 
these fifteen days, including instituting his military reforms in three days, and committing 
to Nasica's surrounding route only 8 days after arrival.  
 While we know what day the battle occurred, we have limited evidence with 
which to determine what actually happened in the battle.550 Neither army pressed for 
battle in the morning (L.44.37.10; Plut.Aem.17.12 - 18.1), and by the afternoon the sun 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549 See Briscoe 2012, pp 584-6 for discussion. 
550 In contrast, Zonaras reports that after Paullus moved the Roman camp there was no fighting "for a good 
many days" (Z.9.23). 
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was no longer in the Romans' eyes (Plut.Aem.17.13), meaning that the Roman line faced 
east from the Roman camp towards the Macedonian camp [Figure 5.36]. Late in the 
afternoon (L.44.52.9; Plut.Aem.18.1), a small skirmish began across a seasonal river. 
Livy reports that a small number of Romans and Macedonian-allied Thracians began the 
fighting over a loose pack animal (L.44.40.7-9).551  
 Plutarch acknowledges this same story, but gives an alternate account in which 
Paullus set loose a horse without a bridle to start the fighting (Plut.Aem.18.1-2). [Figure 
5.37] Paullus himself put up a relief at Delphi in 167 BC commemorating Pydna on 
which he clearly depicted a horse without a bridle in the middle of Roman and 
Macedonian soldiers.552 Paullus' self-presentation thus highlighted the role of this horse, 
perhaps a signifier of divine providence, as instrumental to his victory, rather than 
diligent preparation and focus on quotitian activities, such as are depicted on Trajan's 
column. 
This is in sharp contrast to Livy's narrative that attributes Paullus' success to his 
methodical and careful preparation. 
 [Figure 5.35] The skirmish then escalated into a full-blown battle (L.44.40.7 - 
44.52.6; Plut.Aem.18.1 - 21.5), which the Romans won overwhelmingly (L.44.52.7-8; 
Plut.Aem.21.6-7), in only an hour (Plut.Aem.22.1).553 This was an incredibly short period 
of time for a battle involving so many men to both develop and be resolved and would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 Such undisciplined and reckless behavior by his allied troops would support Perseus' earlier reluctance 
to form further alliances to add more allies to his army. 
552 For the Aemilius Paullus freize at Delphi, see Kähler 1965; Hammond & Walbank 1988, pp 613-7; 
Taylor 2016. Plutarch was a priest at Delphi 270 years later and one cannot shake the feeling that he was 
using this relief as a source for the events of the battle. 
553 Perseus never even got to take advantage of his awesome anti-elephant troops (Zon.9.22). 
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not have allowed for time for changes of tactics or strategies, only disorganized conflict 
and slaughter. The Roman maniple was much better prepared for both disorganized 
conflict as well as gradual escalation of battle (Plb.18.31.12 - 18.32.5, 18.32.9-12), as 
seen previously at the Battle of Cynoscephalae.554 
 The Macedonian army had been crushed, and with it, the Macedonian empire. All 
of Greece, Macedon, and Illyria was now in Roman control, should they choose to seize 
it. 
Conclusions 
 In 198 BC, Philip encamped in the Aous valley in southern Illyria to force the 
Romans to deal with him there. The Romans had been advancing steadily eastward the 
past two years from the Adriatic coast into Macedonian territory and Philip acted to move 
the theater of war from Macedonian territory to Illyria. 
 In contrast, in 169 BC after the Romans had spent two years establishing control 
of northeastern Thessaly, Perseus encamped in Macedonian Pieria and sent out 
contingents to defend the Macedonian side of assorted routes into Macedon. Perseus and 
Philip both acted to defeat the Romans by encamping in unassailable locations, however, 
Philip had also managed to keep the war out of Macedon. In 171 BC, Rome had decided 
they were bringing the fight into Macedon and Perseus did not act to put that fight in a 
different place.  
 Like Flamininus at the Aous, Paullus showed up to a situation at a standstill and 
promptly forced the issue and won. The speed with which Paullus committed to actions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 See chapter 4 discussion. 
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e.g. getting to the army from Italy, moving the army into Pieria, committing to the 
surrounding route, and committing to the decisive battle, allowed Paullus to maintain the 
initiative and forced Perseus to always be reacting. 
 This chapter saw Rome open a new theater of war as well as a new policy for 
dealing with the defeated. Rather than leave Macedon intact in order to maintain the 
balance of power or to gain a client state, Rome reorganized the administrative structure 
of Macedon. Rome had imposed new administrative structures on peoples in Greece they 
had freed from someone else's control, as they had with the Thessalians, but had not done 
this to a people they had defeated. Rome's foreign policy in Greece after Pydna would 
prove to be distinctly different than it had been before.  
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CONCLUSION 	  
 This dissertation grapples with the period between 200 and 168 BC. Traditionally, 
this has been periodized into three wars: the Second Macedonian War (200 BC - 194 
BC), the Syrian-Aetolian War (192 BC - 189 BC), and the Third Macedonian War (172 
BC - 168 BC). Alternatively, some have viewed this as a single, unified period of Roman 
expansion governed by one policy. 
 The results of this study point to a new way to interpret this period, organized 
around two different but related concepts: theater of war and Roman policy. During the 
period from 200 to 168 BC the Romans operated in three distinct theaters of war. In turn, 
the transitions from one theater of war to the next coincide with the development of three 
distinct phases of Roman policy towards Greece, though as we have seen in one case the 
policy developed in response to the change in theater, and in the other the change in 
policy preceded the shift in theater of war by nearly two years. 
 The first theater of war was Illyria and within it were fought the campaigns of 
200-198 BC, as dealt with in the first three chapters of this dissertation. The second 
theater of war, examined in Chapter 4, was Thessaly and remained so from the point 
when Flamininus crossed the Pindus into Thessaly in 198 BC all the way through the 
campaign in 170 BC. The third and final theater of war was Macedon, where the Romans 
fought during the 169 BC and 168 BC campaign seasons, as investigated in Chapter 5. 
 The three phases of Roman policy towards Greece and its surroundings can be 
defined in the following way.  The first Roman policy was to protect the Illyrian ports 
and gradually extend the buffer zone to the east while waging a concurrent naval war 
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against Macedon in the Aegean. This concern with securing the Illyrian ports under 
Roman protection and establishing and extending an inland buffer zone around them 
continued a Roman policy seen since 229 BC in this region during the First and Second 
Illyrian Wars. The addition of naval campaigns in the Corinthian Gulf and Aegean Sea 
came about with the period of the First Macedonian War. The aspect that made Roman 
policy in 200 BC and 199 BC distinct was the use of a two-legion consular army to wage 
a land campaign extending the buffer zone east and then establishing a garrison at a 
natural boundary at the end of the campaign to demarcate how far Roman control 
extended. Following Philip, in 199 BC Sulpicius campaigned further east than his final 
garrison at Pelium, but notably did not invade Macedon when the opportunity presented 
itself. The 198 BC campaign was probably planned to extend Roman control either to 
Lynchnidus on the eastern side of Lake Ohrid or to Heracleia in western Pelagonia, 
fitting locations for garrisons at the next natural geographical boundary east between 
Macedon and Illyria. However, Philip acted to pull Roman attentions to the Illyrian 
border with Epirus to the south.  
 The second phase in Roman policy was brought about through the actions of 
Flamininus after the Battle of the River Aous.  Flamininus crossed the Pindus into 
Thessaly, drawing the Romans into a new theater of war. As discussed at the end of 
Chapter 4, this was in no way inevitable and in fact was unexpected, as following in 
Sulpicius' footsteps would have made for a more direct route for invading Macedon or for 
continuing the policy of the two previous campaigns. This action on the part of 
Flamininus was not in line with Roman policy at the time he did it, however during the 
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winter of 198/197 BC, the senate voted for Flamininus to continue his war in Thessaly, 
sanctioning the new theater of war and signaling a new policy that would carry forward. 
 Rome did not already have extant economic or strategic concerns in Thessaly as 
they did on the Illyrian coast. No cities were already under Roman protection, no threats 
could be made on Roman trade, and thus Rome now chose to fight the Hellenistic 
kingdoms in the contested territory of Thessaly for control of Greece, and by proxy, 
Greek identity, the inheritance of Alexander the Great, and control of the Mediterranean 
world.  
 However, while Rome now fought to keep other powers from controlling 
Thessaly, Rome did not act to make Thessaly part of her own dominion. In 194 BC and 
then again in 190 BC, Rome pulled all troops out of Thessaly and Greece; there is a 
distinct difference between having influence from afar and maintaining armed garrisons. 
This second policy was focused on reducing the influence of each of the individual 
Hellenistic kingdoms, but then simply maintaining a balance of power in Greece and 
keeping any state from becoming too strong. The states Rome defeated were not 
eliminated but weakened and kept in place.  
 In 171 BC, Rome again returned to Greece and Thessaly, but this time with a new 
policy. Rome now for the first time planned to actually invade Macedon and permanently 
alter how it was administered. Rome spent two campaign years establishing their 
bridgehead in northeast Thessaly before mounting two successive similar campaigns and 
ultimately defeating the Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna. This third Roman policy 
looked towards future change in a way the other two had not - the previous two policies 
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had both acted to maintain some type of status quo in Greece, while this third policy 
looked to actively change it. 
 In Polybian terms, the first policy could have the prophasis that it was defensive 
and justified: protecting economic and strategic interests, and developing and then 
helping allies. There is basis here for a just war. The second policy could have a 
prophasis of first reducing the footholds of the Antigonid and Seleucid powers in Greece 
and then developing and helping allies. Rome is not acting defensively, but they are also 
not holding territory for themselves or acting to dismantle foreign powers. One could 
conceivably look to the divine honors given to Flamininus as an ex post facto moral 
defense of Rome's actions. The third policy, however, could only have a just prophasis 
on the basis of the perceived moral turpitude of Perseus and this could help explain his 
reputation as presented in our sources. Rome could not defend this invasion on other 
grounds. 
 My time spent traveling in Greece and seeing and studying the areas, landscapes, 
and locations discussed in this dissertation have taught me that autopsy is vitally 
important to the study of the ancient world.  I have been continually amazed by our 
ancient authors' grasp of Greek topography and repeatedly surprised to find that 
something I had thought to be a narrative device was in fact an actual feature of the 
landscape. 
 There can be a tendency among scholars to see ancient narratives as merely 
collections of intertextual references with no basis in reality, e.g. seeing every 
surrounding maneuver as simply a reference to Herodotus' account of Thermopylae. It is 
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important to remember, however, that ancient authors are frequently referring to actual 
events and the actual landscape in which they occurred. That similar events recur can be 
exploited by an adept historiographer for narrative goals, but does not mean that such 
events did not happen. 
 For instance, the Battle of Pydna could be looked at as containing elements of all 
the previous Roman events from Hannibal and being some kind of summation event, a 
kind of closure for this 'first stage' of Roman expansion that contains the previous events 
within it: At Pydna, a surrounding maneuver forced the enemy to move from their 
impregnable position as the Romans had done at the Aous in 198 BC, Thermopylae in 
191 BC, Vevi in 199 BC, Spain in 195 BC; At Pydna, the battle developed from a 
skirmish as at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC; the year before Pydna had the Romans lead a 
difficult crossing into enemy territory with such a train that it even involved elephants 
that did not lead to eventual victory because the enemy was able to stall them out like 
Hannibal's crossing to Italy in 218 BC; At Pydna the Romans changed the course of their 
history of warfare with the Macedonians by taking the war directly to the enemy's 
territory as the Romans had at Zama in 202 BC; the Battle of Pydna arose from 
skirmishes over a river as at Magnesia in 190 BC. 
 However, all the events of the Battle of Pydna align with the landscape in which it 
occurred and are all appropriate events for a major battle at this time. The historiographer 
could pick and choose elements from this to highlight to make what narrative points he 
wanted, but the events still happened. 
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 I have been blinded by Thessalian fog near Cynoscephalae, been guided through 
obscure regions by local shepherds, and been turned back from high mountain passes 
closed by rock fall. I have seen the hill that Philip doubled up his phalanx to avoid at 
Cynoscephalae, gotten lost following Cato's route at Thermopylae where he too got lost, 
stood amid the ruins of Macedonian fort systems, and met people in the Pindus 
mountains that still identify with their Athamanian forbears.  Traveling the routes and 
seeing the places described in the texts gets at the history buried inside the 
historiography.  
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Fig. 1.2 
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Fig. 1.3: The difference in water level of the Aous river in late fall (left) and summer 
(right). 
Fig. 1.4 
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Fig. 1.5 (above) 
Fig. 1.6 (left) 
314 	  
	  
 
	   	  
Fig. 1.7 
Fig. 2.1 
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Fig. 2.2 (above) 
Fig. 2.3 (left) 
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Fig. 2.4 (above) 
Fig. 2.5 (below) 
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Fig. 2.6 (left) 
Fig. 2.7 (below) 
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Fig. 2.8 (above) 
Fig. 2.9 (below) 
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Fig. 2.10 
Fig. 2.11 
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Fig. 3.1: Albania was designated as a ‘no-fly zone’ in this 1980 US Military map. 
Fig. 3.2 
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Fig. 3.3 (above) 
Fig. 3.4 (below): Antigonea Archaeological Park 
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Fig. 3.5 (above) 
Fig. 3.6 (left) 
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Fig. 3.7 (above); Fig. 3.8 (below) 
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Fig. 3.9 (above); Fig. 3.10 (below) 
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Fig. 3.11 (above) 
Fig. 3.12 (left) 
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Fig. 3.13 (above) 
Fig. 3.14 (below) 
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Fig. 3.15 (above) 
Fig. 3.16 (below): View from catapult emplacement at the southern side of the Neck.  
Philip’s camp is to the right, the route of the Roman approach to the left. 
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Fig. 3.17 (above): View from the Neck entering the valley, i.e. the view the Romans 
would have first had. 
Fig. 3.18 (below): SEG 40.524.  Image from Hatzopoulos 1996. 
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Fig. 3.19 (above) 
Fig. 3.20 (left) 
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Fig. 3.21 (above); Fig. 3.22 (below) 
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Fig. 3.23 (above); Fig. 3.24 (below) 
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Fig. 3.25 (above) 
Fig. 3.26 (below) 
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Fig. 3.27 (above) 
Fig. 3.28 (below) 
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Fig. 3.29 (above); Fig. 3.30 (below) 
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Fig. 3.31 (above): Paved Ottoman road on south bank (left); Terrace wall built to 
support the road (right); Fig. 3.32 (below) 
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Fig. 3.33 (above); Fig. 3.34 (below) 
337 	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fig. 3.35 (above) 
Fig. 3.36 (below): Looking west across the Drin at the fortress of Ali Pasha looming 
over the valley.  The Roman camp would have extended to the south. 
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Fig. 3.37 (above) 
Fig. 3.38 (below) 
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Fig. 3.39 (above); Fig. 3.40 (below) 
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Fig. 3.41 (above): Photo taken from remains of stone watchtower on southern side of 
the Neck. 
Fig. 3.42 (below) 
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Fig. 3.43 (above); Fig. 3.44 (below) 
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Fig. 3.45 (above); Fig. 3.46 (below) 
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Fig. 3.47 (above) 
Fig. 3.48 (below) 
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Fig. 3.49 (above); Fig. 3.50 (below) 
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Fig. 3.51 (above) 
Fig. 4.1 (below) 
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Fig. 4.2 (above); Fig. 4.3 (below) 
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Fig. 4.4 (above) 
Fig. 4.5 (left) 
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Fig. 4.6 (above) 
Fig. 4.7 (below) 
349 	  
	  
	   	  	  	  
	  
Fig. 4.8 (above); Fig. 4.9 (below) 
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Fig. 4.10 (above) 
Fig. 4.11 (left) 
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Fig. 4.12 (above) 
Fig. 4.13 (below) 
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Fig. 4.14 (above); Fig. 4.15 (below) 
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Fig. 4.16 (above): View of surrounding landscape from Eretria. 
Fig. 4.17 (below) 
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Fig. 4.18 (top left) 
Fig. 4.19 (bottom left) 
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Fig. 4.20 (above) 
Fig. 4.21 (left) 
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Fig. 4.22 (left) 
Fig. 4.23 (below) 
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Fig. 4.24 (above); Fig. 4.25 (below) 
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Fig. 4.26 (above); Fig. 4.27 (below) 
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Fig. 4.28 (above); Fig. 4.29 (below) 
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Fig. 4.30 (above); Fig. 4.31 (below) 
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Fig. 4.32 (above) 
Fig. 4.33 (below) 
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Fig. 4.34 (above) 
Fig. 4.35 (below) 
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Fig. 4.36 (above) 
Fig. 4.37 (below) 
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Fig. 4.38 (above) 
Fig. 4.39 (below) 
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Fig. 4.40 (above) 
Fig. 4.41 (below) 
366 	  
	  
	  	  
	  
Fig. 4.42 (left) 
Fig. 4.43 (below) 
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Fig. 4.44 (above) 
Fig. 4.45 (below) 
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Fig. 4.46 (above) 
Fig. 4.47 (below) 
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Fig. 4.48 (above); Fig. 4.49 (below) 
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Fig. 4.50 (above) 
Fig. 4.51 (below) 
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Fig. 4.52 (above) 
Fig. 4.53 (below) 
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Fig. 4.54 (above); Fig. 4.55 (below) 
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Fig. 4.56 (above); Fig. 4.57 (below) 
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Fig. 4.58 (above); Fig. 4.59 (below) 
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Fig. 4.60 (above); Fig. 4.61 (below) 
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Fig. 4.62 (above); Fig. 5.1 (below) 
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Fig. 5.2 (above); Fig. 5.3 (below) 
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Fig. 5.4 (above) 
Fig. 5.5 (below) 
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Fig. 5.6 (above) 
Fig. 5.7 (below) 
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Fig. 5.8 (above); Fig. 5.9 (below) 
381 	  
	  
	  	  
	  
Fig. 5.10 (above) 
Fig. 5.11 (below): Note: Macedonian camp is from later in the 169 BC campaign. 
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Fig. 5.12 (above) 
Fig. 5.13 (below) 
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Fig. 5.14 (above); Fig. 5.15 (below) 
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Fig. 5.16 (above) 
Fig. 5.17 (left) 
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Fig. 5.18 (above) 
Fig. 5.19 (left) 
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Fig. 5.20 (above); Fig. 5.21 (below) 
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Fig. 5.22 (left) 
Fig. 5.23 (below) 
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Fig. 5.24 (above) 
Fig. 5.25 (left) 
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Fig. 5.26 (above); Fig. 5.27 (below) 
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Fig. 5.28 (above) 
Fig. 5.29 (left) 
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Fig. 5.30 (above) 
Fig. 5.31 (left) 
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Fig. 5.32 (left) 
Fig. 5.33 (below) 
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Fig. 5.34 (above); Fig. 5.35 (below) 
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Fig. 5.36 (above) 
Fig. 5.37 (below) 
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